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This research examines the impact of public debt and financial instability on 
the economic growth of selected West African countries. The effect of public 
debt on an economy cannot be overemphasised. The amount of public debt that 
a country owes can either help in increasing the growth rates or it can result in 
situations that are detrimental to economic growth. Some scholars have argued 
that when public debt is not properly managed, it can be carried on to future 
generations by way of compound interest problems. Therefore, it is very 
important to know how the amount of debt country owes can affect economic 
activities. Financial stability on the other hand is an important aspect of the 
economy because most of the decisions taken by policy makers are centred 
around maintaining stability. This is because financial instability is 
disadvantageous to the economy. It results in a weakening of investment and 
economic activities; it leads to a rise in public debt and also affects economic 
growth in a negative way. The study carried out an extensive literature review 
on various school of thoughts on public debt and economic growth; it also 
identified sources of financial stability. A quantitative research approach was 
adopted for this study and the data was gotten from the World Development 
Indicators for a period starting from 1970 to 2015. The selected countries were 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Togo. The econometric model for this study was adapted from the theories of 
business cycle and the statistical tests used for estimation includes the unit root 
test, leg length criteria, ARDL bounds test, Johansen Cointegration tests, error 
correction models, granger causality tests, cumulative sum tests, and serial 
correlation tests. The results revealed that there is a long run relationship 
between public debt, financial stability and economic growth for the selected 
West African countries, and the granger causality results mostly indicated a 
unidirectional causality for the selected West African countries. The results 
suggested that that government spending is the most effective policy 
instrument in regulating the level of public debt and financial instability. Based 
on the econometric findings, this research recommends that fiscal policy is 
more effective in curtailing the effects of public debt and financial instability 
on the economic growth of the selected countries.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 1.1 OVERVIEW 
The relationship between public debt and economic growth has been of constant debate 
over the years as there have been several unrests on numerous occasions in various 
economies and at different periods. The unrests such as the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the Asian crisis of the 1990s, the global financial crisis and European debt crisis 
since 2007 are contributing factors to the relevance of this debate.  
 
Why is the study of public debt and economic growth so important? It is important 
because governments and Central Banks have a number of macroeconomic objectives 
to achieve such as a sustainable and rising economic growth, creating employment, 
attaining and maintaining price stability, as well as balance of payment equilibrium. 
However, since the ever-present issue of scarce and limited resources persists, there is 
the need to find alternative means to get resources to achieve these objectives. An 
alternative way to get these sought after resources is to borrow from either nationals 
(domestic sources) or foreigners (external sources). In as much as borrowing can help 
a country to achieve its set objectives, it can also be a deterrent to economic growth in 
some cases. Cecchetti et al. (2011) describes debt as a two-edged sword because it can 
improve welfare, but if it is not used creatively or if it is accumulated, it can be a 
tragedy because it weakens the provision of welfare to the citizens. 
 
Another reason why governments borrow is to contain external shocks such as oil price 
shock. If there was an unexpected oil price shock that resulted in an expansionary fiscal 
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policy, where the focus was to increase money supply through tax cut, the government 
would need to borrow large sums to close the fiscal gap or deficits. However, since 
expansionary fiscal policy leads to an increase in a government’s budget deficit, it 
causes a fear of default risk and raises interest rates. This rise in interest rate creates a 
crowding out of investment (because investors would rather invest abroad as it is 
cheaper and there is a lower default risk), resulting in decline in aggregate output and 
economic growth. In some instances, the rise in interest rate and capital flight can result 
in financial instability. This was the case for the Asian crisis (discussed in section 
3.4.2). Other reasons why government accumulate debt include accruing principals and 
interests, wasteful use of the loan, unfitting macroeconomic policies, wars and political 
uprising among other reasons.  
 
Furthermore, there has also been a growing alertness of the implications of financial 
instability on economic growth, particularly the channels by which a flawed or 
weakened financial sector can create or expand volatilities in the real economy. 
Financial activities and how they affect the real economy have developed more and 
more interest from policy makers since the repercussions of the global financial crisis 
of 2008. This has made Central Banks around the globe become keen on their 
involvement, including other financial intermediaries in promoting financial stability 
objectives. A rise in conflicting views about the causes of financial instability along 
with the appropriate policy response were also noticed (Chant, 2003).  
 
Financial stability was not always a goal of Central Banks. Early banks of the late 19th 
century such as the Riksbank of 1668 and the Bank of England of 1694 had different 
roles to those of modern banks. The Riksbank was founded as a government’s 
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commercial bank to take over from an unsuccessful private bank, whereas, the Bank 
of England was founded by the monarch to fund its expenditure. These banks were 
essentially founded to fund government expenditure. The Bank of England soon 
realised that its leading position meant that it had power over the system stability as 
compared to other commercial banks at that time. This seemed to have been the basis 
for the focus on uncontrolled financial pressures. Thus, the realisation prompted the 
rise of the new Central Banks of the early 20th Century. The establishment of the 
Federal Reserve in 1913 was a consequence of several financial instabilities in the 
United States of America (Chant, 2003).  
 
Financial instability can affect the workings of an economy in numerous ways. It can 
affect the financial institutions (such as banks and other financial intermediaries) so 
that they are unable to finance other aspects of the economy. It also affects nonfinancial 
entities (such as households, enterprises, and governments) to the point that access to 
finance by them becomes limited. It can start in a number of ways and it varies from 
country to country, year to year, or what portions of the financial system are affected 
and the impact of the instability (Chant, 2003). Some of ways by financial instabilities 
have been experienced includes bank failures and/or a sudden reduction in credit 
availability and trade, an exchange rate regime failure, and so on, which creates severe 
disruptions to the regular functioning of financial and monetary systems, and in so 
doing, hurts the productivity of an economy. Unfortunately, financial instabilities have 
occurred recurrently throughout history, and regardless of relentless efforts to eradicate 
them, it looks doubtful that they will not reappear in the future (Goldstein and Razin, 
2015).  
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It is against this backdrop that this research investigates the implications of public debt 
and financial instability on economic growth, while discussing various theoretical and 
empirical literatures on the subject matter. This chapter is the introductory chapter to 
the thesis. It provides the background of the study discussing the issues investigated 
and states the research questions. The aims and objectives of the study are also made 
known including the type of methodology used, giving a brief explanation on why it 
was chosen. Finally, the chapter also provides an outline of how this thesis was 
structured.  
 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
As earlier stated, there have been numerous debates among financial economists about 
the relationship between public debt and economic growth during the past few years. 
Becirovic et al. (2010) suggested why this is the case is because, both public debt and 
economic growth can be used to interpret a government’s finances. Since the gross 
domestic product (GDP) measures the government’s tax base, a decreasing debt to 
GDP ratio reflects low public debt and its capability to raise tax. This situation 
sometimes indicates that government has a good financial management. However, the 
reverse is the case for a rising debt to GDP ratio; meaning that the economy is faced 
with high public debt and its ability to raise tax revenue is very low. An economy faced 
with this situation cannot sustain itself for long and could end up in a debt crisis.  
 
Furthermore, if a government finances its debts by borrowing more, the debt problem 
would be carried on to future generations. The situation can also lead to a compound 
interest problem, which is a risk to a nation. Compound interest causes governments 
to get fresh loans to finance interest costs and repayment of loans, making deficit 
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financing an incessant activity. Since budget deficit is a cumulative value that increases 
public debt, the rise in public debt continually leads to growing costs for loan 
repayment and interest costs. For example, the total debt as a result of compound 
interest in Germany between 1950 and 1995 grew 177fold and the GDP between the 
same periods grew 33fold. During 1992, the government had to pay 317million 
Deutsche Mark per day as interest expenditure. Again in 2005, the German budget 
deficit was €74.3billion and the interest expenses was €64billion (Becirovic et al., 
2010). Similarly, Nigeria borrowed $5 billion in 1985 and as at year 2000, had paid 
about $16 billion in interest but still owed $28 billion as a result of compound interest 
up until 2006 where they were given debt relief. 
 
Therefore, to curb an unending rise in public debt, steps has to be taken to ensure that 
there is an exponential rise in economic growth, meaning that interest rate and growth 
rate of GDP has to be equal. It is difficult to achieve this because of scarce resources 
and level of market potential. As a result of this, during a recession, government 
interference results in more debt accrual, as government has to bail out the private 
sector, like the United States government did during the financial crisis of 2008 in an 
attempt to revive and sustain economic growth. Further leading to more debts and 
repayment defaults.  
 
Since a high level of debt cannot be prolonged for a certain duration because of its 
detriment to the economy, the government has to respond either by increasing taxes, 
reducing its spending or by raising inflation levels. Raising taxes is the first theoretical 
option for a country as a countermeasure for high debt levels. However, the 
disadvantage of this is that it can lead to capital flight as private businesses might not 
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want to invest anymore in the country. Furthermore, tax increases are only effective in 
countries with a high GDP growth. The second option of cutting expenditures cannot 
be avoided but the effect will be felt more by the poor and those on welfare. The third 
option is inflation. The government can ask the Central Bank to buy its bonds and 
therefore get new money in the process. This new money will in the long run result in 
inflation. While inflation is good for the debtor because it results in a fall of the real 
value of the debt, on the other hand, it can cause a fall in the total savings level due to 
higher price level and a high hoarding level as a result of a lower interest rate.  
 
Therefore, if the Central Bank wants financial institutions to attract additional savings, 
they would have to raise the real interest rate which would now cause a redistribution 
of wealth from lower-income groups to high-income groups. All three options with the 
exclusion of tax increase would be beneficial to the rich. Therefore, in the long run, 
wealth will be concentrated in the hands of a few (Becirovic et al., 2010). 
 
In a situation whereby, there is an external shock to the economy, the higher the debt 
level of a country, the more difficult repayment will be. The shock might be a minor 
one, but high indebted countries would be affected and no longer be seen as credible 
or trustworthy. Hence, when creditors refuse to lend because of the aforementioned 
circumstance, consumption and investment drops. In essence, the greater the debt level 
of a country during an external shock, the higher the effect of that shock to the 
economy.  
 
Furthermore, the greater the negative effect of shocks to economic activities, the more 
the likelihood of debtors not repaying their debt. This is because high level of public 
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debts increases interest rate and inflation levels, leading to financial instability and 
finally, decreasing the rate of economic growth. Therefore, the level of public debt can 
be the difference between having a stable economy with low inflation, rising economic 
growth, financial stability and an unstable economy with a high rate of volatility, a 
high rate of inflation and financial instability. 
 
Experience has shown that high debt rate or rising debt is a problem or should be of 
concern to the economy. This can be justified with the recent financial crisis of 2008 
that began with the housing market burst in the United States. The severity of the global 
financial crisis of 2008 put some financial strains on public finances across the globe. 
Generally, there were huge deficits and rise in public debt as growth declined in many 
countries. The European Area was also highly prone to the crisis which led to financial 
instability and reduction in GDP during that period. In 2010, the Eurozone was faced 
with a serious sovereign debt crisis and some states in this zone amassed an 
unmaintainable rate of government debt as three countries Greece, Ireland and Portugal 
had to get loans from other neighbouring countries and the IMF to prevent non-
payment of their debt with this crisis later expanding to Italy and Spain (Nelson et al., 
2011; Gorea and Radev, 2014). As estimated by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 2012, the level of public debt as a ratio of GDP for developed countries rose 
from 75% to 100% in 2011 and this level had not been seen since World War II (Cherif 
and Hasanov, 2012).  
 
Public debt is also seen as one of the tools used for deficit financing for bridging 
financial gaps that have occurred in the economy. The economy is affected by public 
debt through the connection between fiscal deficits and investments. This is because a 
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large fiscal deficit leads to an increase in government borrowing. Consequently, it 
limits and causes a restriction in capital resources, that in turn raises the cost of capital 
and hence interest rate. During a boom, financial institutions are highly vulnerable to 
the government policies, because government bonds have a low default risk. However, 
during a recession, the reverse is the case and it becomes difficult to maintain 
government assets, subsequently leading to unfavourable growths in both real and 
financial sectors. 
 
1.3  RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEBT AND GROWTH 
There has not been a definitive answer to the relationship between debt and growth. 
Findings of various researchers seem to differ from each other, for instance, Reinhart 
and Rogoff (2010) suggested in their study that debt affects growth within a certain 
threshold. They contended that countries with debt over 90% of GDP would observe 
positive effects than the countries whose debt to GDP ratio falls below that threshold. 
This was challenged by other researchers such as Herndon et al. (2013) who argued 
that the positive effect fades away when it is adjusted for a coding error and a different 
set of data was employed. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) also established 
that the consequence of public debt on growth is nonlinear, when they used twelve 
European countries as the sample size. Checherita-Westphal and Rother (2012) 
concluded that public debt is associated with lower growth rate of GDP and a debt to 
GDP ratio of about 90%-100%. However, another investigation by Baum et al. (2013) 
on the relationship between debt and economic growth, with twelve European 
countries as the case study from 1990 – 2010, revealed that the short-run consequence 
of debt on economic growth is positive.  
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On the other hand, Panizza and Presbitero (2012) suggested that there is no association 
between debt and growth, when debt was estimated using a variable that takes into 
account the linkages between foreign currency debt and exchange rate volatility. 
However, in a more recent study, Teles and Mussolini (2014) used endogenous growth 
model to test the relationship and concluded that debt has an impact on growth, and 
that impact is not only nonlinear, but it also depends on the magnitude of the debt. 
Lesser amount of debt results in increase in growth level while a greater debt amount 
leads results in the opposite because of the absence of decreasing marginal return for 
aggregate capital in endogenous growth models, causing a significant increase in 
governments’ expenditure for servicing debts.  
 
Although there has been numerous researches that have been undertaken on the 
relationship between public debt and economic growth, there hasn’t being a solid 
conclusion on the effect of public debt on economic growth. Therefore, this research 
contributes to the ongoing discussion by testing certain variables, based on the theory 
of business cycles (discussed in chapter four).  
 
1.4  FINANCIAL INSTABILITY AND GROWTH 
The link between macroeconomic policies and the financial market is an important 
relationship to explore as it gives an understanding of the relationship between 
government activities and financial stability. One of the factors that can determine 
economic growth is the financial system. The institutional structure and efficiency of 
financial systems are vital determinants of economic growth (Prochniak and Wasiak, 
2017).   
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Financial stability denotes the functional capability of financial institutions and sectors 
that constitutes the financial system. Financial instability on the other hand is a 
situation whereby the economic proficiency of financial institutions has been affected 
by volatilities of assets prices or the inability of financial intermediaries to carry out 
their contractual obligations (Crockett, 1997). Financial stability on a general note can 
be said to be a state at which financial markets are stable.  In other words, it reflects 
low level of volatility in some economic and financial indicators such as bond spreads, 
price level, interest rate, money supply, private sector credit, exchange rate, stock 
prices, etc. (Das et al., 2010). It can also be seen as the nonexistence of financial crisis 
and the intrinsic capacity of the economy or financial market to prevent, insulate and 
tackle any imbalance that can threaten the system.  
 
Financial stability is an important aspect of an economy, because the decisions policy 
makers take on a daily basis are centred on maintaining stability. It provides the 
framework or the system for allocating resources through time, therefore improving 
aggregate savings and investment.  Without financial stability and public debt, 
economies are poor and will remain poor. But with the ability to borrow and save, 
consumption can exist even in the absence of current income. Similarly, with the 
ability to borrow, firms can invest even when their revenues are not sufficient to 
reinvest. However, when the debt ratio rises above a certain level, financial crisis is 
likely to occur and could be severe (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009). 
 
According to Chant (2003), financial stability is advanced by situations where 
investors experience really reduced levels of financial uncertainties. Occurrences in 
the 1970s and 1980s in developed countries indicated that high inflation levels resulted 
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in greater unpredictability in inflation levels, consequently producing larger volatilities 
in the rates of interest and several economic conditions. Therefore, financial 
institutions and investors reacted by reducing the maturity dates of their financial 
obligations, including other regulations, so as to forestall unfavourable market 
conditions in the face of rising volatilities. The search for low and steady inflation rates 
can decrease the level of uncertainties for stakeholders of financial institutions. In the 
long run, the objectives of financial stability, as well as low and stable inflation rates 
seem to be compatible and jointly beneficial to the economy.  
 
Financial instability, on the other hand, can hinder economic activities and affect 
economic well-being of a country. When financial markets cannot operate in normal 
and stable economic condition or portions of financial activities are strained, the 
consequent impact on businesses and households could have serious damages on the 
real economy as funds might be restricted or stopped from circulating into areas of 
worthwhile investments, and a recession may occur (Nelson and Perli, 2005).  
 
Changes in asset prices and interest rate occur on a daily basis and so does the 
conditions of businesses and the financial market. However, these changes do not 
necessarily constitute financial instability. What constitutes financial instability is the 
degree by which these shocks or changes impact the capability of a country to produce 
goods and services. Therefore, the severity of the constant fluctuations of asset prices 
and interest rates can be used in the differentiation between usual fluctuations of 
financial markets and fluctuations that lead to instability. An intense and continued 
swings in asset values and interest rates have severe consequences because they impair 
the efficiency of financial systems by hampering their capacity to allocate funds 
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competently from creditors to debtors. It also affects the ability of financial systems to 
handle risks successfully or to offer the payments for services. These activities are 
important for a strong economy (Chant, 2003). Furthermore, the danger of financial 
instability can result in defensive policy responses that can deter the effectiveness of 
the financial system and economic growth. 
 
Bleger (2006) is also of the opinion that financial instability can also be caused by an 
increase in market volatilities. Volatility might be a reflection of a rise in risk taking 
and a better flow of information and could in reality be positively correlated to 
economic growth. This volatility usually arises when the stock price changes is a 
reflection of the frequent new information that is available to the market. Simply put, 
in an efficient financial market, the prices reflect new information, and the practice of 
prices incorporating new information causes volatility.  
 
This situation can be viewed as improving economic growth because when prices 
incorporate new information and investors are aware of these changes, they can take 
healthier economic decisions. Conversely, volatility can turn out to be very high. This 
happens when the investors’ response to new information largely affects price 
fluctuations. In an imperfect market where there is asymmetry information, a lot of 
financial market stakeholders would not be able to indemnify against these fluctuations 
at a reasonable price. A high rate of volatility and lack of indemnity can create colossal 
effects on the economy, thereby causing a crisis, which in turn causes economic growth 
to plummet.  
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Instability in financial markets also causes negative repercussions for public finances. 
It disrupts government activities because they need to respond to instabilities in order 
to sustain economic activities. The response can have either a direct fiscal cost or an 
indirect fiscal cost. The direct fiscal cost calls for fiscal policy action, where the 
government intervenes either through buying toxic assets, subsidies, or paying out 
creditors like the United States government did during the bail out in 2008 and 2009.  
This action can later result in a rise in public debt levels showing up as a rise in stock 
flow adjustments or increased deficit. It was reported by the European Central Bank 
that throughout years 2003-2007, the stock-flow adjustment of the euro area was an 
average of 0.3% of GDP but because of the global financial crisis and various forms 
of interventions by different countries, it had risen to 3.2% by 2008 (Tagkalakis, 2014). 
The indirect fiscal cost is a result of effects of instability to economic activities. They 
can be low income because of reduced profits and asset prices, increased government 
spending (financed by borrowing) in attempts to offset the effect of the crisis, along 
with interest and exchange rate reactions to the state of the financial market.  
 
According to Chant (2003) financial instability is not an inflexible condition, as it can 
take different forms and has an impact on economic performance. It can either be in a 
crisis form or a shock form. A financial crisis is a severe form of financial instability 
because the burdens on financial markets are so intense that it can affect its 
performance for a longer period. It results in the misallocation and mismanagement of 
economic resources, causing a fall in economic growth (Lai, 2003). However, financial 
markets can be prone to pressure long before a crisis occurs. While financial instability 
affects economic growth directly, its impact on the long-run economic growth can be 
a cause for alarm. We can see this trend in the way by which the financial crisis that 
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begun in the United States in 2008 metamorphosed after a while into a global crisis 
affecting several regions like the Eurozone in 2010 and which still remains felt in some 
developing countries today.  
 
Financial shocks often raise financial stress levels in an economy. An unexpected fall 
in value of assets or stock prices can negatively impact the financial situations of 
households, governments, banks and other financial intermediaries. This situation 
tends to result in an increase in interest rates as investors search for better rewards 
because of their perceived higher risk (Chant, 2003). High interest rates stemming from 
financial pressure could impair the short-run success of firms and affect the household 
welfare and governments by raising their costs of debt. An important attribute of 
financial instability is lack of confidence by investors. It manifests in the economy by 
way of capital flight, affecting the liquidity of lenders and financial institutions, thus 
causing a fall in output. The capital inflow to the five countries involved in the Asian 
Crisis fell from $93billion dollars in 1996 to $12.1billion in 1997, representing 11% 
of GDP of those countries (Lai, 2003) 
 
Chant (2003) also suggested that an instant impact of financial instability arises from 
the failure of financial markets’ capacity to carry out their functions. This situation can 
result in bad loans or cause financial institutions to reduce access to credit for new 
borrowers. They can also limit credit to their current borrowers or give them credit at 
higher interest rates or require higher collateral to mirror their awareness of higher 
risks. Some of this impact will occur in the local financial market where the instability 
started. However, there might be a contagion effect where the impact spreads 
elsewhere, affecting the real economy and ability of the government to carry out its 
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obligations. For instance, the impact of a collapse in foreign exchange payments may 
cause payment difficulties in a domestic payments system. Subsequently, any 
consequential decline of financial market conditions may perhaps hinder their ability 
to finance business activities continually. In extreme cases, financial instability can 
cause economic meltdowns where the financial systems all together collapse, halting 
economic activities and deterring economic growth.  
 
Therefore, this research discussed the channels by which financial instability affects 
economic growth for the case of West Africa. This is because instability undermines a 
country’s capacity to perform which depends on an effective countercyclical monetary 
and financial strategy. Investors in the financial market continuously re-examine the 
risks of volatilities in the financial sector as this could restrict lending activities, 
because investors are aware of the cost of borrowing (Das et al., 2010).  
 
1.5 RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
i. What is the nature of relationship between public debt, financial instability and 
economic growth in West African countries and what factors can be used to 
determine this relationship? 
ii. Do monetary and fiscal policy instruments have the same impact in addressing 
financial instability in the West African countries? 
  
1.6 RESEARCH AIM AND OBJECTIVES 
The overall aim of this research is to evaluate the impact of public debt and financial 
instability on economic growth of West African countries. 
 
In order to attain the aim of the study, I will begin with various literature reviews on  
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i. Various schools of thoughts on the relationship between debt, financial 
instability and economic growth; 
ii. An in-depth discussion on how financial instability has affected public debt 
and economic growth around the world throughout the years; and 
iii. Establish different channels on how debt affects economic growth. 
iv. Establish sources of financial instability 
v. Discuss in detail the impact of public debt and financial instability on economic 
growth of selected West African countries 
I will also be carrying out some empirical reviews by  
i. Testing econometric models on financial instability, public debt and economic 
growth;  
ii. Analysing the results and making conclusions and recommendations. 
 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
This research adopts a quantitative research method, using secondary data from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators was used. The reason for choosing a 
quantitative research method compared to a qualitative method is because, the study is 
trying to determine the effect of public debt and financial instability on economic 
growth. Those three key concepts can be quantified, and data is readily available to 
reflect those concepts. Also, since the study of the effects of public debt and financial 
instability on economic growth is not a new concept, the variables chosen are a pre-
specified concept using the theories of financial instabilities as our framework which 
can only be carried out using a quantitative approach.  
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1.8 RESEARCH STRUCTURE 
The study has 8 chapters. Chapter one is the introductory chapter containing the 
background of the study, the research questions and objectives of the study, and the 
methodology. Chapter two is the literature review on public debt and economic growth. 
In this chapter various themes were discussed such as school of thoughts on economic 
growth and the channels by which public debt affects the economy. Chapter three 
discussed literature reviews on financial instability. Sources of financial instability 
were discussed, as well as major financial instabilities that have plagued the world. 
Chapter four focused on the political economy, impact of financial instability on 
selected West African countries and the policy response. Chapter five discussed the 
theoretical framework of the study – Business cycle theories, and the conceptual 
framework of the study. Chapter six is the methodology and research plan chapter 
where the research approach was discussed, the tests conducted, as well as the 
statement of hypothesis. Chapter seven focused on the interpretation of empirical 
analysis and chapter eight presents the summary of the thesis and policy 
recommendations. 
 
1.9 CONCLUSION 
This chapter gave a synopsis of the direction of the thesis.  It provided the background 
of the study where the relevance of the topic was discussed. The discussions on the 
relationship between economic growth and public debts were highlighted, and the 
rationale for studying that phenomena was explained. Furthermore, financial 
instability and how it affects economic growth was also introduced. The chapter also 
stated the research questions and the steps taken to answer them in the aims and 
objectives. The methodology used in analysis was briefly touched upon and the 
structure of the thesis was discussed.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON PUBLIC DEBT AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This literature review chapter was created in order to establish a theoretical foundation 
of public debt. It examined and recognised the backgrounds of public debt and how it 
affects economic growth and financial instability. Furthermore, in conjunction with the 
research objectives, this chapter discussed various schools of economic thoughts on 
public debt such as classical and Keynesian schools of thoughts. The classical 
economic thoughts reviewed were from scholars such as David Hume, Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, J.S. Mills and Thomas Malthus. While the Keynesian economic 
thoughts reviewed were from scholars such as J.M. Keynes and Franco Modigliani. 
Also discussed were the channels by which public debt impacts the economy. 
 
2.2 REVIEW OF VARIOUS ECONOMIC THOUGHTS ON DEBT AND 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 
There have been various literatures on public debt by different scholars over the years. 
Each scholar saw public debt in a different context. A broad definition of public debt 
is that it is the total amount owed by the government of a country either to its citizens 
or foreign creditors. In other words, it is the amount a government (either central or 
other tiers) borrows from sources outside itself to carry out various projects. It can also 
be seen as what government incurs when its spending is greater than its revenue. The 
sources government borrow from include individuals, firms or from other countries. 
However, different scholars specify what public debt they are discussing in their 
literatures. Some of the popular forms of debts discussed are: 
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- Internal Debt: This is the total amount of money borrowed from the citizens or 
residents by the government.  
- External Debt: This refers to the total amount of debt owed to non-residents of 
a country. In other words, it is the unpaid amount consisting of principal and 
interest rate which a government owes to foreigners.  
- Sovereign Debt or National Debt: This is the total amount of debt owed by the 
government to both residents and non-residents of a country. 
 
It is important to note that when we talk about public debt in this study, we refer to the 
national or sovereign debt. 
 
2.2.1 Classical Economic Thoughts on Public Debt 
The classical school of economic thought refers to the works by scholars in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Thomas 
Malthus, John Stuart Mill among others. Their major assumption and primary principle 
is that the economy will always regulate itself towards equilibrium without 
government intervention. The classical school was also of the opinion that a high rate 
of debt is caused by excessive government spending on unprofitable activities, and can 
lead to crowding out of private savings, which reduces investment and output. This is 
because total savings is assumed to be consistent with total investment; therefore, as 
public debt hinders savings, it hinders investment as well.  
 
As aforementioned, one of the main assumptions is that the economy is in full 
employment. Therefore, any form of public debt by the government means that they 
are diverting scarce resources from the private to public sector of the economy. 
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Another underlying assumption was that there was no significant difference between 
public debt (state or national debt) and private debts because both are for balancing the 
flow of income and expenses over a period of time. Early classical writings were 
influenced by huge public debt that Britain suffered in the late 17th century. This 
stemmed out of the parliament taking over the control of taxes for debt services, which 
at that time was a private credit to the monarch. This action made it easy for the 
government to borrow money and raise money because of public confidence in the 
government compared to lending money to a king.   
 
An early classical economist who was not a supporter of public debt was David Hume. 
He was of the opinion that creating public debt results in bonds that act as a substitute 
for money, in as much as they are easily negotiable and without default risk, it raises 
the liquidness of trade. Hume was of the opinion that at some point, a continuous rise 
in public debt will gradually raise the present taxes and it will result in creation of 
further burdensome taxes. This ultimately will create default that can destroy 
bondholders in favour of normal populace. Those who decide on the default would 
desire for it to be advantageous to the bondholders instead of the general public. It will 
finally result in either the state destroying public debt or public debt extinguishing the 
state (Theocarakis, 2014).  
 
Adam Smith, who is regarded as the father of classical economics was also not in 
favour of government intervention in allocation of resources. He opined that when a 
government borrow funds from private investors, they are denied the capital required 
for promoting manufacturing and trade. He frowned at the “wasteful” nature of 
governments. He suggested that government ought not to have budget deficits because 
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it contributes to a rise in public debt and a decline in economic growth, even if the debt 
is owed locally.  
 
This idea was formed on the belief that governments can easily borrow money and 
transfer burden to later generations. Also, the inconvenience of levying new tax can 
ultimately lead to currency devaluation (Theocarakis, 2014). Therefore, if government 
wants to repay the debt, they will increase taxes, which will have a harmful effect on 
local investment and cause an increase in capital flight, and consequently, exchange 
rate problems. The reason for this ‘ripple effect’ is because taxes reduce household 
spending and can sometimes reduce savings. Since the amount saved is in turn the 
amount available for investment, a reduction in savings would mean a reduction in the 
amount available for investment. Therefore, the amount of public debt owed by the 
government causes a decrease in investment by an equal amount, since savings equals 
investment under the classical school of thought.  
 
Furthermore, Adam Smith is of the opinion that government should always have a 
balanced budget except in times of crisis; it is only in war situations that government 
can operate a budget deficit and accrue debt and should be financed either with tax or 
loans. The Institute of Economics and Peace (IEP) (2011) reports that both World War 
II and the Korean War were financed by loans and taxes respectively by the United 
States government. According to them, the public debt was over 120% of GDP during 
World War II and tax revenue rose more than three times to over 20% of GDP during 
the Korean War. The rise in tax revenue was an average of 5.8% between 1950 and 
1953 with its peak at 1951 with an 11.4% increase. 
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The disadvantage of using taxes to fund budget deficit according to Smith is that a 
portion of taxes is made up of capital. This stems from the fact that the two main 
sources of national income (land and capital) according to Smith will be burdened by 
a high rate of tax so as to enable them to service the debt. Therefore, productive capital 
will be withheld from the investors who could have used it efficiently and transferred 
to the government. Since the main intention of the government is not productivity, 
economic activities such as trade, agriculture and hence manufacturing would decline 
(Holtfrerich, 2013). However, with loans, the lender is not burdened since he can loan 
his capital while holding liquid assets. Smith also believed that the easiness of 
government borrowing and the transference of burden to future generations joined with 
the inconvenience of levying new taxes can ultimately result in economic crisis and 
failure to service the debt. This could further lead to devaluation of currency or to 
bankruptcy. 
 
David Ricardo was another classical scholar that got into the discussion of public debt. 
He agrees with Adam Smith on the notion that government spending on unproductive 
activities causes a rise in public debt and hinders economic growth. This is because of 
his opinion that national debt is dangerous because it causes disequilibrium in the price 
of goods and services. He believed that government borrowing is mostly used for 
unproductive activities, instead of the money been used in promoting production and 
employment. Furthermore, he opined that government should only borrow in cases of 
emergencies such as war and that war can be financed in three ways; either through 
taxes, loan with an annual interest rate or loan to be repaid at a specified time. Ricardo 
argues that the burden of public debt is derived from the reduction in the initial capital 
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accumulation and the burden of debt is borne by the generation that incurred it (Wood, 
1994).  
 
However, his dislike for public debt was more obvious than Adam Smith. He 
advocated that wars should be financed completely by taxes and appealed for an 
overall repayment of public debt by a one-time taxation on the state’s property 
(Holtfrerich, 2013). Ricardo was also of the opinion that government should limit 
public spending. According to him, in some situations, there is no difference in 
outcome when government spending is financed through debt or taxes. If the 
government opts for taxes for the purpose of funding expenditure, then the masses will 
constantly get loans for the corresponding amount taxed. He was convinced that 
although there is no distinction in principle, he did not encourage public debt because 
it causes people to be less prudent and prevents people from seeing the true situation.  
 
David Ricardo identified three means for which a supposed expenditure of £20million 
for war purposes could be funded. Firstly, direct financing by taxes; secondly, 
borrowing without paying the principal on a yearly basis of one million in interest, 
(proposing a 5% interest rate); and thirdly, creating a fund where additional revenues 
are paid, and the amounts received compounded until it reaches the £20million that 
will repay the principal. He claimed there is a “public debt illusion”, when individuals 
believe that it is not burdensome to pay tax to fulfil terms surrounding debts in 
perpetuity than to repay the full expenditure in a single payment. He is also of the 
belief that capitalists will move their monies overseas if they are to remain in a country 
that will maintain taxing them to repay the public debt interest. He therefore advised 
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that it is better to pay in time of peace all the debt that was accumulated for war 
financing (Theocarakis, 2014). 
 
John Stuart Mill on the other hand believed that a high public debt can be advantageous 
to a country in three forms. The first is, if a country uses excess foreign savings as the 
source of its financing; secondly, if government borrowing causes savings; and thirdly, 
if government borrowing controls local savings that would have been invested 
wastefully or invested in foreign countries (Tsoulfidis, 2011).  
 
A rise in the interest rate is a way to ascertain if borrowing was gotten from foreign or 
unproductive capital. If the interest rate stays unchanged, it means that borrowing has 
no harmful effect (Theocarakis, 2014). Otherwise, public debt and private capital are 
in competition, interest rate rise, and workers pay the cost. In cases of unsettlement or 
crisis where the government needs to borrow, there might be a rise in interest rate at 
that point and this increase is an indication that the government is in competition with 
the private sector for finances that were to be invested in profitable ventures. But then 
again, the government with all its power is diverting these resources to its unprofitable 
activities. 
 
Mill also agrees with Adam Smith and David Ricardo that public debt causes a 
negative effect on capital that could have been used for productive activities and that 
it is important to pay-off debt straightway by a general contribution or through regular 
payments from surplus revenue. According to him, when capital is removed or taken 
from production or from the fund intended for production and lent to the government, 
and spent wastefully, it means that the fund is denied to the labouring class. Thus, the 
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loan is indeed repaid in the same year and the cost required for repaying it is really 
made, just to the wrong individuals. Furthermore, even if the government does all it 
can to fully repay the debt, it still bears the cost and the repayment of its interest in 
perpetuity. 
 
Another classical scholar was Thomas Robert Malthus whose primary concern was on 
sufficient food production and the growing population. He agreed with the 
unproductive arguments of Adam Smith and David Ricardo because he felt that high 
public debt would lead to a high rate of taxation to service said debt, thereby affecting 
food production (Holtfrerich, 2013). He believes that unproductive workers such as 
soldiers and sailors contribute to full employment. He explains that even though they 
survive on taxes without them producing, they create the necessary consumption for 
the economy to attain full employment. He condemns public debt because he believed 
that it is dangerous for economic growth.  
 
2.2.2 Criticism of the Classical Economic Thoughts on Public Debt 
The basic ideology of the classicalists that a high public debt leads to decline in 
economic growth still holds in this era of the 21st century where the European debt 
crisis that started in late 2009 is an example. The crisis emanated as a result of the 
global financial crisis and the inability of countries in the Eurozone such as Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Cyprus to repay or refinance their government debt and 
the inability of the countries to bail out their over indebted financial institutions.  
 
However, it is important to mention some of the flaws in their ideologies and works 
such as; at the time of the publications of Adam Smith, David Ricardo, J. S. Mills, 
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David Hume and Malthus which was between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, there were no empirical methods of calculating the debt to growth ratio, as the 
debt/GDP ratio was a concept that emerged in the 20th Century. Also, during that 
period, there were no intergovernmental organizations like the World Bank, 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the European Union (EU). International 
borrowings were between two countries agreeing to an interest rate and due date for 
the principal amount to be repaid. Therefore, it was necessary that the scope of 
government of the 21st century be enlarged to include intergovernmental 
organizations1 as problems or situations in member states become the responsibilities 
of group as a whole. For instance, the European Union acts a governing body over its 
member states and any economic situation that affects one of them, affects all.  
 
Intergovernmental organizations, like any form of government under the classicalist 
school of thought, are likely to cause disruptions in economic activities. For instance, 
in Greece, after the financial crisis affected its budget, the national government 
received billions of Euros as bail out money in 2010 from the EU and International 
Monetary Fund and the prerequisite was that Greece implemented spending cuts and 
increased taxes, which later added to raising unemployment and falling standard of 
living. If Greece was not part of the European Union or were not using the Euro, it 
might have been able to improve its economy by printing more of its currency or 
devaluating its currency so that their exports could increase. Also, it could have been 
able to lower its interest rates, thereby boosting internal investment, so that debtors 
could service their debts easily. But since it was obligated to share monetary policy 
	1	International organizations are organizations composed primarily of sovereign nations called 
member states coming together as a group under a treaty to carry out projects in common interest such 
as the European Union, World Bank, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, etc. 
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with the other members of the EU, it was unable to do so and might continue to need 
bail out money from intergovernmental organizations in the future.  
 
During the crisis period in 2008, the fiscal condition of Eurozone got worse, because 
the vast majority of euro zone members did not take advantage of reducing their 
government deficit and debt and did not create opportunities for automatic stabilizers 
to freely operate. Note that governments are the biggest lender in the domestic 
economy and financial system issuing bonds in domestic currency with a safe interest 
rate. This is in contrast to classical economic assumption that government borrowing 
leads to removal of money or funds from the productive private sector to the 
unproductive. In recent times, the government has helped bail private sectors from 
unproductive activities that has affected the economy. For instance, the U.S. 
government had to bail out some of the insurance giants such as the American 
International Group (AIG), while the U.K. government bailed out Northern Rock in 
the wake of the global financial crisis. Government must have a clear future-oriented 
program including budget plans for a few years into the future. The decisions should 
be clear and fiscal policy expansion and contraction should be monitored (Bikas and 
Zaltauskaite, 2014).  
Additionally, “war” was the only acceptable scenario where public debt was 
encouraged by the classical economists. However, it is not the only form of crisis or 
the only reason why governments have borrowed in recent years. There are other 
reasons for government borrowing such as for investing in public sector development 
or capital expenditures, providing bail out for financial institutions, or because of a 
decrease in tax revenue. The recent global financial crisis of 2008 or the eurozone crisis 
from 2010 were not as a result of war but as a result of greed on the part of financial 
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institutions in the United States of America, which was made possible by their 
monetary policy.  
As stated earlier, the classical economists were not in support of the government 
intervention in the economy except in times of crisis. Therefore, in cases such as the 
global financial crisis, the solution provided by Adam Smith would have been that the 
government could borrow but that this should be financed by taxes; and Ricardo’s 
would have been to borrow a huge sum at once which would technically increase debt. 
However, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) claimed that the global financial 
crisis of 2008 was worsened by taxation policies, which drove the credit boom before 
the downturn.  
2.2.3 Keynesian Economic Thoughts on Public Debt 
Unlike the classical economists’ assumption that the economy is always at full 
employment level or self-adjusting towards full employment, the Keynesians argue 
that such economy may result in underemployment equilibrium. Underemployment 
equilibrium refers to a situation whereby there are resources that may be unemployed 
by the private sector for a length of time in the absence of corrective actions by 
government (Gupta, 2007). Therefore, Keynesians argue that government allocation of 
resources does not rob the private sector of anything but rather raise aggregate 
production and income by making use of those untouched resources.  
 
John Maynard Keynes, commonly referred to as the father of Keynesian economics, 
proposed that during recession, government should prevent using taxes. He suggested 
that government should rather borrow (as a source of finance) and it should pay back 
debt in periods when the economy is in a better shape with a budget surplus. Then 
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government needs to motivate activities in the economy by directly or indirectly 
purchasing goods and services.  
 
The reason why this action is necessary is because expectations in periods of economic 
downturn are low or worse, and so, governments do not increase taxes as it sends bad 
signals to stakeholders. Instead, they use loans from the capital market or Central Bank 
to take care of its budget deficit. Budget surplus can be achieved either by cutting 
expenditures or raising its tax revenue. This rise in tax revenue could be achieved by 
raising tax rates or a notable increase of GDP at current tax rates (Becirovic et al., 
2010). Keynes also opined that for a government to reduce its spending in the budget, 
there are automatic stabilizers that can adapt to the economic situation.  
 
The alternative to increasing tax is reducing costs or spending. For every budget, there 
are automatic stabilizers that aid in the dampening of fluctuations in the real GDP such 
as personal taxes and welfares. For instance, if the economy is facing a depression, 
unemployment welfare increases, whereas they reduce during an economic upsurge. 
Sometimes, the government can face challenges when trying to intervene in the 
economy. These challenges could come in the form of costs of projects. A project may 
involve large capital and/or may need political backing before it can be undertaken. 
The period of time before it gets the backing may take a lot of time or the completion 
date could be long term. While steps to carry out this project are still ongoing, the 
economic situations can change rapidly, so the extra public demand for money and 
resources can create crowding out or inflation because the aggregate demand is higher 
than aggregated supply, but these expenses cannot be ‘evaporated’ until the project is 
completed.  
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In addition to the challenges that governments face with spending cuts, there is also an 
issue with cutting subsidies and cancelling projects for political reasons. Such reasons 
can stem from bargaining power of pressure groups such as labour unions, with the 
inability to cut expenditure resulting in growth of debts.   
 
Keynes also opined that the magnitude of public debt does not matter and the size of 
the interest to be paid does not form any burden on society. According to him, an 
increase in public debt means that the government can access savings and make 
productive use of the funds raised with the aim of raising the national income or 
economic growth. In periods of unemployment, a rise in public debt adds to the capital 
formation, as it helps the development of sources of savings institutions such as banks, 
financial markets, etc.  
 
An important contributor to the Keynesian school is Franco Modigliani. He believed 
that an increase in debt is beneficial to those present at the time of increase. This 
increase will place a burden on the future generation because of the decrease in the 
stock of private capital. Also, that the burden of public debt can be narrowed as long 
as the rise in debt is followed by a rise in public expenditure which adds to the real 
income of future generations.  
 
Modigliani argued that irrespective of how a government finances its public debt, the 
amount of the current resources remains the same. However, the choice of financing 
may adjust the allocation of resources to private investors, therefore, consumption and 
investment will be largely affected.  
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In closing, Keynesians do not conclude if public debt has a negative or positive impact 
on economic growth because it depends on the economic state. Therefore, there is no 
general recommendation to policy makers. Thus, they need to identify the state of their 
economy and take appropriate measures (Tesic, et al., 2014).  
 
2.2.4  Criticism of The Keynesian Economic Thought on Public Debt 
Keynes contrary to classical economics emphasised government intervention and 
borrowing instead of levying taxes. As mentioned earlier, he argued that when an 
economy is in a recession, government should avoid the use of taxes but should rather 
borrow to fund its spending and then should back when the economy is in a better 
shape with a budget surplus. The main criticism of this suggestion is that high rate of 
borrowing can lead to crowding out of investment. This is because increased level of 
borrowing causes the cost of borrowing (interest rate) to increase and investors, and 
high rate of interest causes investors to look elsewhere for better deals, resulting in the 
crowding out of investment. Examples of high rates of borrowing, high interest rates 
and crowding out can be seen across major financial instabilities (discussed in section 
3.5).  
 
Keynes did not believe that government spending could negatively affect the 
confidence of private investors. According to him, government spending stimulates 
economic activities and can in the long run revert a budget deficit. But this is not 
always the case especially in a recession. For instance, the effect of government 
borrowing during a recession is exemplified in the case of Greece during the Euro debt 
crisis, where the government borrowed in order to meet its obligations, however the 
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economy did not get better. They borrowed over two years and even sold government 
enterprises to the private sector as a way to raise funds (Anand et al. 2012).  
 
Additionally, a major challenge facing government intervention is financing costs such 
as costs for repayment and interest. For long term projects, long term loans are taken. 
These costs cannot be expunged, except if the loans are repaid earlier than the maturity 
date. But because the long term investments are huge, it is hard to attain and it is not 
beneficial for the creditors to lower interest rate due to lower interest earnings. 
Furthermore, if in the short run government revenues reduce due to lower rate of 
economic growth, the government will collect fresh loans to finance old debts, 
consequently, the effect of compound interest raises debts.  
 
Another criticism of the Keynesian economic thoughts on debt came from the Austrian 
School of economics. Keynes intervene in a recession by borrowing, however the 
Austrian economists argue that a recession period is part of the natural order of the 
business cycle and it is usually followed by a recovery period. Therefore, government 
interference during a recession only weakens and impairs recovery (Jahan, et. al. 
2014).  
 
2.3 CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH PUBLIC DEBT AFFECTS THE 
REAL ECONOMY 
The effects of public debt on the real economy cannot be overemphasized. Whether it 
is a conscious effort by the government through policies or as a result of crisis, it has 
consequences for the economy. The risks or consequences of sovereign debt can be 
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transmitted through two ways; the first channel is through the financial system and the 
second is directly upon the real economy. 
 
The financial system is a vital and integral part of the economy. Most human daily 
activities revolve around the financial system. Some of the activities include savings, 
loans, mortgages, buying and selling of securities government securities, etc. This is a 
major reason why the effects of public debt or any form of shock to the economy 
affects the financial system. There are several channels by which risks of sovereign 
debt can affect the financial system.  
 
The Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS) identified four channels of 
transmission. The first one is through banks balance sheets. This is a result of banks 
holding enormous volumes of government debt securities on their balance sheet. 
Therefore, any form of loss on government debt has a straight adverse result on the 
assets on a bank’s balance sheet and also on the liquidity of the bank. Secondly, 
government debt is sometimes used by banks as collateral for getting loans, which 
consequently raises public debt or sovereign risk lessens the accessibility or worthiness 
of the collateral, resulting in a further decrease in their financing ability. Thirdly, an 
increase in public debt causes lower ratings for domestic banks, raising costs of 
funding and possibly weakening their market accessibility. Fourthly, it decreases the 
benefits that banks get from implicit and explicit government securities (CGFS, 2011; 
Popov and Van Horen, 2013).   
 
The effects of public debts can also be transmitted directly to the real economy through 
interest rate. As a result of high public debt, rising interest rate crowds out private debt 
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and shrinks total investment, which deters economic growth. This also diminishes how 
much foreign investors are willing to invest in the local economy making it hard to 
finance the debt, thereby leading to the payment of interest overseas, which can be 
challenging for the country if it cannot effortlessly retain a current account surplus. 
Another channel is through public investment. According to Bruchez and Schlaffer, 
(2012), public debt has a positive outcome on economic growth if the funds raised to 
finance public investments such as infrastructure are beneficial to the economy. 
Subsequently, the high growth rate will make it easier to repay debts.  
 
Furthermore, high levels of public debts may affect households and firms’ ability to 
borrow, consume and invest. The level of public debt can cause weaknesses exposing 
households, firms and governments such as having creditworthiness problems. It can 
also make the economy prone to fluctuations in asset prices, intensifying shocks and 
financial instability. Borrowers using assets as collateral are restricted in their capacity 
to get loan if the real worth of the collateral drops, which can thereby prompt 
deleveraging. Similarly, high levels of public debt can cause weaknesses in the 
financial sector which can spread throughout a country (OECD, 2012). 
 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter, in line with the research objectives, discussed classical and Keynesian 
school of thought on public debt. A major assumption of the classical school of thought 
is that the economy is self-adjusting and hence is always in full equilibrium. They are 
also against government intervention in economic activities, arguing that government 
borrowing causes a transfer of funds from areas of economic productivity (private 
sector) to areas of economic unproductivity (such as spending on welfare and 
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pensions). However, this is not the case in recent years, as governments have borrowed 
money to fund private sector activities and, in some cases, have bailed them out. 
Additionally, the classicalists argue that public debt create burdens for the next 
generation as future taxes need to be raised to repay the debt. These taxes would cause 
a reduction in savings, which limits productive capital to investors, and so, activities 
such as trade and manufacturing declines. 
 
Conversely, J.S. Mills, a classical scholar is of the opinion that a high rate of debt can 
be beneficial to the economy, if the borrowing leads to savings. This is based on an 
assumption that government borrowing mean that actual resources remain the same 
and people would be able to save. The classicals suggested that government spending 
can only be funded either by taxation or by borrowing. Therefore, an increase in 
interest rate would mean that the public debt is harmful. Otherwise, public debt and 
private capital are in competition when the interest rate rises, while the workers bear 
the cost (in terms of taxation and reduced savings).  
 
Similar to the classicals, Keynes also argue that government spending is funded either 
by taxation or borrowing. However, he did not support taxation as a source of finance 
during a recession, and instead recommends borrowing, suggesting the money should 
be paid back in periods of boom. Keynesians do not agree with the stance that the 
economy always adjusts itself towards equilibrium. They recommend that there should 
be automatic stabilisers such as personal taxes and welfares to check fluctuations in 
real GDP. 
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Another similarity to the classicals is that the cost of repaying loans can be a problem 
because the interest charged may not be fully paid or the loans may have a really long 
repayment date.  Despite this, Keynes did not agree that interest rates can form a burden 
on society because an increase in public debt reflects that governments have access to 
savings and makes use of debt to increase investment and economic growth. In 
contrast, another Keynesian, Franco Modigliani argued that rise in debt can be a burden 
to future generations. However, he believed that the increased debt is beneficial to the 
present generation. Also, the debt burden can be narrowed as long as the debt is 
accompanied by increased public expenditure, which will add to the real income of 
future generation.  
 
Also discussed were the transmission channels of public debt. The two channels 
mentioned were the financial system channel and the real economy channel. The 
financial system channel includes balance sheets of banks. An increase in debt level 
prompts a decline in domestic banks rating, and they are no longer able to carry out 
their function of giving loan to businesses and households. While the transition on the 
real economy is through interest rate and public investment, high interest rates crowds 
out private investment, which in turn, reduces aggregate investment and causes 
economic growth to decline. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
LITERATURE REVIEW ON FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, various theoretical and empirical literatures on financial stability were 
reviewed as part of the study objective. The macroeconomic objectives of a country 
include price stability and sustained high rate of economic growth, among others, and 
financial stability plays an important role in achieving them.  Therefore, it was 
necessary to discuss the concepts and sources of financial stability, including how 
macroeconomic policies affect financial stability.  
 
Additionally, some major financial instabilities were reviewed starting with the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, the Asian crisis of the 1970s, the global financial crisis and 
the European debt crisis since 2007; explaining how financial instability has affected 
economic activities with a focus on debt level and economic growth across several 
countries. Also discussed were the similarities and differences across the crises.  
 
3.2 THE CONCEPT OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
The financial market is an essential aspect of the macroeconomic system. It plays the 
role of directing investment capital to firms or businesses that have production 
potentials. If the financial market fails in properly performing this role, the economy 
may not perform proficiently, and economic growth would be affected (Mishkin, 
2000). However, there is no unanimous characterisation of financial stability as 
different scholars have described it in various ways.  
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Crockett (1997) defined financial stability as the nonexistence of financial instability. 
Therefore, financial instability is a situation where economic activities are possibly 
weakened by volatilities in the financial asset prices or financial intermediaries’ 
inability to attain their contractual responsibilities. This definition focuses on public 
policy (i.e. the effect of financial instability on economic performance such as inflation 
rate, asset prices, and fragility of financial intermediaries). 
 
Das et al. (2010) on the other hand view financial instability from the standpoint of 
financial markets. They implied that financial instability is a situation characterised by 
a high level of volatility in some economic and financial indicators such as bond 
spreads, price level, interest rate, money supply, private sector credit, exchange rate, 
stock prices, etc. 
 
On the other hand, according to Schinasi (2005), financial stability goes beyond the 
simple nonexistence of crises. A financial system may be categorised as stable if it 
fulfils the following conditions - Firstly, if it is able to efficiently allocate resources 
(either geographically and through time), and it can also carry out other financial and 
economic activities (such as savings and investments, lending and giving loans, among 
others). Secondly, if the financial system effectively evaluates prices, assign and 
manage financial risk, and thirdly, if the financial system is proficient in maintaining 
its capability to carry out these vital functions even in the face of external shocks or an 
upsurge of financial imbalances. This definition considers financial instability from 
the standpoint of efficiency of the financial system. 
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This study will be looking at financial instability as a comprehensive phenomenon 
combining the standpoints of public policy, the financial market, and the efficiency of 
the financial system. Therefore, in this study, financial instability is seen as a condition 
where financial markets are unstable and does not have the potential to prevent or 
protect the economy from a financial crisis. This means that financial instability is 
when markets are unstable and there are no effective structures in place to prevent the 
economy from experiencing a financial crisis. 
 
3.3  SOURCES OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
The preservation of financial stability is a key objective of financial policy makers as 
its absence can be severe for economic activities. Financial instability arises when 
fluctuations in the financial markets affects their ability to incorporate information 
flows to the point that financial markets cannot effectively allocate investment 
resources. Lack of funds causes households and businesses to cut spending, leading to 
a shrinkage of economic activities, which in some cases are severe (Mishkin, 1997).   
 
Mishkin (1997, 2000) and Crockett (1997) identified sources of financial instability, 
some of which are weakness of financial institutions, asset price volatility, foreign 
exchange markets, etc. Each of these is discussed below.  
 
i. Fragility in Financial Institutions: This fragility can be from financial 
intermediaries or non-bank financial intermediaries. Financial intermediaries are 
important in the financial sector because they help to contain the problems of 
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asymmetric information2. When a financial market is faced with a high level of 
asymmetric information, stakeholders lose confidence in the market, giving rise 
to the problem of adverse selection and moral hazard.  
 
Furthermore, in situations where there are serious problems of asymmetric 
information, the financial market fails, because both sellers and buyers are not 
willing to accept prices for which they are uncertain, especially about the worth 
of traded bonds. Therefore, financial intermediaries serve as agents that monitor 
the flow of information within the system and protect the less informed party 
from exploitation or poor investment choices. Examples of financial 
intermediaries are commercial banks, insurance companies, financial advisers, 
etc.  
 
Commercial banks are good financial intermediaries, since they provide added 
value by way of superior information and availability of high-yielding liquid 
assets. They achieve a steady portfolio over time as drawings by depositors occur 
randomly, allowing them to hold a large reserve. This enables them to have 
sufficient liquidness to meet regular drawings and also invest their assets in 
lesser liquid but huger yielding assets. In as much as investors believe in bank’s 
creditworthiness, the market remains in equilibrium.  
 
Therefore, stakeholders (creditors and borrowers) have trust in banks’ capability 
to meet its contractual commitments. However, if there is a situation whereby 
	2	Asymmetric information which can also be referred to as imperfect information is a 
situation whereby a party in a transaction has additional or better information 
compared to another.	
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there is a large withdrawal of deposits from banks, they would have no choice 
but to sell their assets and, in most cases, incur losses. This triggers loss of 
confidence in investors and possibly a crisis. What this suggests is that, a 
weakening in the financial institutions’ intermediation abilities such as giving 
loans can result in a fall in aggregate investment and hence, a fall in economic 
growth. 
 
Sometimes, financial intermediaries also make bad credit judgments, that is, they 
fail to analyse properly the risks involved in the investment or the actual return 
in investment. This is what Crockett (1997) refers to as Disaster Myopia, a 
situation when the creditor's valuation of the hypothetical distribution of 
economic outcomes (subjective possibilities) is different from what actually is 
(objective possibility). Disaster myopia also stems from a couple of other reasons 
besides improper evaluation by creditors such as a sudden policy change or the 
financial intermediaries deciding it is not worth allocating resources and time in 
to analysing the investment prospects. 
 
On the other hand, failures or fragility of nonfinancial intermediaries also have 
strong effects on financial instability of an economy. This can either be directly 
through its effects on firms’ customers or indirectly over a wider effect on the 
trust in the financial sector to effectively carry out its obligations. Nonfinancial 
intermediaries also carry out huge financial transactions such as securities and 
foreign exchange, and therefore possess the ability to affect viability of the 
payment system (Crockett, 1997). 
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The condition of nonfinancial organisations’ balance sheet is another significant 
aspect for determining the impact of asymmetric information obstructions in the 
financial market. When there is a serious widespread weakening of lenders’ 
balance sheet, it increases the problems of asymmetry information in financial 
markets, and can result in enabling financial instability (Mishkin, 2000). In order 
to address problems of asymmetry information, issuers of loan sometimes use 
collaterals. Collateral decreases the effects of information asymmetry since it 
decreases the creditors’ losses when there is a default. In other words, if a debtor 
fails to meet their loan obligations, the creditor can liquidate the collateral in 
order to recoup some of the losses resulting from the issuance of that loan. 
However, if general prices of assets drop, the collateral’ worth drops too, 
signalling a rise in information asymmetry (Mishkin, 2000).  
 
Similarly, deterioration in the quality of assets of financial intermediaries for a 
long duration of time can cause investors to lose confidence. For instance, banks 
invest in activities to generate more profit during an economic boom. This tends 
to be very rewarding as they can give out loans. But when there is a recession, 
or an unfavourable economic condition that causes the value of their assets to 
weaken, they can no longer finance such activities like they did during the boom 
and this causes people to lose confidence in financial institutions (Crockett, 
1997).  
 
ii.  Asset Price Volatility: Asset price volatility is another source of financial 
instability. Not only is it connected with difficulties for the financial market, but 
also, volatilities in assets prices can have a direct impact on the investment level 
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of the private sector. This impact is the outcome of fluctuations in the private 
sectors’ assets and changes in the rate of return on savings and investment, which 
upsets the overall confidence levels. Imperfect information also plays a role in 
asset price volatility especially in terms of valuations of financial firms’ worth 
because individual asset holders do not know the flow of expected income, 
neither do they know the components that stimulate the degree to which the 
market would discount it. For instance, a stock market collapse can raise adverse 
selection and moral hazard issues in the financial sector because it results in a 
heavy reduction in a firm’s market value.  
 
Similarly, an increase in interest rate can promote financial instability through 
asset prices. A high interest rate raises household’s and businesses’ costs, while 
decreasing their income streams, worsening of their balance sheets (Mishkin, 
2000). Asymmetric information can also occur with a rise in interest rate. It arises 
due to households and businesses with risky investment plans are prepared to 
pay high rates of interest because if the risky investment turns out well, they 
would benefit the most. Therefore, higher interest rates raise the chances that the 
creditor is undertaking a serious credit risk.  
 
If creditors cannot differentiate between the debtors with a riskier investment 
plan, they should reduce the amount of loans they give. This action would result 
in a decline of loans given to high risk projects at high interest rates. 
Consequently, when the demand for loans surpasses its supply, high rates of 
interest does not bring the market to an equilibrium state, because additional 
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increase in the rate of interest would deter issuance of loans. Therefore, there 
will be a further increase in demand for loans (Mishkin, 1997).  
 
Furthermore, rise in the cost of borrowing also has a negative repercussion on 
banks’ balance sheets. This is because a bank’s traditional role involves issuing 
short term and long-term loans, hence, there usually is a maturity mismatch 
between assets with lengthier maturity dates and liabilities. Therefore, an 
increase in interest rate causes a decrease in the net worth of assets because high 
interest rates diminishes the value of assets with longer maturity more than it 
does the value of liabilities with shorter maturity. Thus, if the credit value of 
bank loans were to stay unchanged, increases in interest rates causes a decline in 
net worth of a bank’s assets resulting in a fall in banks’ ability to issue loans 
(Mishkin, 2000).  
 
iii. Foreign Exchange Markets: Financial instability as a result of foreign exchange 
is primarily caused by a currency crisis. Currency crisis happens when investors 
lose confidence in the ability of authorities to sustain exchange rate and find ways 
to lower their vulnerability to that currency. It can also be as a consequence of 
Central Bank’s decision to peg their exchange rate which may not be compatible 
with the internal economic policies. Even if the rate is sustained for duration of 
time by using foreign reserves or imposing restrictions, ultimately, investors will 
feel that a change in the exchange rate is inevitable.  When this occurs, a crisis 
can follow at a fast rate. This spreads to the real economy through the lack of 
Central Banks and policy maker’s ineffective policies to resist speculations or 
plans to reduce the devaluation that affected their countries mostly through 
	 45	
market pressures. In any of those situations, national interest rates may increase, 
and that slows down the economic activities and creates depreciations in the 
values of financial intermediaries’ asset portfolios.  
 
The possible harm that a currency can impose is mostly dependent on the potency 
of a country’s monetary policies. If a country has weak monetary policies, 
interest rates might be increased to a high rate so as to protect the exchangeability 
of their currency, but strong currencies stimulate imports and makes exports 
expensive, widening trade deficits. However, raising the interest rate might be 
disadvantageous, especially if the financial market assumes that interest rates 
cannot be sustained at that high rate. In a situation where a country had a string 
monetary policy, adjustments to exchange rates might be adequate to re-establish 
investors’ confidence and allow interest rates to be reduced without panic in the 
financial market. Currency crisis cannot occur when exchange rate is flexible 
(Crockett, 1997).  
 
iv. Equity Markets: Financial unsteadiness in equity markets has not caused 
considerable real economic damage over a large portion of the post war period 
(Crockett, 1997). Unlike most currency instabilities, equity market crashes are 
not straightforwardly described by logical speculative behaviour. Equity market 
stakeholders are always waging against themselves and not against the formally 
specified disequilibrium rate. As markets have a tendency to demand return 
against risk, an undesirable shock may large fluctuations in asset prices than a 
positive shock will. This is because increased volatility risk will intensify the 
undesirable shocks but will neutralise a positive one. 
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Stock market failures have the possibility to disturb real economic activities in a 
number of ways. Firstly, a reduction in private sector wealth will have direct 
consequences on readiness to consume present income. The magnitude of this 
consequence is perhaps not big enough because wealth held as equity 
characterizes only about 25% of total household wealth. Furthermore, the 
majority of equity is possessed by financial intermediaries such as insurance 
companies and pension funds whose eventual recipients are not necessarily 
sensitive to short-term volatility in asset prices.   
 
The second way through which stock market failures affect real economic 
activity is the impact of equity valuation on the attraction of purchasing physical 
assets. If the market estimation of the potential flow of returns created by a 
sector’s asset drops, then the desirability of procuring physical assets also falls, 
thus possibly decreasing investment expenditure. The third consequence of stock 
market failure is on the role of financial intermediaries. If falling equity prices 
decrease the wealth of financial institutions and their clients, the drop can worsen 
complications of asymmetric information and result in a decline in the amount 
of financial intermediation. This would then cause it to be tougher to organize 
funds for industrious investment and would cause a growing reduction in output 
levels. The fourth way by which stock market failures affect the real economy is 
through the influence of financial market growths on confidence levels. Since 
the time of Keynes, financial analysts have accepted the function of confidence 
in defining the volume of business investment (Crockett, 1997). If there is a rise 
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in future uncertainties, investors may react by lessening their openness to such 
uncertainties, thereby lessening how much they are willing to investment. 
 
v. Fixed-Interest and Real-Asset markets: The causes of instability in the fixed-
interest and real-asset markets are like that of the equity markets, however, the 
interest rate medium is apparently tougher. Variations in the macroeconomic 
events makes investors re-examine their predictions for inflation and real interest 
rates. Therefore, they incorporate the surprising changes to the price of fixed-
interest bonds. As the bulk of investments backed by bonds or loans with longer 
maturity dates usually exceeds those financed through equity, movements in 
bond yields have a more prevalent effect on the total investment.  
 
Real estate values are also essential for economic activities. The reason being 
that a sizeable amount of real estate holdings is funded through borrowing, and 
also, real estate is sometimes used as indemnity for numerous financial 
businesses. Therefore, rise and falls in prices and values of real estate can 
intensify the effects of fluctuations in interest rates on macroeconomic activities. 
A rise in interest rate causes a fall in real estate value as it can lead to debt-
servicing problems for borrowers. A weakness of real estate prices, in turn, 
results in decreasing the indemnity values for lenders.  
 
3.4 MACROECONOMIC POLICY AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY 
Macroeconomic policies are rules, regulations or actions taken to control shocks or 
activities that can destabilise the economy. However, there are some classical 
economists who feel that there should be no intervention or little government 
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interference in the economy3. According to them, a government should only interfere 
in times of national crisis such as a war. They are of the opinion that the market will 
always tend towards equilibrium and that government are likely to make wrong 
decisions as they could be influenced by political pressure groups.   
 
On the other hand, other economists like J. M Keynes and Modigliani4 argue that there 
should be some form of intervention. They suggest that government or Central Banks 
should intervene for the purpose of income redistribution and to control prolonged 
recession. During a recession, there is a severe decrease in private sector investment 
and spending, causing a decline in economic growth. They also suggest that 
governments can borrow money from the private sector and use the money to address 
market inefficiencies such as employment of untouched resources. Furthermore, if 
there is a reduction in money supply, Central Banks can procure public sector bonds 
or print money. Keynesians are of the opinion that governments can intervene in the 
economy through fiscal policy while the monetarists argue that monetary policy should 
be the tool for intervention.  
 
Fiscal policy has an important role in the economy of “shock absorber” as it is a 
primary instrument used by governments to sustain financial stability. This is because 
governments have a significant role in controlling the national budget and their 
decisions on revenue and expenditure has a huge effect on aggregate output. Therefore, 
in times of instability, fiscal decisions have to be made to ensure the economy is not 
largely affected.   
	3	See	section	(2.2.1)	4	See	section	(2.2.2)	
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Governments use fiscal policy as a tool of economic sustenance according to 
Keynesian economics for two reasons; for expansionary purposes or for 
Contractionary purposes. Expansionary fiscal policy is a situation where the 
government aims at increasing the money in the economy, by creating employment 
and also increasing aggregate demand or output. It does this by reducing taxes, 
increasing spending on capital or developmental projects such as constructions of new 
roads, or building of more houses causing an increase in aggregate demand. This is 
usually employed in times of crisis. For example, at the height of the 2007 financial 
crisis impact, there was an increase in the U.S. government expenditure for the 
acquisition of lots of non-performing financial assets from the balance sheets of failing 
banks by the Bush administration. The Federal Reserve was allocated a budget of 
$700billion by congress for “bailing out” financial institutions by buying asset-backed 
securities, and other securities under the first Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP).  
 
Similarly, under the Obama administration, there was a second part to the expansionary 
fiscal policy in form of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) in 
February 2009, where he allocated another $787 billion. It comprised of $288 billion 
in tax cuts and welfares; $275 billion in bonds, grants and loans; and $224billion in 
entitlements including an unemployment program (Tcherneva, 2011). Therefore, a 
government responds by using expansionary fiscal policy because it is effective in 
crisis time.  
 
Contractionary fiscal policy is effective when a government is trying to reduce money 
in circulation. It does this by increasing taxes while reducing the money it spends. 
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Contractionary fiscal policy is usually used to curb inflation as demand for labour 
decreases and people have less money to purchase goods and services which causes 
inflation to reduce. Therefore, financial stability depends on the effectiveness of each 
discrete policy tool separately. 
 
Hannoun (2010) expands those fiscal functions further and categorises them into three 
functions. Firstly, fiscal policy is used for the regulation of public demand by the use 
of taxes, automatic stabilizers and counter-cyclical policies5; secondly, for the creation 
of fiscal buffers in good times by reducing indebtedness; and thirdly, to help the 
financial sector in economic downturn through deposit and loan guarantees, banks 
lifesaving packages, and discrete fiscal inducements. For example, government 
decisions related to budget revenue and expenses have the biggest impact on public 
demand. One of the ways to increase public demand is temporary budget deficit 
increase by increasing public expenditures.  
 
Investigating the theoretical relationship between fiscal policy and financial instability 
cannot be complete without paying attention to the effects of budget deficit (Jesic, 
2013). One of the functions of a budget deficit is to stabilise the economy. According 
to Keynesian principles, during a crisis, the budget deficit would offer an incentive for 
an economy to promptly leave the downturn period. According to Hannoun (2010), 
developed countries used fiscal policy in the face of the global financial crisis of 2008 
because of their zero-interest rate, which was therefore preferable to monetary policy. 
This was because fiscal policy plays a vital role in absorbing shocks and can play a 
	5	Counter- cyclical policies are policies used to control the downsides of business cycle. This means 
increased government spending and reducing taxes in times of recession and less government spending 
and more taxes in times of economic boom. 
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role in preventing financial instability. It is important to use fiscal policies that have 
an almost instantaneous response to economic changes because monetary policy ought 
to be used for controlling inflationary processes while fiscal policy should control non-
cyclical demand and maintain fiscal buffers withstanding the tension in finance system 
(Bikas and Zaltauskaite, 2014). 
 
Monetary policy makes it possible for financial environments to be efficient and stable 
and can also add to the accrual of volatilities resulting in raising risks of financial 
instability. Shocks can prompt financial instabilities and weaken the efficiency of the 
monetary policy transmission channels. As financial markets incorporate new 
information, a sharp price movement can arise, leading to massive and significant 
losses, which reduces investors willingness to carry out projects. Since financial 
market activities, economic activities and monetary policy are interdependent, policy 
makers have paid considerable attention to monitoring activities of the financial market 
(Nelson and Perli, 2005). These risks can create a negative multiplier effect from asset 
sales down to the aggregate output of the economy.  
 
3.5 SOME MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTABILITIES 
The global economy has witnessed several financial instabilities most notably the great 
depression, the global financial crisis and the Euro area crisis. These crises destabilised 
economics with respect to debt and economic growth. Each crisis was responded to 
using different economic policies. For instance, monetary policies were employed to 
stabilise many economies during the financial crisis. In some countries, traditional 
fiscal policies were abandoned, and countercyclical fiscal policies were utilised 
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especially by the European Central Bank. Therefore, this chapter helps to understand 
the various natures of financial instabilities.  
 
3.5.1 The Great Depression 
The great depression started in the summertime of 1929 in the United States. It began 
as a result of the decrease in aggregate demand and a massive decline in production, 
causing real gross domestic product and prices to decline rapidly. The fall in aggregate 
demand was a consequence of tighter monetary policy meant to regulate stock market 
speculation. This tightened monetary policy was in response to mild recessions 
between 1924 and 1927 where economic growth dropped to 5.9% in 1926 (Granados 
and Roux, 2009). 
 
Before the mild recession, the US economy underwent a boom phase from 1921 to 
1924 with stable prices of goods and services, with GDP increasing at an annual rate 
of 12.5% as at 1923. After monetary policy tightening in 1927, there was perceived 
economic recovery causing speculations to once again rise because of the confidence 
in the economy. Coupled with the rise of new technologies such as the automobile, 
electricity as well as real estate boom, there were positive speculations in the stock 
market which made the stock prices rise tremendously. Between 1925 and 1929, real 
GNP rose by 13%, manufacturing by 21% and unemployment was stationary at 3%. 
By the last quarter of 1929, stock prices had gotten to unreasonable numbers with 
respect to expectations in future earnings with the Dow Jones industrial index 
recording an increase of 215% between January 1925 and September 1929 (Allais, 
1999).  
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The Federal Reserve slowly raised the interest rates because they did not want to 
destabilise businesses with a sudden rise, while decelerating the continuous increase 
in stock prices. The new interest rates reduced the sensitivities of some sectors such as 
real estate and automobile, spiralling reductions in construction and manufacturing. 
Thus, as stock prices began to decline in October 1929, there was a loss of confidence 
in the market and it crashed, with investors selling out in panic. Consequently, the fall 
in price made investors to clear up their assets, further driving down prices (Crafts and 
Fearon, 2010).   
 
3.5.1.1 Effects of the Depression on US Economy 
The initial effect of the fall in prices and the lack of confidence by investors caused 
the market to crash, resulting in about a 20% contraction in money supply between 
1929 and 1932, and a 30% contraction in bank deposits. Investors who had bought 
stocks with borrowed short-term funds were forced to borrow again at very high 
interest rates, or to sell at any price in order to meet their obligations (Allais, 1999).  
 
There was also a bank panic across the country where many people lost confidence in 
bank solvency and withdrew their deposits in cash within the same period. This caused 
banks to liquidate their loans with the aim of raising the required cash. This set of 
action of hasty liquidation made banks fail and resulting in a further contraction in 
money supply. The lack of confidence and fall in money supply led to a drop in the 
nominal GNP by 44%, real GNP by 29%, industrial production by 40%, and the 
general price index by 21% between 1929 and 1933. The unemployment rate on the 
other hand rose from 3.2% in 1929 to 25% in 1933. 
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The crash of the stock market caused a reduction in aggregate demand as firms’ 
investment and households’ acquisitions of durable goods fell. As a result of this fall, 
real GDP of the United States declined speedily in late 1929 and throughout 1930 as 
the GDP was -9% (Granados and Roux, 2009). The aggregate demand fell even more 
as a result of prevalent banking panic that hit the United States between 1930 and 1932. 
People lost confidence in bank solvency and demanded that their deposits were repaid 
in cash. As a result of this, between 1929 and 1933, business investment fell about 
80%, employment fell about 25% and output fell more than 38%. Consumer durables 
which represent household investment declined by more than 55% and consumption 
of non-durables and services declined almost 29% in the same period (Cole and 
Ohanian, 1999).  
 
The effect of the decline in aggregate output in America spread to other parts of the 
world predominantly through the gold standard. At that time, the gold standard 
connected countries by way of fixed currency exchange rates. With the gold standard, 
countries fixed a value of its currency in relation to gold and made monetary policy 
decisions to protect the fixed price. This made it imperative that they had to maintain 
a balanced budget and export more than they imported thereby getting income from 
abroad.  
 
European countries had left the gold standard when the First World War broke so that 
they could print money to finance the war. Meanwhile, the American economy was 
buoyant because of their stock market bubble and technological innovations such as 
electricity, the radio, the automobile, and so on, during the same period. Their exports 
and foreign direct investment to Europe increased, causing their gold reserves to rise. 
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After the war, returning to the gold standard was not easy for the European countries 
because they had to lower their price levels, thereby causing governments to reduce 
their expenditures and reduce prices of goods and services. For instance, the British 
pound sterling was overvalued at 14% when they returned to the gold standard in 1925. 
As a result, Britain’s export industries were no longer competitive, and unemployment 
rose (Crafts and Fearon, 2010).   
 
Post 1918, America overtook Britain as the top international lender of the world. A lot 
of the war debts accumulated by France, Germany, and Britain were borrowed from 
the US government and US private citizens. The total war debt by European nations 
represented 11% of American gross national product in 1929 and private debts from 
Germany accounted for 13.5% of the US GNP (Allais, 1999). A consistent flow of 
dollars was essential for debtor countries, because it enabled their governments to carry 
out their obligations. The United States of America was accountable for 60% of global 
lending, and Germany owed about 33% of that. (Crafts and Fearon, 2010). With high 
rate of exports and investments abroad, the United States of America was able to 
support the ability of owing nations to purchase goods and services and to also service 
their debts. 
 
Once this cashflow dwindled, the owing nations had no other option but to face balance 
of payment and debt settlement issues that they did not anticipate. Primary producers 
needed to act rapidly to lessen imports and increase while the terms of trade were not 
in their favour. In an attempt to address the gold and foreign exchange losses, the US 
used contractionary fiscal and monetary policies to seriously deflate their economies. 
Public expenditure was cut, wages were lowered, and there was significant rise in 
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unemployment. It was difficult to generate earnings from foreign exchange, or to 
borrow from abroad. The United States stopped lending in 1931 and did get back the 
money owed to until the end of the decade. (Crafts and Fearon, 2010). 
 
As the world economy fell into depression in 1931, international trade from Britain 
declined, which had a damaging effect on the trade in the U.S., and as a result the 
current account of the balance of payments went into deficit during 1931. During this 
period, import prices fell by 25% and both consumer prices and the price of final output 
fell by 10 (Crafts and Fearon, 2010). 
 
3.5.1.2 Recovery from the Depression 
Since reduction in money circulation and collapse of the gold standard started the great 
depression, it is not startling that currency depreciations and increase in money supply 
became the key recovery factors around the world. There is a prominent connection 
between the period when nations dropped the gold standard and depreciated their 
currencies, and the transformation in their economic growth. For instance, the United 
Kingdom abandoned the gold standard in September of 1931 and their economic 
conditions improved earlier than the United States whose currency were not 
depreciated until 1933, and so they much later.  
 
Improvements in economic conditions in the United States of America started in the 
spring of 1933.The real gross domestic product averaged the rate of 9% per year 
between 1933 and 1937. However, between 1937 and 1938 the US had one more mild 
set back which hampered the growth rate. But the economy recovered in towards the 
end of 1938 and the American economy expanded at a significant rate, higher than it 
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did before the mild set back. The United States output eventually had a long period of 
economic boom even up until 1942.  
 
On the other hand, improvements in other parts of the world differed. The United 
Kingdom’s economy stopped retrogressing as soon as they abandoned the gold 
standard in September 1931, and eventually the economic recovery because towards 
the end of 1932. The economies of some Latin American countries like Brazil and 
Argentina started their economic recovery towards the enc of 1931 and start of 1932. 
Germany and Japan also started their recovery periods towards the end of 1932, while 
Canada and some European countries began their recovery in the same period as the 
US in 1933.  
 
3.5.2  The Asian Crisis of 1997-1999 
The East Asian Financial crisis is a significant occurrence that happened in mid-1997 
and remained up until late 1998. King (2001) suggested that the crisis occurred in two 
phases. The initial phase was a panic that arose in July of 1997 and continued until late 
summer, distressing the ‘East Asian Tigers’ – Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Singapore. The next phase commenced in late October 1997 and it had a massive 
presence in Indonesia, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and it extended to Japan and South Korea 
in the end of December 1997. This second phase had the wildest outcome, triggering 
stock market to collapse in the US and Europe, while also and affecting emerging 
economies like as Brazil and Russia. 
 
Prior to the crisis, several countries in the region such as China, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, the Philippines and Thailand 
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observed a significant currency appreciation in the early part of the 1990s. The region 
also enjoyed massive inflow of FDI which resulted in a long period of economic boom. 
However, by 1997, they had a huge current account deficit. The deficits were mitigated 
with the use of short term loans from abroad. (Diao et al., 2000). The region had a 
sustained growth rate with Indonesia having an average annual growth rate of 6.9%, 
Thailand 8.17% and Korea with 8.4% since 1970. The sustained growth rate and 
periods of economic stability caused foreign investment banks, foreign investors, and 
governments to be unconcerned, hence the shock when the crisis happened (Berg, 
1999).  
 
The liberalisation of the local financial sector was not followed by necessary 
supervision and regulations. Additionally, the private financial establishments caused 
numerous issues for the government such as the absence of competition in financial 
sector, improper supervision of the financial sector and considerable government 
involvement in economic activities (Berg, 1999). 
 
A lot of the East Asian nations had a fixed-exchange rate regime, fixing their currency 
to the U.S. dollar and ran current account deficits, resulting in reduction in domestic 
interest rate. Meanwhile, commercial banks and big nonfinancial corporations in these 
nations were borrowing huge sums of money, mostly in dollars, from banks from 
abroad, while local banks issued loans to local investors in their national currencies. 
Also, a couple of big corporations from those countries also sought loans from abroad 
mostly in dollars but a large portion of their income was made domestically and in 
their national currencies. Therefore, as a result of currency mismatches, banks’ balance 
revealed that liabilities were predominantly in dollars while assets were predominantly 
	 59	
in local currencies. This led to significant decline in the worth of assets compared to 
their liabilities (Hale, 2011).  
 
Berg (1999) opined that the current account deficits got to a point where is was no 
longer sustainable the exchange rate was overvalued. The East Asian Tigers did not 
get the expected benefits associated with huge FDI inflow (such as 3% of GDP in 
Korea, and 10% in Malaysia) due to tightened fiscal and monetary policies aimed at 
reducing the monetary effects of the FDI inflows and also to prevent currency 
appreciation against the dollars (because the exchange rate was pegged to the dollars).  
 
In the wake of the crisis, several nations such as Korea, Indonesia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines amassed large amounts of short-term foreign debt. It rose from 11.4% of 
GDP to 15.9% of GDP for Indonesia, from 8.4% to 11.1% for Korea, 11.1% to 15.1% 
in Malaysia, 9.3% to 14.1% in the Philippines and 18.1% to 18.8% in Thailand 
between 1993 and the end of 1997.  
 
However, once local banks’ access to foreign credit ceased, a large wave of capital 
flights occurred. Most of the loans had short maturity dates, therefore banks could no 
longer service them or repay them like they used to prior to the crisis. Therefore, a 
banking crisis ensued across the East Asian countries and the percentage of 
nonperforming loans rose rapidly. Prior to the crisis, countries in the region had 
balanced budgets and almost-balanced budgets. But when the crisis occurred, 
governments had to look for a way to support banks and forced them to get help from 
the International Monetary Fund (Hale, 2011). 
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The event that triggered the first stage of the Asian financial crisis was an 
announcement that the Thai Baht would be allowed to float. Thus, the government 
abandoned their exchange peg with the US dollar because of pressure from investors, 
thereby effectively devaluating the Baht by about 20% (Chowdhury and Goyal, 2000). 
The Baht was under pressure towards the end of 1996 when the Thai stock market 
crashed, creating doubts in the stock market and also affecting the prices of real estate. 
By the end of the first quarter 1997, speculation about the Baht arose again because 
the Thai government decided to help some troubled Thai finance companies that were 
affected with the real estate issues. In May 1997, the Thai government enforced capital 
control measures that made the then finance minister to step down from his position 
because he could not successfully arrange a merger to rescue the biggest financial 
organisation at the time - Finance One.  
The newly appointed finance minister (in that era) upon visiting the Thai Central Bank 
learnt that nearly all of the nation’s $30billion foreign exchange reserves were bound 
in forward contracts, and an additional $8billion had been used by the Central Bank’s 
to support distressed financial organisation. That newly appointed finance minister 
decided to back out on government’s plan to revamp Finance One with public fund, 
allowing it to fail. This deed viewed as a break in trust on the part of government by 
the foreign investment banks, local bankers and foreign investors, on investments 
being secure. Therefore, there was massive capital flight, causing the Thai government 
to depreciate their currency and seek help from the IMF (King 2001).  
 
The depreciation of the Baht and the break in the Thai government’s commitment to 
Finance One caused foreign investors to re-evaluate the risks of investing the region. 
Within seven days, there was a widespread contagion effect. The Philippines floated 
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their Peso on 11th July, Malaysia also let their Ringgit float on 14th July, compelling 
next-door Singapore to also devalue their currency. Indonesia on the other hand took 
necessary precaution enlarged their trading band on the Rupiah and was later floated 
on 14th August. Hong Kong raised their interest rates on 15th August, which caused 
their stock market to crash, while South Korea also increased interest rates and 
depreciated the Won but observed that the credit ratings of their major banks sunk as 
well (King 2001).  The currency devaluation also caused foreign portfolio capital to 
leave these nations. During the first period of 1997, the total amount of capital flight 
was about $12billion, while the overall amount in the second period was about 
$109billion dollars. The aggregate of the capital flights accounted for 10% of the 
collective GDP of these nations. Therefore, the Central Banks were unable to sustain 
the fixed-exchange rate regime and had to depreciate their currency (Grozdev, 2010). 
 
This inaction by the Central Banks resulted in foreign investors simultaneously 
withdrawing loans that were given in dollars from Thai companies. For instance, when 
Thailand abandoned the exchange rate regime, the Baht fell by 16% on that day and 
lost close to half of its value by the start of 1998 (Hale, 2011). In subsequent months, 
the region experienced a serious economic crisis. Although Hong Kong as well as 
China managed to sustain their currency pegs a little longer, they also experienced a 
crisis at later periods. The gross domestic product fell during 1998 by 13.7% in 
Indonesia, 9.4% in Thailand, 6.7% in Malaysia and 5.8% in Korea (Berg, 1999). 
 
Investors and policy makers did not pay attention to early signals that the lending boom 
was no longer sustainable because the debt-to-equity for corporations were increasing. 
In 1996, the ratio was 301% for Indonesia and 517% for Korea respectively. Another 
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early signal was the high rate of short-term debts to Central Banks reserves, which is 
a key estimation of the country’s total foreign liquidity. In 1996, the ratio was 177% 
for Indonesia and 193% for Korea (Hale, 2011). As warnings of the Asian crisis 
became evident, policy makers attempted to stabilise interest rates, fiscal policies were 
mostly neutral (apart from Thailand who tried an expansionary policy. For instance, 
the initial response from the Thailand and Korean governments to the huge capital 
flight in 1997 was to interfere in financial regulation and also interfere in the foreign 
exchange markets so as to defend their currencies (Berg 2011). 
 
As those countries allowed their currencies to float, they were confronted with the 
problem of deciding the policies that can be used to respond to the large capital 
outflows. Their aim was to restore equilibrium levels and confidence of investors so 
as to control the declining economic growth and avoid defaulting on foreign debts. 
Apart from Malaysia, the other countries continued to float their exchange rates, and 
this was done to access foreign investment, get funds to restructure the economy and 
also to adjust macroeconomic policies accordingly (Berg, 2011). The most severely 
affected crisis countries, Thailand, Korea and Indonesia further observed foreign 
liquidity crisis because foreign investors did not have confidence in their economies 
as their foreign reserves were not able to service their debts with short-term maturity. 
The adequacy of reserves of the course depends on capital flows themselves, but for 
these three, a “bad equilibrium” was possible in which investors, believing other 
investors would flee, would conclude that there were not enough reserves. Notably, 
the ratio of reserves to short-term external debt was substantially above one for each 
these countries.  
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In essence, the East Asian was a result of two main factors: currency mismatch and 
FDI inflows from abroad. Due to currency mismatches, liabilities had more values than 
assets, causing assets to be illiquid, therefore banks could no longer issue as much 
loans. In addition to the steady FDI inflows, acquisition of credit from abroad by big 
corporations was easy because of government banking. Consequently, banks ran out 
of low risk projects and financed high risk projects (so as to increase their revenue). 
However, the economic activities had a set because the borrowed dollars were invested 
in projects that did not yield foreign exchange, as most revenue were in their local 
currency. A large percentage of this credit had short term maturity dates but were used 
to fund medium and sometimes long-term projects. Most of foreign debt incurred by 
local banks had short term maturity. For instance, 56% in Malaysia, 59% in Indonesia, 
66% in Thailand, and 68% in Korea. Therefore, risks associated with foreign exchange 
largely increased, and the inability to maintain the currency pegs to the dollar also 
increased (Sundaram, 2008). 
 
3.5.2.1 Policy response to the Asian Crisis 
The initial fiscal policy response to the crisis was to enact some contractionary 
measures. In Thailand, this was justified in part by the need to reduce the excessive 
current account deficit, driven in part by fiscal expansion in 1996 and 1997, in a 
context in which growth was expected to be slower than previous years but still 
strongly positive. A further argument in favour of fiscal restraint was related to the 
potential effect of fiscal policy on confidence that is on expectations regarding future 
policy. All of the impacted countries, with the exception of the Philippines, had a 
reputation for strong fiscal discipline. Nonetheless, as the magnitude of the problems 
were revealed, particularly in the financial sector, and as policymakers faced 
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unprecedented economic and, in some cases, political pressures, doubts emerged as to 
the sustainability of the policy regime. While initial debt stocks were low, they were 
clearly growing rapidly and there was a case that demonstrating fiscal resolve might 
signal that the problem would not be allowed to grow out of control. The fiscal costs 
of the banking system restructuring are estimated to be enormous in most of the 
countries, ranging from 17% of GDP in Indonesia to 32% in Korea but only 3% in the 
Philippines according to World Bank estimates (Berg, 1999). 
 
The availability of authorised emergency liquidity funding was created to mitigate the 
severe problems caused by the fast capital flights that was a key feature of this crisis. 
A total of 17billion dollars of support was committed to Thailand, $42billion to 
Indonesia, and $58billion to Korea. The packages were not sufficient enough to cover 
all the likely servicing of those short-term debt with less maturity dates, including 
stocks of short-term debt and scheduled amortizations of medium and long term debt. 
They instead relied on the assumption of some roll-over of maturing foreign debt, as 
well as some adjustments to the current account in order to reduce the financing gap 
caused by the capital flight. These Asian countries consequently found it difficult to 
convince some of the foreign investors to stay (Berg, 2011). 
 
3.5.3 Global Financial Crisis 2007-2008 
The global financial crisis began in the United States in 2007 and spread through 
financial markets of developed economies such as Spain, United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Greece, etc. It took a while before the crisis spread into developing and emerging 
markets such as sub-Saharan African countries and the ‘BRICS’, which were affected 
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when the crisis grew into a global economic recession primarily through international 
trade (Dullien et al., 2010).  
 
There are two arguable causes of the crisis according to Chomsisengphet and 
Pennington-Cross (2006). The first cause is the greed of bankers as they were 
concerned only about their bonuses and not the credit worthiness of potential 
homebuyers. They were able to circumvent the buyers’ credit because of the 
convenience of subprime lending. During the recovery period from the East Asian 
crisis, some financial organisations that were under pressure saw the subprime market 
as a viable option to increase profits (Munro et al., 2005). With subprime lending, they 
were able to give mortgages to people who would have been denied in the standard or 
prime mortgage markets, therefore, giving easy access to loans in the subprime market. 
However, subprime mortgages comprised of higher interest rates, higher risks and poor 
collateral. The borrower cost of subprime lending depends on credit history and down 
payment requirements, while the prime market borrower cost is driven by the down 
payment alone as long as the minimum credit history requirement is satisfied.   
 
The subprime lending was backed by investment banks such as AIG and Lehman 
Brothers in the form of Mortgaged Backed Securities (MBS). The MBS market was 
larger than the Treasury market and the nonfinancial corporate bond markets. 
Mortgages backed by MBS were prepaid without consequences. In late 2004, the 
overall value of mortgages in the United States was over $12Trillion, with $8Trillion 
made up of single-family residential for purposes and $4.5Trillion represented MBS 
(Nelson and Perli, 2005). Therefore, the more the housing prices were raised, the more 
subprime mortgages they were able to sell and the more the banks made more money. 
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These assets were oftentimes broken down further into several other financial 
instruments (such as Collateralised Debt Obligations) and sold to newer sets of 
investors, and in a few cases, this process had been repeated more than once. When 
the bubble burst, investment banks failed as well and needed to be bailed out. The 
refusal to bail out some banks like Lehman Brothers, initiated the crumbling financial 
institutions (Dullien et al., 2010). 
 
These securities were inherently high in risk as people could not found much 
information about the assets, therefore any violation of them were not that easy to 
notice. In April 2008, the international Monetary Fund (IMF) valued the global losses 
at $945billion whereas the actual losses written down as at 2009 was below 
$200billion. There were worries that this possibly affected the creditworthiness of 
numerous financial institutions across the globe. Commercial banks were expected 
bear a huge percentage of the losses, while the other financial institutions such as the 
money market, hedge funds and insurance companies bear the remaining percentage 
of losses. However, not only were financial corporations of countries exposed, other 
sectors also felt the impact. For instance, in Norway, it was claimed that some local 
government sectors were exposed through investments in USA (Kellaway, 2009).  
 
Consequently, the crisis affected the activities of the money market as short-term loans 
ceased, largely due to asymmetric information regarding the real worth of the 
borrower. This put financial institutions in a difficult situation, especially those that 
rely on issuing short-term loans. Even though a lot of steps were taken by the Federal 
Reserve to reduce interest rate and increase the amount of money in circulation, the 
financial sector did not get back to their pre-crisis state. The markets that dealt in MBS 
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shut down because their assets could not be liquified into cash at banks. Also, the 
illiquid assets could not be traded or presented as collateral for borrowing purposes. 
Therefore, the main problems that the crisis caused for financial institutions were two-
fold – inability to use or dispose of their illiquid assets, and so were exposed to losses; 
and the problems of liquidity for the companies that dealt in this MBS because they 
depended wholesale backing from the financial market. These issues had serious 
consequences on the US economy (Kellaway, 2009). For example, Northern Rock plc 
that operated a business model of using securitisation to back mortgages, faced a 
serious liquidity challenge and in September 2007 sought after a distinct lending 
package from the Central Bank in order to take care of its liquidity situation. However, 
after failing to get a reasonable private sector resolution, the company was nationalised 
in February 2008. 
 
The crisis because severe when disbelief in the markets increased sporadically, partly 
as a result of Lehman Brothers’ failure. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers, banks 
funding started contracting at a rate of 100billion euros a year, a sharp contrast to its 
prior expansion rate that was expected to go up to 600billion euros in 2007 (Cour-
Thimann and Winkler, 2013). The effect of this was not only felt in America as other 
European countries were affected causing massive bailouts for financial corporate 
giants or nationalisation of these companies. In Europe, Holland, Belgium and 
Luxembourg administrations made equity injections in order to save Fortis. Similarly, 
the governments of France, Luxembourg and Belgium also made equity injections in 
an attempt to save Dexia, while the three major banks in Iceland were nationalised 
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Furthermore, in the United Kingdom, policy makers resolved that a financial house 
called Bradford and Bingley (UK) could not the financial criteria to act as deposit taker 
anymore, and so the company was nationalised. After that moment, there were a lot of 
rescue and support procedure put in place in different countries. The government of 
the United Kingdom publicised similar packages in late 2008.The method applied by 
the United Kingdom was to recapitalise affected banks by way of preference shares. 
Several banks such as Lloyds TSB, the Royal Bank of Scotland group Plc., and HBOs 
traded preference shares with the government. In January 2009, the government of the 
United Kingdom announced a second package to support businesses (Kellaway, 2009).  
 
3.5.3.1 Response to the Financial Crisis 
The initial response of the United States Federal Reserve was with monetary policy. 
They started by lowering the federal funds target rate. They also lowered the target rate 
from 5.25% to 2% in September 2007. And after the bank panic, it was further dropped 
to approximately 0.25% (Robinson and El Nasser, 2010). The policies the Federal 
Reserve utilised to reduce the effect of the financial crisis was known as quantitative 
easing6. QEI was introduced in late 2008, while QEII in introduced late 2009 and a 
subsequent operation twist7 was introduced in 2011. The operation twist policy 
required obtaining significantly huge quantities of targeted securities such as MBS, 
agent debt securities (enabling financial agencies to be able to back the mortgage 
market), commercial paper, money market, mutual fund securities, and medium and 
longer term treasury bonds. The total Federal Reserve assets skyrocketed from $0.91 
	6	Quantitative easing refers to a situation whereby Central Banks buy or sell government securities to 
banks in order to either expand or contract the money supply and lower short term interest rates. 7	 Operation twist refers to a situation whereby the Federal Reserve sells short term government 
securities and purchases long term government securities in an effort to lower long term interest rates.   
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trillion in of September 2008 to about $2.2trillion on November of 2008. Most of this 
additional funding was soaked by banks in form of excess reserves, which rose from 
approximately $2billion in August 2008 to $0.77trillion in December 2008 (Robinson 
and El Nasser, 2013). 
 
The bank panic created distrust between banks and the public but also among other 
banks. In Europe, investors had reservations about the financial strength of their 
counterparts in the interbank market. This forced the money markets’ rate upwards and 
put pressure on the resolution about the suitable interest rate transmission by the 
European Central Bank (ECB). Since the interbank market tension began in August of 
2007, the ECB provided lots of funds so as to meet the demands of member countries’ 
banks, while at the same time helping them to improve their liquidity, which would 
eventually reduce uncertainties about domestic banks’ liquidity situation. The ECB 
above all else provided overnight loans to banks, assigning about €95billion in August 
2007. 
 
 The European Central Bank also organised additional refinancing actions with 
maturation date of about six (6) months, as against the maximum period of three (3) 
months prior to the crisis. In order to lessen uncertainties about banks’ liquidity 
position during the early periods, any offers above the preceding programme’s 
marginal rates were selected in last refinancing programme of that period. Also, 
provisional swap lines were created in collaboration with other Central Banks in order 
to moderate the growing pressure on the American funding markets. (Cour-Thimann 
and Winkler, 2013). 
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After the Lehman Brothers went bankrupt in September of 2008, a panic arose about 
the financial positions of major global banks, which led to a severe decline in activities 
of both the financial sector and economic activities. Prior to the crisis, banks had 
accumulated great liquidity cushions and to protect themselves from risks associated 
with balance sheets and lending situations. Given the essential significance of banks 
in providing finance in the euro region, and the ECB’s monetary policy application, 
the liquidity problems were disturbing with respect to credit crunch and the dangers of 
monetary authority’s incompetence in protecting the financial market. The ECB like 
other major Central Banks around the world decreases vital interest rates to really low 
levels, however, a key component of the ECB’s solution was to maintain its 
effectiveness in controlling monetary conditions comprised of non-standard policy 
recommendations. The objective was to main the preservation of price stability, 
continue to maintain stability in financial situations, and regulating the fall of the real 
economy (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013).  
 
3.5.4 Euro Area Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The European crisis was an aftermath of the global financial crisis. The GFC of 2007-
08 served as the trigger that debt contagion across Europe eventually causing a sharp 
decline in growth. As interest rates fell, it gave rise to excess borrowing that left 
commercial banks in serious debts, and left governments with huge fiscal deficits and 
high public debts among countries in the region. With a view of meeting liquidity 
problems that arose from the global financial crisis, the European Union (EU) 
organised a meeting in Paris in October 2008, to come up with a collective action for 
the Eurozone and settled on a bank rescue package to increase their funding and secure 
interbank lending. The effort to manage the crisis was viewed as an essential step to 
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avoid a situation whereby actions of one-member nation hurts other member nations 
ability to provide credit and liquidity to their indigenous banks. 
 
Towards the end of 2009, Greece acknowledged that their fiscal deficit was 
undervalued. They disclosed actual figure of 12.7% of GDP, compared to the 3.7% 
stated in a previous meeting. In the same vein, Greece’s public debt in 2009 was 
disclosed to be about 113%, which was above Eurozone threshold of 60%. In the same 
period, there was lack of confidence by investors resulting from high fiscal deficits and 
that the sovereign debt was composed of risky insurance and CDS. As at 2010, a 
sovereign debt crisis had ensued in the euro zone and Greece was the most affected at 
that point. Subsequently, similar issues had started in Ireland, Portugal and Spain. 
Despite the fact that the composition of fiscal deficit, public and private debts, as well 
as conditions for bank lending were substantially unalike across the member countries, 
their financial sectors operated in identical fashion mostly using CDS premiums 
(Anand et. al, 2012). In order to reassure investors’ confidence, on May 2 2010, the 
European Union and International Monetary Fund developed a bailout strategy worth 
about 110billion Euros for Greece which was dependent on their ability to cut 
government spending and raise taxes.  
 
The bailout strategy was accompanied by another strategy that was agreed in May of 
2010. This strategy was decided by the 27-member nations of the EU, and it was to 
start an initiative, referred to as European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). The aim 
of this initiative was to assist with the preservation of financial stability in the Euro 
area by offering financial support to member countries in crisis.  
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The EFSF had authority to trade securities and use these funds acquired to provide 
loans up to 440billion euros for EU member countries. The securities traded were 
supported by guarantees provided by the European commission on behalf of the entire 
European Union, the eurozone member nations, and the IMF. The EFSF added a 
€60billion worth of loans from the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 
(EFSM) and a 250billion euros loan funded by the IMF in an attempt to have a financial 
buffer. The arrangement enabled the ECB to procure government debts in form of 
bonds. In connection with the agreement in May 2010, Greece was able to gather 
$70billion through the sale of government enterprises to the private sector. 
Furthermore, in November of 2010, the European Union and IMF agreed to bailout the 
Ireland with €85billion, while in April of 2011, Portugal declared that they can no 
longer deal with their financial obligations and sought assistance from the EU. 
Subsequently, in May of 2011, the finance ministers of member nations approved a 
78billion Euros rescue loan to Portugal (Anand et al. 2012).  
 
Another surprising meeting was organised once more in July of 2011 in Brussels. The 
heads of states agreed on actions to end the spread of the crisis. They concluded that 
another bailout of 109billion euros would be helpful to for Greece. Therefore, in 
conjunction with the IMF and contributions from private investors, they were able to 
raise that money as a way of bridging the financial gap. The EFSF was a key financial 
agent, while the IMF and ECB undertook regular assessments. The agreement also 
incorporated extension of the maturity dates of loan repayment and also decrease in 
interest rates. In a bit to avert the perceived contagion, the heads of states decided to 
raise the flexibility of the EFSF so as to enable them to give loans to member nations 
as a precautionary initiative. 
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The EFSF was given the ability to recapitalise financial institutions by issuing loans to 
governments even if those countries are not part of the initiative. Furthermore, the 
EFSF was given the permission to interfere in secondary market activities in order to 
create an excellent financial markets situation, in case of financial instability 
circumstances. In order to raise fiscal consolidation and economic growth level within 
the euro area, the representatives of those countries agreed to continually support 
implementation of EFSF agenda. The representative also decided to give Portugal and 
Ireland the kind of package that was provided to Greece such as debt maturation period 
of 15 years also to reduce interest rate to about 3.5%.  They further decided that all the 
Euro member countries have to strictly observe stipulated fiscal objectives.  
 
Along with dealing with possible macroeconomic fluctuations and crisis, the member 
states (apart from the ones under the EFSF plan) agreed to decrease their deficits under 
3% by 2013. The representatives of the EU member nations also requested that the 
European Investment Bank (EIB) support the nations seeking financial assistance from 
the EU and IMF. This happened because the Euro area had a special institutional 
arrangement in the form of the European Union, and because they cannot dictate the 
exchange rates, there was tension on employment levels in some of the member 
countries. This resulted in some member countries attempting to improve those 
employment burdens with fiscal spillage. The ensuing debt levels had been aggravated 
by the global financial crisis, which later contributed to the financial instability in the 
region (Blundell-Wignall, 2012).  
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In late 2011, the euro banking system gradually became under pressure because of the 
numerous interactions between the ECB and national banks, which exposed those 
individual countries to sovereign risks. Therefore, as the price of sovereign bonds 
reduced, national banks’ balance sheets were also affected. Consequently, investors 
began to have concerns over the ability of several national banks within the region to 
meet their financial obligations, and at the same time, concerns arose over the 
capability of the European Union to support impending crisis. This caused the bond 
prices of the sovereign organisation to fall even more, affecting not only Greece, 
Portugal and Ireland but it also put a stress on other economies like France, Belgium 
and Austria. The national banks’ equity prices decreased by approximately 70% in 
2011, and the credit default swaps was more than that of Lehman Brothers. In a lot EU 
member countries, the funding from the union ceased, and their national bank’s 
guarantee of bonds was seriously limited (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 2013). 
 
Therefore, the European Banking Authority came up with further capital boost and 
increase the Core Tier-1 capital ratio8 to 9%. It was supposed to be a stabilising 
programme, but it ended up initiating a necessity for funds in the European banking 
system of over 100billion euros that had to be raised before 2012. Speculators 
projected a deleveraging risk of over 1trillion euros, because banks would lessen their 
weighted risk assets in order to better their equity ratio (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 
2013).  
 
	8	Tier 1 Capital ratio is a measure of a bank’s financial strength by regulators such as the Basel 
Committee. It is the comparison between banks’ core equity capital and total risk-weighted assets. A 
core firm’s capital is the sum of their equity capital and disclosed reserves while risk-weighted assets 
include all assets that the firm holds that are systematically weighted for credit risk.  
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In an attempt to increase investors’ confidence and to provide an efficient monetary 
policy system, the European Central Banks started its Securities Markets Programme 
(SMP) for ensuring that liquidity is available in the sectors that were not functioning 
properly. With the SMP, economic interventions by the EU can be easily done in both 
public and private debt securities markets. According to the treaty, involvements in 
sovereign bonds markets would be solely to secondary markets (Cour-Thimann and 
Winkler, 2013). Sovereign bonds held by the ECB through the SMP reached 219.3 
billion Euros in February 2012 (Kang, 2015aka). 
 
Even though the initial problems that arose from the sub-prime lending were observed 
first in the USA, the impact on the financial sector mostly felt in Europe, particularly 
in the United Kingdom and the Euro area, as financial institutions that survived in 
those areas lost significant amount of money and assets. It was projected that 51% and 
70% of the total market capitalisation of the 10 of the biggest banks in Europe as well 
as insurance companies respectively, were lost at the peak the crisis and led to a 
subsequent worsening in investor’s confidence. At institutional level, the decrease in 
market capitalisation ranged between 30 and 96% (SESRIC, 2011). 
 
With regards to the debt levels, the gross government debts in the Euro area reached 
from 69percent of the total GDP in the starting three months of 2007 to 85.5percent in 
the last three months of 2010. Also, as at June of 2011, the average government debt 
of the Euro area was about 87.3percent of the total Euro area GDP. For the case of 
Greece, government debt as percentage of GDP rose to about 152% in 2011, while the 
quickest rise in the government debt took place in Ireland where it was 24.8percent of 
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GDP in March of 2007 but had risen to 102.4percent of GDP June of 2011 (SESRIC, 
2011).  
 
As the sovereign debt crisis continued to affect the real economy, several European 
nations experienced a large unemployment rates, some of which was caused by the 
austerity measures proscribed by the EU and IMF, which resulting in a large about of 
workers’ turnover. In 2001, the unemployment numbers for Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were 17.1%, 14% and 12.5% respectively in June 2011 (SESRIC, 2011). 
Spain on the other hand faced the highest unemployment rate with 21.3% in same 
period. Furthermore. It was observed that countries that had their national currencies 
pegged to the euro suffered high rates of unemployment when contrasted countries 
who had floating exchange rate regimes (SESRIC, 2011). 
 
3.5.4.1 Response to the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The European Union is not a federal union and therefore operates under a treaty. The 
treaty included several agreements and corrective measures for affected member 
countries. The provision included the prevention of bailouts by national Central Banks; 
the restriction of special access certain public institutions, governments and financial 
institutions; nonexistence of bail out clause; and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP, 
which is considered to be distinct from the Treaty itself) (Cour-Thimann and Winkler, 
2013). The EMU under the Maastricht regime was designed for stability mainly 
through price stability-oriented monetary policies of ensuring that inflation rate is kept 
under but around 2% along with comprehensive public finance, i.e., government debt 
of 60% and budget deficit lower than 3% (or as stated otherwise by the SGP).  
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According to Anand et al. (2012), the formation of the euro area had a fundamental 
paradox in that it is a monetary union and not a fiscal union. The establishment of the 
current currency (The Euro) specifically prevented the European Central Bank or 
member nations’ Central Banks from funding government deficits. However, one of 
the methods employed by the EU included raising the minimum amount of bank 
capitalisation in order to promote stability and their capability to handle shocks. They 
also created the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF). This was arm was 
created in 2010 for the purpose of raising the required funds that the union might need 
to provide assistance to member countries in distress, and also to buy government debt 
as well as provide financial assistance to banks. The EFSF is unanimously backed by 
all the members of the Euro area. Another initiative was also introduced in 2011 called 
the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism (EFSM). This initiative was formed 
to enable the European Commission to acquire needed funds while using the European 
Union Budget as a security. The EFSM can lend funds in association with the EFSF 
and the International Monetary Fund. 
 
3.6 LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE DISCUSSED CRISES 
There are several similarities between all the crises discussed above such as the 
dangers of pegging your currency to a particular exchange rate regime, loss of 
investor’s confidence, inability of banks to carry out their financial obligations, bail 
out of large corporation among others. 
 
The patterns of the crises are similar to the findings of Lai (2003), who listed some 
common features that occur during a financial crisis. They include economic peak 
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before crisis, banking crisis and loss of investors’ confidence, all features which were 
prevalent in the various crises discussed in previous sections.  
 
Prior to those crises, there were periods of boom or economic expansion. This was the 
case for the great depression, the Asian crisis and the Global Financial Crisis. 
Similarly, all the crisis discussed resulted in the failure of both the stock markets and 
real estate markets and were usually introduced or followed by a banking crisis. This 
occurred in the case of the Asian crises, Financial crisis and the Euro Area sovereign 
debt crisis where major banks needed a bail out. Those financial instabilities were also 
characterised by loss of investors’ confidence which manifested itself as a capital 
flight.  
 
Despite these similarities between the crises, there were several and significant 
contrasts between the economic and financial systems of the United States in the 
1930s, East Asia before 1997 and that of the USA and Europe prior to 2007. The 
dissimilarities could be the reason why some policymakers concluded that the kind of 
crisis that the East Asian countries experienced is not likely in happen in industrialised 
countries (Hale, 2011). 
 
Firstly, the financial sectors of industrialised countries are a lot more advanced, and 
the regulations are tougher than that of those Asian countries. The changes in 
regulations suggested for the Asian countries were intended to make their economic 
and banking regulations in accordance to that of industrialised nations. For instance, 
financial analysts suggested that the banks in East Asia align their capital ratios in 
accordance with the Basel Accord adhered to by industrial countries. In other words, 
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industrialised countries’ financial sectors were in an improved state in 2007 than the 
state of the East Asian Financial sector in the boom period prior to the Asian crisis 
(Hale, 2011). 
 
Another set of distinction can be seen from the perspective of an established financial 
sector. It can be observed that the United States learnt from the mistakes of the great 
depression and the fall in Gold standard and were a lot more resistant to shocks because 
of their strong regulations and complexity. As earlier mentioned, the impact of the 
Global Financial crisis was felt more in Europe than in the United States of America 
where the crisis originated. A well-structured and monitored financial systems should 
be able to perform efficiently with little supervision and more leverage. Then again, as 
the crises discussed demonstrated, less oversight can decrease transparency. 
 
3.7 CONCLUSION 
Financial instability, according to this research, is defined as a situation where financial 
markets are unstable and does not have the potential to prevent or protect the economy 
from a financial crisis. Sources of financial instability have also been identified and 
explained. The sources discussed were fragility in financial institutions, asset price 
volatility, foreign exchange markets, equity markets, fixed-interest and real-asset 
markets. Attributes of those sources could be noticed in the major financial instabilities 
discussed, for instance, evidence of fragility in financial institutions and asset price 
volatility could be seen in the great depression and evidence of foreign exchange 
markets as a source was recorded during the great depression and Asian crisis. Foreign 
investors lost confidence in the financial authorities to maintain the exchange rate, 
therefore withdrew their investments causing exchange rate to decline. Evidence of 
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fixed-interest and real-asset market as a source of financial instability were also 
observed in the great depression, Asian crisis and global financial crisis. The effect of 
a financial crisis on the selected West African countries will be discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
CONTEXTUAL INFORMATION ON SELECTED WEST AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter discusses political economy of the West African region as well as some 
political instabilities that plagued the region post-independence from their various 
colonial rulers. Additionally, the impact of public debt, financial stability and 
economic growth in the West African countries used as case study were discussed. 
These counties are Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Niger, Togo, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Nigeria. This chapter also highlights the main areas that were affected by 
the recent financial crisis and the policy responses by their governments and Central 
Banks. The consensus on the areas according to literatures examined, concluded that 
the main channels affected were financial market and trade.  
 
4.2 RATIONALE FOR SELECTED COUNTRIES 
The selected case study countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Ghana, Mali, Senegal, Niger, 
Togo, Cote d’Ivoire and Nigeria) are located in West Africa and are all members of 
the Economic Cooperation of West African States (ECOWAS) (see section 4.5). 
Additionally, seven of the nine countries (except Nigeria and Ghana) all belong to the 
same monetary union – West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) and 
have used a common currency – CFA Francs since 1945. The monetary union is 
responsible for making monetary policy decisions for the member states, however the 
final decision to implement those policies rests on the national governments of those 
states. Ghana and Nigeria on the other hand have their own independent central banks 
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that makes and implement monetary policy decisions in those countries. Although the 
monetary authorities in these countries are supposedly independent, the president still 
has the power to approve or disapprove polices made by the monetary authorities. This 
is because these countries operate a presidential system of government where decision 
making is centralised and decided mostly by the signature of the president.  
 
Irrespective of how policy decisions are taken, all those countries have similar 
histories. They were once colonised either by France or Britain and have also faced 
several political unrests either domestically or with their neighbouring countries. 
Those political instabilities have negatively impacted government revenue and 
spending, manufacturing, savings, investment, economic growth, wealth allocation 
and poverty in the West African region (Abu et. al., 2015). On the other hand, since 
they are all members of ECOWAS, all those countries benefit from cross-border trade 
with at minimal cost and cross-border investments. Furthermore, their export similar 
primary commodities like cocoa, diamonds, gold, hides and skin as well as crude oil 
among others. They also have similar economic trends such as trends in GDP, inflation, 
government spending, high rates of public debts, etc (as shown in section 6.8). 
 
Additionally, these countries are highly indebted and there is the influence of 
international organisations in all of those countries. An example of foreign influence 
was the Structural Adjustment Programme suggested by the IMF and adopted by all 
the case study countries (see 4.6). Ronnback (2008) reported that these countries also 
receive official development aid which consist of 15%-20% of GDP in most cases (see 
4.7).  
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4.3 POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE WEST AFRICAN REGION 
The West African region consists of 16 countries and it is the most populous region in 
Africa. All those countries are multi-ethnic. For example, Nigeria has over 250 ethnic 
groups. The commonly practised religions include Christianity, Islam, and various 
traditional practice. The region is predominantly agrarian with over 60% of the 
population living in rural areas, as majority of the countries prior to independence were 
exporters of primary goods such as groundnuts, hides and skin, coffee, cotton, cocoa, 
rubber and palm produce (Olukosi, 2001). They also possess other mineral resources 
such as crude oil, diamonds, gold, limestone, tin and uranium. Over the years, most 
countries in the region limited their export base because they became increasingly 
dependent on the exportation of one or two primary commodities/mineral resources as 
their major source of revenue. For instance, exportation of petroleum products 
accounts for 61% while cocoa exportation accounts for 44% of the total agricultural 
exports in West Africa.  
 
All the countries in region were created during colonialism except Liberia that was 
founded in 1821 as the home of former slaves from the United States. Of all the 
countries in the region, Senegal, Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria and Ghana appear to have 
improved industries based on the magnitude of their manufacturing sectors and the 
amount of people employed by the sector. Nigeria also has the largest economy, 
accounting for more than half of West African economic activities, and so, 
developments of the Nigerian economy is very important for the whole region. 
However, about 70% of the West African population live on less than $2 per day. Even 
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though they receive foreign aid, yet it has not had any significant impact on their living 
conditions (Ronnback, 2008).  
 
The region also experienced colonialism by European nations such as France, England 
and Portugal. Prior to the colonial era, the different parts of the region were dominated 
by kingdoms and empires such as the Ashanti Kingdom, Kanem Bornu empire, Sokoto 
Caliphate, the Benin kingdom, the Dahomey Kingdom among others. The colonialists 
used these established kingdoms as a means of control in nations. In Francophone9 and 
Lusophone10  countries, the main mode of control was termed policy of assimilation 
where the aim was to obliterate local cultures while creating black French or 
Portuguese people; whereas in Anglophone11  countries, indirect rule was the method 
used. The indirect rule was a system whereby the traditional rulers maintained the norm 
of the society but also enforced taxation for the British colonial regime. Regardless of 
the method of colonial governance, West Africa became the first region in Africa 
where the earliest intellectuals emerged and the movement towards independence 
began. The events during colonialism inspired a larger pan-Africanist agenda aimed at 
reclaiming the history and identity of the continent. It was in Ghana – West Africa that 
the first pan-African congress took place, attracting major nationalists and intellectual 
African leaders (Olukosi, 2001).  	
Furthermore, the region comprises of a number of multinational organisations. These 
organisations are founded on the bases of promoting economic and/or regional 
cooperation. The prominent one is the Economic Community of West African States 
	9	French	speaking	countries	10	Portuguese	speaking	countries	11	English	speaking	countries	
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(ECOWAS) which has memberships from countries of all languages. There used to be 
the Communaute economique des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO) which 
operated in a similar way to ECOWAS but strictly for Francophone countries. 
Additionally, there is the monetary union known as the Union economique et 
monetaire Ouest Africaine (UEMOA), the successor of the CEAO which is in direct 
competition to ECOWAS in terms of functions especially when it relates to 
accessibility to funds.  
 
West Africa also has additional important attributes. It consists of one-third of Africa’s 
population with Nigeria being the most populous, the oldest republic in Africa in 
Liberia and the first African country to gain independence – Ghana in 1957. One of 
the earliest coup d’états in Africa also took place in the region – Togo in 1963. That 
coup was the first of many for the region during the 1960s and 1970s. Only two 
countries of the 16 countries (Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal) succeeded in avoiding 
military rule until 1999 (Olukosi, 2001).  
 
4.4 POLITICAL CONFLICTS AND TENSIONS IN THE WEST AFRICAN 
REGION 
The West African countries over the years have faced increased levels of corruption 
and political instability, resulting in the slow pace of economic development through 
negative impacts on the level of investment, poverty, government income, 
manufacturing, rate of savings, etc. Corruption in this case refers to situations whereby 
economic rent is pulled out from the local economy and invested abroad. Earlier 
military regimes in member countries suggested that corruption and poor economic 
conditions was their main reason for overthrowing democratic leaders, however, they 
	 86	
themselves have been blamed for participating in the same corruption and failed to 
lead the citizenry out of poverty (Abu et. al. 2015). Between 1957 and 2004, the West 
African region has experienced forty-four successful military coup d’état’s, forty-four 
failed coups, eighty-two plots and seven civil wars (Ronnback, 2008) 
 
The partition of West Africa by European colonialists also created ‘manmade borders’ 
that soon became causes of conflicts. Several tribes and ethnic groups were separated 
into two or three countries, nomadic lifestyles of groups such as the Fulani and Tuareg 
were inadequately accommodated. As a way of quelling potential conflicts that could 
arise from border disputes, in 1964 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 12 decided 
to recognise and accept all inherited boundaries from the colonial regimes. There have 
since been many border conflicts in the region such as Nigeria-Benin, Nigeria-
Cameroon, Nigeria-Chad, Ghana-Togo, Mali-Burkina Faso, Senegal-Mauritania, 
Guinea-Sierra Leone, among others. The named border conflicts were mostly driven 
by the control of land, human and mineral resources (Olukosi, 2001).  
 
After independence, most West African countries practiced a multiparty system but in 
some cases like Senegal, the party that fought for independence dominated until 
military rule spread from Togo to other countries in the region up until the late 1990s. 
The military regime in these countries were seen to be significant contributors to 
political instability in the region as successions were mostly achieved by coup d’états 
and violence. Politics in West Africa is dominated by a centralised system of 
governance whereby the central governments wield the most power and they are also 
responsible for the redistribution of wealth. This system made it easier for the military 
	12	Predecessor	of	the	African	Union	
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to enforce their agenda in various countries leading to various degrees of authoritarian 
governance (Olukosi, 2001). 
 
Additionally, some of the political instabilities that have plagued the region include 
civil wars in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in 
the early 1990s which had serious impact on their neighbours; conflicts in Senegal 
which engaged The Gambia and Guinea Bissau; Bakassi Peninsula oil conflict between 
Nigeria and Cameroon, among others (Atuobi, 2007). Lengthy military rule in West 
Africa did not only spawn serious political instability, it also created the norm of 
militarism combined with other factors such as economic decline and rise in rebel 
propelled several countries in the region into war. Liberia became the first West 
African country to be regarded as a failed state as a result of their civil war. 
Francophone countries for the most part benefitted from the influence of the France 
government in terms of investment and the placement of military persons in positions 
of power, which arguably might have aided in the reduction of the pressures towards 
internal political instabilities such as civil wars.  
 
Countries that have faced armed conflicts have shared common characteristics. They 
are typified by extreme poverty, low levels of education, less developed industries, 
highly indebted and sometimes reliant on agricultural production. They are also highly 
susceptible to fluctuations in the global economy. Economic slumps and social 
disruption trigger and prompt armed conflicts. Among the fifteen ECOWAS countries, 
twelve of them have faced armed conflicts since their independence where human 
rights violations were widespread. In 2004, nine ECOWAS states were plagued with 
armed factions. Those factions sprang up for different reasons such as religious, ethnic, 
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financial, anti-state, etc. Since 2005, the only ECOWAS states not affected by conflict 
are Ghana, Cape Verde and Burkina Faso (Ronnback, 2008). Even though some of the 
West African countries survived their various and, in some cases, numerous political 
instabilities, their economy and polity took a while before it returned to the good 
economic conditions.  
 
Three of the major political conflicts and tensions that affected the entire region are 
discussed below.  
i. The Nigerian Civil War 
The Nigerian civil war is regarded one of the bloodiest civil wars in West Africa with 
a reported three million deaths and widespread malnourishment, starvation and 
destruction. The civil war occurred in the south-eastern part of Nigeria from July 6, 
1967 to January 15, 1970. 
 
In January 1966, the Military government of General Aguiyi-Ironsi forcefully took 
power from the then civilian government in Nigeria. That coup was significant because 
it saw the death of Nigeria’s first prime minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa as well 
as other regional leaders – Sir Ahmadu Bello (Premier of the Northern region) and 
Samuel Akintola (Premier of the western region). Prior to that coup, Nigeria operated 
a regional system of governance where each region took care of their needs and the 
Premiers were the regional leaders. After the coup, the system was changed to a unitary 
system of government where the centre is responsible for executive duties and the 
allocation of resources.  
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In May 1966, General Aguiyi-Ironsi implemented the ‘Unification Decree’ that 
eliminated the regional civil service and introduced a unified national civil service, 
which was a major modification from the federal system of government employed by 
the British colonial government to protect the large and poor Northern population after 
independence. However, the Northerners appeared not to be happy with this decision, 
they saw it as a tactic to assert Igbo domination over the region (The Head of state, 
General Aguiyi-Ironsi was Igbo). The North was predominantly Muslim Hausa/Fulani. 
Consequently, there was widespread rioting in the Northern region resulting in the 
killings of hundreds of Igbos. In July of 1966, there was another coup d’état resulting 
in the overthrow and assassination of General Aguiyi-Ironsi by Northern Military 
officers and Colonel Yakubu Gowon assumed the position of Head of State, even 
though he was a Christian. Colonel Gowon was also warned by the British High 
Commissioner and the United states Ambassador about the consequences of a potential 
separation of Nigeria on the Northern economy (Uche, 2008). He was the Head of state 
of Nigeria from 1966-1975 and was also the first Head of ECOWAS.  
 
The main reason for the civil war was that Igbo people of the Eastern region wanted to 
be separated from Nigeria to become an independent nation called Biafra Republic. 
The leader of this movement, Lieutenant Colonel Chukwuemeka Odumegwu-Ojukwu 
was an appointed military governor of then Eastern region in 1966 under the 
government of General Aguiyi-Ironsi. In May 1967, the Head of State, General Gowon 
made a decree dissolving the regions as well as their regional leaders, replacing them 
with twelve states (Kirk-Greene, 1975). The dissolution of regions meant that the 
aspiring Biafra now consisted of three states instead of the entire Eastern region – 
South Eastern state, East Central state and Rivers state. Two of the three states had 
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internal tribal conflicts – Ibibio/Efik disgruntlement and the Rivers-Calabar-Ogoja 
conflict, while the third state was landlocked and oil-less. In early 1967, there was an 
agreement between the federal government of Nigeria and Shell-BP (Nigeria’s Largest 
Oil firm at the time) had an agreement to stop making royalty payments to the East 
region, even though 75% of its operation was in that region. This meant that the would-
be Biafra would have no royalties from oil. This reportedly was one of the reasons for 
Ojukwu’s call for a secession from Nigeria. Another reason was the mass killing of 
Igbo military officers in July 1966 by Northern soldiers.  
 
Additionally, there was the issue of distribution of wealth which began in the colonial 
era but was not changed prior to the war. For instance, there was a policy called 
Northernisation where priority in employments and royalties were given to 
Northerners, which meant that the Southern and Eastern regions in Nigeria at the time 
had high rates of employments and low standards of living compared to their Northern 
counterparts. Religion and Tribalism also had a role in the genesis of the war. Northern 
Nigeria were predominantly Muslim Hausas and Fulanis, while the East were 
predominantly Igbo Christians, which reflected throughout the civil service and the 
composition of the Nigerian army. As a result, there was heightened discriminations 
along religions and tribal lines (Kirk-Greene, 1975). Religion also played a big role in 
the determination of what side to support during the war. Since General Gowon was 
from the North, even though he was not Muslim, other northerners and soldiers who 
were Muslim supported him; and since most of the Head of States of Neighbouring 
countries were also Muslim, they were encouraged to join the cause of a united Nigeria. 
In southern Nigeria, the Christian population for the most part were indecisive in their 
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support, however there were some who were supportive of their fellow Christians in 
Eastern Nigeria (Gowon, 1984).  
 
According to Gowon (1984), the civil war was a test of loyalty and commitment from 
neighbouring francophone countries. Commitment from neighbouring countries was 
important because Biafra received help from a superpower – France. General de Gaulle 
of France revealed in 1968 that they were in support and assisted the Biafran regime. 
Niger, Togo, Mali and Cameroon were vocally opposed to recognising Biafra as a 
separate and independent nation, whereas Cote D’Ivoire were in support of the Biafran 
regime and gave Lieutenant Colonel Ojukwu political asylum after the war. The 
support of Cameroon was important to Nigeria because of its proximity to the Eastern 
region, this weakened the ability of Biafran soldiers to get access to weapons. Gabon 
supported the Biafran republic initially (because of the friendship between President 
Bongo of Gabon and President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote D’Ivoire) but later changed 
their stance. Therefore, Cote D’Ivoire was the last Francophone country in the West 
African region to support the secession in Nigeria. This created a break in diplomatic 
ties between Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire. While in East Africa, two countries were in 
support of the Biafrian secession – Tanzania and Zambia. 
 
On the other hand, from 1968 until the end of the civil war in January 1970, there was 
uncertainty about the loyalty of certain Anglophone countries, notably Ghana and 
Sierra Leone. Sierra Leone gave a military base to Biafra soldiers and were allowed 
free entry and exit into the country. Sierra Leone also criticised the policy of Nigeria 
in the Organisation of African Unity’s summits of 1968 and 1969. Ghana’s relationship 
with Nigeria became estranged at the start of the civil war. This is because their first 
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Military president General Ankrah tried to proffer solutions to Nigeria’s problems, 
which the Nigerian government did not take lightly. The relationship between the 
countries then improved after he was succeeded by General Afrifa in April 1969. Since 
General Afrifa and General Gowon both went to Sandhurst, they got along really well 
and there was a cordial relationship between both countries.  
 
However, in October of 1979, Ghana transitioned from a Military rule to a civilian one 
and Dr. Kofi Busia became the Prime minister. As part of a new policy, foreigners 
residing and working in Ghana were expelled within a short period between 1969 and 
1970. About five hundred thousand Nigerians were among those expelled. This 
expulsion coincided with the end of the Nigerian civil war, putting pressure on the 
efforts to reconstruct and resettle citizens, and hence, cooperation between the two 
countries grew even more challenging (Gowon 1984). 
 
By the end of the Civil war, there was an international relation crisis between Nigeria 
and some other countries in West Africa and efforts were made to repair them. The 
crises were resolved through the OAU, CEAO and ultimately, ECOWAS. 
 
ii. Ghana, Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire Conflict 
The Nigerian civil war was not the only political instability to disrupt the region. The 
military takeover from Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (Ghana’s first prime minister, first 
president and renowned Pan Africanist) in February 1966 also created political tension 
in the region. The new military regime of General Ankrah reversed a previous 
partnership between Guinea and Ghana, while aggravating tensions between Guinea 
and Cote D’Ivoire.  
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President Sekou Touré (the first president of Guinea), gave Kwame Nkrumah 
sanctuary in Guinea and also moved to reinstate Nkrumah as Ghana’s leader, directing 
his army through Cote D’Ivoire. Therefore, Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana also moved 
armed troops to their borders in anticipation of an attack, where they stayed until April 
1966. As a result of Sekou Touré’s move, Houphouet-Boigny (Cote D’Ivoire’s 
president) had to seek guarantees from France and the Conseil de l’Entente13 that in 
the case of an assault by Guinea, they would respect the terms of their joint defence 
agreements. However, the attack did not happen because Guinea were not able to 
support a military mission of such magnitude (Gowon, 1984).  
 
On the other hand, the overthrow of Kwame Nkrumah strengthened the Conseil de 
l’Entente, aiding Togo in making a formal entry into the Entente in June 1966. After 
Togo’s independence, there was a territorial dispute over the Ewe population with 
Ghana emanating from the colonial era. During the colonial era, Britain and France 
divided West Africa among themselves and drew up the borders, in most cases, 
separating tribes into different countries. In this case, the ewe population was divided 
into British Togoland and French Togoland. After Ghana’s independence in 1957, 
there was a transfer of territory and population from the British government to Ghana 
but when Togo gained independence in 1960, the Ewe of Ghana started a movement 
to re-join their compatriots in French Togoland. However, Kwame Nkrumah was 
opposed to the idea. Since Ghana had the backing of Britain, Togo had to look for 
	13	Conseil	de	l’Entente	is	a	union	of	five	francophone	countries	–	Benin,	Burkina	Faso,	Cote	D’Ivoire,	Niger	in	1959	and	later	Togo	in	1966.	
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backing from Cote D’Ivoire and other francophone countries. This dispute caused 
several clashes and unrests for over thirty years.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Sekou Touré of Guinea and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana had a 
good relationship, and so after the Nkrumah’s overthrow, Guinea saw itself gradually 
isolated. Even though Touré moved to reinstate Nkrumah, most African leaders were 
opposed to military interference as a way to resolve political and social issues. 
Diplomatic ties were also cut off between Ghana and Guinea. Similarly, the relations 
between Cote D’Ivoire and Guinea did not improve after the removal of Nkrumah, 
especially since Guinea attempted to restore him to power and moved their armed 
forces through Cote D’Ivoire.  
 
Promptly after the Ghanaian coup d’états overthrowing Nkrumah, Guinea put the 
Ghanaian ambassador in Conakry under house arrest, denying his return to Accra. By 
February 1967, nationals of both countries were arrested and held in custody in a series 
of retaliatory acts that could have gotten worse, especially after the abduction of 
Guinea’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary to the foreign minister and other 
diplomats who boarded a Pan-American Airway jet headed for Addis Ababa in Accra 
– Ghana. General Ankrah of Ghana declared that the Guinean diplomats who were on 
their way to attend the 1966 OAU summit would be detained until eighty-five 
Ghanaian detainees in Guinea were allowed to return to Ghana (Gowon, 1984; Meyers, 
1974). The response of the Guinean government was quick. President Sekou Touré 
held the US government responsible for the abduction and arrests and demanded that 
the US lodge a strong instantaneous protest in Accra-Ghana; and secondly, that they 
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facilitate the release of the Guineans and transfer them to their destinations (Skurnik, 
1967).  
 
A number of factors contributed to the Ghanaian government’s detention of Guineans. 
The chief factor being the forceful and constant hostility shown by Sekou Touré 
towards the new Military government in Ghana. Not only did Guinea offer Nkrumah 
shelter after the was exiled, they also provoked Ghana by making Nkrumah the co-
president of Guinea. Besides that, Nkrumah declared on arrival in Guinea that he 
intended to return to Ghana and will teach the military personnel who overthrew him 
a deserved lesson. After those actions, the Ghanaians did not see any difference 
between the provocative utterances by Nkrumah or actions taken by the Guinea 
government. Both sources also publicly called on Ghanaians to rebel and eject the new 
government of General Ankrah since President Sekou Touré did not see the new 
government as a legitimate one. Furthermore, Guinea seized Ghanaian properties in 
Conakry and sanctioned Nkrumah’s withdrawal of Ghanaian public funds from a 
Guinean bank. The final motivation for Ghana’s detention of Guineans was that the 
Ghanaians wanted to put pressure on the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) to step 
in and play an active role in the freedom of previously arrested Ghanaians (Skurnik, 
1967).  
 
However, in a bid to avoid further conflict and a possible War in the region, Hamani 
Diori (President of Niger) and Modibo Keita (President of Mali) in July 1967 
facilitated a successful meeting to settle the tension between Guinea and Cote D’Ivoire 
and an exchange of detainees took place in September 1967. Also, the Guinea-Ghana 
	 96	
conflict was resolved in Addis Ababa in an ad-hoc meeting of some African leaders in 
November 1967 (Gowon, 1984; Skurnik 1967) 
 
iii. La Francophonie 
Post independent francophone West African countries had a tight and one-sided 
relationship with their former colonialist - France. It was General de Gaulle of France’s 
policy to strengthen and increase the imprint of France in Africa. That policy continued 
even after his resignation in 1969 and continued under his successor, President 
Georges Pompidou. Regardless of the continuity of France’s policy, occurrences in the 
1960s were not altogether encouraging for the francophone countries because they 
dreaded a weakening or termination of French economic and technical aid.  
 
During that period, France experienced increased domestic pressure to reduce 
economic commitments in its colonies and former colonies. The indifference of many 
French nationals to the issues and events in former colonies were made known through 
the principles of ‘cartierism’14 became an increased source of anxiety for Francophone 
African countries. This anxiety did not get any easier for the Francophone countries as 
there were drastic cuts in France’s budget for foreign aid for the purpose of increasing 
their domestic spending to alleviate social unrest in France (Gowon, 1984). Moreover, 
France also became reluctant to provide troops in support of francophone leaders 
because of the domestic pressure. There was also the unanticipated and contentious 
decision to devalue the currency of francophone countries – CFA Francs without 
consultation, after the resignation of General de Gaulle. These events were the first 
	14	Cartierism,	also	known	as	‘cartierieme’	was	a	principle	that	colonialism	or	economic	aid	to	former	colonies	is	not	good	business.		
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signs of a new and different relation between France and her former colonies for the 
next couple of decades.  
 
Even though economic aid and technical cooperation was the main concern for many 
West African francophone states, President Houphouet-Boigny of Cote D’Ivoire and 
President Senghor of Senegal had other ambitions which ultimately required the 
authorisation and backing of de Gaulle of France. For instance, in 1967 as Nigeria 
headed towards a civil war, the Cote D’Ivoire president wanted France’s support to 
help secure the separation of Biafra from Nigeria as well as his ambition for leadership 
of the West African region (Gowon, 1984). Senghor also wanted de Gaulle’s 
authorisation and backing to create an international francophone community where 
France would also be an active participant, and he will be a leader of the organisation 
in some capacity.  
 
However, to their dismay, France under the leadership of General de Gaulle did not 
intervene and left the initiative to those West African presidents. When he later 
intervened, it was different from what the leaders hoped for. General de Gaulle’s late 
involvement in the Nigerian civil war in 1968, was in promotion of secession but 
withheld the official recognition of Biafra, which was counterproductive. And so, both 
France and Cote D’Ivoire governments eventually had to reach an agreement with the 
military government of Nigeria. The remainder of the West African francophone 
countries on the other hand were in support of the Nigerian military government, 
primarily to avoid a complete diplomatic cessation between Nigeria and France; to 
discourage de Gaulle supporting the Biafran secession, and the later facilitate 
reconciliation between Nigeria and Cote D’Ivoire.  
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The idea of ‘Francophonie’ was discussed at the OCAM15 summit in June 1966.  At 
that summit, President Senghor of Senegal laid down his proposal for an organisation 
comprised of independent French African colonies, the Maghreb countries, 
Madagascar, Belgium, Switzerland, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam and Canada 
(Alexandre, 1969; Gowon, 1984). La Francophonie was intended to be what the 
Commonwealth was to former British colonies. Unlike the Commonwealth, emphasis 
was placed on language as a condition for participation. The emphasis on the language 
criterion was because of de Gaulle’s affinity for supporting and protecting all French 
people irrespective of whether they are from France or French colonies (Therien, 
1993). 
 
Although the initiative received a lot of support from non-African French states like 
Canada, the African contingencies had some reservations. Guinea was the first to speak 
out in 1967, when President Sekou Touré labelled ‘la Francophonie’ an effort to 
undermine African interests. According to him, it was an effort to preserve the 
economic overpowering of African nations that sought to eradicate themselves from 
the colonial oppression. Cameroon was also not in support of the outfit mostly because 
they were a bi-lingual state (English and French) and therefore they were not willing 
to be integrated into a pure French-speaking organisation (Gowon, 1984).  
 
Furthermore, Francophonie did not receive full backing from de Gaulle of France and 
so the proposed first conference scheduled for December 1966 did not take place. 
	15	OCAM	is	an	international	organisation	of	15	countries	that	were	former	French	Colonies.	The	acronym	stands	for	Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian	Common	organisation.		
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France’s reluctance was based on the fact that the organisation would require France 
to be a dominant partner, echoing colonialism (Alexandre, 1969). Also, France were 
not keen about Francophonie because of the economic issues in Africa as they were 
trying to cut off all economic aid to former colonies. Francophone West African 
countries during the 1960s always sort for economic support from France, even though 
African leaders insisted on their political independence. Therefore, by the middle of 
1968, la Francophonie was overtaken by the more pressing concern of the Nigerian 
civil war, which caused a division among the Francophone leaders, with Cote D’Ivoire 
and its allies in a minority.  
 	
4.5 THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 
(ECOWAS) 
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) started in 1975 with 
sixteen (16) member countries comprised of Anglophone, Francophone and 
Lusophone speaking countries, but currently has fifteen (15) members16. These 
comprises of two Lusophone nations (Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde), five 
anglophone nations (Nigeria, Ghana, Gambia, Liberia and Sierra Leone), while the rest 
are francophone nations (Senegal, Mali, Guinea, Benin, Cote D’Ivoire, Togo, Niger 
and Burkina Faso). 
 
The main criticism of regional economic integration prior to ECOWAS was that it 
benefitted only powerful countries and does little to protect poorer member states, also 
that the advantage of low-tariff or no-tariff barrier is short-term because other regional 
	16	Mauritania	withdrew	in	2000.	
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blocs would emerge and subsequently, tariffs are raised by all sides. Despite those 
criticisms, governments of West African countries viewed regional economic 
integration as a more practical solution for the subregion because it was seen as a 
reliable way of achieving improved standard of living for member countries at the time. 
They were of the opinion that regional integration enables poor countries attract 
investment on more favourable terms, improve diversification of their economies, 
reduce social and political strains between countries and harmonise their policies for 
better economic standing. The challenge of the economic integration in West Africa 
was diversification of trade. The economies of member countries were not 
automatically stimulated either commercially or through manufacturing as there were 
little industries to start with. Also, the countries were largely competitive because they 
produced similar goods at similar prices for the same destinations in Europe (Gowon, 
1984). 
 
ECOWAS started in 1975 as a reaction to colonialism and epitomised the start of 
collective self-sufficiency. ECOWAS was specially created to eliminate the artificial 
obstacles to trade and development that was operational during the colonial era 
(Gowon, 1984). The principal purpose of ECOWAS is to stimulate cooperation and 
integration among West African countries as well as improve the standard of living 
and economic growth of member states. Other objectives were added later on such as 
Non-Aggression protocol – 1978, mutual assistance on defence – 1981, establishment 
of a Community Parliament – 1993, among others (Ronnback, 2008).  
 
In the early seventies, Nigeria was a fast-growing nation with huge prospects and their 
Francophone neighbours sought to be partners and valued allies in economic 
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development. Therefore, by the time ECOWAS was created, economic integration was 
already in progress by member countries (Gowon, 1984). Chambers et. al. (2012) 
reported that the pace of ECOWAS is somewhat determined by decisions and non-
decisions of Nigeria. Not only was the country instrumental in ECOWAS’ creation, 
they were a driving force for several landmark agreements, and it plays a role of 
keeping the peace and security in the region. Therefore, there is a view that Nigeria’s 
commitment to the regional integration is unmatched. Nigeria also accounts for 73.5% 
of all ECOWAS exports due to its crude oil exports and large economy; followed by 
Cote D’Ivoire and Ghana which accounts for 8% of the total exports respectively. 
 
Unlike other economic integrations, ECOWAS was not formed for the purpose of 
being a strong regional administration for member countries, rather, member states are 
responsible for making their political decisions and implementing economic decisions 
(Gowon, 1984). For example, Nigeria’s trade policy is protectionist, imposing high 
tariffs and bans on imported items change often. Consequently, this proved to be a 
major challenge for the body. This is because a genuine commitment by individual 
member countries to the regional integration process is vital for the body to achieve its 
objective of regional integration. However, the level of commitment by member 
countries appeared doubtful. This could be seen in part when there are changes in 
governments or elected officials in member countries. The freshly elected leaders are 
usually enthusiastic about establishing their unique landmark so as to distinguish 
themselves and their policies from predecessors, so they abandon policies previously 
established (Chambers et. al., 2012).  
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Another example can be seen from the recent global financial crisis of 2007-2009, 
Guinea introduced an export ban on all food commodities to nearby countries, whereas 
Senegal also banned rice exportation to surrounding countries. Therefore, while export 
and import bans were for the most part prominent during that period, they have been a 
common feature of policy making in the West African region and stayed that way 
(Engel and Jouanjean, 2015). Furthermore, high transaction costs and the high barriers 
to trade over time resulted in the growth of informal trade all through the region. The 
Benin-Nigeria border has been the most problematic in relation to informal trade, 
which was a consequence of Nigeria’s repeated import bans and protectionist policies. 
The informal trade channel has caused restraints on revenues from formal trade 
channels across the region. In the early 2000s, illegally imported Nigerian petrol 
accounted for over 70% of Benin’s petrol usage (Chambers et al., 2012).  
 
The ECOWAS’s role of keeping peace and security was strengthened in the early 
1990s as a result of the start of Liberia’s civil war. Although the intention of the 
Nigeria-led ECOWAS was questioned by those loyal to then Liberian opposition 
military leader Charles Taylor, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) was 
created with the aim of providing a multilateral armed force for peacekeeping missions 
as well as providing humanitarian support. Since the establishment of a peacekeeping 
arm was opposed by several francophone countries, ECOMOG has a large percentage 
of Nigerian soldiers and have been deployed in several conflicts within the region. 
ECOMOG have been deployed in Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau. 
The deployment involved military actions versus rebel groups that oppose government 
authority. The missions for ECOMOG has mostly been peacekeeping such as 
obtaining cease-fires, generating atmospheres conducive for negotiations and 
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protecting the general public. ECOMOG missions have been fruitful in that they were 
able to force rebel groups to consent to cease fire negotiations (Ronnback, 2008). 
Amongst its successes was the restoration of then elected civilian government of 
Ahmad Tejan Kabbah that was deposed by joint RUF and renegade armed forces of 
Sierra Leone fighters in 1998 (Olukosi, 2001). 
 
4.6 STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMME 
The West African region has experienced incompetence in their national 
manufacturing and trade sectors as a result of unsuitable government strategies that 
constrained competition and the utilisation of economics of scale.  
 
After independence in the 1960’s, the Heads of state of West African countries 
assumed that their private sectors were ill-equipped and so government had to perform 
a central role. This assumption turned into socialist attitude towards economic 
development in which all aspects of economic sectors were state-run. Therefore, they 
invested in large public-run primary industries and implemented policies to regulate 
prices and exchange rates, as well as restriction of trade (Heidhues and Obare, 2011). 
In the beginning, this approach seemed successful as there was rise in education and 
employment rates, huge investment in public infrastructures such as health, power and 
transportation (roads and ports). However, in the mid-70s, economic activities began 
to decelerate and echoed in the GDP as decline in growth of primary sectors, decrease 
in investment levels, deterioration of exports, inefficient allocation of resources and 
high public debts. 
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During the 1980s, substantial effort has been directed towards the elimination of such 
constraints. Several countries have attempted to implement policies that will foster 
national and foreign investment, develop their private sectors, boost agriculture and 
hence, increase economic growth. One of such implemented policies was the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP). SAP is an economic reform programme for developing 
economies recommended by the IMF and World Bank. It is a policy that aims at trade 
liberalisation, devaluation of pegged currencies or undertaking a flexible exchange 
rate, diversification of the economy (so that the country does not depend on one or few 
goods) and promotes food security. Trade liberalisation and currency adjustment came 
with additional regulatory measures such as the reduction of the public sector size and 
expenditure, inflation rate control and provision of subsidies to manufacturing sectors 
(Barry et. al., 2000). The inadequate size of West African markets pigeon-holed them 
as price takers for their most exportable products, which means that countries in the 
region are highly susceptible to fluctuations in world prices for commodities. 
 
 Prior to the introduction of SAP, countries in West Africa experienced significant 
increase in agriculture after their independence, but due to certain events and 
macroeconomics strategies, the increase rapidly turned into a decline. For example, the 
agricultural real GDP for Cote D’Ivoire averaged 4.5% during the 1960s and 3.3% in 
the seventies; Ghana on the other hand also had significant rise in agricultural 
production until the mid-70s were it declined due to drought, fall in international prices 
of cocoa and heavy taxes levied on producers in order to mitigate their budget deficits. 
Furthermore, during the late 1960s, Mali experienced significant economic growth due 
to their agricultural and long-term industrial policies to the point where the Malian 
Franc became overvalued and unexchangeable leading to reduction in the 
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competitiveness of local products. However, in the early seventies, attempts were 
made to revert Mali to a lucrative economy and producer were given incentives, but 
an exogenous oil shock and drought between 1972 and 1974 counteracted the potential 
positive effects of the enacted policies. In the periods between 1980 and 1984, food 
output fell by 20% and livestock by 35% (Barry et. al., 2000). 
 
Similarly, Guinea saw decline in economic growth as a result of a fall in agricultural 
products and livestock from 1973 to 1981. This is in part due to the exogenous oil 
shock and droughts in the seventies, but it could also be attributed to poor policies by 
their government.  The policies included poor exchange rate regimes that upset the 
country’s exports and competitiveness; high tariffs; the state’s monopoly of 
agricultural sector; and lack of a viable transportation infrastructure, to name a few. 
The ineffective policies caused a steady decline in manufacturing, agricultural 
production and exports, while importation of food was incessant. In the same vein, 
Senegal experienced economic decline in the mid-70s as a result of a fall in the prices 
of their chief exports (groundnuts and phosphates). Prior to this event, Senegal had a 
good tertiary sector and a well-paid public sector. The well-paid public sector was a 
big inconvenience for the country as it did not only affect government spending, but 
also served as yardstick for private sector wages. Therefore, when the prices of their 
chief exports fell, the burden of government expenditure caused a weakening of the 
country’s current account as export decreased (Barry et. al., 2000). 
 
The overall purpose of SAP was efficiency in the redistribution of resources with 
respect to comparative advantage and for this to happen, governments had to disengage 
from owing and controlling the production process. This is because the policies in 
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place before the adoption of SAP were not in favour of an open economy. The basic 
principle of an open economy is that economic agents can respond without restrictions 
to fluctuations in market prices. For example, the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 
caused changes in market structure for exportable goods, which in turn generated 
incentives for the demand of those goods, leading to increased agricultural productivity 
(Barry et. al., 2000). Therefore, SAP reform policies were targeted at trade 
liberalisation, diversification of the economy and beneficial exchange rate regimes 
across different countries. The competitiveness of West African agrarian production 
was inhibited by low rate of labour productivity, incapable financial sectors which 
results in shortage of capital, reduced access to farmable lands and water supply, 
inadequate transportation and distribution infrastructures as well as poor economic 
policies by each country. These were some of the issues that the Structural Adjustment 
Programme (SAP) aimed to address. 
 
However, SAP was not successful in some countries. For example, government 
finance for Senegal declined between 1990 and 1994; fiscal and current account 
deficits also increased significantly; aggregate investment from total savings declined 
from -1.03% of GDP in 1991 to -3.2% of GDP in 1994. Furthermore, as a result of 
currency depreciation based on SAP policies, inflation of Senegal rose to 19.8% 
(Katombe, 2001).  
 
After the Implementation of SAP, even though the revenue from exports rose from 
$3billion to $5billion between 1980 and 1995, poverty doubled from 17.8% to 37% 
even though production shifted from public to private sector (Kingston, 2011). As part 
of the SAP package, governments were to cut their spending so as to adjust budget 
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deficit. However, the cuts in government spending affected key sectors such as 
education as wages of teachers declined, resulting in skilled teachers leaving for better 
employment in other countries.  
 
Cote D’Ivoire also had public debt issues by adopting the SAP. Their debt levels grew 
from $7.4billion to $17.7billion between 1980 and 1990. Cote D’Ivoire devalued their 
currency by 50% so as to encourage exports but that action affected the economically 
disadvantaged as their level of savings was affected and their purchasing power fell. 
In a bid to curb the negative effects of SAP, Cote D’Ivoire joined other surrounding 
countries producing cocoa in order to regulate the price of cocoa beans by controlling 
supply. For instance, in 2000, Cote D’Ivoire along with Ghana, Cameroon and Nigeria 
decided to destroy about 250,000 tons of cocoa beans as a way to raise prices 
(Kingston, 2011). As a result of all the negative effects on their economies, most West 
African countries eventually abandoned the Structural Adjustment Programme.  
 
4.7 IMPACT OF FINANCIAL INSTABILITIES ON WEST AFRICAN 
COUNTRIES 
The impact of the global financial crisis and consequently, the Euro Sovereign debt 
crisis affected the economies of West African countries through high and fluctuating 
prices of commodities and foreign exchange rates, which raised investors’ uncertainty 
levels and led to significant fall in levels of investment and trade flows (Allen and 
Giovanetti, 2011). The debt levels and stock market were also severely affected by 
those financial instabilities. 
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The relationship of this countries with the rest of the world and certain regions such as 
the European Union served as the anchor through which the financial instability 
filtered through. Nigeria has the biggest economy in the West African region 
contributing about 76.9% of the regions GDP, along with Cote D’Ivoire, Ghana and 
Senegal. Put together, these four countries contributed about 90% of the West African 
economy (European Commission, 2014), so as instabilities arose in those regions, 
growth rate dwindled. The main channels through which the global financial crisis and 
European sovereign debt impacted the growth rate of these economies are discussed 
as follows: 
 
i. Debt: Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, the region experienced economic 
growth averaging 6.5% per annum between 2002 and 2007 (Arieff et al., 2010). The 
growth rate was achieved due to economic restructurings and propelled by high 
demand for primary raw materials such as crude oil and other mineral resources such 
as gold, iron ore, etc. from abroad. The increased need for African primary raw 
materials caused investment to rise in several countries with FDI stock increased two-
folds between 2003 and 2007. 
 
Even though the sub-region was not affected directly by the global financial crisis, its 
effect however caught up in later periods causing a rise in debt levels. The total debt 
as a ratio of GDP rose from 11.56% in 2008 to 19.4% in 2012 according to the Debt 
Management Office (DMO, 2013). Most debts in West Africa are used on current 
spending and this has hindered the economic growth. The average ratio of public debt 
for the entire African continent according to a report by Lopes Da Veiga et al. (2015) 
is 81.37%.  Figure 4.1 shows the trend in the external debt stock from 1970 to 2015. 
	 109	
Figure 4.1: External debt stock (%of GDP) between 2005 and 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
As shown in figure 4.1, there was a significant rise in the level of external debt stock 
in those West African countries from 2012. Also noticeable is the fact that Ghana is 
the largest debtor among those countries. However, between 2005 and 2006, there was 
a decline in the level of public debt because of the debt relief programs by the IMF, 
and also, Nigeria’s ability to pay off their $18Billion debt to the Paris Club (Igbatayo, 
2011).    
 
ii. Stock Market: The biggest and direct impact of the global financial crisis in West 
Africa was experienced mostly through the financial sector. There was rapid decline 
in the stock exchange indices as billions of dollars’ worth of equity wealth were lost, 
resulting in a decrease in stock prices and an unprecedented economic and social 
experience that distressed most countries (Obayelu, (2010); Seck, (2010). Stock 
market indices fell by about 67% between the first quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 
of 2009. This fall in stock market activities and the negative effects it had on the 
financial sector affected aggregate demand causing financial instability in the region.  
 
(%	of	GDP)	
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The decline in stock market activities caused a significant fall in economic activities 
in various countries. In Ghana, the non-performing loans to gross loans increased from 
7.9% in 2006 to 8.7% in 2008. The Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE) also lost 62.2% 
of its valuation between July 2008 and April 2009 (AfDB, 2009).  Seck (2010) reported 
that for $100 worth of investment in 2007, the annual return rate in Ghana was $5.36 
in 2007 but had declined to about $-15.57 as at 2009; while for Nigeria, the annual 
return rate as $74.73 in 2007 but had fallen to $-33.78 in 2009; and for the Bourse 
Regionale des Valuers Mobilieres17 (BVRM), the annual rate of return was $77.05 in 
2007 but $-25.89 in 2009, thus, resulting in capital flight by foreign investors.   
 
iii. Trade: The financial crisis and the Euro crisis also had an effect on trade in West 
African countries, as the European Union is one of the main trade partners of the West 
African region. West African trade with the world and the European Union improved 
by 67% and 70% respectively during 2008-2013 period. Nigeria, Ghana, Togo, 
Senegal and Cote D’Ivoire accounted for 79% of the European Union exports to West 
Africa. 40% of the European Union’s export to the West African region was received 
by Nigeria, another 15% received by Togo and another 10% received by Senegal. On 
the other hand, Nigeria exports the most to the EU contributing about 76%, followed 
by Cote D’Ivoire by 9% and Ghana with 8% (European Commission, 2014).  
 
As a result of the crisis, global aggregate demand fell causing revenue from exports to 
drop quickly, leading to the weakening of current account balances, loss of foreign 
exchange reserves and a massive reduction in trade tax revenue (AfDB, 2009). The 
	17	The Bourse Regionale des Valuers Mobilieres is a regional stock exchange serving Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal, Togo and Mali. 
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region had enjoyed strong trade relation with other countries and regions. West African 
countries depended on export to get foreign exchange and earnings and since there was 
a noticeable decline in the prices and export of key commodities from the second half 
of 2008, their foreign earnings also dwindled. The major export commodities for West 
African countries include food, agricultural products and crude oil. The commodity 
affected the most was crude oil, as its price declined by about 50% between February 
of 2008 and February of 2009 (Obayelu, 2010). Nigeria’s reserves declined by 19% 
between September 2008 and January 2009 because of a fall in oil prices. This is 
because the Nigerian oil sector accounts for about 80% of its government revenue 
thereby affecting the country’s financial stability due to widening current account and 
budget deficits (Ajakaiye et al., 2016).  
 
While oil revenue sustained the economic activities of oil producing countries such as 
Nigeria all through the prosperous periods, the oil sector presented a major challenge 
during a time of crisis. When crude oil prices fell by 50percent in December of 2014 
and traded close to $50 per barrel, the IMF lowered Nigeria’s growth projection from 
5percent for 2015 to 4.8percent.  The sharp fall in the dominant oil revenue had a 
significant negative effect on the economy turning fiscal surpluses to severe deficits. 
This speaks to the dramatic effect of this experience on the Nigerian economy as 
employment dropped, with the level of unemployment rising from 23.9% in 2011 to 
25% in 2014 (Ajakaiye et al., 2016). 
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Trade	(%	of	GDP)	
Figure 4.2: Trade as a Percentage of GDP between 2005 and 2015 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation 
 
Figure 4.2 above shows the trend in Trade as a percentage of GDP from 2005 to 2015. 
It can be observed that the trade in those countries move in a similar way. There was 
a general decline in Trade activities from 2015 in most of those countries. Another 
example of the effect of the financial crisis on commodity prices can also be seen in 
the case of Mali and Ghana. Livestock and cotton make up about 80% of Mali’s exports 
and the prices of cotton fell by 25% in 2009 (AfDB, 2009). Also, a fall in the prices of 
gold and cocoa led to a worsening of the macroeconomic situation in Ghana. Public 
debt in Ghana rose to 70% of GDP, the budget deficit reached around 10% and the 
currency lost about 31% of its value in 2014. The country had to borrow heavily on 
current spending by increasing public sector salaries and energy subsidies, rather than 
spending on development (Zamfir, 2016).  
 
iv. Exchange rate: Furthermore, there was a severe drop in the nominal exchange rates 
of the Ghanaian Cedi and Nigerian Naira in 2008 and 2009 than in the two preceding 
years. At the end of 2009, the Cedi lost 28.6% of its value while the Naira lost 20.1% 
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in the same period. Furthermore, the BVRM had a fixed peg to the Euro so it was 
difficult to ascertain the impact. Therefore, compared to the stock indices the BVRM, 
Ghana and Nigeria experienced a significant fall in the nominal values of their 
respective currencies (Seck, 2010).  
 
4.8 RESPONSE TO CRISES 
Even though the world is advancing towards globalisation, West African countries did 
not predominantly boost their degree of integration into the world economy compared 
to other regions like the EU (Seck, 2010). Before the financial crisis of 2008, there 
were some notable attempts to support West African exports with initiatives such as 
the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)18, the European Unions ‘Everything 
but Arms” Initiative (EBA)19, and China’s robust efforts to increase its imports of 
primary commodities from Africa. Seck (2010) suggested that West Africa was not a 
prime destination for Foreign Direct Investment except in the extractive industry, 
namely Nigerian Oil, Ghanaian Gold, Nigerien Uranium, Senegalese Iron Ore, etc. 
(Seck, 2010).  
 
The African Development Bank (AfDB) came up with facilities with the primary aim 
of targeting the global financial crisis. They were intended to counteract budget 
deficits, expand liquidity, and support financing for both infrastructure and trade.  
Some of those facilities were Emergency Liquidity Facility (ELF)20 and Trade Finance 
	
18 AGOA is a United States Trade Act enacted in 2008 to enhance market access to the US for 
Qualifying SSA countries.  
19 EBA is an agreement by the EU to grant less developed countries full duty free and quota-free 
access to the EU for all their exports with the exception of arms and armaments.  
20 The ELF aims to provide financial assistance to eligible countries to support a broad range of 
obligations, including fiscal stimulus and supporting public - private partnerships at risk 
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Initiative (TFI)21. These were deliberated by many experts to be critical to Africa’s 
ultimate economic revival (Arieff et al., 2010; Obayelu, 2010). The AfDB made 
available $1.5billion Emergency Liquidity Facility, $1billion for Trade Finance 
Initiative, created a framework for quicker transfer of funds to suitable countries, and 
also policy advisory support. During the peak of the crisis between 2008 and 2009, 
AfDB loans rose to about $11bullion with most of its funds going towards budgetary 
support, trade finance and infrastructure projects to countries like Senegal where 
foreign investors had withdrawn (Arieff et al., 2010).  
 
The IMF also provided funds to assist several countries that could not carry out their 
international repayment obligations and found it difficult to get credit or to raise funds 
from both national and international financial markets at reasonable conditions. The 
International Monetary Fund increased its financial assistance in response to the crisis 
by raising the amount that countries could borrow for low-income countries. The 
IMF’s loaning commitments for Africa between January and July of 2009 was 
$2.7billion, compared to the $1.1billion commitments in 2008. However, the available 
funds from the IMF to African countries suddenly dropped due to the enactment of the 
Multilateral Debt Relief Initiative (MDRI) agreed upon at the G-8 summit in 2008. 
The overall volume of IMF credit accessible to African nations totalled about 
$4.7billion, but $2billion remained undrawn. Cote d’Ivoire had the largest loan 
program in West Africa ($581 million) (Arieff et al., 2010). 
 
	
21 The TFI provided $500million to support commercial banks and development institutions in Africa 
to use banking resources to support trade financing. 
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Ghana signed onto the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)22 Initiative in the early 
2000s with the aim of bringing its public debt rations to sustainable levels. The aim of 
the initiative was to allow the country to gain debt sustainability without debt relief 
and was consistent with fiscal policies towards debt sustainability. This helped Ghana 
in reducing its overall level of fiscal deficit from 9.81% of GDP in 2000 to 2.96% of 
GDP in 2005. Also, the stock of public debt dropped from 18.3% of GDP in 2000 to 
26.2% of GDP in 2006 and rose again up to 55.2% in 2013 (Asiama et al., 2014).  
 
A number of monetary policy measures were used to control the financial instability 
including reduction of interest rates, recapitalisation of financial institutions, revising 
budget expenses, bond financing of public spending, and targeted assistance on key 
sectors in Nigeria (Obayelu, 2010). An example of bond financing of public 
expenditure in Nigeria was the CBN issuing directives to banks that they had the option 
to restructure margin loans up to 2009, where rules on share buy-back were released 
with a limit of 15%. The targeted assistance plan was to support specific sectors 
considered as key growth drivers. The Nigerian government injected N70billion into 
the severely weakened textile industry in 2009. Prior to 2006, South Africa was the 
only sub-Saharan African country to issue a sovereign. However, in attempts to raise 
funds, several West African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal and 
Ghana have successfully raised funds in international debt markets. Ghana in particular 
was able to place a $1Billion bond even before completing an IMF program. A few 
corporate entities in Nigeria and Ghana have also been able to issue Eurobonds 
successfully such as Guarantee Trust Bank of Nigeria issuing a five-year $500million 
	
22 HIPC is an initiative by the World Bank and the IMF to reduce debt burden of poor countries to 
sustainable levels in order to ensure that no country faces a debt that it cannot manage. (Lopes, et al., 
2015)  
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bond offering in 2011 and Ghana Telecom selling a $300million five-year bond in 
2007 (Amadou, 2015). 
 
In order to respond to the several devaluations of national currencies, a range of actions 
were undertaken to protect the currency or to improve competitiveness. In the countries 
that operate a fixed-exchange rate regime, their governments depreciated their 
currencies to increase competitiveness. The Central Bank of Nigeria for instance, took 
aggressive measures to intervene in the foreign exchange markets so as to limit the fall 
of the Naira that went up just after the global financial crisis (Obayelu, 2010). The 
Nigerian Central Bank also depreciated the Naira in November of 2014 by 8.4% 
attempting to bolster the value of the Naira and maintain the foreign reserves. 
However, as pressure continued to mount on the foreign exchange rate, the Central 
Bank Nigeria closed up the official window in February 2015, which was viewed as a 
strategic depreciation of the Naira that resulted in relative stability in the currency 
market (Akakaiye, et al., 2016) 
 
Steps were also taken to raise liquidity levels of banks as well as that of domestic firms’ 
in order to forestall the impact of the crisis. In Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Mali, Niger and Togo, the joint Central Bank (BCEAO23) provided funds on a seven-
day basis to the regional money markets. Nigeria also reduced the cash reserve ratio 
and the liquidity ratio from 40% to 30% (Obayelu, 2010).  
 
The region adopted other fiscal stimulus packages in order to control the severity of 
the crisis with contractionary fiscal policy. In Senegal, the government had to lower 	
23 The Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) is the Central Bank for West 
African states. It is the monetary Authority for Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo. This organisation is also responsible for issuing their currency. 
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its spending by 4% of GDP and its emergency spending by 0.6% of the GDP, while in 
Nigeria, the government utilised approximately $52billion of its foreign reserves to 
support the economy and to save economic activities from the recession though a 
stimulus package (Obayelu, 2010). 
 
Generally, the fiscal policy measures adopted by West African countries sought to 
raisese the countries revenue and revert the progression of mounting national debt did 
not improve. The unchecked spread of lesser unofficial economic activities as a means 
of income and subsistence by a lot of households disturbs the instrument of proper 
taxation and causes a setback for fiscal policy actions. Therefore, countries are 
encouraged to seek for more funds in order to fill current account deficit gaps and to 
fill gaps between expenditures and revenues. Borrowing serves as an alternative for 
getting the required funds needed to meet government obligations, while safeguarding 
the development of socio-economic circumstances of their citizens (Lopes Da Veiga 
et al., 2015).  
 
4.9 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we discussed the political economy of West Africa, regional economic 
integration as well as some political instabilities faced in the West African region. 
Furthermore, also discussed was the impact of financial instability on West African 
countries. The impact on these countries were evaluated under four channels – debt, 
stock market, trade and exchange rate. The region experienced a significant rise in debt 
levels in the aftermath of the global financial crisis. The stock market was the channel 
which experienced the biggest impact. The rate of returns on investment dwindled 
significantly, lead to capital flight by foreign investors. All the countries discussed also 
experienced a substantial dip in exports because of a fall in commodity prices, leading 
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to a rise in budget deficits. This is because trade made up a large part of government 
revenues, so when trade activities decrease, the budget deficits increased.  The 
financial crisis also resulted in a fall in nominal exchange rates. Since a lot of their 
revenue is from trade, a fall in commodity prices coupled with a fall in the nominal 
exchange rates mean that the economic activities suffered leading to a high rate of 
unemployment. 
 
Additionally, the steps taken to resolve this financial instability was also discussed. 
Some of the steps taken included seeking financial assistance from the IMF, making 
use of monetary policy instruments such as interest rate reduction, devaluated 
currencies and bail out of some sectors. Other fiscal policy instruments were used such 
as revised government spending, and also increasing borrowing in order to fill up gaps 
caused by budget deficits. In the next chapter, the theoretical framework for the 
research is discussed.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCEPTUAL AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: BUSINESS CYCLE 
THEORIES 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explained the conceptual framework of the study and focused on the 
theoretical framework of this research. A theoretical framework introduces and 
describes the theory explaining why the research problems exist and is considered as 
the blueprint for the entire dissertation inquiry (Grant and Osanloo, 2014). It provides 
a lens through which this research topic was examined, making use of the Business 
Cycle theories as the theoretical foundation. 
 
Economic fluctuations have negative consequences for the well-being of individuals 
and are therefore an important area of study because large fluctuations result in 
financial instabilities that can cripple the economy. Stages of a business cycle include 
the expansion phase which is the stage when the economy is growing characterised by 
rising GDP, lower inflation and a lower unemployment rate; the peak or boom phase 
is the phase where expansion is at its highest point before it transitions into the next 
phase; the contraction or recession phase is a stage where economic growth declines 
and GDP falls while inflation and unemployment starts to rise; and the trough or 
depression phase is when the economy reaches rock bottom after a long period of 
recession.  
 
The stages can be so intense that they are referred to as the boom-bust cycle. A lot of 
scholarly debates have been focused on the periods of boom and recession, where the 
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key area for debate has been whether recessions are naturally a consequence of a long 
period of boom. This was observed as one of the similarities in the various financial 
instabilities discussed in section 3.5. 
 
The recent global crisis has once again left economists questioning economists’ ability 
to explain business crisis mechanism and to provide policy solutions to economic 
crises (Dobrescu et al., 2012). The reason for this is two-fold. First, the recession cycle 
was of great intensity and caused significant economic fluctuations. The second reason 
is because of the challenges faced by macroeconomists where they failed to predict 
and explain the root cause of the crisis. We discuss three major theories – The Austrian 
Business cycle theory, the Marxian Analysis of the Business cycle and The Financial 
Instability Hypothesis. 
 
5.2 THE AUSTRIAN BUSINESS CYCLE THEORY    
This theory was initially introduced by Ludwig von Mises but was later enhanced and 
progressed by Friedrich von Hayek. The theory is not one of mathematical 
relationships but of historical explanations (Bismans and Mougeot, 2009). A 
prominent aspect of this Austrian Business Cycle Theory is the interpretation of the 
business cycle from a monetary aspect. The Austrian business cycle theorists 
emphasised the role that credit and interest rate plays in the movement of the business 
cycle. Interest rate is comprised of different levels of economic productivity such as 
price levels of different production phases and the marginal returns of expanding 
production processes (Keeler, 2001).  
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Austrian theorists differentiate between preference induced decrease in interest rate 
which reflects economic agents lowered time preference and policy included decrease 
in interest rate which occurs because of an expansion of credit by Central Bank. 
Interest rate reductions in interest rate should at the same time increase consumption 
expenditure and decrease savings and investment (Mulligan, 2006). Theorists also 
believe that equilibrium in the credit market consists of the balance between real 
savings and demand for investment loans, in addition to variations in money demand 
and supply (Keeler, 2001).  
 
A prominent feature of this theory is artificial expansion, also referred to as policy 
induced expansion. In a monetary economy, an artificial expansion or boom occurs 
when there are credit extensions and also when there is a reduction in interest rates 
resulting from bank interventions, while a crisis and subsequent stages of depression 
are a combination of phases of unjustified investment, resulting from credit 
expansions. On the other hand, equilibrium in a non-monetary economy is attained 
when the natural rate24 is equal to the market rate25.  Furthermore, an artificial 
expansion occurs in a non-monetary economy when an excess money supply causes 
the market rate to be lower than the natural rate. In this period, an additional money 
supply causes savings to decrease and investment to increase. Investments that would 
not normally be considered if interest rates were not influenced would be embarked 
upon resulting in fewer savings and more consumption (Bismans and Mougeot, 2009).   
 
	24	The natural rate is the interest rate that results in growth of real GDP and stable inflation rate. 25 The market rate is the natural rate determined by the flows of planned saving and investment. 
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The Austrian theorists postulate that whenever there is a growth in credit beyond 
available resources of an economy, there will be two outcomes. The first outcome is 
the Cantillon effect. This refers to a situation whereby fluctuations in money supply 
cause fluctuations in relative prices. The fluctuation in prices happen because 
fluctuations in money supply has entry points in the economy. For instance, the first 
beneficiary of a new money supply has the opportunity of spending that extra money 
prior to an increase in prices, whereas the last beneficiary obtains his portion of the 
new money supply after prices must have increased. Therefore, the advantages and 
difficulties of inflationary credit expansion are not evenly spread in an economy 
(Zelmanovitz, 2011).  
 
The second outcome is that the presence of new money decreases the real interest rate 
causing investments to increase because cost of capital is low. Hence, there is a rise in 
capital intensive production creating an increase in demand of real resources above the 
existing actual resources in the economy. During an expansion, the economy 
experiences periods of excessive consumption and excessive investment where 
economic agents are guided by “distorted relative prices” (which is a result of how 
new money is introduced into the economy along with misguided investments). After 
some time, economic agents start to compete for actual available resources with respect 
to consumption and investment, marking the end of the expansion and demonstrating 
where business cycle peaks. Thus, as economic agents try to access more capital for 
investment purposes, savings begin to depreciate, creating a mismatch between 
savings and investment (Zelmanovitz, 2011).  
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The Austrian business cycle posits that artificial low interest rates governs an 
unmaintainable boom where resources are channelled towards early stages of 
production, resulting in a lot of unfinished production projects. Besides, a lower 
interest rate means that consumption would increase. Since consumable products take 
a while to be produced, consumers are not prepared to wait for their wants to be met. 
This system is not maintainable, and the outcome is the abandonment of many 
entrepreneurial plans resulting in high unemployment. Furthermore, since production 
projects are initiated and cannot be completed, this will after some time lead to a 
scarcity of resources, hence ending the artificial boom, leading into a recession. 
According to this theory, recovery will not happen until the bad investments are ended 
or stopped and the resources reallocated according to the actual intertemporal 
preferences of consumers (Dobrescu et al., 2012).  
 
The lowering of the interest rates below sustainable market rates increases production 
of consumable products and investment within a short period of time but both factors 
are reduced in the long run. Credit increases causes aggregate output, aggregate 
consumption and investment, however, long run reduction in the level of economic 
growth, consumption and investments, manifests as a recession (Mulligan, 2006). 
Similarly, a very low interest rate would suggest that consumers multiply their 
consumption and reduce savings. This results in an economic situation whereby the 
consumable outputs take a long time to be produced because consumers are not patient 
enough to wait for their desires to be satisfied, and hence the production arrangement 
is not sustainable. Both producers and customers entrepreneurial plans are affected 
because they were grounded on a lower interest rate and a longer production 
arrangement (Dobrescu et al., 2012).  
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According to this theory, financial intermediaries play an important role in the 
allocation of resources in a monetary economy, and in an attempt to carry out their 
responsibilities and commitments, financial agents such as banks bid for money. As 
banks bid for money, the interest rate rises (Zelmanovitz, 2011). Similarly, when 
interest rates rise, higher rates of returns in production are needed to compete with 
financial instruments such as government bonds with higher returns (Mulligan, 2006). 
The rising interest rate and limited credit availability stops certain investments, 
creating a new business environment where defaults increase, and uncertainty rises 
suddenly. This is the moment when recession starts. Moreover, as uncertainty 
increases, so does the demand for cash balances (Zelmanovitz, 2011).   
 
Mulligan (2006) identified three ways by which a recession can happen according to 
the Austrian Business cycle theory. Firstly, it can be through deflation. After a long 
period of supplying new money, Central Banks realise the negative effects that the low 
interest rate has caused, and therefore, try to control the damage by reducing the money 
supply using contractionary monetary policy. This is done by raising the interest rate 
and occurs towards the final phase of the expansion, which is also when a recession 
phase is on the horizon. However, because of policy lag, recession still occurs, and the 
negative effect is intense. Nevertheless, the policy eventually takes effect and the 
economy returns to pre-recession conditions with sustainable interest rate. For 
example, contractionary monetary policy was noted to have preceded the Great 
Depression.   
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Secondly, it can be through Steady Inflation. During an expansion, Central Banks 
steadily increase money supply over time, especially if they are not cognisant of the 
effects of their policy induced credit expansion. The low rates of interest encourage 
investors to invest in production activities that are low yielding. The ripple effect of 
this high rate of investment is that savings decrease, and consumption rises. Therefore, 
the inefficient allocation of resources would cause steady rise in prices and drive 
interest rate upwards, resulting in large numbers of unfinished projects/production and 
hence, causing unemployment to rise. Most post-war recessions began in this manner, 
with an example of the first Gulf crisis recession of 1990-91 (Mulligan, 2006).  
 
Thirdly, it can be through accelerated inflation. Sometimes Central Banks may 
anticipate a recession or a rise in credit demand, so they try to control the situation by 
expanding credit even quicker. The recession will be delayed if the expanded credit is 
able to sustain both consumption and investment demands. Unemployment rates and 
GDP may seem like the economy is in a good condition during the policy induced 
expansion, but the policy results in an unmaintainable production situation. Middle 
and late stage production endeavours are stifled as there are not enough resources to 
meet large demands for consumable goods (as they have been allocated to early stage 
productions), hence, the weakness in the middle stage hinders the productivity in the 
economy as investment plans cannot be achieved. Therefore, a lot of resources are not 
utilised properly because of the accelerating inflation. Even though this process is 
meant to suspend or delay the recession phase from occurring, it ends up unfolding a 
serious and prolonged one (Mulligan, 2006). 
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In a nutshell, an induced credit expansion is mostly justified by the need to raise 
investments and general economic activities. However, an economic downturn would 
be unavoidable. This is because the induced investments cannot be sustained, and 
consumers cannot wait long periods to satisfy their wants. Also, the production 
structure cannot translate outputs associated with early-stage production into the same 
amount of output that would have been gotten if production got to the late stage 
(Dobrescu et al., 2012).  
 
5.3 MARXIAN ANALYSIS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE 
Karl Marx was one of the first economists to identify the presence of business cycles 
(Evans, 2004). He analysed business cycles from the viewpoint of financial instability, 
suggesting that movements of the business cycle occur as a result of the interaction of 
productive capital and financial capital (Argitis et al., 2014). Even though Karl Marx 
did not explicitly present a comprehensive business cycle theory, he presented several 
rationalisations in different areas of his work. 
 
 A fundamental element of this business cycle discussion is the deviation from the way 
in which recession is viewed. A lot of scholars’ view recession as a distress or an 
economic upset but from Marx’s perspective, it is necessary for economic growth in a 
capitalist economy.  This is because of the opinion that an expansion is a result of 
lengthy economic strains, whereas, recession or downturn is the means by which those 
strains are eradicated, forming a new era of economic growth (Evans, 2004).  
 
As stated earlier, Karl Marx had several rationalisations for the business cycle. One of 
the rationalisations is the simple commodity economy context. The production or 
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commodity economy is seen as a monetary economy, because products are traded for 
money, and the exchanged money is not instantly used to buy another product. Hence, 
that exchanged money is withdrawn from circulation and serves as a store of value.  
This is known as the abstract possibility of crisis (Evans, 2004).  
 
Also, in some cases, products are not instantly exchanged for money, but for a 
contractual promise to pay at a future time. This involves money’s function as a means 
for deferred payment. However, because of the money’s function as a means of 
deferred payments, there are two likely outcomes. Firstly, if there is inflation before 
the agreed date of payment, the borrower may not be able to raise the sum needed to 
pay back his debt. Secondly, if the debt is associated with other series of debts, the 
inability of a borrower to pay could affect the ability of others to pay (Evans, 2004). 
This is another form of abstract possibility of crisis and represents the notion that 
problems in one part of the economy could quickly spread to other parts.  
 
Another business cycle explanation relates to the credit system, which plays an 
important role in Marx’s analysis as it is one of the reasons why economies grow 
during an expansion or fail during a recession (Evans, 2004). The accessibility of credit 
as well as interest rate is the linkage between business capital and the financial system. 
For instance, firms can decide to lend their capital to other capitalists as a way of 
making profit. The other capitalists then repay the money along with a share of 
revenue, also known as interest. Marx labelled this type of capital as interest bearing 
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capital, and also explained that there are two types of interest rates; market rate and 
average rate26 (Evans, 2004). 
 
According to Marx, at the beginning of an expansion, investors regain confidence, and 
this comes with a set inclination to expand commercial credit supply. With expansion 
of credit supply (a rise in investment), there is less demand for money as a payment 
means, causing the market interest rate to decrease or stay as low as possible. As 
expansion advances and production is ongoing, the demand for money as a payment 
means has a tendency to increase, mounting pressure on the market interest rate. 
However, in a moment of crisis, the commercial credit crumbles and there is a frantic 
demand for money as a payment means, causing market interest rate to climb to its 
peak level. During the ensuing recession, market interest rate tends to reduce as the 
immense pressure calms down. Consequently, an unwillingness to expand commercial 
credit may perhaps cause demand for money as a payment means to increase further, 
in so doing stopping the rate from dropping as low as it was in the beginning of the 
expansion (Evans 2004).  
 
Furthermore, according to Marx, phases of economic growth and accumulation of 
wealth will in general undermine that state of their own prosperity and lead to a 
decrease in productivity. This is because of the parts that financial systems play when 
they over expand credit during periods of expansion or upturn. In the last stages of the 
upturn where speculations about the returns on natural resources and financial assets 
are declining, and the upturn is ended by a financial crisis and a steep economic 
	26	The average rate is the average interest rate of an entire business cycle, reflecting how the market 
interest rates fluctuated in that period. 
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downturn. Therefore, with rising unemployment and liquidation of weak firms, the 
downturn makes the conditions through which a new era of productivity and economic 
recovery can be established (Argitis et al., 2014). 
 
Marx acknowledged two likely reasons that can end an expansion and bring about a 
crisis. The first reason comprises of a semi-autonomous monetary-financial crisis, 
which occurs when banks decide to restrict credit after an elongated period of credit 
expansion. Credit expansion can be restricted because banks anticipate imminent 
problems regarding their liquidity or ability to give loans to investors. Therefore, as 
investors and businesses struggle to gain access to credit, this leads to a significant rise 
in interest rate that causes a sharp decline in profit returns in the business sector.  The 
second reason relates to rising labour costs and raw materials on one hand, and 
increasing interest rate on the other hand, that results in a fall in the net profit returns 
of firms. If firms are not able to carry out their payment obligations while the credit 
system is by now over-expanded, the economy ends up in a crisis (Argitis et al., 2014).  
 
This is because the imminent demand for money to meet their obligations pushes 
interest rates higher and the interest payment can surpass overall profits of some firms. 
Therefore, people lose their jobs and unemployment rises; furthermore, investment 
plans are deserted, and there is an upsurge of bankruptcies. On the other hand, an 
increase in interest rate in the financial sector is usually followed by a decline in prices 
of securities.  This situation affects brokers who traded at top prices on credit which 
cannot be recovered. In all cases, the incapacity of the business sector and financial 
sector to pay back loans is linked to a banking system crisis, and hence, an economic 
recession (Argitis et al., 2014).  
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5.4   MINSKY’S FINANCIAL INSTABILITY HYPOTHESIS (FIH) 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis is an endogenous business cycle theory that 
analyses the financial framework of a country. It focuses on investments by firms and 
how they make financial choices (Caverzasi, 2010). Minsky’s financial instability 
hypothesis posits that capitalist economies tend towards financial instability (Palley, 
2009).   
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis seeks to explain how finance drives the boom-
bust cycle. The boom is driven by an overestimated return on investment which results 
in a higher level of investors’ confidence, causing investors to seek credit to finance 
their projects (Barnes, 2011). As a result of the increased inclination to borrow, a large 
portion of projected profits are used for repaying financial commitments. Minsky 
believed that a high rate of investment brings about a high rate of profit in the economy 
(Wray, 2011). However, investors soon realise that returns are overestimated and then 
panic occurs initiating a bust. During the initial boom, prices of shares and firms’ 
valuations are higher than the real values, but because share prices are high and 
expected returns are high, financial institutions boom. However, at the latter stage, 
prices fall quickly below the real values (Barnes, 2011). Therefore, the financial 
instability hypothesis was formulated to expound instabilities that happen in a 
capitalist economy (Tse, 2001).  
 
According to Minsky, phases of the business cycle are influenced by firms’ investment 
financed by loans and purchasing capital asset. He recognised that loans by individuals 
and government are important but does however believe that they only adjust to 
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economic situations, and rarely cause changes in the business cycle. The reason why 
firms’ borrowing has more viability with regards to business cycle is that as firms 
borrow to carry out investment projects or to purchase capital assets, their ability to 
repay their loans or financial obligations is a key-determining factor for economic 
stability. In other words, the business cycle governs future productivity and profit level 
of firms and how they repay their financial obligations (Evans, 2004).  
 
Minsky identified three categories of firms’ competence to sustain and repay their 
financial obligations: hedge finance, speculative finance and Ponzi finance. Palley 
(2011) refers to this as the basic Minsky cycle. Hedge finance refers to a situation 
whereby a firm expects its overall profit to be more than its financial obligations 
throughout the repayment period. Speculative finance refers to a situation where a firm 
expects its overall profit to be more than its loan payment obligations, but in the 
meantime, profit is enough for the payment of interest on the loan but not enough for 
its cover it until maturity. This firm uses short term loans to fund long term assets. This 
means that the firm can pay back some of their debts, and because they repay their 
interest obligation, their overall borrowing will not rise. Lastly, Ponzi finance is similar 
to speculative finance, but the short-term overall profit is not enough to repay interest 
and so the firm has to get more loans to be able to pay the remaining interest. In 
Minsky’s opinion, the economy will be stable if there is more hedge financing (Evans, 
2004).  
 
The Financial Instability Hypothesis asserts that at some point during an expansion, 
the financial institutions of a vibrant capitalist economy endogenously change from 
buoyancy to a state of unsustainability. Minsky observed that during an expansion, 
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profit-oriented businesses have reasons to seek financing compared to equity, hence, 
stability is destabilising (Tse, 2001).  
 
If there are a lot of institutions that are financially unstable, the economy becomes 
prone to a debt deflation. Therefore, in order to curb the instability of a capitalist 
economy, Minsky suggested that it is important for the government to form appropriate 
regulatory institutions to control the economy. He suggested two key institutions – the 
Big Government and the Big Bank. Prior to World War II, the United States of 
America’s government was small (with respect to GDP) and could not sustain the 
economy. Also, debt deflation can be thwarted if the government can counter the rise 
and fall in investment (Tse, 2001). 
 
However, a big government deficit is likely to have three effects. The first related to 
income and employment effect. When there is a deficit in government, the gross 
national product (GNP) rises through the multiplier, resulting in a rise in income flow 
and employment. The second effect relates to cash flow. A government deficit sustains 
cash flow, so individuals can sustain debts. For instance, in some capitalist economies, 
when individuals lose their employment in a recession, they get unemployment 
benefits.  The third effect relates to the portfolio effect. This is a situation whereby a 
government increases money supply during a government deficit, leading to excess 
reserves. Government then sells more of their bonds to curtail the excess reserves, and 
hence, the private sector will possess a lot of government bonds. As government 
securities are the securest type of asset, the private sector gains more confidence. In 
other words, government deficit determines the highest and lowest levels of 
unemployment, income, and flows of profit (Tse, 2001).  
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The financial instability hypothesis argues that if a large corporation or a bank within 
an economy is unable to repay its debts during a recession, other corporations and 
banks will be affected negatively because of the interconnectivity and linkages of their 
balance sheets. Therefore, another regulatory authority might be necessary to avert 
debt deflation. Central Banks for that reason step in as the lender of last resort, giving 
credit to financial institutions, and by doing so, the financial sector is protected from 
situations whereby they are not able to repay their financial obligations. Subsequently, 
if financial institutions are aware that the Central Bank can bail them out as the lender 
of last resort in situations where they cannot meet their financial obligations, they will 
be care free about business dealings, and risky conduct is encouraged. Therefore, 
Central Banks have a responsibility to manage commercial banks’ activities so as to 
minimise the amount of bad loans approved (Tse, 2001). 
 
In other words, the optimism of expansion causes firms to be over-indebted, and thus, 
the boom becomes a financial crisis resulting in a debt deflation, and then a recession 
or even a trough. Financial crises are persistent but always different as capitalism 
continually changes. From a Minskyan stance, the severity of the recent global 
financial crisis was controlled by monetary and fiscal policy interventions. Also, 
financial fragility occurs in the financial market when there are no reforms regulating 
dishonest practices by financial institutions which can result in a severe financial crisis 
(De Antoni, 2016). Firms that build up debt without raising their revenues are more 
likely to become Ponzi at the smallest rise in the interest rate; an idea that was central 
in explaining the recent global recession from a Minsky viewpoint (Solomon and Golo, 
2013).  
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The Financial Instability Hypothesis also alludes to a super Minsky cycle that occurs 
over a few business cycles. The super cycle is a course that changes financial market 
regulations, firms’ decision-making practices, and Central Banks regulations. The 
process of institutional change usually takes a few business cycles where optimistic 
investments during expansions morphs into recession. On the other hand, the economy 
experiences a crisis when the super cycle has seriously affected and weakened its 
institutions. However, in between super cycles, an economy undergoes several boom-
bust cycles (Palley, 2009).   
 
Another Minskyan perspective is that a long period of expansion creates opportunities 
for both banks and businesses, thereby increasing investors’ confidence, the safety 
margin tightens, and speculative and Ponzi finance becomes the norm. However, an 
unexpected rise in interest rate resulting from contractionary monetary policy, external 
shock or change in future expectations creates a situation whereby speculative and 
Ponzi units are unable to carry out their financial obligations. Therefore, they will 
either put their assets on sale or default. This action results in a crisis and debt deflation 
that escalates because of the interconnectivity of balance sheets among financial 
institutions (Caverzasi, 2014).  
 
In summary, we observe that the Financial Instability Hypothesis assumes the 
economy is naturally unstable, and that government interference is necessary to 
stabilise it. The process of stabilising the economy requires policy implementation, 
and successful policies lead to boom or expansion. Businesses gain confidence and are 
enthusiastic about the possible future return on profit, but this does lead to increasing 
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risky conducts and economic instability occurs. Minsky’s interpretation is that the 
government intervention sways the economy towards instability, an opinion that 
differs from the classical economic understanding that the economy is naturally stable, 
and the invisible hand frequently pushes the economy in the direction of equilibrium 
(Tse, 2001).  
 
Table 5.1:  Summary of Business Cycle Theories discussed 
Austrian Business Cycle Theory Marx Analysis of the 
Business Cycle 
Financial Instability 
Hypothesis 
This theory is an explanation of 
the business cycle from a 
monetary viewpoint. It highlights 
the importance of interest rate 
and credit in the progression of 
the business cycle.  An 
underlying belief of this theory is 
that credit market stability 
depends on the balance between 
real savings and demand of 
credit for investment purposes, 
and also the fluctuations in the 
demand and supply of money 
(Keeler, 2001).  
 
A constant feature of the 
Austrian business cycle theory is 
Karl Marx explained the 
business cycle from a 
financial instability angle. He 
opined that business cycle 
changes occur because of the 
interactions of productive 
capital and financial capital 
(Argitis et al., 2014). It is 
also imperative to note that 
he saw a production 
economy as a monetary 
economy. This is because 
products are exchanged for 
money (as a store of value) 
or for a promise to pay at a 
The financial instability 
hypothesis examines the 
financial structure of an 
economy. It suggests that 
capitalist societies veer 
towards financial crisis 
(Palley, 2009).  
 
It aims to describe how 
finance drives the 
business cycle from boom 
to bust or from expansion 
to recession, because 
business cycle phases are 
manipulated by 
investment decisions by 
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the concept of artificial boom. 
This is also known as policy-
induced expansion, which 
happens when there is a decrease 
in interest rate so as to increase 
the money supply, resulting in 
extensions of loan repayments. 
Whereas periods of crisis and 
following periods of depression 
are a result of accumulated 
unjustified investment that 
happened in various parts of a 
credit expansion (Bismans and 
Mougeot). 
 
According to this theory, a 
reduction in interest rate raises 
the money supply, making the 
cost of capital to be low, and this 
encourages investment. 
Therefore, there is an upsurge in 
capital-intensive investments 
causing the demand of real 
resources to rise exceeding the 
actual present economic 
later date (deferred 
payments).  
 
In Marx’s analysis, investors 
have confidence during the 
early stages of an expansion 
and so want loans in order to 
increase their credit supply 
for investment purposes. 
This rise in investment 
reduces the need to hold 
money as a payment means. 
Therefore, interest rate falls 
or remains low. As the 
expansion progresses, so 
does the demand for money 
as a payment means, 
intensifying pressure on 
market interest rate. 
 
 However, when there is a 
crisis, investment credit 
ceases and there is a 
desperate desire for money 
as payment means, making 
interest rate soar to their 
firms with regards to how 
much loan they can get 
and how much capital 
asset is purchased.  
 
During an expansion, 
expected returns 
increases, encouraging 
firms to increase their 
investment, and 
encourages financial 
institutions to give credit. 
Because of the focus on 
making more profit, both 
firms and financial 
institutions are not alert to 
rising debt. The debt 
eventually becomes higher 
than profits and capital 
stock, and thus, a large 
part of the profit is used 
for repayment of debt, 
even though the interest 
rate has not changed 
(Evans, 2004).  
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resources. As investors seek to 
gain more access to investment 
capital, savings declines and 
there is a mismatch between 
investment and savings. This is a 
sign of the end of the expansion.  
 
Moreover, financial 
intermediaries perform an 
important role of allocating 
resources, and as they attempt to 
do their activities and financial 
obligations, banks bid for 
money.  As banks bid for money, 
interest rates rise making it 
impossible to carry out capital-
intensive projects, as there is 
inadequate credit availability. 
This produces a different 
business environment where 
there are increases in defaults 
and uncertainty. Increases in 
uncertainty level also causes the 
demand for cash balances to 
raise as well, which signals the 
highest level. In subsequent 
recession, the market interest 
rate falls because the 
desperate need for money as 
a payment means calms 
(Evans, 2004). 
 
Karl Marx unlike other 
scholars viewed recession as 
a necessary step for 
economic growth in a 
capitalist society. Marx also 
recognised two possible 
explanations on why a boom 
period end. The first relates 
to a situation when banks 
resolve to control credit after 
a long expansion period 
because they envisage 
impending complications 
regarding their ability to 
provide loans to investors. 
Thus, as investors strive to 
get loans, it results in a 
The Minsky’s business 
cycle identifies the 
progression of how the 
financing of investments 
by firms and financial 
institutions can lead to 
financial instability, 
moving the economy from 
expansion to recession. 
This starts in an expansion 
with hedge finance where 
firms borrow for financing 
investment with the 
expectations that revenue 
will be enough to pay 
back both interest and 
principal. After a while, it 
turns into speculative 
finance where revenue can 
only cover interest 
payment and is not 
enough for the principal. 
The last part of the 
sequence is Ponzi finance 
where revenue is not 
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beginning of a recession 
(Zelmanovitz, 2011). 
substantial rise in interest 
rate.  
 
The rise in rate of interest 
triggers a swift fall in the 
levels of profit return. The 
second explanation 
comprises of rising costs of 
factors of production such as 
labour and raw materials and 
rising interest rate. 
Therefore, if businesses are 
unable to perform their 
payment obligations during 
an expansion, a crisis is 
imminent (Argitis et al., 
2004).  
sufficient to cover both 
payments of interest and 
principal, so firms rely on 
capital gains to carry out 
payment obligations 
(Palley 2009).  
 
 
 
5.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE BUSINESS CYCLE THEORIES 
i. Limitations of the Austrian Business Cycle: A major assumption of the Austrian 
Business cycle is the artificial boom where there is an induced decrease in interest rate 
so as to increase money supply. Since the artificial boom is not backed by real savings, 
investment suffers eventually, and the boom turns into a recession. This is because 
according to Mises, entrepreneurs are unable to estimate in advance the impacts of 
money supply expansion on prices because they cannot anticipate the extent to which 
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the demand for money for transactionary purposes would change. However, this 
principle was disputed by scholars such as Jorg Hulsmann and Paul Krugman who 
argued that there is an unacknowledged or overlooked scenario where investors are 
able to accurately predict the impact of money supply increase on prices and the 
induced decrease in interest rate. When that happens, a recession would not ensue 
because entrepreneurs would demand higher interest rates, that is, they would ask for 
higher price premiums on the gross market interest rate, raising the interest rate back 
to its normal (pre-induced) market level (Macovei, 2015; Howden, 2010).  
 
A critical aspect of the business cycle according to this theory is the equilibrium of the 
structure of production. It is assumed that the level investment is directly influenced 
by the consumers’ willingness to reduce present consumption expenditure, and so 
consumers put their savings into time-deposits (withdrawal of savings from time-
deposits requires some notice period or else, they will incur losses). However, it can 
be argued that, even if that is the case, there is no guarantee that the notice period of 
time-deposits correctly coincides with producers’ investment period. Also, even if 
consumers put their savings into time-deposits, the losses suffered from potential 
withdrawals would have to be substantial enough to dissuade consumers from taking 
out money. Therefore, it is doubtful that consumers would be enthusiastic about putting 
their savings into time-deposits except banks offered interest rates large enough to 
counter the cost of withdrawals. Consequently, for consumers to be eager to put their 
money into time-deposits, banks have to propose a term premium but that will raise 
their interest rates causing them to demand for even higher premiums on loans. 
Therefore, the suggested transmission mechanism by the Austrians for distributing 
savings to investors is not that straightforward (Mentrah, 2014). 
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Another important aspect of the Austrian Business Cycle theory is the argument that 
recessions are important because they correct all the malinvestments completed during 
the artificial expansion. However, as shown in this study based on the several financial 
crises discussed (see section 3.5), governments and central banks would make efforts 
to stimulate the economy during recessions by a further increase in money supply. This 
is done by the government and/or central banks as an attempt to maintain employment 
levels by keeping firms that are not doing well afloat, but it ends up prolonging and 
enhancing the adverse consequences of their initial credit expansions. Consequently, 
the problems in the economy during a recession are greater in magnitude because of 
the artificial boom and sustained by the stimulus (Bjonskov, 2011). The Austrians, on 
the other hand, would argue that unprofitable firms should be allowed to fail because 
it allows profitable firms with access to surplus capital to acquire valuable assets, 
which would generate new sustainable businesses and employment. 
 
 ii. Limitations of Marx Analysis of Business Cycle: As mentioned earlier, Karl Marx 
did not cohesively put together a comprehensive business cycle theory, he presented 
several rationalisations in several of writings. As a result, every debate about Marx’s 
explanation of the business cycle entails a contest between explanation, understanding 
and contextualisation (Clarke, 1994). Marx explained how the demand for money as a 
medium of exchange leads to economic boom or bust (see section 5.3). However, the 
financial system detailed by Marx in a capitalist economy is not as complex as the 
modern financial institutions and there are other factors that impact interest rate levels.  
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For instance, contemporary financial structure is a response to recessions in the U.S 
between during the 1960s and 70s. Investors have found new ways generate capital at 
the expense of workers, keeping interest rates low (Tabb 2010). Furthermore, there are 
other financial instruments available to financial that are liquefiable and can be used 
for generating money for investment, without affecting the ability of household to 
withdraw deposits. For example, deindustrialisation in the U.S during the 70s was 
accompanied by leveraged buyouts in the 80s where failed enterprises were purchased 
using the target enterprises’ collaterised assets. This practice seemed to continue until 
the collapse subprime mortgages. 	
Clarke (1994) on the other hand argued that the failure of Marxists to come up with a 
satisfactory theory of business cycle especially in response to the deindustrialisation 
of the 70s does not imply that the crisis tendencies described are irrelevant. It could be 
that capitalism is not inherently prone to crisis but that the dislodgment of the capitalist 
system was an outcome of institutional and political let-downs. The uniqueness of the 
Marxist viewpoint is that it explains causes of boom-bust cycle not in natural or 
abstract economic parameters but as a social relationship within the capitalist mode of 
production and offers resolution for economic crisis through the transformation of 
those relationships within an economy.  
 
Another criticism of Marx’s business cycle explanation is that it seems to have a 
functionalist approach as it only explains the efficient functionality of financial 
institutions in a capitalist society but does not consider the persistent poverty present 
in a capitalist economy. In spite of this, it has been argued that the functionalist 
approach downplays Marx’s refutation of monetary business cycles. According to 
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Toporowski (2013), Marx shed light on how investor’s need to finance production led 
to the rise of interest-bearing capital. The author argued that Marx’s explanation of the 
business cycle is only functionalist because of the fact that financial markets are 
founded to meet the credit demands of capitalist production. However, since industrial 
capitalism existed before the emergence of financial markets, credit does exist solely 
for the purpose of serving industrial capitalism.  
 
Financial markets emerged initially because of the need for commercial credit and later 
transformed into the overall credit system in order to encourage and sustain industrial 
production without having to hold large stocks of money capital, thereby raising the 
profit rate of capitalists by decreasing the stock of money capital they had to loan 
(Potts, 2011). The central focus of Marx’s discussion is that since financial markets 
exist to serve industrial capitalism, it has become a significant liquid source of financial 
gain. Interest-bearing capital as well as credit-inflation turned out to be the medium 
through which capitalism was redirected on the reshaping of balance-sheet to be source 
of capital instead of just production.  
 
iii. Limitations of Financial Instability Hypothesis: The financial instability hypothesis 
explains a financially driven boom-bust economic cycle (see 5.4). However, several 
aspects of financial instability hypothesis have been criticised. For instance, the cause 
or the boom phase is not explained, even though he detailed how the boom period 
transitions into the bust. According to Prychitco (2010), the theory also does not 
acknowledge how increase in money supply and alterations in interest rate leads to 
optimism and consequently boom phase and optimism in the first place. Therefore, to 
that author, the theory places more on socio-psychological behaviours of entrepreneurs 
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instead of economic patterns. However, optimism can be better explained using the 
Austrian theory which insinuates that while widespread optimism lead to unpredictable 
situations, it is a product of general macroeconomic boom, but not the source. But the 
Financial Instability theory do not imply a systematic tendency in one direction. It 
needs to explain why mistakes are not randomly distributed around an unbiased mean 
since it is expected that systematic mistakes trigger correction mechanisms.  
 
Another criticism of Financial Instability Hypothesis is that market mechanism does 
not result in a financial crisis, but crisis occurs as a result of decisions made by banks 
and the activities of businesses in an attempt to organise their firm’s finances in 
expectancy of banks’ demands and policies. This suggests that accounting information 
does not play a part in Minsky’s theory. To Barnes (2009), both accounting 
information and investor’s decisions play important roles. Since it is assumed that the 
interest of business owners and those that manage it are the same, he did not 
acknowledge the impact and consequences of information asymmetry when 
businessowners try to influence and mislead investors and banks.  
 
Financial intermediaries are also able to influence investors’ decision making based on 
the investors’ anticipated return on investments when selling financial packages, 
especially when their anticipations are high and unachievable. Therefore, it is argued 
that good accounting practice essentially has an exaggerating effect at various points 
of the business cycle. For example, during the financial crisis of 2007, banks and other 
financial intermediaries were directed to lower book values of assets to a reasonable 
value, even with instances where payments have been made. Since subprime securities 
were no longer sold or purchased, firms holding those securities as assets were 
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instructed to reduce the value in some way; the reduction could be similar to other 
weakened assets or by a substantial amount (Barnes, 2009). 
 
5.6 CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Conceptual framework refers to a researcher’s synthesis of literature on how to explain 
a subject matter. It captures the researcher’s understanding of how the variables 
studied connects as a whole. In chapter two, Classical and Keynesian economic 
thoughts on public debt and economic growth was reviewed (see section 2.2). In that 
chapter, several debates on public debt and its impacts economic growth were 
discussed. The channels through which public debt affects the economy was also 
discussed – resources available to the financial market and interest rates were identified 
(see section 2.3). Furthermore, in chapter three, financial instability was defined and 
sources of financial instabilities as well as the influence of macroeconomic policies 
(fiscal and monetary policy) in combating financial instability were reviewed (see 3.2, 
3.3, 3.4). Evidence of this public debt channels, financial instability sources and the 
role of macroeconomic policies were demonstrated in the major financial instability 
channels discussed (see section 3.5). 
 
The contextual information chapter (chapter 4) discussed the regional integration of 
the selected West African countries (ECOWAS) and its approach to trade; as well as 
the impact of financial instabilities on West African countries where channels through 
which the recent global financial crisis affected the region was elaborated – debt levels, 
stock markets and trade (see 4.5, 4.7). In this chapter (chapter 5), theories of business 
cycles were discussed, and it was deduced from those theories that the key 
macroeconomic variables that influences fluctuations in the business cycle are interest 
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rates, credit available to financial intermediaries and level of investment (see sections 
5.2, 5.3, 5.4).  
 
Based on these literature review chapters; the study develops a conceptual framework 
(figure 5.1) which illustrates how public debt and financial instability affects economic 
growth. It begins with macroeconomic policies by the government and/or central bank 
to sustain economic growth through the adoption of fiscal policies (government 
spending, public debt, budget deficit, etc) and/or monetary policies (bank reserve 
requirements, open market operations, inflation targeting, etc). The policy(s) adopted 
would have an impact on interest rates and money supply. The level of interest rates 
and money supply could be positive or negative for the economy depending on the 
reaction of financial intermediaries. If the interest rates are high, it affects the liquidity 
of financial intermediaries and their ability to give loans to investors. High rates of 
interest, coupled with low money supply as well as shortage of credit over a period of 
time causes investors to doubt the credit worthiness of financial institutions, 
investment levels falls and triggers crowding out, leading to financial instability and 
consequently affecting economic growth negatively (see 3.3,3.4). The opposite is the 
case when interest rates are low and money supply is high. 
 
Furthermore, public debt is a macroeconomic policy instrument and it is usually used 
to foster economic growth. In a recession, it is usually adopted to correct budget 
deficits or as a source of revenue for government spending, which impacts money 
supply (see 2.2.1, 2.2.3). However, high public debts affect the credit available to 
financial intermediaries through banks’ balance sheets because of the volume of 
government securities they hold. If government securities are used as collaterals for 
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debt, it means that banks lose their assets, affecting the credit worthiness and liquidity 
of banks as well as their ability to give credit to investors. Likewise, high public debt 
and rising interest rates weakens foreign investment, which makes it hard to finance 
the debt affecting a country’s current account. High public debts and rising interest 
rates also causes decline investment levels and hinders economic growth (see 2.3). 
This situation prompts a panic and investors lose confidence in the capability of 
financial intermediaries to perform their role, resulting in crowding out of investment. 
The crowding out of investment triggers financial instability and adversely affects 
economic growth.   
 
On the other hand, if a country has weak monetary policies, interest rates might be 
raised in order to protect the exchangeability of their currency. But strong currencies 
stimulate imports and makes exports expensive, widening trade deficits. Since imports 
and exports are directly connected to GDP, an unjustified strong currency can put a 
strain on the economy in the long run because domestic firms become uncompetitive, 
reducing investment levels and growth rate. As aforementioned, raising interest rate 
can be detrimental especially when the foreign investors assume that the rates cannot 
be sustained, creating lack of confidence and panic (see 3.3, 3.5,4.7).  
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Figure 5.1: Conceptual Framework of the Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s compilation (2018) 
 
It is important to mention that there are some limitations to the study’s conceptual 
framework. This is because they are based on the following assumptions: - firstly, the 
framework shows interest rates and money supply as the channels through which 
macroeconomic policies affect the real economy. Secondly, that the credit available to 
financial intermediaries and investment levels are responsible for the presence or 
absence of financial instability. Thirdly, the framework does not consider effects of 
household activities on economic growth.  
 
Although certain variables or factors contributing to public debt, financial instability 
and economic growth may seem to be omitted (such as purchasing power of the 
citizens, labour productivity, governments’ attitude towards reforms, etc), similar 
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studies have been able to achieve their study objectives without the omitted variables. 
For example, Creel et. al. (2014) used non-performing loans, stock market volatility, 
return on assets, trade openness and inflation to investigate whether financial stability 
has causal impact on economic performance; Prochniak and Wasiak (2017) 
investigated the impact of the financial system on economic growth using variables 
such as domestic credit provided by financial sector, bank non-performing loans, 
monetization ratio and growth rate of real GDP per capita; Baum et. al. (2013) used 
growth rate of GDP, gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP) interest rate and trade 
openness to investigate the relationship between public debt and economic growth. 
Therefore, it suggests that while the assumed omitted variables might have been 
adopted in other studies or might have a significant influence in other countries, 
including them in this research is outside the scope of the study (see 6.7) and could 
make it difficult to achieve the study objectives. 
 
Furthermore, the variables in the framework are adopted from the business cycle 
theories (see 5.2, 5.3, 5.4), including ones with the most impact on public debt and 
financial instability of the selected West African countries (see 4.7). As mentioned in 
contextual information chapter (chapter 4), the case study countries are highly indebted 
because that is how government spending is funded, and a major contributor to GDP 
is trade. Thus, while testing the business cycle theories in the selected West African 
countries, it is important to include the variables that has significant impact on their 
economic growth. Therefore, it can be asserted that even with of the specified 
limitations, the conceptual framework still contributes an adequate approach to answer 
the research questions and achieve the study objectives based on relevant literatures 
reviewed and the theoretical framework adopted.  
	 149	
 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
The theoretical framework of this research was discussed in this chapter. Three 
theories of the business cycle were examined. It can be deduced from these theories 
that the key macroeconomic variables playing an important role in the movement of 
the business cycle include the rate of interest, money supply, availability of credit to 
the financial market and investment, which form part of the model used in this study. 
The level of interest rate affects the amount of money in circulation. The amount of 
money in circulation plays an important role in investment decisions by both firms and 
banks. If there is a shortage of money supply, it means that the credit available to 
domestic firms would be limited. The reverse is the case when there is an increase in 
the money supply.  
 
In a situation where there is increased money supply over a long period of time, 
investors’ confidence in the financial market increases and which tends to raise the 
general level of investment. However, when there is a crisis, the credit available to 
domestic firms decreases, causing a decline in the level of investment. While these 
situations are happening, the interest rate spikes, generating a loss of confidence in the 
financial market by investors. Therefore, there would be a capital flight and a recession 
would occur. As a result of the recession, desperation for money arises and investors 
would require money to meet their financial obligation. Banks would go to the Central 
Bank to get credit in order to carry out their activities. Therefore, a government would 
resort to borrowing, which would in turn result in a high rate of public debt.  A 
conceptual framework was also developed based on the theoretical framework and the 
literatures reviewed in chapters two and three. The framework aided in illustrating the 
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theoretical linkages between public debt, financial instability and economic growth. 
These variables – interest rate, money supply, investment, and public debt form the 
basis of our econometric model which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
RESEARCH PLAN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
6.1.  INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explains the methodology and methods used in conducting this 
research. Research is usually based on underlying philosophical assumptions, 
validating the research methods and approaches used for the expansion of 
knowledge in a research. Therefore, in order to carry out any study, it is essential 
that we know what these philosophical assumptions are.  
 
This chapter focused on discussing these assumptions and how they are 
implemented in this study. Some general philosophical suppositions were presented 
and discussed. The positivist philosophy was recognised as the framework for 
analysing and answering the research questions itemised in section 1.5. Since the 
positivist philosophy was chosen, a quantitative research method was employed as 
the researcher intended to develop knowledge through cause and effect thinking, 
reduction of social phenomena to specific numerical values, and hypothesis testing. 
 
The research design was also explained. The research design was inspired by the 
research questions and the research philosophy adopted. The scope of the study was 
discussed along with the source from where the data was collected. The variables 
and econometric tests used in the study were also detailed in this chapter.  
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6.2 RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
The manner in which research is conducted is in most cases, a result of the research 
philosophy adopted. It also influences the research strategy and tools used to attain 
their research objectives and to answer the research questions. A research process 
has three main dimensions namely – epistemology, ontology and axiology. The 
ontological and epistemological aspects are usually guided by the researcher’s 
worldview, which has a significant influence on the perceived but relative aspects 
of reality (Thomas, 2010). Axiology on the other hand, has to do with the ethics and 
values of the researcher. 
 
6.2.1 Epistemology  
Epistemology refers to how we understand the world. In other words, it refers to 
information and understanding can be obtained through various kinds of inquiry 
and alternate methods of inquiry (Thomas, 2010). Two epistemological 
interpretations - realism and idealism are highlighted in this study. 
 
Realism: Realism is a research philosophy that focuses on social phenomena. It is 
assumed that the world is a separate entity (external reality) and it is independent of 
the researcher and their activities. Realism discusses the external reality as being 
made up of frameworks of interconnected objects and the ways by which those 
objects relate with one another (Sobh and Perry, 2006).  Therefore, a realist 
researcher views the world as a social construct in which the social events are the 
consequence of social actors. This external reality consists of conceptualised 
occurrences that are born of the researcher’s mind but exists separately from the 
researcher. Realists recognise the distinction between the actual world and their 
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opinion of it and then attempt to build several interpretations of this reality, taking 
into account time and place. Thus, the fundamental phenomena explored in a social 
science are mostly dependent on the researcher’s experiences.  
 
Three distinct realist epistemologies - naive, scientific and critical. Naïve realism 
maintains somewhat of a simple correspondence theory of truth where the world is 
mostly comprehensible, it is exactly how it looks e, as long as the research 
approaches and data collection instruments are satisfactorily crafted. Scientific 
realism takes into account that the logical methods can incorporate true depiction 
of the world and is common with positivist positions. Critical realism, on the other 
hand, suggests that the ways in which we observe the events around us dependent 
partly on opinions and predictions. Critical realism acknowledges an essential 
subjectivity in the development of knowledge, and it is mostly used by researchers 
with a constructionist position (Gray 2004). 
 
Idealism: Unlike realism, idealism asserts that reality is a result of ideas and 
experiences of the researcher. This philosophy is founded and reliant on nature of 
the mind. Idealists are of the opinion that the world is epitomised by ideas, and these 
ideas can be figured out if there is no limit to academic investigation. They argue 
that natural scientists do not explain reality, they can only represent what is 
observed because reality does not have a mind of its own. Idealism negates the 
‘external reality’ viewpoint of realists. They argue that a separate reality 
independent of how events appear does not exist. According to them, if we 
comprehend reality as people’s experiences and beliefs, it logically suggests that 
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reality is completely based on physical world occurrences and experiences by 
people (Chalmers, 2017). 
 
In essence, idealism is a research philosophy that has to do with perception. It is the 
view that people are cognisant of everything that they are mindful of. For instance, 
a person is conscious of their own emotions, and their consciousness is not based 
on the mindfulness of anything else. For instance, it maybe factual that persistent 
pain can lead to anxiety, yet, this conclusion does not articulate anything about the 
pain in itself. The conclusion does not provide clues about the characteristics of 
pains, which one comes to know by having them (Bolender, 2001). 
 
6.2.2 Ontology 
Ontology is the branch of philosophy concerned with articulating the nature and 
structure of the world. It specifies the form and nature of reality and what can be 
known from it. One of the key differences between epistemological reasoning and 
ontological reasoning is that, ontology considers how the researcher develops his 
research questions (i.e. the researcher’s dedication to certain understandings).  The 
two viewpoints of ontology commonly used by social science researchers are 
objectivism and subjectivism (Saunders et al., 2012). In essence, ontology factors 
differ in realities, opinions and viewpoints of individuals and how it affects human 
behaviour.  Two ontological ideas are discussed below – objectivism and 
subjectivism. 
 
Objectivism: Objectivism adopts a natural science convention that the social reality 
studied is external to the researcher (also known as a social actor). This is because 
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the events that social actors have lived through, do not affect the reality of the social 
world. (Saunders et al., 2009). The objectivist methods to social research were 
adopted from the natural sciences in order to explore social science events and 
occurrences.  
 
An objectivist believes that knowledge can be attained free of the researcher’s 
interests, ethics and views, therefore, they have no impact on what is studied or 
what approaches are utilised. They contend that the research methods and 
methodological designs are made impartially. Objectivists also consider causes and 
effects, and the research hypotheses are either confirmed or rejected in accordance 
with the study results. Furthermore, an objectivist supposes that reduction improves 
how a problem is understood (Holden and Lynch, 2004).  
 
This research adopts an objectivist approach.  
 
Subjectivism: Subjectivism arose as a result of arguments against objectivism. A 
subjectivist researcher assumes that social reality comes from opinions and 
experiences of individuals. Also, the researcher believes that knowledge acquisition 
is a continuous process since people have different experiences and different 
opinions about a social event, therefore, the research process has to be revisited 
from time to time to capture any changes (Saunders et al. 2012). 
 
Subjectivism is distinct from objectivism in that the researcher emphasises the 
meaning of a social event as against measuring that event. The goal is to understand 
and to explain a problem in its contextual setting. Also, subjectivism does not 
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embrace reducing social phenomena to small numbers, because of the perception 
that social phenomena can only be understood by exploring it wholly (Holden and 
Lynch, 2004). 
 
6.2.3 Axiology 
Axiology relates to the how values and ethics plays a part in the research process. 
It takes into consideration how the choice of data collection technique or the 
interaction with research participants reflect our values and ethics. In other words, 
it is the aspect of philosophy that deals with value judgement. Values influences a 
researcher’s choice as to what the truth is. Thus, rests on feelings and thoughts.  
 
Therefore, under axiology, there are two choices a researcher must make – a 
decision on whether the research will be value-free and unbiased or that the research 
will be subjective and thus, biased. In value free research, the selection of the 
research topic and how to examine it can be governed by an objective measure 
rather than by opinions and views, while a biased research is driven by the 
researcher’s fascinations, opinion, skills and views (Holden and Lynch, 2004). 
 
This research is a value free and unbiased research because of the use of secondary 
data and also, the interpretation of the results is fact-based, reliable and can be 
generalised.  
 
6.3  RESEARCH PARADIGMS 
A research paradigm is the philosophical basis upon which a research is carried out 
(Collis and Hussey, 2014). It comprises of the ideological interpretations and norms 
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that forms the way in which the researcher views the world. There are a number of 
paradigms that have surfaced over the years, and some of those paradigms are 
discussed below. All paradigms are created upon their particular ontological and 
epistemological conventions. Since the conventions are supposed, the philosophical 
foundations of every paradigm cannot be empirically verified or invalidated. 
Therefore, different paradigms intrinsically encompass opposing ontological and 
epistemological positions. Hence, they contain varying notions of truth and 
knowledge that reinforce their specific research method (Scotland, 2012). 
 
Empiricism: Empiricism postulates that experience is the sole source of 
knowledge, and thus, should be the basis by which all hypotheses and theories are 
tested. Empiricism is a philosophical concept that highlights the areas of scientific 
knowledge that are evidence related, particularly those that were established 
through careful experimental arrangements (Uddin and Hamiduzzaman, 2009). 
Empiricists believe that validity and reliability can be achieved by means of precise 
observation and numerous recordings of similar activities. Furthermore, 
observation and experimentation, if properly used can lead to well-informed and 
unquestionable research findings that can be generalised (Dean et al., 2006). 
 
Interpretivism: Interpretivism is a philosophical standpoint that knowledge is 
attained through subjective interpretation. An interpretivist believes that truth or 
knowledge is not universal, hence, the researcher seeks to examine and understand 
social events from his own point of view or experience (Aliyu et al., 2014). Another 
key aspect of interpretivism is that researchers operating within this philosophical 
stance usually prefer to study events in their natural environment in order to capture 
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the various perspectives and viewpoints of their target population (Gicheru, 2013).  
An interpretivist assumes that there are numerous perceptions about reality because 
that different people have different understanding of a social phenomenon. 
Therefore, the researcher endeavours to work in conjunction with respondents to 
figure out their individual viewpoints, and then they (the researcher) interpret these 
experiences in relation to the research objectives. Therefore, an interpretivist 
research is inductive in nature or theory building. 
 
In other words, an interpretivist researcher or scholar argues that there is no such 
thing as a global and universal truth. This type of researcher recognises, understands 
and analyses information based on his/her own perception, understanding and 
reference. They hold the opinion that uninterested and indifferent neutrality is 
unrealistic and realism or practicability of framework and background is imperative. 
The methodologies mostly used by these interpretivist researchers are field 
experiments, inductive reasoning and qualitative study (Aliyu et al., 2014). The 
concentration of the interpretivist is on comprehending the implications and 
understandings of social actors and to see the world in the social actor’s viewpoint. 
This makes it highly contextual and it cannot be generalised.  
 
Rationalism: Rationalism is the ideology that knowledge is a result of logic and 
not from experience. It is based on the assumption that human beings are rational 
beings that think logically and objectively, so they have capability to comprehend 
and describe their social world and also figure out the solutions to any questions 
they might have. A rationalist is of the opinion that reflection is enough to justify 
what is true or not true. This is because it is assumed that reasoning occurs even 
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before an investigation is carried out. However, rationalism does not make a 
distinction between observational and theoretical statements, whereas all 
observations are theory dependent (Uddin and Hamiduzzaman, 2009).  
 
Positivism: One of the oldest philosophies is Positivism. It came about as an effort 
to explain the abstract or supernatural. A positivist philosophy assumes that a 
researcher can acquire unbiased information by observation and that the 
information can be substantiated by testimonies about the circumstances, therefore, 
that information is factual and objective. The objectivity is realised by verifying 
with impartial tools such as empirical testing, questionnaires, surveys, etc. When 
tested again with these instruments, you will achieve the same results. This means 
that the positivist approach is reliable and can be generalised. The data gotten are 
usually evaluated by quantitative methods, which are also objective in that they can 
be proved by logical assessment irrespective of who uses such methods (Stern, 
2004).   
 
Positivists are of the opinion that reality is constant and should be recorded and 
explained from an unbiased point of view without a lot of interaction with what is 
being researched. The positivists also opine that the phenomenon studied has to be 
isolated and that the results should be consistent when retested using the same 
parameters and procedures. This usually comprises controlling reality with use of 
variables such as a single independent variable in order to achieve consistency, and 
also to design associations between some of the components of the social world. 
Therefore, forecasts can be done by making use of the previously recorded and 
explained realities and their associations (Gicheru, 2013).  
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In essence, the positivist philosophy is a consequence of the methods utilised by the 
natural sciences and is typified by the hypothesis testing gotten from theories that 
already exist. In other words, the positivist approach is characterised by deductive 
reasoning or challenging existing theories by measuring observable social reality. 
Therefore, it is founded upon logic, evidence, rationality and the emphasis are 
mainly on facts, gotten by direct observation and they are estimated empirically 
using quantitative methods such as surveys, experiments, statistical analysis, etc.  
 
In social sciences, the positivist philosophy is an effort to achieve predictive and 
explanatory knowledge of the world and to do this; the researcher must test theories 
that are characterised by highly generalised statements, stating the relationships 
between social phenomena (Uddin and Hamiduzzaman, 2009). It also aims to 
recognise causal relationships and key laws that describes occurrences in social 
activities (Holden and Lynch, 2004). Therefore, a positivist accepts as true that 
knowledge is reached through a reductionist style, and thus, attaches significance 
and emphasis to neutrality, analysis, and repeatability. The researcher adopts a 
realist perspective and carries out an objective investigation of social events. The 
methodologies adopted by a positivist researcher includes quantitative analysis, 
experiments, surveys and deductive reasoning (Aliyu et al., 2014).  
 
In this study, the positivist philosophy is adopted along with a quantitative 
approach. This is because the research uses deductive reasoning to ascertain 
quantifiable socioeconomic reality. The research is also reductionistic in nature as 
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public debt, financial instability and economic growth are reduced into smaller 
variables discussed in section 6.8. 
 
Determinism: Determinism is a post-positivist philosophy. Under the deterministic 
philosophy, it is believed that no action is random but that there are previously 
existing causes that determine effects or outcomes (Creswell, 2003). This means 
that a deterministic researcher assumes that current events are based on previous 
events that resulted in the present happenings, and they are driven by universal 
causal laws that functions within nature itself free from awareness. 
 
Just like positivism, determinism is also reductionistic. This means that the ideas or 
phenomena studies are condensed into a small, distinct set of concepts for it be 
examined, including the variables that were used for testing the research hypotheses 
and research questions. Therefore, the phenomena studied by a deterministic 
researcher usually investigates causes that impacts results (Creswell, 2003).  
 
6.4 TIME HORIZON 
The time horizon aspect of research has to do with whether the research is a cross 
sectional study or longitudinal study. 
 
A cross sectional study is one where the data is collected for one time period, usually 
a short period. This means that data is collected and analysed in various 
circumstances but within the same time period. Cross sectional studies are usually 
used to investigate large dataset and are usually used to establish comparisons 
between groups of people or organisations. One of the problems associated with 
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cross sectional studies is how to determine what sample size is big enough to 
represent the population. Another problem is that cross sectional studies do not take 
into account the correlation between variables (Collis and Hussey, 2014). 
 
A longitudinal study on the other hand is one where the researcher wants to 
understand an event that has happened on multiple occasion. In other words, the 
research covers more than one time period.  It is often linked with a positivist 
philosophy. The aim is to investigate the dynamics of a research problem by 
examining the same variables over a long period in time. The repeated observations 
are done with an expectation of disclosing the discrepancies of the event under 
study. Therefore, it makes it feasible to provide possible clarifications from 
examining the dataset and the patterns that arise from the data (Collis and Hussey, 
2014).  
 
There are two variations of longitudinal studies – cohort studies and panel studies. 
Cohort studies includes assessing several groups with the same characteristics over 
a period of time. For example, a researcher might want to study behaviours of a 
group of university students (cohort) in the first year. The researcher might study 
newly admitted students, students who have spent three to six months in the 
university, and students that have spent more than six months in the university. 
Studying the various cohorts may disclose different characteristics or relationships 
among students. Panel studies on the other hand involves studying the same dataset 
over several time periods.  
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This research adopts a panel longitudinal study. Certain variables have been 
identified to examine the effect of public debt and financial instability on economic 
growth. Data has also been collected for a number of years on those variables to 
understand the relationship among those variables as it pertains to this study. 
 
6.5 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research approach refers to the plans and procedures used in carrying out a 
research, how data is collected, analysed and interpreted. There are three main 
research approaches – inductive approach, deductive approach and abductive 
approach. If a researcher wants to assess a theory, deductive approach is 
recommended. If the researcher wants to construct a theory, inductive approach is 
recommended. Furthermore, if the researcher wants to create or adjust a prevailing 
theory by using extra data collection, then abductive approach is recommended 
(Saunders et al., 2012). 
 
Deductive Approach: The deductive research approach is employed when the 
researcher wants to test a theory. The process starts with a theory, then hypotheses 
are formulated, then data is collected and tested, and finally a theory is rejected or 
accepted. The data collected is used to test the research hypothesis, which also 
makes it possible to generalise under the deductive approach.  
 
Deduction makes it possible for the researcher to explain causal associations 
between variables. Also, it allows facts to be reduced and measured in a quantitative 
manner. Therefore, this research approach makes it possible to study a large sample 
size or data set. 
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Inductive Approach: The inductive research approach is usually employed when 
the researcher wants to understand the nature of a problem. Unlike the deductive 
approach where a theory is tested, established suppositions are used to develop 
unverified inferences under the inductive approach. This approach does not 
comprise of hypotheses formulation. It begins with the research questions and 
objectives that a researcher aims to accomplish at the end of the study. The outcome 
of this approach is usually the origination of a theory, frequently articulated as a 
conceptual framework. However, the results from an inductive approach cannot be 
generalised because of the limited sample size and the nature of the research. 
 
Abductive Approach: This research approach is used for explaining partial 
observations or shocking facts stated at the commencement of a study.  It starts with 
the partial observations and then identifies likely theories on how those observations 
must have taken place. It also makes it possible for theory creation, amendment of 
a theory, or integrating existing theory where necessary.  
 
The approaches discussed above can be used by using quantitative and/or 
qualitative methods of data collection. 
 
6.6 RESEARCH METHODS 
Research methods refers to the instruments and techniques used in carrying out 
research. It can be quantitative, qualitative or mixed method.  
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Quantitative Method: This method is used to test associations between variables 
that can be calculated mathematically and investigated using a wide range of 
statistical tests. It usually takes into consideration unbiased modes of data collection 
in order to ensure validity of results (Saunders et al., 2012). Quantitative methods 
are usually linked with a deductive approach and a positivist paradigm. Despite this, 
quantitative researchers incorporating an inductive approach can adopt this method 
as well, when the data collected is used in the development of a theory. That said, 
this research employs the quantitative method of data collection and empirically 
tests for the relationship between public debt, financial stability and economic 
growth. 
 
Qualitative Method: This method examines the research participants’ viewpoints 
and uses a variety of data collection techniques (such as interviews, case study 
groups, etc) and a logical process to create a conceptual framework. The data 
collected when using a qualitative method is non-numerical. The qualitative method 
is usually linked to an inductive approach, but some researchers can start with 
deduction or abduction (Saunders et al., 2012). Qualitative methods are also linked 
with an interpretivist paradigm (Collis and Hussey, 2014). The researcher has 
flexibility in data collection and the questions asked to respondents tend to be open 
ended. This is done so as to capture as much information as possible.  
 
Mixed Method: This method is adopted when a researcher collects both measurable 
and non-measurable data. The researcher may also choose to use either a deductive 
or inductive approach (Saunders et al., 2012). Mixed method is usually adopted 
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understanding of the research problem, rather than using a quantitative or 
qualitative method alone. 
 
6.7 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The differences in philosophical perspectives in each paradigm combined with the 
aims of a study in most cases determines the focus, approach and enquiry mode, 
which in turn determines the structure of a research design (Kumar, 2011). This 
research adopted a Positivist philosophy and used a quantitative approach in getting 
measurable data from secondary sources. These sources include publications such 
as books and journal articles, continuously used for compiling the latest 
information. The research approach employed was deduction as the Theories of 
Business cycle inspired the research questions and the variables used for estimation. 
The econometric software used in the analysis of this work is E-views 9.5 as well 
as Microsoft Excel. The econometric tests to be used include unit root tests, 
cointegration and vector error correction model. Other post estimation tests were 
also carried out such as the cumulative sum test, serial correlation test and granger 
causality test. 
 
i. Unit root test 
The unit root test is done to check for the stationarity or non-stationarity of a time 
series dataset. Prior to conducting statistical analysis, it is important to check for the 
presence of unit root so as to avoid spurious regression results. Stationary tests are 
important because if the result is spurious, the data can no longer be used for 
forecasting. 
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In order for a non-stationary data to be stationary, the variables have to be integrated 
in the first difference so that it is said to be integrated of order one I(0). Hence, 
variables integrated in the order of I(1) series enclose one unit root. While, I(2) 
encompasses 2 unit roots and so it has to be differentiated at least two more times 
before it can be stationary. There are several variations of the unit toot tests such as 
the Kwiatkowsi-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (KPSS), Augmented Dickey Fuller 
(ADF) and the Phillips-Perron test (PP). However, this research made use of the 
Phillips-Perron tests. The unit root can be examined in three ways 
a. No Constant No trend 
Δϰt = γϰt-1+µt      (i) 
b. With Constant and No Trend 
Δϰt = α + γϰt-1+µt     (ii) 
c. With Constant and With Trend 
Δϰt = α + γϰt-1+ ʎt +µt     (iii) 
The situation when g = 1 matches the random walk which is non-stationary. 
 
ii. Lag-Length Selection Criteria 
A lot of time series analysis calls for the use of lagged values of the variables. This 
is because some statistical analysis integrates lagged values of the dependent 
variable(s) in explaining movements in the independent variables. Therefore, it is 
important to know the highest number of lagged values that can be incorporated in 
a test. If the chosen number of lags is smaller than the definite number of lags, it 
can lead to wrong results as there might be presence of autocorrelation in the 
residuals. While a greater number of lags than the definite number of lags can create 
an increase in errors of the mean square forecast. The popular types lag selection 
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criteria are the Schwarz Information criteria (SIC), Hannan-Quinn Information 
Criteria (HQIC) and the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC).  
 
iii. Cointegration Test 
The purpose of a cointegration test is to identify the likely information on the 
equilibria relationships among variables of a model in the long run. According to 
econometric assumption, two or more variables in a model will be cointegrated if 
there is a long run association between them. There are several types of 
cointegration test, but the ones used in this study includes the Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ARDL) cointegration test, also known as the Bounds cointegration 
test and the Johansen Cointegration test.  
 
Unlike other cointegration tests, all the data does not have to be stationary for the 
ARDL cointegration test. It can be used whether or not the data is integrated in order 
of I(0), I(1) or both combined. The long run relationship in his test is determined 
through the F-stat. If the value of the F-stat exceeds the critical value band, a long 
run relationship is present. However, if it does not exceed the critical value brand, 
the reverse is the case. Nevertheless, testing for cointegration is an essential step of 
establishing if a model empirically exhibits meaningful long-term relationships. If 
cointegration is not detected in the variables, it is important to work with the 
variables at first difference (Nkoro and Uko, 2016).  
 
On the other hand, the Johansen cointegration test can only be carried out if the data 
is integrated in order I (0) or I (I). Similar to the bounds test, if there is a 
cointegrating relationship among the variables, it means that a long run relationship 
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exists. However, if the estimated results are not cointegrated, then there is no long 
run relationship between the variables. If a cointegrating relationship exists, then 
we proceed to do an error correction regression (also known as error correction 
model). In this research, both methods discussed were adopted based on the 
preliminary test results.  
 
iv.  Error Correction Model 
The error correction model (ECM) is a time series model that measures the speed 
of adjustment by which the dependent variable reacts to equilibrium changes in the 
explanatory variables. In other words, it estimates the short run impact of the 
explanatory variables on the dependent variable. The coefficient of the lagged error 
correction term (ECT) represents the short-run adjustment(s) coefficient reflecting 
the degree by which the long-run equilibrium in the experimental variable is 
adjusted in the short run.  
 
v. Cumulative Sum Test 
The Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) test is a stability test. It maps the cumulative sum 
of recursive residuals in the model along with two lines that represents 5% critical 
level (Zeileis, 2004). The critical lines represent break points. Therefore, if the 
CUSUM line is positioned between critical lines, then the model is said to be stable. 
However, if there are instabilities in the model, the CUSUM line moves beyond the 
5% critical lines.  
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vi. Serial Correlation Test 
The serial correlation test is done in order to ascertain if the error term of a variable 
is correlated over a period of time. However, it is vital to note that the presence of 
serial correlation does not automatically mean that the results of prior statistical 
tests are biased. It just means that the current error term of a variable is highly 
dependent on the previous period’s error term. 
If serial correlation is detected, it indicates that the results from previous statistical 
tests might not be exact. This is because the standard errors of a serially correlated 
variable would appear to be smaller than the actual standard error. Therefore, the 
estimation of statistical significance will be exaggerated.  
 
vii. Granger Causality Test 
Granger causality test is conducted to determine if there is a causation between two 
variables. The test examines if the lagged value of Y has a significant influence on 
X, and if the lagged value of X has a significant influence on Y (Alimi and 
Ofonyelu, 2013). It is important to note that granger causality does not really infers 
that one variable causes the other, it is mostly a linear prediction. Granger causality 
assesses if an event occurred before another event and aids in predicting it 
(Sorensen, 2005).  
 
It is assumed that if the cointegration test result confirms the presence of 
cointegration among variables, then there should be evidence of causality as well. 
If this is not the case, then there is a problem with the cointegration results. On the 
other hand, if the cointegration result does not confirm cointegration among the 
variables, there is no need to conduct a granger causality test. In this research, the 
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Toda-Yamamoto approach to causality was used. The reason for using this 
approach is because the Toda-Yamamoto method is one of the few Granger 
causality test regularly done by estimating an autoregressive model. Similar to the 
ARDL cointegration test, Toda-Yamamoto tests estimates the autoregressive model 
at level.  
 
6.8 DATA SOURCE AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
As mentioned in the introductory chapter, the overall aim of the study to examine 
the effect of public debt and financial instability on economic growth. Panel time-
series data from the World Development Indicators for a period between 1970 to 
2015 was used for the analysis. The data covers several economic variables of 9 
West African countries namely Benin (BEN), Burkina Faso (BF), Cote D’Ivoire 
(CIV), Ghana (GHN), Mali (MAL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGR), Senegal (SEN) 
and Togo (TOG). The World Bank development indicator was mainly used for the 
compilation of data. These variables include gross capital formation (GCF), Trade 
(TR), growth rate of GDP (GR), external debt stock (DBT), private sector credit 
(PSC) and Broad Money (M3). Two additional variables were added later on in 
order to carry out a robust analysis, namely Inflation (IN) and government spending 
(PX).  
 
Gross Capital Formation (GCF): This refers to the net increase in physical assets 
within a given time. It does not consider devaluation of fixed capital and does not 
include land acquisitions. In this study, it is used as the proxy for aggregate 
investment. Investment is a key element of a country’s economic growth because it 
has a strong influence on the level of productivity of an economy. In other words, 
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% of 
GDP 
an increase in investment helps to improve GDP, create employment opportunities 
and also raise income levels. Furthermore, a rise in investment suggests a significant 
rise in investors’ confidence. Investment also has an inverse relationship with 
interest rate. Therefore, when interest rate is high, the cost of obtaining a loan 
becomes expensive, causing a decline in investment levels. 
 
Figure 6.1: Gross Capital Formation (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors Computation, 2018 
 
The above graph shows the trend in gross capital formation for the specified 
countries. It can be seen that there was a severe fall in the level of investment 
between 2007 and 2010. This can be attributed to the global recession that affected 
world economies around that period. However, this decline differs among the 
countries. It can be seen that it is steeper in the case of Senegal and Cote D’Ivoire 
while it was gradual in Burkina Faso. Niger on the other hand seemed not to have 
been affected until after 2010 with a short period of decline until about 2012. It can 
also be observed that there seemed to be quick recovery among the countries 
irrespective of the fluctuations in the level of investment. 
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Growth Rate of Gross Domestic Product (GR): This is the dependent variable of 
this research. The gross domestic product (GDP) is the monetary estimate of all 
fully produced goods and services in a country in a particular period of time, usually 
a year. The growth rate of GDP measures how fast an economy is growing. It is 
usually adjusted for inflation. This is an important indicator of an economy’s 
growth. If an economy is experiencing a boom, the growth rate will be positive. 
This will mean that there is low employment rate; higher investment activities and 
businesses are growing. On the other hand, if an economy is having a downturn or 
slowing downturn, it could be because of investment falling and unemployment 
levels rising. This in turn can lead to a recession and thus, growth rate will be 
negative.   
 
Figure 6.2: Growth Rate of GDP (Annual %) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
From the above graph, we can see that the countries follow a similar trend in certain 
periods. This is because some of the countries have the same regional/Central Bank. 
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We can see periods where the growth rates fell below zero. Furthermore, during the 
era of the global financial crisis, the growth rates of GDP for Nigeria and Cote 
D’Ivoire were close to zero. However, Cote D’Ivoire had a quicker recovery than 
Nigeria. The overall period shows steady rise and fall in the growth rate. Unlike the 
other countries, Benin and Senegal do not have steep fluctuations in their growth 
rate. They seemed to have a steady and gradual fluctuation up until 2013. This could 
be as a result of the inability to conduct trade compared to their neighbours, causing 
their GDP growth rate to be steady and low.  
 
Broad Money (M3): Broad money on the other hand is a measure of money supply 
that includes both liquid and non-liquid forms of money. In other words, broad 
money takes into account commercial bank demand deposits, currencies, assets and 
non-institutional money market accounts. These variables serve as a proxy for 
monetary policy in this analysis.  In order to achieve set macroeconomic objectives 
and financial stability, policymakers or the government can choose to adjust the 
interest rate or money supply. An expansionary monetary policy is associated with 
a rise in money supply and a reduction in interest rate to boost the economy, while 
a contractionary monetary policy signifies a reduction in money supply and increase 
in interest rate to tighten the economy Alterations in money supply and/or interest 
rate have an effect on the level of investment and on stock market activities 
especially on expected return on investment.  
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Figure 6.3: Broad Money (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above graph shows the trend in broad money of the sample countries from 1970 
to 2015. It can be observed that there is a similar pattern in the rise and decline in 
money supply among countries. However, there is a sharp and steep decline in 
Nigeria’s broad money between 2008 and 2010, while that of other countries was 
not as steep. This denotes a dissimilarity in policy remedies to the global financial 
crisis. Also, while Nigeria has its own independent monetary authority, the other 
countries all respond to policies by BCEAO (a regional monetary authority) with 
the exception of Ghana. Therefore, Nigeria makes its own monetary policies in 
respected to how much money is in circulation. This is the case for Ghana as well. 
However, the regional bank is responsible for the other countries’ monetary policy. 
This means, whatever monetary policy decision was taken by the BCEAO, the 
member countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo) 
have to oblige irrespective of whether it hurts or improves the economy.  
 
Trade to GDP ratio (TR): This represents the value of a country’s international 
trade. It is an important economic indicator as it is measured by dividing the total 
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trade by the GDP over a given period. Also, as mentioned earlier (see section 5.2), 
trade played an important part with respect to how the recent financial crisis affected 
the selected West African countries. 
 
Figure 6.4: Trade as a percentage of GDP 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
We can see from the above graph the trend in Trade (% of GDP) from 1970 to 2015. 
It can be observed that the fluctuations in trade levels are steep and intense. This is 
because trade is one of the most impacted areas when there is an instability among 
the West African countries. Nigeria is an oil exporting country, therefore when there 
are fluctuations in oil prices, the impact is visible. Similarly, when there are 
fluctuations in the price of Gold or cocoa, the impact on trade is visible. However, 
it can be seen that Ghana had a sustained increase in their trade level between 2012 
upwards, which can be attributed to the discovery of oil which also contributed to 
the exports, and hence, trade levels. Similarly, Togo had a steady rise in Trade levels 
between 2010 and 2012, which can also be attributed to expansion in their cotton 
and phosphate sectors.  
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Private sector credit (PSC): This refers to the domestic credit or capital given to 
private investors by financial intermediaries. This can be in form of loans, 
securities, or trade credits. A well-structured and stable financial condition is 
necessary for sustainable economic growth. It enables an increase in the investment 
levels, a higher return on investment, and more importantly, it boosts the 
manufacturing aspect of the economy. An efficient private sector is important for 
an economy because of the contribution towards creation of jobs, allocation of 
resources and contribution to GDP. The figure below shows the private sector credit 
(% of GDP) for the selected West African countries. 
 
Figure 6.5: Private sector credit (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
Figure 6.5. above shows the trend in private sector credits for the selected West 
African countries. It can be seen that there was a sharp decline in private sector 
credit for all countries between late 1993 and 1994. The reason for this was a 
devaluation of the CFA francs (IMF, 2003). Also, we can see a sharp increase in 
Nigeria between 2006 and 2008. This was a result of the bank consolidation 
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exercise in 2004, which saw a rise in the number of private banks (Ajakaiye et al., 
2016). This led to an increase the economic activities such as investment and 
production. However, due to a fall in oil prices and the global financial crisis, there 
was a sharp decline from 2010 all the way unto 2012. 
 
Public Debt (DBT): It refers to the total amount of money owed by the government 
to foreign lenders including other governments and international financial 
organisations. Public debt is one of the methods for financing budget deficit and 
can also be used to finance capital projects by the government (such as roads, 
construction of houses, bridges, hospitals, etc). It can also be used to bail out the 
private sector.  
 
Figure 6.6: External Debt Stock (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
Figure 6.6 shows the fluctuations in the level of public debt (% of GDP) of the 
selected West African countries. It can be seen that the trends all flow in a similar 
manner. There was a spike in the debt level between 1993 and 1994, which is in 
agreement to the devaluation of the CFA Francs. This was because the governments 
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of these countries had to borrow in order to handle their obligations. Furthermore, 
we can see a decline in debt levels from 2004 onwards which is attributed to debt 
relief and financial aid by the IMF and other international organisations. This make 
it possible not to have high accumulated debt as the money given by those 
organisations are not owed but a form of debt relief for those countries. 
 
Inflation (IN): This usually refers to either a rise in money supply or a rise in 
general price levels. Fluctuations in supply of money in most cases affect the 
inflation level. The levels of inflation affect investors’ borrowing capacity, their 
costs of production as well as potential return, also affecting the purchasing power 
of money. Furthermore, inflation has an inverse relationship with interest rates. A 
reduction in interest rate causes people to borrow more money, leading to rise in 
spending. This rise in spending leads to a rise in inflation levels.  
 
Figure 6.7: Inflation  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
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It can be observed that the inflation levels for Ghana and Nigeria are higher than 
those of Benin, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo. This is because, 
Ghana and Nigeria have their own independent Central Bank who can make their 
own policy decisions in accordance with an economic situation. Therefore, they can 
raise inflation levels or reduce inflation levels depending on the shocks to the 
economy, while those other countries have to wait for the BCEAO to make 
monetary policy decisions on their behalf. Also, Ghana and Nigeria are the richer 
economies among those countries, therefore, there are higher levels of economic 
activities in those countries. Hence, a shock to the economy has a much dearer effect 
than in the other countries. 
 
Public Expenditure (PX): This refers to the total spending by a government of a 
country. It includes spending on capital projects, pension, provision of welfare, etc. 
Public expenditure is also one of the fiscal policy tools, and can sometimes to be 
used to regulate the money supply in the economy. Therefore, it is used in this study 
as a proxy for fiscal policy.  
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Figure 6.8: Government spending (% of GDP) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above figure shows the trend in government spending (% of GDP) for the 
selected West African countries. It can be seen that Nigeria has the lowest 
government spending ration compared to others. However, they also have a steeper 
trend. This is because of the fluctuation in oil prices. Oil makes up over 80% of 
Nigeria’s revenue, therefore, any shock in oil prices, limits the ability of the 
government to spend. It can also be observed that the overall spending level for 
government also dropped for all countries between 2009 and 2012. This was a result 
of the global financial crisis in that time period.  
 
6.9  MODEL SPECIFICATIONS  
In econometric analysis, a model is essential. The model includes at least one 
dependent variable and one or more independent variables. The econometric model 
for this research is developed from the consistent factors gotten from the theoretical 
framework (see Chapter 5). The consistent factors affecting economic growth 
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according to the theories were investment, money supply and credit to private 
businesses. According to the Austrian Business Cycle (discussed in section 5.2), the 
level of economic growth is affected by the money supply, level of investment and 
financial resources available to financial institutions. In Marx’s analysis of the 
business cycle (discussed in section 5.3), the level of economic growth is 
determined money supply as well as credit available to investors and financial 
institutions. Also, from the Financial Instability Hypothesis (discussed in 5.4), the 
main influence of level of economic growth are investment levels and financial 
resources available to financial institutions. Additionally, we could see in section 
4.7 that Debt and Trade are some channels by which the financial crisis affected the 
selected West African countries. Therefore, unique econometric models are 
developed in this study for evaluating the implication of financial instability and 
public debt on economic growth. This research has two research questions (See 
section 1.5) and these are examined using two econometric models. 
 
The model used in testing the first research question is expressed as: 
GR = b0 + b1DBT + b2GCF + b3PSC + b4M3+ b5TR +ε    (iv) 
Where:  
GR = is the dependent variable and is the annual growth rate of GDP. This is a 
proxy for economic growth. 
DBT = External debt stock (% of GDP). This is a proxy for public debt. 
GCF = Gross Capital formation (% of GDP). This is a proxy for investment 
PSC = Private sector credit (% of GDP). This is a proxy for financial resources 
available to financial corporations and financial intermediaries. 
M3 = broad money (% of GDP). 
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TR = Trade (% of GDP). 
 
The second model used in testing the second research question is expressed as  
PSC = c0 + c1DBT + c2IN + c3PX + c4M3+ε    (v) 
Where:  
PSC = Private sector credit (% of GDP) and is the dependent variable. This is a 
proxy for financial resources available to financial corporations and financial 
intermediaries. 
DBT = External debt stock (% of GDP). This is a proxy for public debt. It is also a 
fiscal policy instrument 
PX = Government spending (% of GDP). Government spending is a fiscal policy 
instrument 
IN = Inflation. This is a monetary policy instrument 
M3 = broad money (% of GDP). This is money supply, which is also a monetary 
policy instrument. 
 
6.10 STATEMENT OF HYPOTHESES 
The research hypotheses for this study (derived from the research objectives stated 
in section 1.5) are 
1. H0: public debt and financial instability has no effect on economic growth 
of selected West African countries 
H1: Public debt and financial instability has an effect on the economic 
growth of selected West African countries 
2. H0: Monetary and fiscal policy instruments are not effective in addressing 
financial instability. 
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H1: Monetary and fiscal policy instruments are effective in addressing 
financial instability. 
 
6.11 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, the research philosophy, research approach and the research method 
adopted was discussed. This research adopted objectivism as its ontological 
perspective and realism as the epistemology. This is because objectivism and 
realism restrict a researcher from having a biased research and denote a scientific 
method of carrying out a study. This influenced the researcher to conduct a 
positivist research using a deductive approach and quantitative method for data 
collection and analysis.  
 
Furthermore, an overview of the trends of each variable used in the study was 
provided. It was observed that the gross capital formation of the counties followed 
a similar trend but Senegal (SEN) and Cote D’Ivoire (CIV) had a steeper decline 
between 2007 and 2010, whereas, it was gradual for Burkina Faso. Looking at the 
trend for growth rate of GDP, it was observed that the trend for Nigeria (NGR) and 
Cote D’Ivoire was close to zero. However, Cote D’Ivoire had a quicker recovery 
from the crisis period. On the aspect of trade, Nigeria had issues because the level 
of trade declined steadily from 2010 up until 2015 because of the fall in oil prices. 
With regard to private sector credit, it was observed that there was a steep fall in 
credit between 1993 and 1994, which was due to a devaluation of the currency.  
 
This chapter also specified new econometric models for testing the effect of public 
debt and financial instability on economic growth of West African countries; and 
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for testing the effectiveness of macroeconomic policy instruments in addressing 
financial instability. The statement of hypotheses was also specified. The next 
chapter will present the analysis results and interpretations.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS AND RESULT INTERPRETATION 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the data and interpret the various tests. 
Two sets of cointegration tests were carried out in an attempt to answer the research 
questions stated in section 1.5. The first research question was tackled using the 
ARDL Bounds cointegration tests (section 7.4 to 7.9), while the second research 
question was tackled using the Johansen cointegration test in order to determine the 
effectiveness of policy response in the West African region (section 7.10 to 7.11). 
Other post-diagnostic tests were also carried out to check for serial correlation, 
causality and stability of the model. 
 
7.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
The descriptive statistics are also known as summary statistics, which is useful for 
describing the basic features of the data. The descriptive statistic also helps 
researchers to display large data in a summary table. The mean is the average value 
of the variable while the median is the middle value of the variable or average of 
the two middle values of the variable. The standard deviation is a measure of 
variability and shows volatility in the variables. It is also used to measure how 
spread out the data is from the mean. A higher standard deviation means there is a 
greater spread in the data.  
 
Skewness, Kurtosis and Jarque-Bera show if the data has a normal distribution. The 
skewness depicts asymmetry from the normal distribution in the dataset. The 
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kurtosis assesses the distribution of the dataset while the Jarque-Bera calculates the 
difference between skewness and kurtosis of the data from a normal distribution. 
 
Table 7.2.1: Descriptive Statistics for Benin 
Benin GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  3.731869  43.52897  18.61521  25.42634  17.27469  53.34303 
Median  4.093406  38.32135  17.98317  23.41357  18.26428  52.91957 
Maximum  9.954231  88.42967  28.57381  43.00435  31.83996  76.53089 
Minimum -4.895345  11.58998  8.939974  13.15247  5.415283  38.30037 
Std. Dev  3.167296  23.83528  5.045320  7.645561  7.705753  8.355959 
Skewness -0.783581  0.273905  0.219701  0.808349  0.199496  0.430655 
Kurtosis  3.756469  1.718993  2.188885  3.019071  1.824932  2.927374 
Jarque-Berra  5.804128  3.720398  1.631049  5.010316  2.951626  1.431998 
Probability  0.054910  0.155642  0.442407  0.081663  0.228593  0.488704 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the summary statistics of the selected variables, which are 
external debt stock (DBT), Growth rate of GDP (GR), Gross Capital Formation 
(GCF), Broad Money (M3), credit to private sector (PSC), and Trade (TR) for 
Benin.  The first two, mean and median are measures of central tendency. The mean 
shows the average value of each series. The average value for the growth rate of 
GDP was 3.73%, gross capital formation was 18.61%, and broad money was 
25.42%, Trade was 53.34%, and so on. The maximum and minimum represent the 
highest and lowest values of each variable.  
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We can also observe from the standard deviation summary that GR has the least 
spread around the mean and TR has the greatest spread around the mean.  The 
skewness statistic reveals symmetry of the data. GR has negative values, and hence, 
it is skewed to the left, while GCF, M3, PSC, DBT and TR are skewed to the right. 
The Kurtosis summary above indicates that the data has a positive kurtosis and has 
a sharper peak than a normal distribution.   
 
Table 7.2.2: Descriptive Statistics for Burkina Faso 
Burkina 
Faso 
GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  4.557981  28.88188  21.50751  19.05487  13.06668  38.71458 
Median  4.415739  24.51006  20.61818  18.62467  13.25276  37.43736 
Maximum  11.01474  60.34118  32.83449  37.87074  25.85966  67.33890 
Minimum -1.778697  3.467744  10.27003  7.264333  4.443414  21.59701 
Std. Dev  3.249772  16.17351  5.200520  7.186219  4.734819  9.979218 
Skewness -0.066046  0.289539  0.378547  0.483003  0.514711  1.497625 
Kurtosis  1.938252  2.041516  2.857651  2.850783  3.866234  5.065633 
Jarque-
Berra  2.194117  2.403544  1.137456  1.831246  3.469304  25.37352 
Probability  0.333852  0.300661  0.566245  0.400267  0.176462  0.000003 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
	 189	
The above table shows the summary statistic of the selected variables for Burkina 
Faso.  The mean shows the average value of each series. The mean for GR was 
4.55%, DBT was 28.88%, GCF was 21.5%, M3 was 19.05%, PSC was 13.06% and 
TR was 38.71%. The maximum statistic shows the highest values of each variable 
in the dataset. The maximum for GR was 11.01%, 60.34% for DBT, 32.83% for 
GCF and so on.  The minimum values for each variable are -1.78% for GR, 3.47% 
for DBT, 10.27% for GCF, 7.26% for M3, 4.44% for PSC and 21.59% for TR. We 
can also see that the standard deviation statistics are similar to that of Benin where 
the summary of GR has the least spread around the mean and TR has the greatest 
spread around the mean. However, the skewness results show that GR is skewed to 
the left signified by its negative value, while the other variables are skewed to the 
right as indicated by their positive values. The Kurtosis statistics shows that the data 
has a positive kurtosis.   
 
Table 7.2.3: Descriptive Statistics for Cote D’Ivoire 
Cote D’Ivoire GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  3.053575  99.70482  15.66062  27.70571  25.66822  75.19079 
Median  2.468624  89.45033  13.47815  27.40030  24.28241  75.50876 
Maximum  12.91640  230.7226  29.76217  37.06329  42.26380  95.06973 
Minimum -10.95770  26.31229  4.703723  18.15996  9.748175  55.34852 
Std. Dev  4.753248  58.33320  6.545527  4.464621  10.89623  10.53405 
Skewness -0.150587  0.432991  0.468854 -0.038743  0.073433  0.058546 
Kurtosis  3.308809  1.980423  2.100788  2.658675  1.420300  2.431791 
Jarque-Berra  0.356632  3.429801  3.235104  0.234805  4.824291  0.645097 
Probability  0.836678  0.179982  0.198384  0.889227  0.089623  0.724301 
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Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The table above is the descriptive statistics for Growth rate of GDP (GR), public 
debt (DBT), Gross Capital Formation (GCF), Broad Money (M3), credit to private 
sector (PSC), and Trade (TR) for Cote D’Ivoire.  We can observe that the average 
value for GR was 3.05%, DBT was 99.70%, GCF was 15.66%, M3 was 27.7%, 
PSC was 25.66% and TR was 75.19%. The maximum statistic displays the highest 
values, and that of GR was 12.91%, 230.72% DBT, 27.76% for GCF, 37.06% for 
M3, etc.  It can also be observed that GR and M3 is skewed to the left reflected by 
its negative value, while the other variables are skewed to the right as shown by 
their positive values. Furthermore, the data has a positive kurtosis. 
 
Table 7.2.4: Descriptive Statistics for Ghana 
Ghana GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  3.850813  56.90842  16.90758  22.92586  8.651859  57.02203 
Median  4.651426  47.18775  17.78949  22.76131  5.953888  51.33136 
Maximum  14.04600  139.4388  31.78475  34.10831  20.44463  116.0484 
Minimum -12.43163  18.23117  3.377636  11.30499  1.542268  6.320343 
Std. Dev  4.636846  33.08579  8.078089  6.345978  5.453394  30.11926 
Skewness -1.250409  0.841336 -0.053944 -0.031214  0.451747  0.156542 
Kurtosis  5.567911  2.683708  1.733665  1.954719  1.924806  1.886175 
Jarque-Berra  24.62582  5.618563  3.095886  2.101644  3.780328  2.565704 
Probability  0.000004  0.060248  0.212685  0.349650  0.151047  0.277245 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
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From the above table, the mean for GR was 3.85%, 56.90% for DBT, 16.9% for 
GCF, 22.92% for M3, 8.65% and 57.02% for both PSC and TR respectively. The 
maximum and minimum statistic shows the highest and lowest values in the data 
for each variable for Ghana.   
 
We can also observe that the standard deviation of GR has the least spread around 
the mean and TR has the greatest spread around the mean (Similar to the data for 
prior countries).  The skewness results show that GR, GCF and M3 have negative 
values, and hence, are skewed to the left, while DBT, PSC and TR are skewed to 
the right, reflected by their positive values. The Kurtosis result shows that the data 
has a positive kurtosis and has a sharper peak than normal distribution as well.   
 
Table 7.2.5: Descriptive Statistics for Mali 
Mali GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  4.201445  67.86948  18.05226  22.92586  15.93721  49.33104 
Median  3.978661  66.16387  17.89164  22.76131  13.80310  50.37339 
Maximum  20.28663  130.8899  24.23647  34.10831  28.68894  63.78796 
Minimum -7.378433  21.57313  12.84285  11.30499  7.519248  29.59859 
Std. Dev  5.246171  32.65586  3.072264  6.345978  5.071268  9.113033 
Skewness  0.596747  0.051477  0.163343 -0.031214  0.850835 -0.653100 
Kurtosis  3.978597  1.675946  2.095832  1.954719  2.803035  2.485158 
Jarque-Berra  4.565651  3.380462  1.771467  2.101644  5.624416  3.778172 
Probability  0.101996  0.184477  0.412411  0.349650  0.060072  0.151210 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
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The above table shows the descriptive statistics for Mali.  The mean which 
calculates the average value of each variable shows that GR has an average of 4.2%, 
GCF has an average value of 18.5%, M3 has 22.92%, DBT has an average value of 
67.87%, while PSC and TR have an average value of 15.9% and 49.33% 
respectively. The result of the standard deviation shows that GCF has the least 
distribution around the mean, whereas, TR has a greater distribution.  It can also be 
seen that M3 and TR are skewed to the left, while GR, GCF and PSC are skewed to 
the right. The Kurtosis also points out that the data has a positive kurtosis, which 
means that each variable has a pointier peak than normal distribution.   
 
Table 7.2.6: Descriptive Statistics for Niger 
Niger GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  2.513090  51.59570  18.07607  14.35261  10.31568  47.59864 
Median  3.027450  52.26115  14.19545  14.31673  11.20515  45.59590 
Maximum  13.47261  100.6434  39.95157  26.35485  17.66587  71.29019 
Minimum -17.04758  4.884976  3.148003  5.341825  3.302083  27.96890 
Std. Dev  6.079947  30.25671  10.23906  5.262519  4.733915  10.71530 
Skewness -1.250965 -0.055765  0.871257  0.256859  0.012801  0.399127 
Kurtosis  5.586050  1.611306  2.562992  2.415260  1.638780  2.442533 
Jarque-Berra  24.81567  3.720077  6.185722  1.161167  3.552689  1.816961 
Probability  0.000004  0.155667  0.045372  0.559572  0.169256  0.403136 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
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The table shows the descriptive statistics of the dataset for Niger. It can be observed 
that the values of the kurtosis are positive. This means that the distribution of the 
variables has a sharper peak than normal distribution. It can also be observed from 
the skewness statistic that GR and DBT both have negative values, meaning that 
they are skewed to the left, whereas, the other variables are skewed to the right.  
 
On the other hand, the mean statistic shows that the average value for the variables 
were as follows: growth rate of gross domestic product was 2.51%, public debt was 
51.60%, gross capital formation was 18.07%, broad money was 14.35%, domestic 
credit to private sector was 10.31% and Trade was 47.59%. Also, for the standard 
deviation, PSC has the least distribution around the mean and TR had the most 
spread around the mean.  
 
Table 7.2.7: Descriptive Statistics for Nigeria 
Nigeria GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  4.406326  4.561789  11.18696  22.50928  47.68974  4.406326 
Median  4.649226  2.897251  7.500000  21.16292  47.84429  4.649226 
Maximum  33.73578  15.90144  28.60000  43.26613  81.81285  33.73578 
Minimum -13.12788  0.102561  3.800000  10.04202  19.62060 -13.12788 
Std. Dev  7.908744  4.470953  6.871474  7.170380  16.43537  7.908744 
Skewness  0.980340  0.869530  1.165016  0.528072  0.036901  0.980340 
Kurtosis  6.665632  2.607286  3.222885  3.336285  2.101213  6.665632 
Jarque-Berra  33.12216  6.092231  10.50089  2.354676  1.558756  33.12216 
Probability  0.000000  0.047543  0.005245  0.308098  0.458691  0.000000 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
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Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The table above shows the summary statistic of the selected variables for Nigeria. 
The mean statistic shows the average value of each series, 4.41% for GR, 11.18% 
for GCF, 22.5% for M3, 47.68% for PSC, 4.41% for TR and 4.56% DBT. The 
maximum statistic shows the highest values of each variable. The highest value for 
GR was 33.73%, 28.6% for GCF, 43.26% for M3, etc. The minimum statistic on 
the other hand represents the lowest of each variable, and it was 19.62% for TR, -
13.12% for GR, 1.65% for GCF, etc.  
 
Furthermore, the standard deviation statistic indicates that GCF has the least spread 
around the mean and TR has the greatest spread around the mean.  The skewness 
statistic portrays symmetry of the data. GR and DBT have negative values, and so 
it is skewed to the left, while other variables have positive values, hence, are skewed 
to the right. The Kurtosis summary above indicates that the data for Nigeria has a 
positive kurtosis, meaning it has a sharper mount than normal distribution.   
Table 7.2.8: Descriptive Statistics for Senegal 
Senegal GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  3.174860  52.27532  18.05891  24.96650  24.06998  65.86190 
Median  3.714144  52.04227  16.90219  23.46235  24.73663  66.08529 
Maximum  8.920504  99.00176  31.21957  46.07344  37.54706  86.96263 
Minimum -5.583240  12.84333  9.139009  13.05806  13.25781  49.63686 
Std. Dev  3.511442  26.48212  5.782294  6.944473  7.169951  9.757863 
Skewness -0.775411 -0.042489  0.415524  0.927925  0.133525  0.135402 
Kurtosis  3.151298  1.535872  2.311130  4.054188  1.804874  2.304075 
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Jarque-Berra  4.653557  4.122543  2.233269  8.731365  2.874316  1.068824 
Probability  0.097610  0.127292  0.327380  0.012706  0.237602  0.586014 
Observations 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The table above shows the descriptive statistic of the selected variables for Senegal. 
The mean statistic represents the average value of each series, and was 3.17% for 
GR, 52.28% for DBT, 18.05% for GCF, 24.96% for M3, 24.06% for PSC and 
65.86% for TR. The maximum statistic shows the highest values of each variable. 
The highest value for GR was 8.92%, 31.22% for GCF, 46.07% for M3, and so on. 
The minimum statistic on the other hand represents the lowest of each variable, and 
was -5.58% for GR, 9.13% for GCF, and so on.  
 
Additionally, the standard deviation statistic indicates that GR has the least spread 
around the mean and TR has the largest distribution around the mean.  The skewness 
statistic portrays symmetry of the data. GR and DBT have negative values, and so 
their skewness statistic is to the left, while other variables have positive values, 
hence, they are skewed to the right. The Kurtosis summary above indicates that the 
data for Nigeria has a positive kurtosis, meaning it has a sharper mount than a 
normal distribution.   
 
Table 7.2.9: Descriptive Statistics for Togo 
Togo GR DBT GCF M3 PSC TR 
Mean  2.833260  78.63435  20.16603  32.66345  21.20806  91.60133 
Median  3.017300  90.50230  17.48062  32.49579  21.88825  93.12124 
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Maximum  14.98241  156.1958  52.68816  53.31023  37.67655  140.8602 
Minimum -15.09583  14.34610  7.477954  16.42907  8.633588  56.47844 
Std. Dev  5.524629  38.91042  8.111330  9.718942  7.017464  17.09805 
Skewness -0.266014 -0.355332  2.445692  0.165754  0.302773  0.346478 
Kurtosis  4.538047  1.934304  9.868672  2.070647  2.582801  3.490518 
Jarque-Berra  5.076564  3.144773  136.2832  1.866056  1.036418  1.381525 
Probability  0.079002  0.207549  0.000000  0.393361  0.595586  0.501194 
Observation
s 
46 46 46 46 46 46 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the summary statistic of the selected variables, which are 
external debt stock (DBT), Growth rate of GDP (GR), Gross Capital Formation 
(GCF), Broad Money (M3), credit to private sector (PSC), and Trade (TR) for Togo.  
The first two, mean and median are measures of central tendency. The mean shows 
the average value of each series. The average value for the growth rate of GDP was 
2.83%, gross capital formation was 20.17%, etc. The maximum and minimum 
represent the highest and lowest values of each variable.  
 
We can also observe from the standard deviation summary that GR has the least 
spread around the mean and TR has the greatest spread around the mean.  The 
skewness shows if the data is symmetrical. GR and DBT have negative values, and 
hence, the statistic is skewed to the left, while GCF, M3, PSC and TR are skewed 
to the right. The Kurtosis summary above indicates that the data for Togo has a 
positive kurtosis, meaning it has a sharper peak than a normal distribution.   
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7.3 PRE-DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
These are time series tests done to check if the data to be tested are statistically 
viable. The common pre-diagnostic tests are the unit root test and the lag length 
selection. 
 
7.3.1 UNIT ROOT TEST 
This test is sometimes referred to as the test of stationarity or the integration order 
test. It is important because nonstationary data often lead to spurious regression and 
inaccurate results (Baumhol and Lycosa, 2009). Therefore, we start by making sure 
that the data used is integrated in the order of one or I(1). In this research, the 
Phillips-Perron Fisher Unit root test was used. The table below shows unit root 
results for Benin (BEN), Burkina Faso (BF), Cote D’Ivoire (CIV), Ghana (GHN), 
Mali (MAL), Niger (NER), Nigeria (NGR), Senegal (SEN), and Togo (TOG). The 
Null Hypothesis of the Unit root test is that there is presence of unit root at first 
difference. 
 
Table 7.3.1: Unit root test results at first difference 
Series BEN BF CIV GHN MAL NER NGR SEN TOGO 
D(GR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
D(DBT) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D(GCF) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
D(M3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D(PSC) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
D(TR) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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The values in the table are the P-values associated with individual series at first 
difference. We can see that the values are all zeros for the entire series. Since the p-
values of each series is less than 0.05, we can reject the null hypothesis at 5% level 
of significance. Since the test was carried out at first difference, we can conclude 
that there is no unit root present and should therefore carry out further tests. The 
next test carried out is the ARDL cointegration test. Even though the ARDL 
cointegration test does not call for initial testing for unit root, it is important to know 
the amount of unit roots in the series tested (Nkoro and Uko, 2016).   
 
7.3.2 LAG LENGTH SELECTION 
The next step before undertaking a cointegration test and error correction test is to 
determine the accurate number of lags to be employed when carrying out those tests. 
The lag length selection involves a number of criteria including Final prediction 
Error (FPE), Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), Schwarz Information Criterion 
(SC) and Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion (HQ). The results are shown in the 
table below. 
 
Table 7.3.2: Lag Length Criteria results 
BENIN 
Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ 
0 -1053.572 NA   1.24e+12  50.55105  50.88203  50.67237 
1 -857.2065  308.5744  2.40e+09  44.24793  47.22679  45.33980 
2 -795.2168  73.79735  3.71e+09  44.34365  49.97039  46.40608 
3 -686.1467  88.29484  1.25e+09  42.19746  50.47208  45.23043 
4 -487.4386   85.16058*   38665395*   35.78279*   46.70529*   39.78632* 
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BURKINA FASO 
0 -952.2112 NA   9.96e+09  45.72435  46.05533  45.84566 
1 -757.8239  305.4658  21133736  39.51542   42.49429*  40.60730 
2 -702.7996  65.50513  45486426  39.94284  45.56958  42.00526 
3 -597.7180   85.06603*  18468581  37.98657  46.26119  41.01955 
4 -404.5296  82.79505   745944.2*   31.83474*  42.75724   35.83827* 
COTE D’IVOIRE 
0 -1131.959 NA   5.19e+13  54.28375  54.61473  54.40506 
1 -888.3083   382.8791*  1.06e+10  45.72897   48.70783*  46.82084 
2 -828.2129  71.54213  1.78e+10  45.91490  51.54164  47.97733 
3 -734.0037  76.26462  1.22e+10  44.47637  52.75098  47.50934 
4 -563.6616  73.00378   1.46e+09*   39.41246*  50.33495   43.41598* 
GHANA 
0 -1105.385 NA   1.46e+13  53.01831  53.34930  53.13963 
1 -908.7400   309.0129*  2.79e+10  46.70190   49.68077*  47.79378 
2 -845.0403  75.83292  3.98e+10  46.71621  52.34295  48.77863 
3 -753.0621  74.45861  3.01e+10  45.38391  53.65852  48.41688 
4 -585.9439  71.62207   4.21e+09*   40.47352*  51.39601   44.47705* 
MALI 
0 -1058.768 NA   1.59e+12  50.79847  51.12946  50.91979 
1 -893.6678  259.4431  1.36e+10  45.98418  48.96304  47.07605 
2 -832.5324  72.78022  2.19e+10  46.12059  51.74733  48.18301 
3 -752.6722  64.64875  2.96e+10  45.36534  53.63996  48.39832 
4 -477.1581   118.0775*   23698087*   35.29324*   46.21574*   39.29677* 
NIGER 
0 -1060.757 NA   1.75e+12  50.89319  51.22417  51.01451 
1 -851.6317  328.6255  1.84e+09  43.98246  46.96132  45.07433 
2 -778.5593  86.99095  1.68e+09  43.55044  49.17718  45.61286 
3 -688.8577  72.61552  1.42e+09  42.32656  50.60118  45.35953 
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4 -426.3345   112.5099*   2106916.*   32.87307*   43.79557*   36.87660* 
NIGERIA 
0 -1128.999 NA   4.51e+13  54.14283  54.47381  54.26415 
1 -970.6036  248.9077  5.31e+11  49.64779  52.62665  50.73966 
2 -900.2038  83.80928  5.50e+11  49.34304  54.96978  51.40546 
3 -809.2565  73.62401  4.38e+11  48.05983  56.33445  51.09281 
4 -599.2696   89.99436*   7.94e+09*   41.10808*   52.03057*   45.11160* 
SENEGAL 
0 -1032.142 NA   4.48e+11  49.53058  49.86157  49.65190 
1 -814.5101   341.9933*  3.14e+08  42.21477   45.19363*  43.30664 
2 -745.4748  82.18483  3.47e+08  41.97499  47.60173  44.03742 
3 -658.0988  70.73300  3.27e+08  40.86185  49.13646  43.89482 
4 -475.2418  78.36727   21631358*   35.20199*  46.12449   39.20552* 
TOGO 
0 -1200.181 NA   1.34e+15  57.53241  57.86339  57.65373 
1 -1020.914  281.7041  5.83e+12  52.04354  55.02240  53.13541 
2 -963.8283  67.95964  1.14e+13  52.37277  57.99951  54.43520 
3 -873.9212  72.78191  9.52e+12  51.13910  59.41372  54.17208 
4 -616.0232   110.5277*   1.76e+10*   41.90587*   52.82836*   45.90939* 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
* suggests lag order selected by the criterion (at 5% critical level). 
 
The table above shows selection criteria. It can be observed that most criterion 
suggests the fourth lag as the best option in order to avoid errors in estimated results 
from other statistical tests. The AIC, which is the strongest criterion, also suggests 
that lag 4 is the best estimating the model for all the selected countries. Therefore, 
the remaining tests will be ran using four (4) lags 
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7.4 ARDL BOUNDS TEST RESULTS 
The cointegration test specifies the possible information on the long-term 
equilibrium relations of the model. Two or more variables are said to be 
cointegrated when there exists a long-term relation between them. As 
aforementioned, the cointegration test was employed in order to answer the first 
research question (see section 1.5). In other words, this test is done to know the 
nature of relationship between GR and the independent variables (DBT, M3, PSC, 
GCF and TR). We use the Auto Regressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) Bound test of 
cointegration.  
 
Table 7.4.1: ARDL Bound Test results for Benin 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.008858 0.021308 -0.415708 0.6807 
GCF -0.076163 0.113638 -0.670226 0.5080 
M3 -0.169812 0.081577 -2.081604 0.0463 
PSC 0.024573 0.065503 0.375146 0.7103 
TR 0.323598 0.078613 4.116320 0.0003 
C -7.862466 3.605026 -2.180973 0.0374 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  9.264918 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
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  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients from the table can be expressed in a model form as: 
GR = -7.8625 - 0.0089DBT - 0.0762GCF - 0.1698M3 + 0.0246PSC + 0.3236TR 
 
 
The table above shows the bound cointegration test results for the Republic of 
Benin. It can be seen that DBT, GCF, and M3 have a negative relationship with GR, 
whereas PSC and TR have a positive relationship with GR. The above model 
indicates that the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) will be -7.86%, 
assuming all other independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a percentage 
increase in GR would result in a fall in the debt level (DBT) but not substantially in 
the long run; meanwhile gross capital formation (GCF) will fall by approximately 
0.08% if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run; M3 will fall by 
approximately 0.17% if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run. On the 
other hand, PSC and TR will increase by 0.02% and 0.32% respectively if there is 
a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, the p-value shows that the 
coefficients of M3, TR and the constant are significant at 5% level in explaining the 
relationship with GR. While the coefficients of the other variables DBT, GCF and 
PSC are not significant in explaining their relationship with GR in the long run as 
indicated by their p-values. 
 
Nevertheless, the null hypothesis for the bound cointegration test is that there is no 
long run relationship. Therefore, looking at the F-Bounds test, the value of the F-
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statistic is greater than the value of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. We 
can conclude that there is a long run relationship between the growth rate of gross 
domestic product (GR) and the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.4.2: ARDL Bound Test results for Burkina Faso 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable 0.052515 0.065922 0.796623 0.4373 
DBT 0.155079 0.207162 0.748589 0.4650 
GCF -0.162011 0.230955 -0.701483 0.4931 
M3 -0.228514 0.232531 -0.982725 0.3404 
PSC 0.072131 0.048327 1.492542 0.1550 
TR 3.092576 4.227036 0.731618 0.4750 
C 0.052515 0.065922 0.796623 0.4373 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  3.938331 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients results shown in the table can be expressed in the model form as 
GR = 3.0926+ 0.0525DBT +0.1551GCF - 0.1620M3 - 0.2285PSC + 0.0721TR 
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We can observe from the model that DBT, GCF, and TR have a positive relationship 
with GR; while PSC and M3 have a negative relationship with GR. The model also 
shows that the growth rate of GDP will be approximately 3.09% in the long run, 
holding all other variables constant. Similarly, a percentage change in GR will result 
in a rise in debt by 0.05% approximately. Furthermore, GCF and TR rises by about 
0.16% and 0.07% respectively, if there is a percentage change in GR in the long 
run, while M3 and PSC will fall by 0.16% and 0.12% respectively if there is a 
percentage change in GR in the long run. However, the p-value for the independent 
variables indicate that the coefficients are not significant at 5% level in explaining 
their relationship GR. 
 
Furthermore, since the value of the F-statistic is not greater than all the values of 
the regressors I(1) at all levels of significance, we do not reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there is no long run relationship between GR and 
the explanatory variables for Burkina Faso. 
 
Table 7.4.3: ARDL Bound Test results for Cote D’Ivoire 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.018358 0.013823 -1.328061 0.1949 
GCF 0.252647 0.074459 3.393092 0.0021 
M3 0.317554 0.142791 2.223914 0.0344 
PSC -0.144718 0.053574 -2.701276 0.0116 
TR -0.181264 0.066173 -2.739260 0.0106 
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C 9.289635 7.694832 1.207256 0.2374 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  2.894789 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the coefficients and p-values of the bound test expressed as 
GR = 9.2896 – 0.0184DBT + 0.2526GCF + 0.3176M3 - 0.1447PSC – 0.1813TR 
 
The result shows that there is a negative relationship between DBT, PSC, TR and 
GR in the long run. GR has a positive relationship with GCF and M3 in the long 
run. GR will be approximately 9.29% in the long run, if the explanatory variables 
are equal to zero. A percentage change in GR will have a negative effect on DBT 
but not substantially (0.02%) in the long run. Similarly, a percentage change in GR 
will result in a fall in PSC by approximately 0.15% in the long run. Also, TR will 
fall by about 0.18% if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run. 
Conversely, GCF and M3 rises by 0.25% and 0.32% respectively in the long run 
when there is a percentage change in GR. However, the p-value also shows that the 
coefficients are significant at 5% level in explaining the long run relationship with 
the exception of DBT and the constant whose p-value is not significant. 
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The above table also shows the F-Bounds test for Cote D’Ivoire. The value of the 
F-statistic is greater than the value of I(1), and so, we do not reject the null 
hypothesis. We can conclude that there is a long run relationship between GR and 
the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.4.4: ARDL Bound Test results for Ghana 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.093449 0.040898 -2.284916 0.0293 
GCF 0.368125 0.126006 2.921488 0.0064 
M3 0.017367 0.248493 0.069889 0.9447 
PSC -0.628549 0.425039 -1.478804 0.1493 
TR 0.067329 0.079187 0.850254 0.4017 
C 3.391578 3.460330 0.980131 0.3346 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  5.580599 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
We can express the coefficients in the above table in model form as 
GR = 3.3916 – 0.0934DBT +0.3681GCF + 0.0174M3 - 0.6285PSC + 0.0673TR 
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It can be seen from the table and model above that DBT, and PSC have an inverse 
relationship with GR while GCF, M3 and TR have a positive relationship. The 
estimation presented shows that holding DBT, M3, PSC and TR constant, GR is 
approximately 3.39% in the long run. Similarly, DBT falls by a fractional amount 
(0.09%) if there is a percentage change in GR. A percentage change in GR would 
also result in fall in PSC by approximately 0.63% in the long run. While GCF, M3 
and TR will increase by about 0.37%, 0.02% and about 0.07% respectively if there 
is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, P-values show that only 
DBT and GCF are significant at 5% level in explaining the long run equilibrium 
relationship with GR. 
 
The above table also shows the F-bound test results for Ghana. The value of the F-
statistic is greater than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, we can conclude that there is a long run relationship between GR and 
the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.4.5: ARDL Bound Test results for Mali 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.024646 0.020630 1.194645 0.2403 
GCF -0.140012 0.436017 -0.321117 0.7500 
M3 0.091115 0.106163 0.858252 0.3966 
PSC 0.096011 0.225458 0.425850 0.6728 
TR 0.088526 0.096721 0.915271 0.3663 
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C -2.934464 9.419890 -0.311518 0.7573 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  11.84080 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients in the above table can be expressed in model form as 
GR = -2.9345 – 0.0246DBT – 0.1400GCF + 0.0911M3 + 0.0960PSC + 0.0885TR 
 
We can see from the results above that the independent variables have a positive 
relationship with GR with the exception of GCF. It is also estimated that GR will 
be -2.93% in the long run, holding the other independent variables constant. 
Likewise, a percentage change in GR results in a rise in DBT by approximately 
0.03% in the long run, while GCF falls by 0.34% when there is a percentage change 
in GR.  However, a percentage change in GR results in a rise in M3 and PSC by 
about 0.09% and 0.10% respectively in the long run. Meanwhile, TR will rise by 
0.09% if GR rises by 1%. Nonetheless, looking at the p-values, the coefficients are 
not significant at 5% level in explaining the long run equilibrium relationship 
between the independent variables and GR. 
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Furthermore, the F-Bounds result shows that there is a long run relationship 
between GR and the independent variables since the value of the F-stat is greater 
than all the regressors (I(1).  
 
Table 7.4.6: ARDL Bound Test results for Niger 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.249876 0.059573 -4.194482 0.0012 
GCF -2.480977 0.549375 -4.516001 0.0007 
M3 2.455736 0.480038 5.115712 0.0003 
PSC -2.943264 0.564858 -5.210628 0.0002 
TR 1.808789 0.398639 4.537404 0.0007 
C -32.52510 8.078864 -4.025950 0.0017 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic 9.603462 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients in the above table can be expressed in model form as 
GR = -32.5251 – 0.2499DBT – 2.4810GCF + 2.4557M3 – 2.9433PSC + 1.8088TR 
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From the above results, we can see that broad money (M3) and Trade (TR) has a 
positive relationship with growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) in Niger, 
while external debt stock (DBT), gross capital formation (GCF) and domestic credit 
to the private sector (PSC) have a negative relationship with GR in the long run. It 
can be seen that GR falls by approximately 32.53% if all the independent variables 
are held constant in the long run. Similarly, a percentage change in GR causes Debt 
to fall by 0.25%.  In the same vein, a percentage change in GR causes GCF and 
PSC to fall by about 2.48% and 2.94% respectively in the long run. However, a 
percentage change in M3 and TR will result in a rise in GR in the long run by 
approximately 2.45% and 1.81%. Looking at the p-values, all the coefficients are 
significant at 5% level in explaining the equilibrium relationship between the 
independent variables and GR in the long run. 
 
Furthermore, the F-Bounds test shows that there is a long run relationship between 
GR and the independent variables as the F-statistic is greater than I(1).   
 
Table 7.4.7: ARDL Bound Test results for Nigeria 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -1.226220 0.641657 -1.911020 0.0730 
GCF -1.218136 0.419734 -2.902162 0.0099 
M3 -0.364400 0.500863 -0.727545 0.4768 
PSC 0.912886 0.301144 3.031391 0.0075 
TR 0.032915 0.066183 0.497340 0.6253 
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C 16.34070 5.802112 2.816336 0.0119 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  3.091222 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients in the above table can be expressed in model form as 
GR = 16.3407 – 1.2262DBT – 1.2181GCF - 0.3644M3 + 0.9129PSC + 0.0329TR 
 
We can see from the above result that DBT, GCF, M3 have an inverse relationship 
with GR, while PSC and TR have a direct relationship with GR. The results also 
show that a unit change in GR leads to a fall in DBT by 1.23% in the long run. 
Likewise, a percentage change in GR leads to a fall in GCF, and M3 by about 1.22% 
and 0.36% in the long run.  Whereas, a percentage change in GR results in an 
increase in PSC and TR by about 0.91% and 0.03% in the long run. GR will be 
16.34% in the long run assuming the other independent variables are equal to zero. 
However, looking at the p-values, the coefficients of DBT, M3 and TR are not 
significant at 5% level in explaining the long run equilibrium relationship between 
the independent variables and GR for Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is no relationship between GR and the 
independent variables in the long run because the value of the F-statistic is smaller 
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than the values of I(1), and so, we do not reject the null hypothesis. The null 
hypothesis for the bound cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship.  
 
Table 7.4.8: ARDL Bound Test results for Senegal 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.000911 0.016333 -0.055771 0.9559 
GCF 0.251400 0.057805 4.349090 0.0002 
M3 -0.076677 0.052355 -1.464552 0.1546 
PSC -0.034663 0.027095 -1.279326 0.2117 
TR -0.073605 0.020551 -3.581499 0.0013 
C 6.161118 2.274674 2.708572 0.0116 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  5.832788 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The F-Bounds test here shows that there is a long run relationship between GR and 
the independent variables because the value of the F-statistic is greater than the 
values of I(1), therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.  
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The coefficients in the above table can be expressed in model form as 
GR = 6.1611 – 0.0009DBT + 0.2514GCF - 0.0767M3 - 0.0347PSC - 0.0736TR 
 
From the above estimation, we can see that nearly all independent variables have a 
negative relationship with GR, except GCF. GR will be 6.16% in the long run, 
assuming other independent variables and equal to zero. Also, a percentage change 
in GR results in a fall in DBT by a small amount in the long run, while a percentage 
change in GR leads to a 0.25% rise in GCF.  On the other hand, a percentage change 
in GR results in a fall in M3, PSC and TR by about 0.07%, 0.03% and 0.07% 
respectively in the long run. However, looking at the p-values, the coefficients of 
GCF, TR and constant are significant at 5% level in explaining the long run 
equilibrium relationship between the independent variables and GR. 
 
Table 7.4.9: ARDL Bound Test results for Togo 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.009639 0.017227 0.559553 0.5810 
GCF -0.249773 0.144982 -1.722783 0.0978 
M3 -0.295470 0.155463 -1.900588 0.0694 
PSC 0.531460 0.235439 2.257316 0.0334 
TR 0.115245 0.064340 1.791201 0.0859 
C -5.259190 4.295430 -1.224369 0.2327 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
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F-statistic  5.396161 10%   2.08 3 
K 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The coefficients in the above table can be expressed in model form as 
GR = -5.2592 + 0.0096DBT – 0.2498GCF - 0.2955M3 + 0.5315PSC + 0.1152TR 
 
From the above results, it can be observed that GCF and M3 have a negative 
relationship with GR, while DBT, PSC and TR have a positive relationship with 
GR. From the above estimation, GR falls by approximately 5.26% if the other 
independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a percentage change in GR results in 
a rise in DBT in the long run by about 0.01%. Furthermore, PSC and TR increase 
by 0.53% and 0.12% approximately, if there is a percentage change in GR. On the 
other hand, GCF and M3 declines by 0.24% and 0.30% approximately when there 
is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, looking at the p-values, 
only the coefficient of PSC is significant at 5% level in explaining the long run 
equilibrium relationship between the independent variables and GR. Furthermore, 
the F-statistic shows that there is a long run relationship between the independent 
variables and GR because the value of the F-statistic is greater than the values of 
I(1), therefore, we reject the null hypothesis.  
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Table 7.4.10: Summary of Cointegration tests 
Countries Cointegrated relationship 
Benin Yes 
Burkina Faso No 
Cote D’Ivoire No 
Ghana Yes 
Mali Yes 
Niger Yes 
Nigeria No 
Senegal Yes 
Togo Yes 
 
Since most of the countries have cointegrated relationships, meaning there is a long 
run relationship among the variables, we shall carry out Error Correction 
Regression for them to see the short run equilibrium dynamics among the variables. 
 
7.5 ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
The error correction model (ECM) is sometimes referred to as the speed of 
adjustment test. It tells us the degree to which the equilibrium behaviour drives short 
run dynamics. The value of the error correction term is expected to be between 0 
and 1, and is also expected to be negative, because a positive value would mean an 
ambiguous estimation. However, if the error correction term is negative and 
statistically significant but has a bigger value (i.e. more than 1), the result is also 
considered to be ambiguous.  
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Table 7.5.1: ECM results for Benin 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(DBT) -0.077584 0.035669 -2.175126 0.0379 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.062545 0.036173 -1.729050 0.0944 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.048422 0.036978 -1.309495 0.2006 
D(GCF) -0.213671 0.089530 -2.386570 0.0238 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.396579 0.092269 -4.298064 0.0002 
D(M3) -0.075282 0.117709 -0.639566 0.5275 
D(M3(-1)) 0.371530 0.116427 3.191099 0.0034 
CointEq(-1)* -1.042474 0.117831 -8.847179 0.0000 
R-Squared 0.810302 Mean Dependent Var -0.100742 
Adjusted R2 0.772363 S.D dependent Var 4.380650 
S.E of regression 2.090067 Akaike info criterion 4.478510 
Sum squared Resid 152.8933 Swartz Criterion 4.806175 
Log likelihood -88.28797 Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.599343 
Durbin Watson 1.752728   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above result shows the ECM result for the republic of Benin. The error 
correction term in the table is denoted as CointEq(-1). The error correction term 
carries the expected sign. The coefficient for the error correction term is -1.04, 
reflecting that there is a quick speed of adjustment. It can also be seen that the P-
value of the error term is less than 0.05, therefore, we can say that the coefficient is 
significant at 5% level. Furthermore, the R-squared result indicates that the error 
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correction model can explain 81.03% of the relationship among the variables. 
However, since the coefficient is greater than 1, we can say that the result is 
ambiguous in explaining the short-run dynamic of the model. 
 
Table 7.5.2: ECM results for Ghana 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(PSC) -0.218573 0.353258 -0.618735 0.5406 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.544490 0.330279 1.648579 0.1093 
D(PSC(-2)) 1.064086 0.325404 3.270041 0.0026 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.444116 0.324369 4.452076 0.0001 
CointEq(-1)* -0.939801 0.137634 -6.828251 0.0000 
R-squared 0.598474     Mean dependent var 0.024555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.555066     S.D. dependent var 5.026908 
S.E. of regression 3.353117     Akaike info criterion 5.369001 
Sum squared resid 416.0055     Schwarz criterion 5.575866 
Log likelihood -107.7490     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.444825 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.160088   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the ARDL error correction regression result for Ghana. The 
error correction term in the model is CointEq(-1) and it is estimated as -0.94. It 
infers that 94% of short run disequilibrium is corrected in that period. It has the 
expected negative sign and the p-value suggests that the coefficient is significant at 
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5% level. Furthermore, the r-squared shows that the error correction model can only 
explain 59.84% of relationships among the variables.  
 
Table 7.5.3: ECM results for Mali 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(DBT) -0.146656 0.070093 -2.092299 0.0437 
D(PSC) -0.417403 0.247344 -1.687543 0.1004 
D(TR) -0.121863 0.117888 -1.033712 0.3084 
CointEq(-1)* -1.266562 0.128537 -9.853655 0.0000 
R-squared 0.714161     Mean dependent var -0.003875 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693246     S.D. dependent var 8.134562 
S.E. of regression 4.505357     Akaike info criterion 5.933099 
Sum squared resid 832.2280     Schwarz criterion 6.093691 
Log likelihood -129.4947 
    Hannan-Quinn      
    criter. 5.992966 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.186752   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the ECM for Mali. It can be observed from the table above 
that the error correction term carries the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant at 5% level. The estimated error correction term is -1.27 and implies that 
there is a substantial speed of adjustment of disequilibrium correction within the 
period. In addition, the r-squared shows that the error correction model can only 
explain 71.41% of the relationships among the variables.  Furthermore, we can see 
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that the error correction term is greater than 1. This infers that the result is 
ambiguous in explaining the short-run equilibrium dynamic of the model. 
 
Table 7.5.4: ECM results for Niger 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) -0.310223 0.087987 -3.525773 0.0042 
D(GR(-2)) -0.413794 0.075895 -5.452157 0.0001 
D(GR(-3)) -0.438181 0.064286 -6.816101 0.0000 
D(DBT) -0.115054 0.036361 -3.164236 0.0082 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.348011 0.041245 8.437762 0.0000 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.136022 0.040442 3.363390 0.0056 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.075868 0.041154 1.843497 0.0901 
D(GCF) -0.179480 0.187675 -0.956336 0.3578 
D(GCF(-1)) 2.567841 0.267979 9.582253 0.0000 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.899351 0.275284 6.899599 0.0000 
D(GCF(-3)) 1.264479 0.187424 6.746606 0.0000 
D(M3) 0.579787 0.273438 2.120358 0.0555 
D(M3(-1)) -0.452078 0.318528 -1.419273 0.1813 
D(M3(-2)) 0.371959 0.283994 1.309745 0.2148 
D(M3(-3)) 0.854202 0.242906 3.516591 0.0043 
D(PSC) -0.329075 0.312965 -1.051477 0.3138 
D(PSC(-1)) 1.259736 0.377029 3.341221 0.0059 
D(PSC(-2)) 1.888627 0.416294 4.536767 0.0007 
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D(PSC(-3)) 0.839615 0.367793 2.282849 0.0415 
D(TR) -0.038018 0.086515 -0.439437 0.6682 
D(TR(-1)) -1.928891 0.217941 -8.850519 0.0000 
D(TR(-2)) -1.486888 0.211596 -7.027016 0.0000 
D(TR(-3)) -0.607147 0.149800 -4.053041 0.0016 
CointEq(-1)* -1.250362 0.124517 -10.04173 0.0000 
R-squared 0.974674     Mean dependent var 0.491735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.942312     S.D. dependent var 8.342766 
S.E. of regression 2.003784     Akaike info criterion 4.523512 
Sum squared resid 72.27273     Schwarz criterion 5.516466 
Log likelihood -70.99374     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.887468 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.761372   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above result shows the ECM result for Niger. The error correction term in the 
table is indicated as CointEq(-1). The error correction term carries the expected 
negative sign and is statistically significant at 5% level as signified by the p-value. 
The coefficient for the error correction term is -1.25, which is ambiguous in 
explaining the dynamics in the short run. Additionally, the R-squared result 
indicates that the error correction model can explain 97.46% of the relationship 
among the variables.  
 
Table 7.5.5: ECM results for Senegal 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 0.846245 0.247156 3.423932 0.0020 
D(GR(-2)) 0.519558 0.191413 2.714332 0.0114 
D(GR(-3)) 0.212666 0.110174 1.930269 0.0641 
D(DBT) -0.072717 0.038874 -1.870588 0.0723 
D(GCF) 0.329173 0.118813 2.770507 0.0100 
D(M3) 0.166924 0.185996 0.897458 0.3774 
D(M3(-1)) 0.628418 0.197031 3.189429 0.0036 
D(PSC) -0.565774 0.151010 -3.746606 0.0009 
CointEq(-1)* -2.181144 0.308761 -7.064187 0.0000 
R-squared 0.850977     Mean dependent var 0.287344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.814850     S.D. dependent var 5.101911 
S.E. of regression 2.195305     Akaike info criterion 4.597928 
Sum squared resid 159.0390     Schwarz criterion 4.970286 
Log likelihood -87.55649     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.734412 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.141615   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the ARDL error correction regression results for Senegal. 
The error correction term in the model is CointEq(-1) and is calculated 
approximately as -2.18. This result is ambiguous even though it carries the expected 
negative sign. The p-value also suggests that the coefficient is significant at 5% 
level. Furthermore, the r-squared shows that the error correction model can only 
explain 85.10% of the relationships among the variables.  
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Table 7.5.6: ECM results for Togo 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 0.198060 0.181080 1.093770 0.2849 
D(GR (-2)) 0.282540 0.156612 1.804073 0.0838 
D(GR(-3)) 0.325018 0.109704 2.962685 0.0068 
D(DBT) -0.157188 0.044908 -3.500220 0.0018 
D(GCF) 0.126046 0.125261 1.006265 0.3243 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.156203 0.116332 1.342738 0.1919 
D(GCF(-2)) 0.488813 0.129202 3.783318 0.0009 
D(M3) 0.128073 0.217043 0.590079 0.5607 
D(PSC) -0.271364 0.208676 -1.300412 0.2058 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.362390 0.195652 -1.852217 0.0763 
D(TR) 0.336895 0.064735 5.204195 0.0000 
CointEq(-1)* -1.476968 0.214944 -6.871420 0.0000 
R-squared 0.846407     Mean dependent var 0.036391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.790090     S.D. dependent var 8.260744 
S.E. of regression 3.784740     Akaike info criterion 5.734788 
Sum squared resid 429.7277     Schwarz criterion 6.231265 
Log likelihood -108.4305     Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.916766 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.242359   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the ARDL error correction regression result for Togo. The 
error correction term in the model is -1.47. The result is ambiguous as the coefficient 
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of the EC term is greater than 1. It has the expected negative sign and the p-value 
suggests that the coefficient is significant at 5% level. Furthermore, the r-squared 
shows that the error correction model can only explain 84.64% of the relationships 
among the variables.  
 
Table 7.5.7: Summary of ARDL Error Correction Regression 
Countries Error Correction term 
(CointEq(-1) 
P-Value 
Benin -1.042474 0.000 
Burkina Faso N/A N/A 
Cote D’Ivoire N/A N/A 
Ghana -0.939801 0.0000 
Mali -1.266562 0.0000 
Niger -1.250362 0.0000 
Nigeria N/A N/A 
Senegal -2.181144 0.0000 
Togo -1.476968 0.0000 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The table above displays the summary of the ECM. It can be seen that even though 
the P-value indicates significance, and the coefficients carry the expected sign, the 
results were ambiguous. However, the coefficient for Mali was significant, carry 
the expected sign and indicates that about 93.98% of the errors in the short run are 
corrected within the same period. It could also be observed that there were no 
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estimated coefficients for Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria, because there 
was no cointegration detected among the variables tested for those countries. 
 
7.6 POST DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
The effects of a mis-specified model in econometric analysis can be dangerous in 
most cases. A mis-specified model has unfavourable consequences on the sampling 
peculiarities of both estimators and tests. Therefore, post diagnostic tests are done 
to check how the error term is distributed, and the likely estimation errors or the 
model’s structural specification. 
 
7.6.1 Cumulative Sum Test 
The cumulative sum test also known as the CUSUM test is done to check the 
stability of the coefficients of the model. The plot of the CUSUM is expected to be 
within the level of significance, usually 5% (depicted by the two red lines). If this 
is the case, then the coefficients of the model are said to be stable. However, if the 
plot of the CUSUM falls outside the significance lines, then the coefficients of the 
model are not stable.   
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Figure 7.1: CUSUM Test Result 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
It can be seen from Graph 7.6.1 that the trend of the cumulative sum (blue line) is 
within the 5% significance level, therefore we can say that our model is stable for 
every country tested.  
 
So far, we can see from the initial set of test results that there are long run 
relationships between the independent variables (DBT, GCF, M3, PSC and TR) and 
the dependent variable (GR) among the selected West African countries apart from 
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Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria. Furthermore, we could observe from the 
Error Correction Regression results, that the coefficients had the expected negative 
signs but were too ambiguous in explaining the short run equilibrium dynamics 
among the variables in the selected West African countries. Therefore, it is 
important to do a more robust test by adding more explanatory variables to see if 
the results will improve. 
 
7.7 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
A robustness test is done when a researcher wants to assess how key regression 
coefficient estimates change when the regression specification is altered either by 
adding or taking away regressors (Lu and White, 2014). In this case, we added two 
more explanatory variables, inflation (IN) and government spending (PX). Inflation 
is added as a monetary policy instrument and government spending is added as a 
fiscal policy instrument. Therefore, this expanded model still examines the first 
research question (see section 1.5). The new robust model is expressed below as 
 
GR = b0 + b1DBT + b2GCF + b3PSC + b4M3+ b5TR + b6IN + b7PX + ε 
Where: GR = is the annual growth rate of GDP.  
DBT = External debt stock.  
GCF = Gross Capital formation (% of GDP)  
PSC = Private sector credit (% of GDP) 
 M3 = broad money (% of GDP). 
TR = Trade (% of GDP). 
IN = Inflation 
PX = government spending (% of GDP) 
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7.7.1 Robust Unit root test 
Table 7.7.1: Robust Unit root results at first difference   
Series BEN BF CIV GHN MAL NER NGR SEN TOGO 
D(GR) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 
D(DBT) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D(GCF) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 
D(M3) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D(PSC) 0.0000 0.0004 0.0004 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 
D(TR) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
D(IN) 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0000 
D(PX) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
The above unit root test was done at first difference. The null hypothesis for the unit 
root test is that there is presence of unit root. Since the p-values are less than 0.05 
as shown above, we can reject the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance and 
say that that there is no presence of unit root.  
 
7.7.2 Robust ARDL Bounds Test Results 
Table 7.7.2: ARDL Bound Test results for Benin 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.053182 0.011757 4.523586 0.0106 
GCF -1.284490 0.189815 -6.767051 0.0025 
M3 0.497281 0.050041 9.937414 0.0006 
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PSC -1.014710 0.110745 -9.162577 0.0008 
TR 0.402220 0.083068 4.842072 0.0084 
IN -0.445539 0.119136 -3.739750 0.0201 
PX 1.256376 0.114249 10.99684 0.0004 
C -131.5169 10.88425 -12.08323 0.0003 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  8.573311 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -131.5169 + 0.0532DBT – 1.2845GCF + 0.4973M3 – 1.0147PSC + 
0.4022TR - 0.4455IN + 1.2564PX 
 
The table above shows the robust bound cointegration test results for Benin. It can 
be seen that DBT, M3, TR and PX have a positive relationship with GR, whereas 
GCF, M3 and IN have a negative relationship with GR. The above model indicates 
that the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) will be -131.51 approximately, 
assuming all other independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a percentage 
change in GR will raise the debt level by about 0.05% in the long run. Meanwhile, 
M3 will rise by approximately 0.50% if there is a percentage change in GR in the 
long run; TR and PX will increase by 0.40% and 1.25% respectively if there is a 
percentage change in GR in the long run.  
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On the other hand, GCF, PSC and IN will fall by 1.28%, 1.02%, and 0.45% 
respectively if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, looking 
at all the p-values for the coefficients, we can see that they are less than 0.05, 
meaning that they are significant in explaining the relationship between the 
explanatory variables and GR in the long run at 5% level of significance. 
 
As previously mentioned, the null hypothesis for the bound cointegration test is that 
there is no long run relationship. Hence, it can be observed that the value of the F-
statistic is greater than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. We 
can conclude that there is a long run relationship between growth rate of gross 
domestic product (GR) and the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.7.3: ARDL Bound Test results for Burkina Faso 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.009158 0.061121 0.149833 0.8881 
GCF 0.091100 0.122532 0.743481 0.4985 
M3 0.380235 0.250978 1.515009 0.2043 
PSC -0.113606 0.114902 -0.988723 0.3788 
TR -0.195057 0.061146 -3.190004 0.0332 
IN -0.031667 0.072476 -0.436932 0.6847 
PX 0.416762 0.106150 3.926180 0.0172 
C -44.16677 11.90018 -3.711437 0.0206 
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F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  6.112519 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -44.1668 + 0.0092DBT + 0.0911GCF + 0.3802M3 - 0.1136PSC – 0.1951TR 
- 0.0317IN + 0.4168PX 
 
The table above shows the robust bound cointegration test results for Burkina Faso. 
According to the results, DBT, GCF, M3, and PX have a positive relationship with 
GR, whereas PSC, TR, and IN have a negative relationship with GR. We can see 
from the above model that the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) is -
44.17% approximately, if all other independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a 
percentage change in GR will raise the debt level by a little amount in the long run. 
Meanwhile, GCF will rise by approximately 0.09% if there is a percentage change 
in GR in the long run. M3 and PX will also increase by 0.38% and 0.42% 
respectively if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run.  
 
On the other hand, PSC, TR and IN and will fall by 0.11%, 0.20% and 0.03% 
respectively if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, looking 
at the p-values for TR and PX, we can see that they are less than 0.05, meaning that 
they are significant in explaining the relationship between the explanatory variables 
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and GR in the long run at 5% level of significance. However, the p-values for DBT, 
GCF, M3, PSC and IN are greater than 0.05, meaning that they are not significant 
at 5% level to explain the relationship between those variables and GR. 
 
The above table also shows the F-Bounds test. The null hypothesis for the bound 
cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship. The estimated value of 
the F-statistic is greater than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. 
We can conclude that there is a long run relationship between the growth rate of 
gross domestic product (GR) and the independent variables. 
 
Table 7.7.4: ARDL Bound Test results for Cote D’Ivoire 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.088323 0.075375 1.171788 0.2684 
GCF 1.845492 1.114771 1.655489 0.0288 
M3 1.091722 0.542016 2.014189 0.0717 
PSC -0.447589 0.275649 -1.623764 0.0355 
TR 0.023996 0.192286 0.124792 0.9032 
IN -0.553490 0.502540 -1.101384 0.2965 
PX -1.165247 0.682289 -1.707849 0.0185 
C 57.36776 29.78421 1.926113 0.0830 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  5.970873 10%   1.92 2.89 
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K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = 57.3678 + 0.0883DBT + 1.8455GCF + 1.0917M3 – 0.4476PSC + 0.0240TR 
- 0.5535IN – 1.1652PX 
 
We can see from the above table that PSC, IN, and PX have an inverse relationship 
with GR, while DBT, GCF, M3 and TR have a direct relationship with GR. The 
results also show that a percentage change in GR leads to a rise in DBT by 0.09% 
in the long run, whereas, a percentage change in GR results in an increase in GCF, 
M3 and TR by about 1.85%, 1.09% and 0.02% respectively in the long run. 
Furthermore, a percentage change in GR leads to a fall in PSC, IN and PX by about 
0.45%, 0.55% and 1.17% in the long run respectively. GR will be 57.37% in the 
long run assuming the other independent variables are equal to zero. However, 
looking at the p-values, the coefficients of DBT, M3, TR and IN are not significant 
at 5% level in explaining the long run equilibrium relationship between the 
independent variables and GR for Cote D’Ivoire. 
 
Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is a relationship between GR and the 
independent variables in the long run because the value of the F-statistic is greater 
than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
for the bound cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship.  
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Table 7.7.5: ARDL Bound Test results for Ghana 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.029852 0.103810 0.287567 0.7924 
GCF 1.484177 0.858589 1.728624 0.1823 
M3 -1.287947 0.503972 -2.555591 0.0835 
PSC 3.238398 1.520544 2.129763 0.1230 
TR -0.360324 0.327742 -1.099414 0.3519 
IN 1.221462 0.639060 1.911341 0.1519 
PX 0.073303 0.492021 0.148984 0.8910 
C -49.44268 36.52554 -1.353647 0.2688 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic 18.94189 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -49.4427 + 0.0299DBT + 1.4842GCF – 1.2879M3 + 3.2384PSC – 0.3603TR 
+ 1.2215IN + 00733PX 
 
From the above results, it can be observed that M3 and TR have a negative 
relationship GR, while DBT, GCF, PSC, IN and PX have a positive relationship 
with GR. From the above estimation, GR is -49.44 if the other independent variables 
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are equal to zero. Also, a percentage change in GR results in a rise in DBT in the 
long run by about 0.03%. Furthermore, GCF, PSC, IN and PX increases by 1.48%, 
3.24%, 1.22% and 0.07% approximately, if there is a percentage change in GR. On 
the other hand, M3 and TR declines by 1.29% and 0.36% approximately when there 
is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, the p-values for the 
independent variables, it can be concluded that none of the coefficients are 
significant at 5% level in explaining the long run relationship with GR. 
 
Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is a long run relationship between the 
independent variables and GR because the estimated value of the F-statistic is 
greater than the values of I(1), therefore, we reject the null hypothesis at 5% level 
of significance.  
 
Table 7.7.6: ARDL Bound Test results for Mali 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.080051 0.050717 1.578402 0.2126 
GCF 2.754410 0.945895 2.911961 0.0619 
M3 -0.720238 0.451958 -1.593597 0.2093 
PSC 2.055492 0.728587 2.821205 0.0667 
TR 0.538658 0.164528 3.273967 0.0466 
IN 0.094251 0.225729 0.417541 0.7044 
PX 0.548992 0.434853 1.262478 0.2960 
C -158.3940 75.67446 -2.093097 0.1274 
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F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  38.75450 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -158.3940 + 0.0801DBT + 2.7544GCF – 0.7202M3 + 2.0555PSC + 
0.5387TR + 0.0943IN+ 0.5490PX 
 
The table above shows the robust bound cointegration test results for Mali. It can 
be seen that DBT, GCF, PSC, TR and PX have a positive relationship with GR, 
whereas M3 has a negative relationship with GR. The above model indicates that 
the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) will be -158.39 approximately, 
assuming all other independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a percentage 
change in GR will raise the debt level by about 0.08% in the long run. Meanwhile, 
GCF will rise by approximately 2.75% if there is a percentage change in GR in the 
long run; PSC will also rise by 2.055% if there is a percentage change in GR in the 
long run; TR, IN and PX will increase by 0.54%, 0.09% and 0.55% respectively if 
there is a percentage change in GR in the long run.  
 
On the other hand, M3 will fall by 0.72% respectively if there is a percentage change 
in GR in the long run. However, looking at the p-value, we can see that only the p-
value of TR is less than 0.05, meaning it is significant in explaining the relationship 
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between the explanatory variables and GR in the long run at 5% level of 
significance. However, the p-value of the others are not significant in explaining 
the relationship among the variables. 
 
Furthermore, the table also shows the F-statistic test and the null hypothesis for the 
bound cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship. Looking at the F-
Bounds test, the value of the F-statistic is greater than the values of I(1), and so, we 
reject the null hypothesis. We can conclude that there is a long run relationship 
between the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) and the independent 
variables. 
 
Table 7.7.7: ARDL Bound Test results for Niger 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT -0.715879 0.376734 -1.900222 0.1978 
GCF -3.992779 2.988837 -1.335897 0.3133 
M3 7.233526 3.792501 1.907323 0.1967 
PSC -9.622685 4.593036 -2.095060 0.1712 
TR 4.614446 2.394270 1.927287 0.1938 
IN 2.092405 0.965922 2.166226 0.1626 
PX -4.585675 1.546973 -2.964289 0.0975 
C 377.0561 125.6746 3.000257 0.0955 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
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F-statistic  11.65587 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = 377.0561 - 0.7159DBT – 3.9928GCF + 7.2335M3 – 9.6227PSC + 4.6144TR 
+ 2.0924IN – 4.5857PX 
 
We can see from the above table that DBT, GCF, PSC and PX have an inverse 
relationship with GR, while M3, TR and IN have a direct relationship with GR. The 
results also show that a percentage change in GR leads to a rise in M3 by 7.23% in 
the long run, whereas, a percentage change in GR results in an increase in TR and 
IN by about 4.61% and 2.09% respectively in the long run.  
 
Conversely, a percentage change in GR leads to a fall in DBT, GCF, PSC and PX 
by about 0.72%, 3.99%, 9.66% and 4.59% in the long run respectively. GR will be 
377.06% in the long run assuming the other independent variables are equal to zero. 
However, looking at the p-values, none are significant at 5% level in explaining the 
long run equilibrium relationship between the independent variables and GR for 
Niger. 
 
Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is a relationship between GR and the 
independent variables in the long run because the value of the F-statistic is greater 
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than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis. The null hypothesis 
for the bound cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship.  
 
Table 7.7.8: ARDL Bound Test results for Nigeria 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 14.92129 143.5214 0.103966 0.0206 
GCF 5.766356 59.38229 0.097106 0.0658 
M3 3.033702 31.03363 0.097755 0.9253 
PSC -1.660177 21.00751 -0.079028 0.0796 
TR 3.855544 34.80959 0.110761 0.0154 
IN -1.831616 17.26435 -0.106092 0.0090 
PX 11.73209 106.5138 0.110146 0.0259 
C -1415.212 12963.18 -0.109172 0.9166 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  13.139398 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -1415.2122 + 14.9213DBT + 5.7664GCF + 3.0337M3 – 1.6602PSC + 
3.8555TR – 1.8316IN +11.7321PX 
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The table above shows the robust bound cointegration test results for Nigeria. It can 
be seen that DBT, GCF, M3, TR and PX have a positive relationship with GR, 
whereas PSC and IN have a negative relationship with GR. The above model 
indicates that the growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) will be -1415.22 
approximately, assuming all other independent variables are equal to zero. Also, a 
percentage change in GR will raise the debt level by about 14.92% in the long run. 
Meanwhile, GCF will rise by approximately 5.77% if there is a percentage change 
in GR in the long run; M3 will also rise by 3.033% if there is a percentage change 
in GR in the long run; while TR and PX will increase by 3.86% and 11.73% 
respectively if there is a percentage change in GR in the long run.  
 
On the other hand, PSC and IN will fall by about 1.66% and 1.83 respectively if 
there is a percentage change in GR in the long run. However, looking at the p-value, 
we can see that only the p-value of DBT, TR, IN and PX are less than 0.05, meaning 
means it is significant in explaining the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and GR in the long run at 5% level of significance. However, the p-value 
of the others are not significant in explaining the relationship among the variables. 
 
Furthermore, the table also shows the F-statistic test and the null hypothesis for the 
bound cointegration test is that there is no long run relationship. Looking at the F-
Bounds test, the value of the F-statistic is greater than the values of I(1), and so, we 
reject the null hypothesis. We can conclude that there is a long run relationship 
between growth rate of gross domestic product (GR) and the independent variables. 
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Table 7.7.9: ARDL Bound Test results for Senegal 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.009141 0.067732 0.134962 0.0092 
GCF 1.270065 0.928558 1.367782 0.2432 
M3 0.144597 0.119872 1.206260 0.2942 
PSC 0.099789 0.152969 0.652344 0.0498 
TR -0.504895 0.320276 -1.576440 0.1901 
IN 0.260266 0.115036 2.262486 0.0864 
PX -0.797205 0.800942 -0.995334 0.0009 
C 93.83043 90.88820 1.032372 0.3602 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  4.919159 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = 93.8304 + 0.0091DBT + 1.2701GCF + 0.1446M3 + 0.0998PSC – 0.5049TR 
+ 0.2603IN - 0.7972PX 
 
We can see from the above table that DBT, GCF, M3, and IN have a positive 
relationship with GR, while TR and PX have a negative relationship with GR. The 
result also shows that a percentage change in GR leads to a rise in DBT by 0.09% 
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in the long run, whereas, a percentage change in GR results in an increase in GCF 
by 1.27%; M3 by 0.14%; PSC by 0.99; and IN by about 0.26% respectively in the 
long run.  
 
Conversely, a percentage change in GR leads to a fall in TR and PX by about 0.50% 
and 0.79% in the long run respectively. GR will be 93.83 in the long run assuming 
the other independent variables are equal to zero. However, looking at the p-values, 
only DBT, PSC and PX are significant at the 5% level in explaining the long run 
equilibrium relationship between the independent variables and GR for Senegal. 
 
Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is a relationship between GR and the 
independent variables in the long run because the value of the F-statistic is greater 
than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 7.7.10: ARDL Bound Test results for Togo 
Levels Equation 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
DBT 0.020084 0.026639 0.753938 0.5057 
GCF -1.104637 0.574952 -1.921267 0.1505 
M3 -0.665956 0.591912 -1.125094 0.3424 
PSC 0.884407 0.659362 1.341306 0.2723 
TR 0.410196 0.231305 1.773398 0.1743 
IN 1.212830 0.555696 2.182543 0.1171 
PX 0.364877 0.243536 1.498244 0.2310 
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C -58.47939 35.81755 -1.632702 0.2010 
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
F-statistic  18.26875 10%   1.92 2.89 
K 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
GR = -58.4794 + 0.0201DBT - 1.1046GCF - 0.6660M3 + 0.8833PSC + 0.4102TR 
+ 1.2128 + 0.3649PX 
 
We can see from the above table that DBT, PSC, TR, IN and PX have a positive 
relationship with GR, while GCF and M3 have an inverse relationship with GR. 
The results also show that a percentage change in GR leads to a fall in GCF by 
1.11% in the long run. Also, a percentage change in GR results in a decrease in M3 
by about 0.67% respectively in the long run.  
 
Conversely, a percentage change in GR leads to a rise in DBT, PSC, TR, IN and 
PX by about 0.02%, 0.88%, 0.41%, 1.21% and 0.36% in the long run respectively. 
GR will be -58.48% in the long run assuming the other independent variables are 
equal to zero. However, looking at the p-values, none are significant at the 5% level 
in explaining the long run equilibrium relationship between the independent 
variables and GR for Togo. 
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Furthermore, the F-statistic shows that there is a relationship between GR and the 
independent variables in the long run because the value of the F-statistic is greater 
than the values of I(1), and so, we reject the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 7.7.11 Summary of Robust Cointegration tests 
Countries Cointegrated relationship 
Benin Yes 
Burkina Faso Yes 
Cote D’Ivoire Yes 
Ghana Yes 
Mali Yes 
Niger Yes 
Nigeria Yes 
Senegal Yes 
Togo Yes 
 
Since most of the countries have cointegrated relationships, meaning there is a long 
run relationship among the variables, we shall carry out Error Correction 
Regression for them to see the short run equilibrium dynamics among the variables.  
 
7.7.3 Robust Error Correction Model 
Table 7.8.1: ECM results for Benin 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
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D(GR(-1)) 2.975314 0.359287 8.281152 0.0012 
D(GR(-2)) 1.818490 0.232008 7.838047 0.0014 
D(GR(-3)) 1.165084 0.165316 7.047598 0.0021 
D(DBT) 0.259672 0.050354 5.156971 0.0067 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.430934 0.050592 -8.517827 0.0010 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.182159 0.022528 8.086026 0.0013 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.277124 0.025901 10.69943 0.0004 
D(GCF) -0.926266 0.086585 -10.69777 0.0004 
D(GCF(-1)) 4.265497 0.504569 8.453744 0.0011 
D(GCF(-2)) 2.205636 0.253757 8.691936 0.0010 
D(GCF(-3)) 0.613436 0.141530 4.334304 0.0123 
D(M3) 1.752272 0.201886 8.679523 0.0010 
D(M3(-1)) -0.743088 0.141294 -5.259168 0.0063 
D(M3(-2)) 0.335783 0.091828 3.656666 0.0216 
D(M3(-3)) -0.847894 0.149660 -5.665473 0.0048 
D(PSC) -1.202990 0.185926 -6.470261 0.0029 
D(PSC(-1)) 5.704870 0.619991 9.201532 0.0008 
D(PSC(-2)) 4.254223 0.462950 9.189371 0.0008 
D(PSC(-3)) 2.773492 0.363511 7.629734 0.0016 
D(TR) 0.830883 0.055777 14.89641 0.0001 
D(TR(-1)) -0.105132 0.070247 -1.496611 0.2088 
D(IN) -1.291195 0.121705 -10.60925 0.0004 
D(IN(-1)) 1.038001 0.132804 7.816038 0.0014 
D(IN(-2)) -0.031370 0.037511 -0.836278 0.4500 
D(IN(-3)) -0.183264 0.035702 -5.133140 0.0068 
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D(PX) -0.350455 0.087322 -4.013374 0.0160 
D(PX(-1)) -5.585031 0.610526 -9.147905 0.0008 
D(PX(-2)) -3.404717 0.422333 -8.061682 0.0013 
D(PX(-3)) -1.280778 0.205157 -6.242913 0.0034 
CointEq(-1)* -0.821259 0.592652 -9.822392 0.0000 
R-squared 0.989611     Mean dependent var -0.038374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964504     S.D. dependent var 4.414386 
S.E. of regression 0.831683     Akaike info criterion 2.645078 
Sum squared resid 8.300366     Schwarz criterion 3.886271 
Log likelihood -25.54665     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.100025 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.216926   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above result shows the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for Benin. 
The error correction term in the table is indicated as CointEq(-1). The error 
correction term carries the expected negative sign and is statistically significant at 
5% level as signified by the p-value. The coefficient for the error correction term 
infers that about 82.13% of the disequilibrium in the short run are corrected within 
that period. This result is in line with the recovery policy of the BCEAO where they 
provide urgent funds in situations of financial instability (see section 4.3).  
Additionally, the R-squared result indicates that the error correction model can 
explain 98.96% of the relationship among the variables.  
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Table 7.8.2: ECM results for Burkina Faso 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 2.033457 0.224849 9.043640 0.0008 
D(GR(-2)) 1.163573 0.159155 7.310938 0.0019 
D(GR(-3)) 0.444420 0.078720 5.645559 0.0048 
D(DBT) -0.182594 0.046055 -3.964728 0.0166 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.185341 0.050010 3.706059 0.0207 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.123933 0.074834 -1.656112 0.1730 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.159452 0.052602 -3.031288 0.0387 
D(GCF) 0.306320 0.134946 2.269938 0.0857 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.413113 0.112345 -3.677188 0.0213 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.388799 0.108627 -3.579220 0.0232 
D(M3) 0.155630 0.095601 1.627914 0.1789 
D(M3(-1)) -1.024308 0.157862 -6.488626 0.0029 
D(M3(-2)) -0.972076 0.147900 -6.572534 0.0028 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828961 0.153052 -5.416201 0.0056 
D(PSC) 0.130841 0.171333 0.763663 0.4876 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.872506 0.224153 3.892462 0.0177 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.669327 0.190261 3.517946 0.0245 
D(TR) -0.141912 0.082052 -1.729534 0.1588 
D(TR(-1)) 1.000320 0.083341 12.00276 0.0003 
D(TR(-2)) 0.643966 0.117562 5.477678 0.0054 
D(TR(-3)) 0.468894 0.105937 4.426166 0.0115 
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D(IN) -0.106587 0.045365 -2.349565 0.0786 
D(IN(-1)) -0.035928 0.052185 -0.688482 0.5290 
D(IN(-2)) 0.021431 0.043431 0.493453 0.6476 
D(IN(-3)) -0.171278 0.076108 -2.250480 0.0876 
D(PX) 0.042358 0.103528 0.409142 0.7034 
D(PX(-1)) -1.064867 0.140954 -7.554694 0.0016 
D(PX(-2)) -0.652090 0.126879 -5.139449 0.0068 
D(PX(-3)) -0.138246 0.097554 -1.417133 0.2294 
CointEq(-1)* -0.571623 0.278018 -12.84671 0.0000 
R-squared 0.989686     Mean dependent var 0.084493 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964760     S.D. dependent var 4.956375 
S.E. of regression 0.930423     Akaike info criterion 2.869453 
Sum squared resid 10.38823     Schwarz criterion 4.110645 
Log likelihood -30.25851     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.324399 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.092455   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the ARDL error correction regression result for Burkina 
Faso. The error correction term in the model (CointEq(-1) is estimated 
approximately as -0.5716. This means that if there are disequilibria in the short run, 
57.16% of those disequilibria will be corrected within that period. The p-value also 
suggests that the coefficient is significant at 5% level. This result is in line with 
Burkina Faso’s sustainability policy. Since 2005, the country’s policy is to face 
substantial financial deficit with support from the international financial community 
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(IMF, 2012). Furthermore, their BCEAO membership allows them to benefit from 
the organisations recovery policies (See section 4.3). 
Furthermore, the r-squared shows that the error correction model can only explain 
98.96% of the relationships among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.3: ECM results for Cote D’Ivoire 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 0.072573 0.161647 0.448963 0.6630 
D(GR(-2)) 0.608953 0.146284 4.162819 0.0019 
D(GR(-3)) 0.644945 0.128218 5.030066 0.0005 
D(DBT) 0.027217 0.027734 0.981348 0.3496 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.090324 0.022988 -3.929182 0.0028 
D(GCF) 0.988207 0.111323 8.876932 0.0000 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.274731 0.267380 -4.767486 0.0008 
D(GCF(-2)) -1.817353 0.271561 -6.692245 0.0001 
D(GCF(-3)) -1.684555 0.276788 -6.086073 0.0001 
D(M3) 0.525487 0.197570 2.659752 0.0239 
D(M3(-1)) -0.641922 0.212600 -3.019394 0.0129 
D(PSC) -0.761735 0.223830 -3.403187 0.0067 
D(TR) 0.195441 0.083982 2.327167 0.0423 
D(TR(-1)) 0.157259 0.090631 1.735155 0.1134 
D(TR(-2)) 0.208566 0.085709 2.433414 0.0352 
D(TR(-3)) 0.574397 0.106335 5.401773 0.0003 
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D(IN) -0.228582 0.048529 -4.710224 0.0008 
D(IN(-1)) 0.377884 0.077571 4.871453 0.0007 
D(IN(-2)) 0.625659 0.082586 7.575832 0.0000 
D(IN(-3)) 0.355382 0.073763 4.817899 0.0007 
D(PX) -0.035176 0.165390 -0.212685 0.8358 
D(PX(-1)) 1.348493 0.202210 6.668773 0.0001 
D(PX(-2)) 1.286729 0.193583 6.646923 0.0001 
CointEq(-1)* -0.925043 0.133341 -6.937444 0.0000 
R-squared 0.942827     Mean dependent var 0.076766 
Adjusted R-squared 0.869773     S.D. dependent var 5.025817 
S.E. of regression 1.813666     Akaike info criterion 4.324137 
Sum squared resid 59.20893     Schwarz criterion 5.317091 
Log likelihood -66.80688     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.688094 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.414891   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
It can be observed from looking at the CointEq(-1) from the above table that, 
92.50% of disequilibrium in the short run are corrected within that period. It also 
carries the expected negative sign. The p-value is statistically significant at 5% 
level. This is due to the enormous financial assistance they receive from the 
international monetary fund. As mentioned in section 4.3, Cote d’Ivoire had the 
largest loan program in West Africa for crisis recovery. 
Additionally, the R-squared result shows that the error correction model can explain 
94.28% of the relationship among the variables in Cote D’Ivoire.  
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Table 7.8.4: ECM results for Ghana 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) -0.516657 0.040700 -12.69418 0.0011 
D(GR(-2)) -0.615024 0.045096 -13.63809 0.0009 
D(GR(-3)) -0.401042 0.044481 -9.015986 0.0029 
D(DBT) 0.222809 0.022863 9.745588 0.0023 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.041292 0.019252 -2.144801 0.1213 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.299725 0.021617 -13.86538 0.0008 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.218804 0.031337 -6.982396 0.0060 
D(GCF) 0.281045 0.070922 3.962734 0.0287 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.061613 0.087219 0.706417 0.5309 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.214085 0.083042 -2.578026 0.0819 
D(M3) 0.417678 0.083534 5.000078 0.0154 
D(M3(-1)) 2.575086 0.133504 19.28848 0.0003 
D(M3(-2)) 1.580196 0.124839 12.65788 0.0011 
D(M3(-3)) 2.210977 0.123470 17.90701 0.0004 
D(PSC) -1.559638 0.302072 -5.163126 0.0141 
D(PSC(-1)) -2.473708 0.222182 -11.13368 0.0016 
D(PSC(-2)) -2.096954 0.189093 -11.08951 0.0016 
D(PSC(-3)) 0.887104 0.128788 6.888103 0.0063 
D(TR) 0.051760 0.035276 1.467297 0.2386 
D(TR(-1)) 0.038862 0.041417 0.938323 0.4173 
D(TR(-2)) 0.388390 0.048925 7.938406 0.0042 
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D(TR(-3)) 0.070916 0.039455 1.797398 0.1701 
D(IN) 0.079692 0.009841 8.098013 0.0039 
D(IN(-1)) -0.672127 0.032332 -20.78806 0.0002 
D(IN(-2)) -0.390927 0.023912 -16.34831 0.0005 
D(IN(-3)) -0.153509 0.014874 -10.32083 0.0019 
D(PX) 0.674843 0.075369 8.953902 0.0029 
D(PX(-1)) 0.180586 0.065048 2.776206 0.0692 
D(PX(-2)) 0.440692 0.061559 7.158890 0.0056 
D(PX(-3)) 0.088443 0.062030 1.425812 0.2492 
CointEq(-1)* -0.777671 0.031105 -25.00164 0.0001 
R-squared 0.993742     Mean dependent var 0.024555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976674     S.D. dependent var 5.026908 
S.E. of regression 0.767747     Akaike info criterion 2.445704 
Sum squared resid 6.483797     Schwarz criterion 3.728270 
Log likelihood -20.35979     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.915815 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.094034   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above results show the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for Ghana. 
The error correction term in the table is denoted as CointEq(-1). The error correction 
term carries the expected negative sign, is between 0 and 1, and is statistically 
significant at 5% level as indicated by the p-value. The coefficient for the error 
correction term supposes that 77.77% of the disequilibrium in the short run are 
corrected in the same period. As mentioned in the contextual information chapter, 
Ghana signed onto the HIPC initiative in the early 2000s as a part of their fiscal 
	 252	
policies towards economic sustainability. Ghana are also able to get financial 
assistance from the IMF and are able issue sovereign bonds in times of crisis as part 
of their monetary policy recovery plans (see section 4.3) 
Moreover, the R-squared result shows that the error correction model can explain 
99.37% of the relationship among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.5: ECM results for Mali 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 0.814951 0.056958 14.30793 0.0007 
D(GR(-2)) 0.173908 0.034950 4.975930 0.0156 
D(DBT) -0.493427 0.022416 -22.01196 0.0002 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.686487 0.027605 -24.86796 0.0001 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.583354 0.029776 -19.59150 0.0003 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.195310 0.024898 -7.844301 0.0043 
D(GCF) 1.579200 0.094379 16.73251 0.0005 
D(GCF(-1)) -4.856279 0.154245 -31.48425 0.0001 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.935763 0.118809 -24.70995 0.0001 
D(GCF(-3)) -3.082228 0.117327 -26.27033 0.0001 
D(M3) -0.967259 0.085472 -11.31664 0.0015 
D(M3(-1)) 2.736958 0.108649 25.19092 0.0001 
D(M3(-2)) 2.851871 0.095628 29.82271 0.0001 
D(M3(-3)) 1.556047 0.082042 18.96648 0.0003 
D(PSC) 1.658936 0.098528 16.83719 0.0005 
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D(PSC(-1)) -5.980549 0.168655 -35.46018 0.0000 
D(PSC(-2)) -3.071559 0.122628 -25.04787 0.0001 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.089978 0.064578 -1.393323 0.2578 
D(TR) 0.635089 0.048493 13.09659 0.0010 
D(TR(-1)) -0.995474 0.051545 -19.31270 0.0003 
D(TR(-2)) 0.022620 0.037895 0.596926 0.5926 
D(TR(-3)) 0.618308 0.047211 13.09681 0.0010 
D(IN) 0.101215 0.020502 4.936939 0.0159 
D(IN(-1)) -0.429311 0.019984 -21.48320 0.0002 
D(IN(-2)) -0.691483 0.025534 -27.08079 0.0001 
D(IN(-3)) -0.399711 0.022359 -17.87656 0.0004 
D(PX) 0.785754 0.063510 12.37216 0.0011 
D(PX(-1)) 0.626658 0.053967 11.61183 0.0014 
D(PX(-2)) 0.932441 0.052130 17.88680 0.0004 
D(PX(-3)) 0.910129 0.056767 16.03263 0.0005 
CointEq(-1)* -0.702073 0.075558 -35.76169 0.0000 
R-squared 0.998025     Mean dependent var 0.176612 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992637     S.D. dependent var 8.313206 
S.E. of regression 0.713337     Akaike info criterion 2.298690 
Sum squared resid 5.597342     Schwarz criterion 3.581255 
Log likelihood -17.27248     Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.768801 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.067836   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
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The above results show the robust ECM results for Mali. The error correction term 
reflected as CointEq(-1) suggests that 70.71% of the disequilibrium in the short-run 
are corrected in that period. The p-value suggests that the coefficient of the error 
correction term is significant in explaining the short-run dynamics for Mali at 5% 
level of significance. This result is also in line with the recovery policy of the 
BCEAO where they provide urgent funds in situations of financial instability (see 
section 4.3).  
Furthermore, the R-squared infers that the model can explain 99.80% of the 
relationships among the variables. 
 
Table 7.8.6: ECM results for Niger 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) -0.491873 0.046365 -10.60875 0.0088 
D(GR(-2)) -2.444586 0.111294 -21.96508 0.0021 
D(GR(-3)) -1.914045 0.081569 -23.46534 0.0018 
D(DBT) 0.273892 0.022792 12.01709 0.0069 
D(DBT(-1)) 1.475180 0.058343 25.28443 0.0016 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.756084 0.040653 18.59836 0.0029 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.427017 0.032018 13.33697 0.0056 
D(GCF) 1.959899 0.109829 17.84495 0.0031 
D(GCF(-1)) 7.097799 0.312477 22.71462 0.0019 
D(GCF(-2)) 5.621199 0.291380 19.29166 0.0027 
D(GCF(-3)) 3.788589 0.184352 20.55084 0.0024 
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D(M3) 9.995450 0.448152 22.30369 0.0020 
D(M3(-1)) -2.295962 0.234746 -9.780624 0.0103 
D(M3(-2)) 1.400354 0.175648 7.972500 0.0154 
D(M3(-3)) 3.406980 0.171169 19.90420 0.0025 
D(PSC) -7.900701 0.416423 -18.97279 0.0028 
D(PSC(-1)) 4.753223 0.319441 14.87982 0.0045 
D(PSC(-2)) 5.658776 0.318758 17.75256 0.0032 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.535545 0.191478 8.019443 0.0152 
D(TR) -0.103693 0.059580 -1.740387 0.2239 
D(TR(-1)) -8.120221 0.377416 -21.51533 0.0022 
D(TR(-2)) -6.913882 0.325626 -21.23261 0.0022 
D(TR(-3)) -4.425606 0.223812 -19.77375 0.0025 
D(IN) 0.658466 0.043991 14.96836 0.0044 
D(IN(-1)) -2.256591 0.104951 -21.50139 0.0022 
D(IN(-2)) -1.867925 0.086255 -21.65575 0.0021 
D(IN(-3)) -0.735741 0.038069 -19.32673 0.0027 
D(PX) -1.190599 0.128317 -9.278584 0.0114 
D(PX(-1)) 5.295184 0.257448 20.56798 0.0024 
D(PX(-2)) 7.058847 0.321872 21.93058 0.0021 
D(PX(-3)) 4.524367 0.204892 22.08169 0.0020 
CointEq(-1)* -0.548337 0.067606 -22.90227 0.0009 
R-squared 0.997534     Mean dependent var 0.491735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989890     S.D. dependent var 8.342766 
S.E. of regression 0.838871     Akaike info criterion 2.575205 
Sum squared resid 7.037042     Schwarz criterion 3.899144 
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Log likelihood -22.07930     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.060481 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.959128   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above result shows the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for Niger. 
We can see that the error correction term carries the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 5% level as signified by the p-value. The coefficient for 
the error correction term infers that about 54.84% of the disequilibrium in the short 
run is corrected within that period. This result is in line with the recovery policy of 
the BCEAO where they provide urgent funds in situations of financial instability 
(see section 4.3).  
Likewise, the R-squared result indicates that the error correction model can explain 
99.75% of the relationship among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.7: ECM results for Nigeria 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) -0.764448 0.133018 -5.746950 0.0012 
D(GR(-2)) -0.612278 0.131739 -4.647656 0.0035 
D(GR(-3)) 0.221847 0.096842 2.290816 0.0619 
D(DBT) -0.680744 0.470858 -1.445753 0.1984 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.313348 0.392787 0.797755 0.4554 
D(DBT(-2)) -1.094988 0.510180 -2.146279 0.0755 
D(DBT(-3)) 1.828604 0.480006 3.809546 0.0089 
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D(GCF) -0.887424 0.562632 -1.577274 0.1658 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.733833 0.398309 -1.842373 0.1150 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.236400 0.402512 -5.556112 0.0014 
D(M3) -0.993338 0.440037 -2.257396 0.0648 
D(M3(-1)) -0.778197 0.733291 -1.061239 0.3294 
D(M3(-2)) 2.749932 0.586647 4.687543 0.0034 
D(PSC) 0.850105 0.350048 2.428538 0.0513 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.552027 0.374504 1.474023 0.1909 
D(PSC(-2)) -1.022178 0.388943 -2.628095 0.0392 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.830352 0.421361 4.343909 0.0049 
D(TR) -0.668565 0.131865 -5.070054 0.0023 
D(TR(-1)) 0.191401 0.103907 1.842043 0.1151 
D(TR(-2)) 0.098397 0.106878 0.920653 0.3927 
D(TR(-3)) 0.308140 0.104296 2.954471 0.0255 
D(IN) -0.199172 0.084252 -2.364002 0.0560 
D(IN(-1)) -0.589315 0.103575 -5.689724 0.0013 
D(IN(-2)) -0.275859 0.067268 -4.100929 0.0064 
D(PX) -0.927154 0.195459 -4.743471 0.0032 
D(PX(-1)) 0.232238 0.202776 1.145297 0.2957 
D(PX(-2)) 0.243725 0.145546 1.674554 0.1450 
CointEq(-1)* -0.162387 0.033197 4.891560 0.0027 
R-squared 0.955575     Mean dependent var -0.065240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.869897     S.D. dependent var 9.719064 
S.E. of regression 3.505648     Akaike info criterion 5.581349 
Sum squared resid 172.0539     Schwarz criterion 6.739795 
	 258	
Log likelihood -89.20832     Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.005965 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.878690   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above results show the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for Nigeria. 
The error correction term carries the expected negative sign and is statistically 
significant at 5% level as signified by the p-value. The coefficient for the error 
correction term suggests that about 16.24% of the disequilibrium in the short run is 
corrected within that period. Nigeria is a highly indebted country with over 80% of 
its revenue comping from oil exportation. As a result, decline in oil prices affects 
its ability to revitalise and sustain its economy due to widening current account and 
budget deficits (see section 4.2).  
Also, the R-squared result indicates that the error correction model can explain 
95.56% of the relationship among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.8: ECM results for Senegal 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) 0.819690 0.156355 5.242490 0.0063 
D(GR(-2)) 0.031041 0.089594 0.346459 0.7465 
D(GR(-3)) -0.211651 0.057189 -3.700919 0.0208 
D(DBT) 0.078938 0.023384 3.375674 0.0279 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.107688 0.026450 4.071340 0.0152 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.021876 0.030664 0.713419 0.5150 
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D(DBT(-3)) 0.178709 0.031780 5.623257 0.0049 
D(GCF) 0.610791 0.097749 6.248538 0.0033 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.364462 0.211932 -6.438199 0.0030 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.071237 0.148908 -0.478397 0.6573 
D(GCF(-3)) -0.602394 0.128470 -4.689001 0.0094 
D(M3) 0.435814 0.094024 4.635154 0.0098 
D(M3(-1)) 1.781260 0.167983 10.60384 0.0004 
D(M3(-2)) -0.102781 0.209177 -0.491358 0.6489 
D(M3(-3)) 1.318800 0.214673 6.143299 0.0036 
D(PSC) -1.018228 0.107154 -9.502455 0.0007 
D(PSC(-1)) -1.701919 0.244415 -6.963221 0.0022 
D(PSC(-2)) -0.315824 0.181354 -1.741473 0.1566 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.492852 0.142021 -3.470277 0.0256 
D(TR) -0.613797 0.048244 -12.72267 0.0002 
D(TR(-1)) 0.580347 0.074065 7.835640 0.0014 
D(IN) 0.112230 0.049393 2.272206 0.0855 
D(IN(-1)) -0.769264 0.089530 -8.592229 0.0010 
D(IN(-2)) -0.341536 0.070739 -4.828115 0.0085 
D(IN(-3)) -0.309726 0.044591 -6.945977 0.0023 
D(PX) -0.162712 0.106556 -1.527010 0.2015 
D(PX(-1)) 1.924037 0.229011 8.401497 0.0011 
D(PX(-2)) 0.066908 0.220972 0.302787 0.7771 
D(PX(-3)) 1.148133 0.187472 6.124304 0.0036 
CointEq(-1)* -0.551428 0.231071 -8.877910 0.0009 
R-squared 0.992823     Mean dependent var 0.287344 
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Adjusted R-squared 0.975480     S.D. dependent var 5.101911 
S.E. of regression 0.798904     Akaike info criterion 2.564656 
Sum squared resid 7.658967     Schwarz criterion 3.805849 
Log likelihood -23.85778     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.019602 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.423595   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above results show the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for 
Senegal. The error correction term carries the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 5% level as signified by the p-value. The coefficient for 
the error correction term infers that about 55.14% of the disequilibrium in the short 
run are corrected within that period. This result is in line with the recovery policy 
of the BCEAO where they provide urgent funds in situations of financial instability 
to its members (see section 4.3).  
 
Additionally, the R-squared result indicates that the error correction model can 
explain 99.28% of the relationship among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.9: ECM results for Togo 
ECM regression 
Restricted Constant and No Trend 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
D(GR(-1)) -0.221826 0.064296 -3.450092 0.0409 
D(GR(-2)) -0.737718 0.079440 -9.286461 0.0026 
D(GR(-3)) -0.271848 0.053509 -5.080460 0.0147 
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D(DBT) -0.239356 0.027510 -8.700590 0.0032 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.242746 0.030069 -8.072965 0.0040 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.101513 0.021172 4.794814 0.0173 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.432739 0.032252 13.41723 0.0009 
D(GCF) -0.597157 0.086267 -6.922219 0.0062 
D(GCF(-1)) 1.293543 0.080256 16.11769 0.0005 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.170379 0.082401 14.20347 0.0008 
D(M3) 0.218680 0.099434 2.199248 0.1153 
D(M3(-1)) -0.293231 0.070433 -4.163244 0.0252 
D(M3(-2)) -0.926730 0.105334 -8.797989 0.0031 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828515 0.109632 -7.557212 0.0048 
D(PSC) 1.210305 0.132239 9.152422 0.0028 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.047788 0.101841 -0.469244 0.6709 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.311728 0.109786 2.839417 0.0657 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.013041 0.114028 8.884182 0.0030 
D(TR) 0.209990 0.032390 6.483215 0.0074 
D(TR(-1)) -0.043369 0.034872 -1.243665 0.3019 
D(TR(-2)) -0.429047 0.041925 -10.23369 0.0020 
D(TR(-3)) -0.355681 0.048698 -7.303830 0.0053 
D(IN) 0.736815 0.045759 16.10223 0.0005 
D(IN(-1)) -1.068036 0.072513 -14.72890 0.0007 
D(IN(-2)) -0.882268 0.062909 -14.02457 0.0008 
D(IN(-3)) -0.411517 0.045129 -9.118627 0.0028 
D(PX) 0.338554 0.062235 5.439952 0.0122 
D(PX(-1)) -0.065875 0.081319 -0.810085 0.4772 
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D(PX(-2)) 0.041435 0.080417 0.515253 0.6419 
D(PX(-3)) 0.290123 0.051648 5.617317 0.0112 
CointEq(-1)* -0.804989 0.073513 -24.55339 0.0001 
R-squared 0.995458     Mean dependent var 0.036391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983071     S.D. dependent var 8.260744 
S.E. of regression 1.074822     Akaike info criterion 3.118604 
Sum squared resid 12.70768     Schwarz criterion 4.401170 
Log likelihood -34.49069     Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.588715 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.567696   
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above result is the robust Error Correction Model result (ECM) for Togo. We 
can observe that the error correction term carries the expected negative sign and is 
statistically significant at 5% level as reflected by the p-value. The coefficient for 
the error correction term infers that about 80.50% of the disequilibrium in the short 
run are corrected within the same period. The result is also in line with the recovery 
policy of the BCEAO where they provide urgent funds in situations of financial 
instability to its members (see section 4.3).  
 
Besides, the R-squared result indicates that the error correction model can explain 
99.54% of the relationship among the variables.  
 
Table 7.8.10 Summary of Robust ARDL Error Correction Regression 
Countries Error Correction term 
(CointEq(-1) 
P-Value 
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Benin -0.821259 0.0000 
Burkina Faso -0.571623 0.0000 
Cote D’Ivoire -0.925043 0.0000 
Ghana -0.777671 0.0001 
Mali -0.702073 0.0000 
Niger -0.548337 0.0009 
Nigeria -0.162387 0.0027 
Senegal -0.551428 0.0009 
Togo -0.804989 0.0001 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the summary of the error correction regression. It features 
the error correction term and the p-value. The coefficients carry the expected 
negative signs, the values are between 0 and 1, and additionally, the p-values are 
less than 0.05. Therefore, they are statistically fit and significant in explaining the 
short-run equilibrium dynamics among the West African countries.  
 
7.8 POST DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
7.8.1 CUSUM Stability Test 
The cumulative sum test is estimated based on the collective sum of repetitive 
residuals. It is calculated continually and is plotted along with break points. If the 
CUSUM line swerves outside the linear margins at the tiniest instance, then the 
model is categorized as unstable. 
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Figure 7.2: Robust CUSUM Test results 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
Figure 7.2 above shows that the CUSUM plot (in blue) is within the 5% significance 
margin, thus, it can be concluded that the models are stable for every country tested.  
 
7.8.2 Serial Correlation LM Test Results 
The Serial Correlation Lagrange Multiplier test is used to check for the presence of 
autocorrelation. If autocorrelation is detected, this would suggest that the 
conclusions from the other tests done are incorrect. The null hypothesis for this test 
is that there is no serial correlation among the variables. The Breush-Godfrey LM 
test was used for this estimation.  
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Table 7.9 Breush-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test results 
 BEN BF CIV GHN MAL NER NIG SEN TOG 
F-Stat 9.701862 1.139906 2.201518 0.494665 1.357238 0.003423 2.112246 10.26338 1.800586 
Pr.F 0.0934 0.3478 0.1308 0.6148 0.5189 0.9628 0.1555 0.0888 0.4662 
P.Chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
Table 7.9 shows the serial correlation LM test results. It shows the F-statistics, p-
values of the F-stat and the P-value of the chi square. Looking at the p-values, it can 
be observed that the estimated figures are greater than 0.05, hence, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis at 5% level of significance. This means that there is no serial 
correlation among the variables. 
 
7.8.3 Granger Causality Test Results 
Since cointegration was detected in the robust model for the disclosed countries, it 
is important to know what variable granger causes the other. There are three 
possible outcomes of a granger causality test. Unidirectional causality, bidirectional 
causality or noncausality. Unidirectional causality is a situation where only one of 
the two variables granger causes the other. Bidirectional causality on the other hand 
is a situation whereby both variables granger causes one another. While 
noncausality, as the name implies, is a situation whereby neither of the variables 
granger cause one another.  
The dependent variable (GR) was tested against the independent variables (DBT, 
GCF, M3, PSC, TR, IN and PX) and vice-versa. The null hypothesis for the granger 
causality test is x does not granger cause y. This null hypothesis is rejected at 5% 
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level of significance when the p-value is less than 0.05. The table below displays 
the causality results of the groups that were statistically significant. 
 
Table 7.10: Granger Causality Results 
Countries Null Hypothesis Chi-Sq Df Prob. Comments 
Benin GR does not granger cause M3 
M3 does not granger cause GR 
10.98641 
1.113120 
4 
4 
0.0267 
0.8922 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause DBT 
DBT does not granger cause GR 
3.397207 
11.77722 
4 
4 
0.4937 
0.0191 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Burkina 
Faso 
GR does not granger cause TR 
TR does not granger cause GR 
23.68387 
2.775198 
4 
4 
0.0001 
0.5961 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause IN 
IN does not granger cause GR 
7.547292 
18.28174 
4 
4 
0.1096 
0.0011 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PX 
PX does not granger cause GR 
9.988549 
5.054546 
4 
4 
0.0406 
0.2817 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Cote 
D’Ivoire 
GR does not granger cause GCF 
GCF does not granger cause GR 
13.03539 
14.50285 
4 
4 
0.0111 
0.0059 
Bidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause TR 
TR does not granger cause GR 
12.51383 
3.849275 
4 
4 
0.0139 
0.4268 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PSC 
PSC does not granger cause GR 
4.121411 
13.00227 
4 
4 
0.3898 
0.0113 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause IN 
IN does not granger cause GR 
24.46895 
8.893978 
4 
4 
0.0001 
0.0638 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
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Ghana GR does not granger cause DBT 
DBT does not granger cause GR 
14.62569 
2.326418 
4 
4 
0.0055 
0.6760 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause M3 
M3 does not granger cause GR 
24.77607 
5.880673 
4 
4 
0.0001 
0.2082 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PSC 
PSC does not granger cause GR 
9.731126 
0.850386 
4 
4 
0.0452 
0.9316 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Niger GR does not granger cause GCF 
GCF does not granger cause GR 
11.53532 
2.537027 
4 
4 
0.0212 
0.6380 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause M3 
M3 does not granger cause GR 
16.30409 
10.46360 
4 
4 
0.0026 
0.0333 
Bidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PSC 
PSC does not granger cause GR 
12.84615 
3.748495 
4 
4 
0.0121 
0.4411 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause TR 
TR does not granger cause GR 
12.04314 
3.200638 
4 
4 
0.0170 
0.5248 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Nigeria GR does not granger cause GCF 
GCF does not granger cause GR 
3.495454 
12.44394 
4 
4 
0.2296 
0.0143 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Senegal GR does not granger cause DBT 
DBT does not granger cause GR 
17.18913 
4.220207 
4 
4 
0.0018 
0.3770 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause GCF 
GCF does not granger cause GR 
11.52221 
1.621151 
4 
4 
0.0213 
0.8050 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause M3 
M3 does not granger cause GR 
12.78298 
6.334096 
4 
4 
0.0124 
0.1755 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PX 
PX does not granger cause GR 
19.24222 
4.100629 
4 
4 
0.0007 
0.3926 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
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Togo GR does not granger cause DBT 
DBT does not granger cause GR 
8.646817 
18.77448 
4 
4 
0.0706 
0.0009 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause GCF 
GCF does not granger cause GR 
19.25977 
1.342672 
4 
4 
0.0007 
0.8539 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause IN 
IN does not granger cause GR 
14.87347 
14.42847 
4 
4 
0.0050 
0.0060 
Bidirectional 
Causality 
 GR does not granger cause PX 
PX does not granger cause GR 
22.56455 
5.948403 
4 
4 
0.0002 
0.2030 
Unidirectional 
Causality 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
Table 7.10 shows the granger causality results for the selected West African 
countries. As mentioned in section 6.7, granger causality does not infer that one 
variable cause another, it only implies that past variables of one variable can be 
used to predict another. In other words, granger causality does not suggest actual 
causality, but infers prediction. 
 
This test was done to investigate the causal relationship between the independent 
variables (DBT, GCF, M3, PSC, TR, IN and PX) and the dependent variable (GR) 
and vice-versa.  
 
The above table shows that there is a causal relationship between GR and M3, and 
GR and DBT for the case of Benin. The results for GR and M3 indicate a 
unidirectional causality. This is because the null hypothesis that GR does not 
granger cause M3 is rejected at 5% level of significance, while the null hypothesis 
that M3 does not granger cause GR is not rejected at 5% level of significance. 
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Therefore, it can be concluded that granger causality runs one-way from GR to M3 
and not the other way. On the other hand, the results for GR and DBT indicate a 
unidirectional causality. This is because the null hypothesis that GR does not 
granger cause DBT is not rejected at 5% significance level, while the null 
hypothesis that DBT does not granger cause GR is rejected at 5% level of 
significance. Therefore, it can be concluded that granger causality runs one way 
from DBT to GR and not the other way.  
 
For the case of Burkina Faso, it can be observed that there are three (3) 
unidirectional causal relationships between GR and TR, IN and GR, and GR and 
PX. From the above table, we reject the null hypotheses that GR does not granger 
cause TR, IN does not granger cause GR, and GR does not granger cause IN at 5% 
level of significance. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is a causal 
relationship running one way from GR to TR, IN to GR and GR to PX, and not the 
other way. 
 
The above results also show that there is one (1) bidirectional causality and three 
(3) unidirectional causalities for the case of Cote D’Ivoire. The null hypotheses that 
GR does not granger cause GCF and GCF does not granger GR are rejected at 5% 
significance level. This infers that granger causality runs both ways from GR to 
GCF and from GCF to GR. In other words, values GR can be used to predict GCF 
and vice-versa. On the other hand, the causal relationships between GR and TR, 
PSC and GR, and GR and IN is unidirectional. This is because we reject the null 
hypotheses that GR does not granger cause TR, PSC does not granger cause GR, 
and GR does not granger cause IN at 5% level of significance. The causal 
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relationship runs one way from GR to TR, PSC to GR, and GR to IN, and not the 
other way. 
 
Similarly, it can be observed from table 7.10 above that there is a unidirectional 
causality between GR and DBT, GR and M3, and GR and PSC, for the case of 
Ghana. This is because the null hypothesis for the aforementioned relationship is 
rejected at 5% level of significance, which infers that granger causality runs one-
way from GR to DBT, GR to M3 and GR to PSC, but not the other way. 
 
Furthermore, the granger causality results for Niger indicates one bidirectional 
causality and three unidirectional causalities. The bidirectional relationship is 
between GR and M3. The p-values are less than 0.05, so we reject the null 
hypotheses that GR does not granger cause M3 and M3 does not granger cause GR 
at 5% level of significance. Therefore, it infers that granger causality runs both ways 
from GR to M3 and from M3 to GR. Hence, past values of GR can be used in the 
prediction of M3 and vice-versa. On the other hand, there is a unidirectional causal 
relationship between GR and GCF, GR and PSC, and GR and TR. The p-values for 
these variables suggest significance at 5% critical level. Consequently, it means that 
granger causality runs one way from GR to GCF, GR to PSC and GR to TR, and 
not the other way. 
 
There appears to be a unidirectional causal relationship between GCF and GR for 
the case of Nigeria. Looking at the p-values for Nigeria in table 7.10, we reject the 
null hypothesis that GCF does not granger cause GR at 5% level of significance, 
while the null hypothesis that GR does not granger cause GCF is not rejected at 5% 
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significance level. Therefore, it means that granger causality runs one way from 
GCF to GR, and not the other way.  
 
Additionally, the above results show four (4) unidirectional causality for Senegal. 
Based on the p-values that are less than 0.05, we reject the null hypotheses that GR 
does not granger cause DBT, GR does not granger cause GCF, GR does not granger 
cause M3, and GR does not granger cause PX at 5% level of significance. It 
therefore implies that granger causality runs one way from GR to DBT, GCF, M3 
and PX, and not the other way. 
 
On the other hand, there are three unidirectional causalities and one bidirectional 
causality for the case of Togo. It can be observed by looking at the p-values that 
granger causality runs one way from DBT to GR, GR to GCF and GR to PX at 5% 
level of significance. However, there appears to be a bidirectional causal 
relationship between GR and IN at 5% level of significance, and hence, past values 
of GR can be used in the prediction of IN and vice-versa.  
 
It can be concluded from table 7.10, that GR causes TR for the case of Burkina 
Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Niger. GR causes PX for the case of Burkina Faso, Senegal 
and Togo. GR causes M3 for the case of Benin, Ghana, Niger and Senegal. GR 
causes GCF for the case of Cote D’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal and Togo. GR causes 
DBT for the case of Ghana and Senegal. GR causes PSC for the case of Ghana and 
Niger, while GR causes IN for the case of Cote D’Ivoire. On the other hand, DBT 
causes GR for the case of Benin and Togo. IN causes GR for the case of Burkina 
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Faso and Togo. GCF causes GR for the case of Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria. PSC 
causes GR for the case of Cote D’Ivoire, while M3 causes GR for the case of Niger.  
 
7.9 JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION RESULTS  
This test was done in order to ascertain the impact of monetary and fiscal policy 
instruments in addressing financial instability, in order to answer the second 
research question (see section 1.5). The Johansen cointegration test shows if there 
is a long run relationship among the variables. Thus, if cointegration is detected, it 
implies that the series will not drift away from each other in the long run.  
 
However, if there is disequilibrium in that period, it will adjust and return to the 
point of equilibrium. The long run relationship is displayed by way of Normalised 
Cointegrating coefficients. It is also important to note that the signs of the 
coefficients under the normalised cointegration are usually inverted, so as to ensure 
correct interpretation. The model used in the Johansen cointegration estimation was 
stated in section 6.9. 
 
Table 7.11.1: Johansen cointegration Test for Benin 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None   0.702299  123.5922  69.81889  0.0000*  49.67824  33.87687  0.0003* 
At most 1   0.559428  73.91399  47.85613  0.0000*  33.60692  27.58434  0.0074* 
At most 2   0.396175  40.30706  29.79707  0.0022*  20.68330  21.13162  0.0577 
At most 3   0.339557  19.62376  15.49471  0.0112*  17.00865  14.26460  0.0180 
At most 4  0.061792  2.615110  3.841466  0.1058  2.615110  3.841466  0.1058 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
	 273	
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
The Trace test in the table above shows four (4) cointegrating equations, while the 
max-eigenvalue test shows that there are two (2) cointegration equations. Thus, it 
infers that there is a long run relationship between private sector credit (PSC) and 
external debt stock (DBT), government spending (PX), inflation (IN) and money 
supply (M3) at 5% level of significance. Table 7.11.2 below shows the breakdown 
of the 4 cointegrating equations. 
 
Table 7.11.2. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -448.8891 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000  1.874299  0.380560 -0.419555 
   (0.30309)  (0.23093)  (0.44273) 
  [6.18397] [1.64795] [-0.94765] 
 0.000000  1.000000 -1.557692  2.091508  3.340508 
   (0.68033)  (0.51836)  (0.99377) 
  [-2.28961] [4.03486] [3.36144] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
We can see that private sector credit (PSC) and inflation (IN) have a negative 
relationship in the long run (normalised cointegration results are inverted). This 
implies that a rise in inflation will cause private sector credit to fall in the long-run. 
Also, Money supply (M3) has a negative relationship with private sector credit 
(PSC). This means that when there is an increase in money supply, the private sector 
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credit falls in the long run. Conversely, government spending (PX) has a direct 
relationship with private sector credit (PSC). This suggests that whenever there is a 
reduction in government spending, the private sector credit rises in the long run. 
 
However, the rule of thumb for the t-statistic is that if the absolute value of the t-
stat is more than 2, then the result is significant at 5% level. Thus, looking at the 
value of the t-stat for IN, we can conclude that the estimation is significant at 5% 
level of significance. On the other hand, the t-stat for M3 and PX are lower than 2, 
meaning that the coefficients are significant in explaining the relationship between 
M3, PX and PSC in the long run for the case of Benin. 
  
Table 7.11.3 Johansen cointegration Test for Burkina Faso 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None   0.801031  129.1975  69.81889  0.0000*  66.19887  33.87687  0.0000* 
At most 1   0.538848  62.99859  47.85613  0.0010*  31.73512  27.58434  0.0138* 
At most 2   0.317580  31.26347  29.79707  0.0337*  15.66650  21.13162  0.2449 
At most 3   0.300140  15.59697  15.49471  0.0483*  14.63189  14.26460  0.0437* 
At most 4  0.023264  0.965082  3.841466  0.3259  0.965082  3.841466  0.3259 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
Table 7.11.3 shows the Johansen cointegration test for Burkina Faso. The Trace test 
indicates that there are four (4) cointegrating equations, whereas, the max-
eigenvalue shows that there are two (2) cointegrating equations. Therefore, we can 
conclude that there is a long run relationship between the dependent and 
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independent variables. However, it is important to know the nature of this 
cointegrating relationship, hence, table 7.11.4 shows the normalised cointegrating 
relationship for Burkina Faso. 
 
Table 7.11.4. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -391.8741 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000 0.000000 -0.270730 -0.588931 -0.829305 
   (0.18739)  (0.12607)  (0.26425) 
  [-1.44474] [-4.67146] [-3.13833] 
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.394670  1.003255  6.531923 
   (0.83444)  (0.56142)  (1.17671) 
  [-0.47298] [1.78699] [5.55100] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
The table above displays the relationship between the cointegrating equations 
within the period (1970-2015) for the case of Burkina Faso. It can be observed that 
PSC has cointegrating relationships with inflation (IN), money supply (M3) and 
government spending (PX). The nature of the relationship is positive. This implies 
that a rise in inflation, money supply or government spending would result in a rise 
in private sector credit in the long run for Burkina Faso. The t-stat also suggests that 
the estimation for M3 and PX are significant at 5% level, while the t-stat for IN is 
less than 2, hence, it is not significant in explaining the cointegrating relationships 
in the long run at 5% level of significance.  
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Table 7.11.5: Johansen cointegration Test for Cote D’Ivoire  
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None   0.734526  113.6194  69.81889  0.0000*  54.37573  33.87687  0.0001* 
At most 1   0.649096  59.24371  47.85613  0.0030*  42.93699  27.58434  0.0003* 
At most 2   0.210000  16.30672  29.79707  0.6905  9.664605  21.13162  0.7755 
At most 3   0.140988  6.642110  15.49471  0.6196  6.230880  14.26460  0.5838 
At most 4  0.009980  0.411230  3.841466  0.5213  0.411230  3.841466  0.5213 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
It can be seen from table 7.11.5 that both the Trace test and max-eigenvalue test 
indicate 2 cointegrating equations for Cote D’Ivoire. This implies that there is a 
long run relationship between the dependent variable (PSC) and the independent 
variables (DBT, IN, M3 and PX). The nature of this cointegrating relationship is 
discussed in Table 7.11.6 below. 
 
Table 7.11.6. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -459.9952 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000  -4.042746  -1.845395 10.27247 
  (0.77800) (1.02486) (2.14902) 
  [-5.19633] [-1.80063] 4.78007] 
 0.000000  1.000000 -18.61899 -5.561186 57.73234 
  (4.33821) (5.71469) (11.9831) 
  [4.29186] [-0.97313] [4.81781] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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The above table shows the normalised cointegrating coefficients for Cote D’Ivoire. 
It can be seen that private sector credit (PSC) has cointegrating relationships with 
external debt stock (DBT), inflation (IN), money supply (M3) and government 
spending (PX). From the above estimation, PSC has a positive relationship with IN 
in the long run. This means that when there is a rise in inflation rate, private sector 
credit rises as well. The t-stat for inflation indicates that the coefficient is significant 
at 5% level in explaining the relationship. Similarly, money supply (M3) has a 
positive relationship with private sector credit (PSC), inferring that when there is a 
rise in M3, PSC rises in the long run. However, the t-stat indicates that the 
coefficient is not significant in explaining the relationship at 5% significance level. 
On the other hand, government spending (PX) has a negative relationship with 
private sector credit (PSC), inferring that an increase in PX would also cause PSC 
to fall. The t-stat shows that the coefficient is significant at 5% level in explaining 
the relationship between PSC and M3. 
 
Table 7.11.7: Johansen cointegration Test for Ghana 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None 0.681004 125.2270 69.81889 0.0000* 46.84558 33.87687 0.0009* 
At most 1 0.598858 78.38145 47.85613 0.0000* 37.45104 27.58434 0.0020* 
At most 2 0.450234 40.93041 29.79707 0.0018* 24.52878 21.13162 0.0160* 
At most 3 0.262944 16.40163 15.49471 0.0364* 12.50877 14.26460 0.0930 
At most 4 0.090580 3.892859 3.841466 0.0485* 3.892859 3.841466 0.0485* 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
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The above table shows the cointegration results for Ghana. The Trace test shows 5 
cointegrating equations while the Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating 
equations. This means that there is a long-run relationship between the dependent 
and independent variables for the case of Ghana. The table below show the 
normalised cointegrating coefficients.  
 
Table 7.11.8. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
3 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -471.6208 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  -0.475847 0.617804 
   (0.16114)  (0.18231) 
   [-2.95300] [3.38875] 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  -0.767800 -4.948499 
   (1.13931)  (1.83458) 
   [-0.67391] [-2.69741] 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.371285 -0.875132 
   (0.40722)  (0.46074) 
   [-0.91175] [-1.89940] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
It can be observed from table 7.11.8 that there is a direct relationship between the 
dependent variable (PSC) and money supply (M3), inferring that a fall in money 
supply will result in a drop in private sector credit and vice-versa. The reverse is the 
case for a rise in money supply. Conversely, PSC has a negative relationship with 
PX, meaning that when there is a rise in government spending, private sector credit 
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will fall in the long run. Furthermore, the t-statistic for both M3 and PX signifies 
that the coefficients are significant in explaining the relationship between those 
variables at 5% level of significance. 
 
Table 7.11.9: Johansen cointegration Test for Mali 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None 0.522617 83.64127 69.81889 0.0027* 30.31692 33.87687 0.1255 
At most 1 0.423528 53.32435 47.85613 0.0140* 22.58400 27.58434 0.1919 
At most 2 0.318365 30.74035 29.79707 0.0388* 15.71371 21.13162 0.2420 
At most 3 0.234287 15.02664 15.49471 0.0587* 10.94485 14.26460 0.1570 
At most 4 0.094761 4.081791 3.841466 0.0433* 4.081791 3.841466 0.0433* 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
The Trace test of the above table shows 3 cointegrating equations, while the max-
eigen statistic shows that there is 1 cointegrating equation. This infers that there is 
a long run relationship between the variables for the case of Mali. 
 
Table 7.11.10. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
1 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -499.1959 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000 -5.792533  31.82189 -57.10147 -63.60437 
  (1.77892)  (11.2783)  (23.5083)  (22.7398) 
 [-3.25620] [2.82151] [-2.42899] [-2.79705] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets []  
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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The above table shows the normalised cointegrated coefficients for the case of Mali. 
It can be observed that DBT, M3 and PX have a positive relationship with PSC, 
while IN has a negative relationship with PSC. This means that when there is a rise 
in DBT, it would result in a rise in PSC in the long run. The same is the case with 
M3 and PX. On the contrary, a rise in IN will result in a fall in PSC in the long run. 
Furthermore, the t-statistic indicates that the coefficients are significant in 
explaining the relationship among the variables at 5% level of significance.  
 
Table 7.11.11: Johansen cointegration Test for Niger 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None 0.736212 124.5516 69.81889 0.0000* 54.63696 33.87687 0.0001* 
At most 1 0.574535 69.91467 47.85613 0.0001* 35.03749 27.58434 0.0046* 
At most 2 0.401281 34.87717 29.79707 0.0119* 21.03145 21.13162 0.0516 
At most 3 0.267315 13.84573 15.49471 0.0873 12.75261 14.26460 0.0855 
At most 4 0.026309 1.093115 3.841466 0.2958 1.093115 3.841466 0.2958 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
Table 7.11.11 indicates that the Trace test shows 3 cointegrating equations, while 
the max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating equations for Niger. This implies 
that there is a long run relationship between the dependent variable (PSC) and the 
independent variables (DBT, IN, M3 and PX). The type of the cointegrating 
relationship is discussed in Table 7.11.2 below. 
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Table 7.11.12. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -444.1563 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.220518 -2.072623  1.449150 
   (0.22379)  (0.25654)  (0.19254) 
  [-0.98538] [-8.07914] [7.526488] 
 0.000000  1.000000  9.887138 -5.251464  6.887572 
   (2.32734)  (2.66791)  (2.00234) 
  [4.24825] [-1.96838] [3.43976] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
It can be observed from table 7.11.12 above that PSC has a long run relationship 
with inflation (IN), money supply (M3), and government spending (PX). It can also 
be seen that IN and M3 has a positive relationship with PSC (Normalised signs are 
inverted) for the case of Niger. This means that when there is a rise in the level of 
inflation or money supply, private sector credit rises in the long run. However, the 
t-statistic shows that the coefficient of inflation is not significant in explaining the 
relationship at 5% level of significance. This is because the t-statistic value is less 
than 2, while the coefficient of money supply is significant in explaining the 
relationship with private sector credit at 5% significance level. 
 
On the other hand, government spending has an inverse relationship with private 
sector credit for the case of Niger. This means that when there is a decrease in 
government spending, the private sector credit rises in the long run. The t-statistic 
also indicate that the coefficient is significant at 5% level in explaining the 
relationship between PX and PSC for the case of Niger.  
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Table 7.11.13: Johansen cointegration Test for Nigeria 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None 0.849684 145.2557 69.81889 0.0000* 77.69558 33.87687 0.0000* 
At most 1 0.647867 67.56009 47.85613 0.0003* 42.79359 27.58434 0.0003* 
At most 2 0.286006 24.76650 29.79707 0.1699 13.81213 21.13162 0.3807 
At most 3 0.213362 10.95437 15.49471 0.2143 9.839459 14.26460 0.2227 
At most 4 0.026827 1.114915 3.841466 0.2910 1.114915 3.841466 0.2910 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
The Trace test and max-eigen tests in table 7.11.13 show 2 cointegrating equations. 
This means that a long run relationship exists between the dependent variable and 
the independent variable for Nigeria. 
 
Table 7.11.14. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -488.7783 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.320230  0.403908 -0.993065 
   (0.06024)  (0.09217)  (0.11156) 
  [5.31590] [4.38221] [-8.90162] 
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.298655  0.235576  0.375010 
   (0.04380)  (0.06702)  (0.08112) 
  [-6.81861] [3.51501] [4.62290] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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The above table shows the normalised cointegrating coefficients for Nigeria. It is 
important to note that the signs of the coefficient are inverted during the 
normalisation process. It can be seen from the above table that inflation (IN) and 
government spending (PX) both have an inverse relationship with private sector 
credit (PSC) in the long run. This implies that when there is a rise in the inflation 
levels or a rise in government spending, private sector credit falls in the long run. 
On the other hand, money supply (M3) has a positive long run relationship with 
PSC. This means that a rise in money supply will bring about a fall in private sector 
credit in the long run. Furthermore, the t-statistics shows that the signs and 
coefficient are significant at 5% level in explaining the relationship among the 
variables. 
 
Table 7.11.15: Johansen cointegration Test for Senegal 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None   0.733636  110.5883  69.81889  0.0000*  54.23861  33.87687  0.0001* 
At most 1   0.540855  56.34968  47.85613  0.0065*  31.91396  27.58434  0.0130* 
At most 2   0.268036  24.43572  29.79707  0.1826  12.79300  21.13162  0.4715 
At most 3   0.226445  11.64272  15.49471  0.1749  10.52708  14.26460  0.1796 
At most 4  0.026844  1.115640  3.841466  0.2909  1.115640  3.841466  0.2909 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
Both Trace and max-eigenvalue statistics show 2 cointegrating equations. This 
signifies that there is a long-run relationship between the independent variable 
(DBT, IN, M3 and PX) and the dependent variable (PSC) for the case of Senegal. 
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Table 7.11.16. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
2 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -435.7900 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000 -3.502119 -3.487963  2.379255 
   (0.89159)  (1.15526)  (1.01405) 
  [-3.92795] [-3.01920] [2.34629] 
 0.000000  1.000000  2.406379  0.590256  0.304215 
   (0.44712)  (0.57934)  (0.50853) 
  [5.38195 [1.01884] [0.59822] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
From Table 7.11.16, we can deduce that IN and M3 have a positive long run 
relationship with PSC. This means that an increase in IN or M3 will result in an 
increase in PSC by a certain percentage in the long run. Furthermore, PX has a 
negative relationship with PSC, indicating that whenever there is a rise in PX, PSC 
will fall by a certain percentage in the long run. Additionally, the t-statistics 
indicates that the sign and coefficients of the model are significant in explaining the 
relationship in the long run at 5% level, for the case of Senegal. 
 
Table 7.11.17: Johansen cointegration Test for Togo 
Hypothesized 
No of CE(s) 
Eigen 
Value 
Trace 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** Max-Eigen 
Statistics 
0.05 
Critical 
Value 
Prob ** 
None   0.857791  163.2720  69.81889  0.0000*  79.96876  33.87687  0.0000* 
At most 1   0.590920  83.30326  47.85613  0.0000*  36.64764  27.58434  0.0026* 
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At most 2   0.432874  46.65562  29.79707  0.0003*  23.25409  21.13162  0.0248* 
At most 3   0.318964  23.40153  15.49471  0.0026*  15.74975  14.26460  0.0289* 
At most 4  0.170248  7.651787  3.841466  0.0057*  7.651787  3.841466  0.0057* 
Note: * connotes presence of cointegration at 5% level of significance 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018. 
 
The table above indicates that both trace and max-eigenvalue indicate 5 
cointegrating equations. This infers that there is a long run relationship between 
PSC and the independent variables (DBT, M3, IN, PX). 
 
Table 7.11.18. Normalised Cointegrating coefficients (β) 
4 Cointegrating Equations Log likelihood -430.0431 
PSC DBT IN M3 PX 
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.005761 
     (0.17586) 
    [0.03276] 
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  3.480395 
     (0.82649) 
    [4.21105] 
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.047466 
     (0.15961) 
    [0.29739] 
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.480810 
     (0.32195) 
    [1.49343] 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses (), t-statistics is in brackets [] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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The above table shows that there is a negative long run relationship between PSC 
and PX. This means that when there is a rise in PX, PSC will fall by a certain 
amount. However, the t-statistic shows that the coefficient is not significant at 5% 
level in explaining the relationship between those variables.  
 
Based on the Johansen cointegration results for West African countries, we can 
conclude that there is a long run relationship between monetary and fiscal policy 
instruments and financial stability. However, since this test was conducted to find 
out what policy instruments has the most impact, table 7.12 below shows the impact 
of policy instruments tested (DBT, IN, M3 and PX) on financial instability (PSC). 
 
Table 7.12: Impact of monetary and fiscal policy instruments on financial 
instability 
 DBT IN M3 PX 
BEN No Yes No No 
BF No No Yes Yes 
CIV No Yes No Yes 
GHN No No Yes Yes 
MAL Yes Yes Yes Yes 
NER No No Yes Yes 
NIG No Yes Yes Yes 
SEN No Yes Yes Yes 
TOG No No No No 
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As mentioned in section 6.9, external debt (DBT) and government spending (PX) 
represents fiscal policy instruments, while inflation (IN) and broad money (M3) 
represents monetary policy, and PSC is used as a proxy for financial instability. The 
results displayed in table 7.12 above are based on the normalised cointegrating 
coefficients for each country. Therefore, looking at table 7.12, it can be concluded 
that government spending (PX) has the most impact on financial instability among 
the West African countries. This is because PX has a relationship with PSC in most 
of the selected countries, except Togo and Benin. The next instrument with a big 
impact across the selected countries is broad money (M3), as it has a relationship 
with PSC in most of the countries, except Benin, Cote D’Ivoire and Togo. 
 
This result is consistent with the Keynesian school of thought discussed in chapter 
2 (see section 2.2.2). Keynes proposed that when an economy is faced with financial 
instability, the government should borrow in order to meet its obligations and fund 
its expenditures. Therefore, it can be inferred that the selected West African 
countries adopts Keynesian economics when faced with financial instabilities. 
However, the classical school provides a contrary argument, stating that if this 
borrowing is not used specifically to tackle government’s obligation, it results in 
economic unproductivity, which affects aggregate investment and results in further 
economic decline.   
 
7.10 VECM RESULTS 
The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) measures the speed of adjustment of 
the variables to shocks in the short-run. In other words, it shows how quickly long 
run disequilibrium is corrected in the current period. The coefficient of the error 
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correction term (CointEq1) is expected to be negative and between zero and one. 
The t-statistic is used to check the level of significance. The rule of thumb is that if 
the T-statistic is 2 or more, it is significant at 5%.  
 
Table 7.13.1: Vector Error Correction Results for Benin 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1 -0.094539 0.933187 -0.153741 -0.003610 0.069360 
S.E (0.10099) (0.30372) (0.26410) (0.09762) (0.10205) 
T-Stat [-0.93616] [ 3.07252] [-0.58213] [-0.03698] [ 0.67964] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
The table above shows the speed of adjustment of a variable to short run 
disequilibrium. It can be seen that when there is a shock or disequilibrium in private 
sector credit (PSC), 9.4% of that disequilibrium will be corrected within the same 
period. Similarly, any deviation in public debt (DBT) from equilibrium is corrected 
at an adjustment speed of 93.3% in the short run. The same can be said about 
inflation (IN), where any short run disequilibrium is corrected at a speed of 15.3% 
within that period. Furthermore, 0.3% of disequilibrium in money supply is 
corrected within the same period and 6.9% of disequilibrium in money supply is 
adjusted in the short run.  
 
As previously mentioned, the coefficient of the cointegrating equation (CointEq1) 
is expected to be negative and between 0 and 1. Most of the variables in Table 7.13.1 
meet this expectation with the exception of DBT. Nevertheless, looking at the T-
statistics, it can be seen that it is only the coefficient of DBT that is significant at 
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5% level in explaining the speed of adjustment for Benin. However, since it does 
not carry the expected negative sign, the estimation is ambiguous.  
 
Table 7.13.2: Vector Error Correction Results for Burkina Faso 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1 -0.557040  0.819774  0.265104  0.340431 -0.422554 
S.E  (0.15253)  (0.63099)  (0.60871)  (0.23001)  (0.22405) 
T-Stat [-3.65202] [ 1.29918] [ 0.43552] [ 1.48004] [-1.88599] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
Table 7.13.2 above shows the speed of adjustment of both monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments to short run disequilibrium in Burkina Faso. It is estimated that 
about 55.7% of disequilibrium in private sector credit (PSC) is corrected in the short 
run. The coefficient of PSC carries the expected negative sign and the t-statistic also 
suggests significance at 5% level. It is also estimated that about 82% of 
disequilibrium in DBT are corrected in the short-run when there is disequilibrium, 
inferring that DBT has a better speed of adjustment than the other variables. 
However, the coefficient is positive, which signifies ambiguity and the t-statistics 
infer that the coefficient is not significant in estimating the short-run disequilibrium 
dynamics.  
 
It can also be observed that 26.5% of short run disequilibrium in IN is adjusted in 
the current period. Similarly, about 34% of the short run disequilibrium in M3 is 
adjusted within that period. On the other hand, the t-statistics show both coefficients 
are not significant in explaining the short run dynamics among those variables. 
Furthermore, PX has the expected value and negative sign. It is estimated that 
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42.3% of the shocks to PX are corrected in the short run. However, the t-statistics 
show that the coefficient is not significant in explaining the short run dynamics. 
 
Table 7.13.3: Vector Error Correction Results for Cote D’Ivoire 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1  0.224810  3.374305  0.154592  0.458015 -0.277296 
S.E  (0.26721)  (0.99382)  (1.25381)  (0.34371)  (0.38628) 
T-Stat [ 0.84133] [ 3.39529] [ 0.12330] [ 1.33256] [-0.71785] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
The above table shows VECM results for Cote D’Ivoire. It was estimated that 
22.4% of the errors in the previous period are adjusted for private sector credit 
(PSC). Similarly, when there is a shock in government spending (PX), only about 
27% of that disequilibrium is adjusted in the short-run. Also, about 33.7% of the 
disequilibrium public debt (DBT) is adjusted in the short run, while for inflation 
(IN) and money supply (M3), the speed of adjustment is 15.5% and 45.8% 
respectively. However, looking at the t-statistics and the signs of the coefficients, 
those estimates are ambiguous and cannot be used to predict the speed of 
adjustment. 
 
Table 7.13.4: Vector Error Correction Results for Ghana 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1  0.198770 -1.174181 -7.191855  0.142754  0.222869 
S.E  (0.16982)  (1.35981)  (2.44575)  (0.21065)  (0.33089) 
T-Stat [ 1.17050] [-0.86349] [-2.94055] [ 0.67768] [ 0.67355] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
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Table 7.13.4 shows the short run equilibrium dynamics for Ghana. Looking at the 
signs of the coefficient, it can be observed that only the coefficients of DBT and IN 
carry the expected negative sign, however, they are larger than the expected values 
(i.e. between 0 and 1). This infers that about 117.4% and 719.2% of disequilibrium 
in DBT and IN are adjusted within the same period. However, this estimation is 
unrealistic. Even though the t-stat for IN reflects 5% level of significance, the 
coefficients are ambiguous in explaining the short run dynamic for Ghana. 
 
Table 7.13.5: Vector Error Correction Results for Mali 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1  0.006746  0.015542 -0.024445 -0.003816  0.006795 
S.E  (0.00415)  (0.01565)  (0.01326)  (0.00425)  (0.00468) 
T-Stat [ 1.62540] [ 0.99282] [-1.84418] [-0.89836] [ 1.45159] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
Table 7.13.5 above shows the speed of adjustment of both monetary and fiscal 
policy instruments to short run disequilibrium in Mali. It is estimated that about 
0.6% of disequilibrium in private sector credit (PSC) is corrected in the short run. 
The coefficient of PSC does not carry the expected negative sign, and the t-statistic 
also suggests the coefficient is not significant at 5% level to explain the speed of 
adjustment. It was also estimated that about 1.5% of disequilibrium in DBT are 
corrected in the short-run when there is disequilibrium. Furthermore, the coefficient 
is positive, which signifies ambiguity and the t-statistics implies that the coefficient 
is not significant in estimating the short-run disequilibrium dynamics. Similarly, the 
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ECT for PX suggests 6.8% of the errors in the short run are corrected. However, the 
coefficient is positive, and the value of the t-stat is less than 2, hence, it is not 
significant in explaining the short run disequilibrium.  
 
Table 7.13.6: Vector Error Correction Results for Niger 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1  0.203446 -0.676641 -0.673688  0.531408 -0.651514 
S.E  (0.10435)  (0.84016)  (0.54140)  (0.09170)  (0.19725) 
T-Stat [ 1.94967] [-0.80537] [-1.24434] [ 5.79537] [-3.30293] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
The t-statistics shows that the error correction term coefficients (CointEq1) for 
private sector credit (PSC), public debt (DBT), and inflation (IN) are not significant 
in explaining the short run disequilibrium dynamics for Niger. On the other hand, 
the coefficient for money supply (M3) suggests that 53.1% of the disequilibrium in 
the short run are corrected within that period, while the coefficient for government 
spending (PX) shows that 65.1% of the disequilibrium in the short run are corrected 
in that period. The t-statistics for M3 and PX shows that the coefficient is 
statistically significant at 5% level in explaining the short run disequilibrium. 
 
Table 7.13.7: Vector Error Correction Results for Nigeria 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1 -0.682914 -0.528095  1.006037 -0.888796 -0.539105 
S.E  (0.27844)  (0.24980)  (1.23301)  (0.54021)  (0.30963) 
T-Stat [-2.45261] [-2.11405] [ 0.81592] [-1.64527] [-1.74115] 
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Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
Table 7.13.7 above shows the vector error correction model results for Nigeria. It 
can be seen that most of the variables have the expected negative sign, with the 
exception of inflation (IN). The t-statistics for IN, PX and M3 are not statistically 
significant in explaining the short run equilibrium dynamics. 
 
On the other hand, the t-statistics of PSC and DBT are statistically significant in 
explaining the short run equilibrium dynamics. It can be observed from the table 
above that 68.3% of the disequilibrium in PSC is adjusted in the short run. Similarly, 
52.8% of the disequilibrium in DBT is corrected in the short run.  
 
Table 7.13.8: Vector Error Correction Results for Senegal 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1 -0.106872 -0.065506  0.271735 -0.076519 -0.050253 
S.E  (0.05462)  (0.13984)  (0.14390)  (0.04087)  (0.05614) 
T-Stat [-1.95664] [-0.46844] [ 1.88834] [-1.87230] [-0.89518] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
The table above shows the speed of adjustment to short run disequilibria in Senegal. 
It is estimated that about 10.7% of disequilibrium in private sector credit (PSC) is 
corrected in the short run, even though the coefficient of PSC carries the expected 
negative sign, but the t-statistic also suggests the coefficient is not significant at 5% 
level in explaining the speed of adjustment. It was also estimated that about 6.5% 
of disequilibrium in DBT is corrected in the short-run. The coefficient is negative, 
as expected, but, the t-statistics infers that the coefficient is not significant in 
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estimating the short-run disequilibrium dynamics. Similarly, the ECT for PX 
suggests 6.8% of the errors in the short run are corrected. However, the coefficient 
is positive, and the value of the t-stat is less than 2, hence, it is not significant in 
explaining the short run disequilibrium.  
 
Table 7.13.9: Vector Error Correction Results for Togo 
Alpha (α) D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
CointEq1 -0.405467  5.592329  0.069335 -0.369294 -1.258828 
S.E  (0.33668)  (1.59811)  (0.75083)  (0.45247)  (0.46912) 
T-Stat [-1.20429] [ 3.49933] [ 0.09234] [-0.81618] [-2.68340] 
Source: Author’s computation, 2018 
 
The table above shows the VECM results for Togo. The coefficient of the ECT 
(CointEq1) for PSC suggests that 40.5% of the disequilibrium in the short run is 
corrected in that period. Even though it carries the expected negative sign, the t-
statistics infers that the coefficient is not statistically significant. The ECT for DBT 
implies that 559.2% of the disequilibrium in the short run is corrected in that period. 
However, it does not carry the expected negative sign, and so even though the t-
statistic is statistically significant, the estimate is ambiguous. 
 
The error correction coefficient for IN shows that 6.9% of the disequilibrium in the 
short run is corrected in that period. However, it does not carry the negative sign 
and the t-statistics suggests that the coefficient is not statistically significant in 
explaining the short run dynamics. Also, the coefficient for M3 infers that 36.9% of 
the imbalance in the short run is adjusted in that period. Although it has a negative 
sign, the t-statistic implies that the coefficient is not significant. On the other hand, 
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the coefficient for PX has a negative sign and is statistically significant at 5% level. 
It is estimated that 125.9% of disequilibrium is adjusted in the short run. However, 
this estimation is ambiguous. 
 
Overall, it can be concluded based on the estimates that the West African countries 
used as case study can hardly adjust itself efficiently towards equilibrium in the 
short run. This is in spite of the cointegration results in section 7.9 inferring that 
there is a long run impact of monetary and fiscal policy instruments on financial 
stability. However, if there is a shock in the short run, those instruments are not as 
effective in addressing instabilities within that period. This situation is also 
consistent with the Keynesian school of thought, that an economy does not always 
corrects itself towards equilibrium, and so, governments has to appropriate actions 
to stimulate the economy towards equilibrium.  
 
7.11 SERIAL CORRELATION TEST 
As the VECM results showed that most of the variables do not correct themselves 
when there is disequilibrium in the short run, it is essential to test for serial 
correlation in the residuals. The table below shows the residual serial correlation 
LM test for the variables and for the West African countries. The null hypothesis 
for this test is that there is no serial correlation at the lag order. 
Table 7.13.10: Residual Serial Correlation Results 
Country Lags LM-Stat P-values 
 
Benin 
1  23.69124  0.5373 
2  19.66477  0.7642 
3  32.64079  0.1403 
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4  34.73326  0.0931 
 
Burkina Faso 
1  17.25760  0.8722 
2  26.08135  0.4033 
3  37.34511  0.0535 
4  33.05734  0.1296 
 
Cote D’Ivoire 
1  35.38205  0.0815 
2  26.87200  0.3623 
3  26.31105  0.3912 
4  27.71602  0.3211 
 
Ghana 
1  29.49812  0.2436 
2  17.33791  0.8692 
3  30.13074  0.2194 
4  34.87621  0.0905 
 
Mali 
1  30.52299  0.2053 
2  33.49578  0.1191 
3  18.84886  0.8043 
4  26.62074  0.3751 
 
Niger 
1  15.98837  0.9152 
2  31.46530  0.1741 
3  18.96957  0.7986 
4  29.85768  0.2297 
 
Nigeria 
1  28.29437  0.2945 
2  25.06318  0.4588 
3  27.38470  0.3369 
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4  30.21173  0.2165 
 
Senegal 
1  23.16000  0.5682 
2  30.27817  0.2140 
3  37.57363  0.0509 
4  23.79162  0.5314 
 
Togo 
1  24.70606  0.4789 
2  16.85313  0.8871 
3  14.16380  0.9588 
4  26.32689  0.3903 
Source: Author’s Computation, 2018 
 
The above table shows the serial correlation estimation for West African countries. 
We can see that the p-values are more than 0.05, hence, the null hypothesis is not 
rejected. Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no serial correlation among the 
residuals of the variables for each country. 
 
7.12 CONCLUSION 
This chapter discussed the results of the various econometric tests employed in the 
study. The first sets of empirical tests undertake were the unit root tests to check the 
stationarity of the data and lag length selection to determine the appropriate number 
of lags for conducting the cointegration and error correction tests. The result showed 
that there was no unit root present and the data is stationary, also that the appropriate 
number of lags is 4. The next series of tests done were the cointegration tests to test 
for the nature of relationships between the dependent variables and independent 
variables for the West African countries. However, the results showed that a long 
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run relationship exists among the variables for 6 out of 9 countries tested.  
Furthermore, Error Correction regression was conducted for those 6 countries in 
order to ascertain the short run dynamics. However, only 1 out of the 6 countries 
had short run dynamics as the coefficients of the others were ambiguous and could 
not be used to explain the nature of the short dynamics among the variables. 
Therefore, a robustness test was carried out by adding two explanatory variables 
(inflation and government spending). 
 
The results of the robust cointegration test suggested that there was a long run 
relationship among the variable in all nine countries. Similarly, the outcome of the 
robust cointegration test revealed that the countries were able to adjust themselves 
back to equilibrium when there is a shock in the variables in the short run. The error 
correction terms also suggested that the variables were statistically fit to explain the 
short run dynamics of the West African countries. Furthermore, the serial 
correlation test indicated that there was no serial correlation in the dataset. 
 
Another set of cointegration tests were carried out to examine which 
macroeconomic policy instrument had more impact on financial instability among 
the West African countries.  These results demonstrated that there was a long-run 
relationship and more importantly, that government spending has the most impact 
on financial instability among these countries. Furthermore, the vector error 
correction model results showed that the macroeconomic instruments tested are not 
so effective in correcting short run equilibrium in those West African countries. 
Also, a serial correlation test was done to test for the presence of autocorrelation in 
the residuals. It was estimated that there was no serial correlation present among 
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the residuals. The research summary, limitations and evaluation of hypotheses will 
be discussed in the next chapter and recommendations are also made.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SUMMARY AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1 SUMMARY 
Although the region has received various debt relief and experienced significant 
rise in trade levels in recent years, West African countries are still among the 
poorest countries in the world. This is because of the amount of public debt they 
have acquired and also due to the fact that their financial system is not well 
developed, which has been reflected in their growth rate and their ability to cope 
with financial instability.  
 
An extensive literature review was undertaken in order to achieve the research 
objectives, taking into consideration various schools of thought on public debt and 
also sources of financial instability. The schools of thought discussed were the 
classical and Keynesian schools of thoughts. According to the empirical findings of 
this research, it was observed that the selected West African countries mirror 
Keynesian economics. Keynes suggested that governments should borrow in order 
to fund their expenditure in situations of financial instability, which was the case 
with the selected West African Countries for the period under study (1970-2015).  
 
It was concluded that government spending is the most effective macroeconomic 
policy instrument that these countries can employ in situations of financial 
instability. The next instrument with the most impact was money supply. This is 
logical as economic reasoning suggests that an increase in government spending 
will result in a rise in money supply, whereas, a decrease in government spending 
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results in a decrease in money supply. Similarly, the error correction results 
suggested that the West African countries were not able to adjust themselves 
efficiently towards equilibrium when there is a shock to the economy, which was 
consistent with the Keynesian school of thought, where Keynes proposed that an 
economy does not always adjusts itself towards equilibrium, therefore, 
governments need to take necessary actions in order stimulate the economy towards 
equilibrium.  
 
Furthermore, some sources of financial instabilities were identified and discussed, 
which were persistent in every major financial instability discussed and were also 
consistent with the theoretical framework – theories of business cycle. The sources 
were also present in the selected West African countries; however, two additional 
sources were considered – public debt and trade. Since the West African countries 
discussed depend on the export of primary commodities such as oil and agricultural 
produce, when the demand for those products reduces, it leads to a weakening of 
current account balance. Therefore, the countries discussed will resort to borrowing 
in order to carry out their obligations, creating a loss of confidence in investors, and 
resulting in capital flight, which causes financial instabilities in the financial market.  
 
Based on the theories of business cycle discussed – the Austrian business cycle 
theory, the Marxian analysis of the business cycle and the financial instability 
hypothesis, an econometric model was developed using recurring variables across 
all three theories. These were private sector credit, money supply and investment. 
Other variables were added such as growth rate of GDP, public debt and trade since 
the overall aim of this research is to examine the impact of financial instability and 
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public debt on economic growth. The result showed that there was a long run 
relationship between public debt, financial instability and economic growth in the 
selected West African countries. The results also showed that fiscal policy 
instruments are the most effective macroeconomic tools in correcting financial 
instability among the selected West African countries.  
 
8.2 EVALUATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
RQ1 – What is the nature of the relationship between public debt, financial 
instability and economic growth in West African countries and what factors 
can be used to determine this relationship? 
 
In order to address this question, an econometric model was developed (section 6.9). 
The model was adapted from the theories of business cycle discussed in chapter five 
(5), for selected West African countries (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Ghana, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal and Togo). The model was comprised of 
growth rate of GDP (GR) as the dependent variable, while the independent variables 
were external debt stock (DBT), gross capital formation (GCF), private sector credit 
(PSC), broad money (M3) and Trade (TR). In order to examine the nature of the 
relationship for the selected West African countries, various statistical analyses 
were done, including the ARDL cointegration test and Error correction regression.  
 
The initial cointegration and error correction regression tests carried out were 
ambiguous and were not statistically significant in explaining the relationship. 
Furthermore, the cointegration results for Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria 
suggested that there was no long run relationship between the independent and 
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dependent variables. Hence, there was no need to conduct an error correction 
regression for those countries.  
 
Consequently, a robust test was undertaken adding two macroeconomic variables, 
inflation (IN) and government spending (PX) 27.  The results of the robust 
cointegration suggested that a long-run relationship exists between the dependent 
and independent variables for the selected countries. This infers that public debt, 
financial instability and economic growth moves together in the long run. In other 
words, public debt, financial instability and economic growth have an effect on each 
other in the long run. Since a long run relationship was established, it was important 
to check the speed of adjustment of the variables in the short run with the aid of an 
error correction regression.  
 
The Error Correction Regression results suggested that there is a quick response in 
the short-run to shocks that might destabilise the economy in most of the countries 
tested. However, the variables tested for Nigeria implied that the country has a 
relatively slower response to short-run shocks to the economy compared to the other 
countries. Serial correlation tests were also carried out to check for the presence of 
autocorrelation among the residuals, and none were found.  
 
Additionally, a granger causality test was done to ascertain what independent 
variable can be used in the prediction of the dependent variable or vice-versa, for 
the selected countries. The empirical results suggested that previous values of the 
growth rate of GDP (GR) can be used in the prediction of trade (TR) in Burkina 
	27 see section 7.7. 
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Faso, Cote D’Ivoire and Niger. Similarly, past values of GR can be used in the 
prediction of government spending (PX) in Burkina Faso, Senegal and Togo. Past 
values of GR can also be used in the prediction of broad money (M3) in Benin, 
Ghana, Niger and Senegal. Furthermore, past values of GR can be used in the 
prediction of Gross Capital Formation (GCF) in Cote D’Ivoire, Niger, Senegal and 
Togo. Also, historical values of GR can be used in the prediction of external debt 
stock (DBT) in Ghana and Senegal.  
 
Furthermore, past values of GR can be used in the prediction of private sector credit 
(PSC) in Ghana and Niger, while past values of GR can be used to predict inflation 
(IN) in Cote D’Ivoire. On the other hand, past values of DBT can be used in the 
prediction of GR in Benin and Togo. Similarly, past values of IN can be used in the 
prediction of GR in Burkina Faso and Togo. Also, the previous values of GCF can 
be used in the prediction of GR in Cote D’Ivoire and Nigeria. Furthermore, past 
values of PSC can be used in the prediction of GR in Cote D’Ivoire, while values 
of M3 can be used to predict GR in of Niger.  
 
However, even though a long run relationship was established by the ARDL bound 
tests, the signs of the coefficients and their significance at 5% critical level as 
denoted by p-values were not uniform across the countries. The coefficients and p-
values of the variables were all significant for Benin, but this was not the case for 
the other selected countries. The variables used to represent financial instability as 
adapted from the Business Cycle theories were money supply (M3), investment 
(GCF) and credit to private businesses (PSC), while public debt and economic 
growth were represented as external debt stock (DBT) and growth rate of GDP (GR) 
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respectively. DBT had a positive relationship with GR in Benin, Nigeria and 
Senegal; GCF had a negative relationship with GR in Benin but a positive 
relationship with GR in Cote D’Ivoire; M3 had a positive relationship with GR in 
Benin; while PSC had a negative relationship with GR in Benin and Cote D’Ivoire, 
but a positive relationship with GR in Senegal.  
 
RQ2 –  Do monetary and fiscal policy instruments have the same impact in 
addressing financial instability in West African countries? 
 
In section 3.4, macroeconomic policies were discussed in relation to financial 
instability. It can be seen that classical economists were basically against 
government interference in the economy. However, the Keynesians support 
government interference. During a period of financial instability such as a recession, 
the Keynesians suggest that government should borrow money or that Central banks 
purchase government bonds, so as to increase money supply.  In section 3.5, various 
financial instabilities were discussed, and attention was also given to the policy 
response to the crises discussed. Fiscal policy was mostly used to curb the Asian 
crisis of late 1997-1999, while monetary policy was mostly used to control the 
effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 in the United States of America.  
 
In order to address RQ2, this study used Johansen cointegration tests and error 
correction models. The cointegration tests suggested evidence of a long run 
relationship among the variables in the West African Countries analysed (see 
section 7.10). In respect to the policy that has the most impact, the results showed 
that government spending (as a fiscal policy instrument), had the most impact across 
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West African countries. The next instrument with a high impact was broad money. 
This explains why the selected West African countries always seek loans from 
external sources in order to meet the financial responsibility of both the government 
and the financial sector.  
 
Since a long run relationship was established, it was important to know the short 
run equilibrium dynamics. Therefore, an error correction model analysis was 
carried out. The results were either not statistically significant or the results were 
ambiguous. The variables that had the expected sign and statistical significance 
were PSC for Burkina Faso, PX for Niger and then, PSC and DBT for Nigeria. 
Therefore, it can be inferred that the West African countries are unable to cope with 
short run equilibrium shocks. This can be attributed to two key factors – the 
financial markets are not well developed enough to withstand shocks, or the 
economy is not viable to withstand unexpected shocks to the economy. 
 
 8.3 POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
This segment provides policy recommendations in relation to the outcomes of this 
research.  
i.  Sustaining Economic Growth 
The empirical results show a long run relationship between public debt, financial 
instability and economic growth. Although not all variables representing those 
concepts were significant, public debt (measured by external debt stock) has a 
positive relationship with economic growth (measured by growth rate of GDP) in 
all the countries disclosed. This is because these countries borrow from external 
sources so as to enable them to carry out their obligations. As pointed out in section 
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4.2, these countries depend on the export of primary commodities so as to take care 
of their responsibilities. However, when the demand for these commodities fall, the 
government is no longer able to get enough money to fulfil its obligation, hence 
must borrow from external sources. As stated earlier, the governments of these 
countries seem to adopt a Keynesian school of economic thought whereby 
borrowing is used as a tool to handle instabilities.  
 
Therefore, in order to avoid excessive debt levels, attention should be paid to the 
growth rates of GDP. The granger causality results also suggest that GR can be used 
to predict debt, especially in Ghana and Senegal.  Since the nature of the relationship 
between DBT and GR is positive, it means that a high rate of public debt will result 
in a high rate of economic growth, and vice-versa. Even though public debt affects 
economic growth positively in these countries, there has to be precautionary 
measures in place so that the level of debt does not rise above a manageable amount. 
For this reason, economic recovery plans and repayment strategies should be put in 
place for short-term, medium-term and long-term debts. This is because countries 
with high rates of public debts are at risk of having compound interest problems.  
Also, a monitoring and evaluation agency or initiative has to be created for the 
supervision of those short, medium, and long-term debts. Furthermore, the 
monitoring and evaluation agency should be given the authority to enforce the debt 
repayment strategies.  
 
ii. Dealing with Financial Instability 
The results show that government spending has an impact in most of the countries. 
As already stated, those governments borrow in times of instability so as to meet 
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their obligations. However, the borrowed money is not necessarily spent on the 
private sector, which means that investment would always be low in those countries. 
Of three countries whose cointegration results for private sector credit (PSC) were 
significant (Benin, Cote D’Ivoire and Senegal), two of them (Benin and Senegal) 
indicated a negative relationship with GR. PSC was one of the variables used to 
measure financial stability. The results indicate that when there is a rise in GR, PSC 
falls. This implies that the money borrowed is not reflected in the private sector, 
which is what the classical school of thought are against (see section 2.2.1). These 
theorists propose that governments should not intervene in an economy because 
they move funds from productive areas of society to the unproductive areas.  
 
As mentioned under sustaining economic growth (in the policy recommendation 
section), a rate high public debt in these countries causes an increase in economic 
growth. But the effect of this borrowing and growth is not reflected in the private 
sector (as suggested by the results). Therefore, governments of the selected 
countries can form a partnership with the private sector and international investors 
so as to boost productivity and innovation in the country. Also, government can 
create or increase the scope of financial regulatory agencies, so that they can make 
it easy for investors to have easy access to funds. This process can help to even out 
the gap between public sector wealth and private sector wealth.  
 
The next variable with more influence on financial instability is money supply. The 
result suggests that the best way to deal with financial instability is to control the 
amount of money in circulation. This is because when a government increases its 
spending, there is more money in circulation and vice-versa. Thus, policy makers 
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can use both monetary and fiscal policy instruments in addressing financial 
instabilities for those countries, based on our results.  
 
iii. Trade and Investment 
Trade and investment are really important for the economic development of the 
selected countries. As mentioned in section 4.2, trade was one the channels through 
which the global financial crisis and euro sovereign crisis affected West African 
countries. The disclosed countries depend a lot on the exportation of primary 
commodities such as agricultural products and natural resources such as crude oil, 
iron ore and gold for the generation of revenue.  Therefore, effort has to be made to 
support the stakeholders in those sectors. The results showed that there is a 
significant linkage between the growth rate of GDP and Trade for at least three of 
those countries – Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, and Niger.  
 
Similarly, there is a significant causal relationship between the level of investment 
(GCF) and the growth rate of GDP (GR) for at least four countries – Cote D’Ivoire, 
Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.  Therefore, targeted efforts have to be made by these 
countries to encourage investments in the trade industries.  Some of the targeted 
efforts can be in form of creating initiatives that would encourage private investors 
to participate in the agricultural, oil and mining sectors. The governments can also 
create an enabling environment that allows foreign investor an ease to do business 
in those aforementioned industries, such as reducing corporate taxation. 
Furthermore, governments can provide loans and grants for local businesses and 
developers, and also exportation process of primary commodities should be 
simplified so as to attract investors’ interest.  
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8.4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE 
This study has made some contributions to knowledge and they are listed as follow. 
a. Previous studies have focused solely on the relationship between public debt and 
economic growth; the effect of debt burden on economic growth; the impact of 
financial stability on economic growth; the impact of macroeconomic policy on 
economic growth; or the impact of financial instability on public debt. In contrast, 
this research has demonstrated that there is a linkage between the three concepts 
and the empirical results have shown that a relationship exists between them. The 
uniqueness of this study is embedded in evaluating the relationship between public 
debt and financial instability on economic growth particularly for the selected West 
African countries discussed.  
 
b. Since the study linked those three concepts, it was essential to develop an 
econometric model to reflect the interrelationship among them. The model was 
deduced from the theories of business cycles and adapted specifically for those 
West African countries, with two additional variables added, based on unique 
channels through which financial instability impacts West African economies.  
Furthermore, the empirical results have demonstrated that the robust model is 
stable, and it can be used to ascertain the nature of relationship between public 
debt, financial instability and economic growth.  
 
c. The study also provided some policy recommendations in relation to public debt, 
financial instability, as well as trade and investment for the selected West African 
countries. Governments of these countries were encouraged to establish economic 
recovery plans for all forms of public debt in order to avoid compound interest 
problems. They were also encouraged to form a partnership with the private sector 
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as the cointegration results suggested a negative relationship between growth rate 
of GDP and private sector credit. Therefore, the partnership would allow the private 
sector to have access to funds for innovation and expansion, which would improve 
their balance sheets. Policy makers of these countries were also advised to create 
an enabling environment for local and foreign investors to participate in the 
primary commodity sector. This is because trade is an important transmission 
channel for financial instability in those countries. 
 
In essence, this study has improved the existing understanding of how the 
relationship between public debt, financial instability and economic growth can be 
determined, especially for West Africa. 
 
8.5 LIMITATIONS AND AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
I. The robust ARDL cointegration results showed the existence of a long run 
relationship between the variables but the coefficients of the variables were 
not significant in explaining the elasticities for most of the selected 
countries. Even though Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote D’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo have the same Central Bank, their results did not follow 
the same trend. The empirical results showed that the only country whose 
coefficients and p-values were all significant was Benin. On the other hand, 
Cote D’Ivoire, Nigeria, Mali and Senegal had a few variables with 
significant p-values, while for Niger, Togo and Ghana there were none. 
Therefore, some alternative variables could be further examined and used 
for estimation for either a shorter period or longer period. For instance, 
instead of growth rate of GDP, real GDP can be used or instead of gross 
capital formation, investment can be used when forming the model. The 
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suggested variables were not incorporated into this model because all the 
data for those variables was not readily available for each and every country. 
 
II. Private sector credit was used as a proxy for the financial resources available 
to the financial sector. Although this variable captures to a certain extent the 
financial strength of a country, other indicators such as balance sheets of 
banks or bank nonperforming loans to total gross loans could have been 
considered. However, this was not the case as data was limited and was not 
available from 1970 to 1990. Hence, they were not used. 
 
In spite of these limitations, the results gathered in this study were carefully 
explained. However, since the elasticities could not be addressed and also given the 
limited data on other financial instability measures, further studies will need to be 
done to address these limitations.  		
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: Bounds Cointegration Test Results 
Bounds Results for Benin 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 3, 2, 2, 0, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:39   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 43   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -8.196416 3.692342 -2.219842 0.0344 
GR(-1)* -1.042474 0.133720 -7.795927 0.0000 
DBT(-1) -0.009234 0.020499 -0.450460 0.6557 
GCF(-1) -0.079398 0.130574 -0.608068 0.5479 
M3(-1) -0.177025 0.088282 -2.005223 0.0544 
PSC** 0.025617 0.065315 0.392208 0.6978 
TR** 0.337343 0.079635 4.236137 0.0002 
D(DBT) -0.077584 0.047253 -1.641877 0.1114 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.062545 0.047435 -1.318528 0.1976 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.048422 0.046444 -1.042585 0.3058 
D(GCF) -0.213671 0.127815 -1.671718 0.1053 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.396579 0.111897 -3.544155 0.0014 
D(M3) -0.075282 0.149515 -0.503510 0.6184 
D(M3(-1)) 0.371530 0.155222 2.393548 0.0234 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.008858 0.021308 -0.415708 0.6807 
GCF -0.076163 0.113638 -0.670226 0.5080 
M3 -0.169812 0.081577 -2.081604 0.0463 
PSC 0.024573 0.065503 0.375146 0.7103 
TR 0.323598 0.078613 4.116320 0.0003 
C -7.862466 3.605026 -2.180973 0.0374 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.0089*DBT  -0.0762*GCF  -0.1698*M3 + 0.0246*PSC + 0.3236 
        *TR  -7.8625 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  9.264918 10%   2.08 3 
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k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
 
 
Bounds Results for Burkina Faso 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 4, 2, 4, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:47   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 5.386491 7.947289 0.677777 0.5076 
GR(-1)* -1.741749 0.450955 -3.862358 0.0014 
DBT(-1) 0.091468 0.108245 0.845012 0.4106 
GCF(-1) 0.270109 0.442772 0.610041 0.5504 
M3(-1) -0.282183 0.422754 -0.667487 0.5140 
PSC(-1) -0.398013 0.407026 -0.977858 0.3427 
TR(-1) 0.125634 0.140630 0.893361 0.3849 
D(GR(-1)) 0.661854 0.366189 1.807413 0.0895 
D(GR(-2)) 0.475378 0.237372 2.002672 0.0625 
D(DBT) -0.328070 0.120895 -2.713677 0.0153 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.008043 0.120335 0.066839 0.9475 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.221640 0.129607 -1.710093 0.1066 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.398970 0.169997 -2.346927 0.0321 
D(GCF) 0.365841 0.241615 1.514150 0.1495 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.654626 0.349371 -1.873729 0.0794 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.699498 0.274691 -2.546491 0.0216 
D(GCF(-3)) 0.248674 0.163371 1.522148 0.1475 
D(M3) 0.079805 0.266825 0.299093 0.7687 
D(M3(-1)) 0.711539 0.350380 2.030764 0.0592 
D(PSC) -0.926238 0.379874 -2.438279 0.0268 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.592071 0.457832 1.293207 0.2143 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.199247 0.366064 0.544294 0.5937 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.532527 0.378872 -1.405561 0.1790 
D(TR) -0.098747 0.185240 -0.533075 0.6013 
D(TR(-1)) 0.459253 0.183356 2.504706 0.0235 
D(TR(-2)) 0.305000 0.230020 1.325971 0.2035 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.052515 0.065922 0.796623 0.4373 
GCF 0.155079 0.207162 0.748589 0.4650 
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M3 -0.162011 0.230955 -0.701483 0.4931 
PSC -0.228514 0.232531 -0.982725 0.3404 
TR 0.072131 0.048327 1.492542 0.1550 
C 3.092576 4.227036 0.731618 0.4750 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0525*DBT + 0.1551*GCF  -0.1620*M3  -0.2285*PSC + 0.0721 
        *TR + 3.0926 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  3.938331 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
Bounds Results for Cote D’Ivoire 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 0, 1, 0, 0, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:56   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 11.59622 13.61682 0.851610 0.4017 
GR(-1)* -1.248297 0.318533 -3.918889 0.0005 
DBT** -0.022916 0.024173 -0.947966 0.3513 
GCF(-1) 0.315378 0.181843 1.734343 0.0939 
M3** 0.396402 0.180940 2.190790 0.0370 
PSC** -0.180651 0.108323 -1.667712 0.1065 
TR(-1) -0.226272 0.137350 -1.647410 0.1107 
D(GR(-1)) 0.372530 0.263407 1.414277 0.1683 
D(GR(-2)) 0.194688 0.204255 0.953161 0.3487 
D(GR(-3)) 0.327788 0.154750 2.118182 0.0432 
D(GCF) 0.685711 0.187802 3.651248 0.0011 
D(TR) -0.152208 0.117521 -1.295153 0.2058 
D(TR(-1)) 0.188639 0.112499 1.676806 0.1047 
D(TR(-2)) 0.257353 0.103765 2.480160 0.0194 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.018358 0.013823 -1.328061 0.1949 
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GCF 0.252647 0.074459 3.393092 0.0021 
M3 0.317554 0.142791 2.223914 0.0344 
PSC -0.144718 0.053574 -2.701276 0.0116 
TR -0.181264 0.066173 -2.739260 0.0106 
C 9.289635 7.694832 1.207256 0.2374 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.0184*DBT + 0.2526*GCF + 0.3176*M3  -0.1447*PSC  -0.1813 
        *TR + 9.2896 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  2.894789 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
Bounds Results for Ghana 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:05   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 3.187407 3.121225 1.021204 0.3151 
GR(-1)* -0.939801 0.166552 -5.642687 0.0000 
DBT** -0.087823 0.053738 -1.634289 0.1123 
GCF** 0.345964 0.221771 1.560006 0.1289 
M3** 0.016321 0.212716 0.076729 0.9393 
PSC(-1) -0.590711 0.549638 -1.074728 0.2908 
TR** 0.063275 0.113872 0.555673 0.5824 
D(PSC) -0.218573 0.489280 -0.446725 0.6582 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.544490 0.537922 1.012210 0.3193 
D(PSC(-2)) 1.064086 0.496418 2.143530 0.0400 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.444116 0.424825 3.399320 0.0019 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.093449 0.040898 -2.284916 0.0293 
GCF 0.368125 0.126006 2.921488 0.0064 
M3 0.017367 0.248493 0.069889 0.9447 
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PSC -0.628549 0.425039 -1.478804 0.1493 
TR 0.067329 0.079187 0.850254 0.4017 
C 3.391578 3.460330 0.980131 0.3346 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.0934*DBT + 0.3681*GCF + 0.0174*M3  -0.6285*PSC + 0.0673 
        *TR + 3.3916 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.580599 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
 
Bounds Results for Mali 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:11   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 45   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -3.716679 12.25133 -0.303370 0.7634 
GR(-1)* -1.266562 0.147061 -8.612512 0.0000 
DBT(-1) 0.031216 0.035382 0.882234 0.3837 
GCF** -0.177334 0.386851 -0.458405 0.6495 
M3** 0.115402 0.177791 0.649087 0.5205 
PSC(-1) 0.121604 0.276795 0.439331 0.6631 
TR(-1) 0.112123 0.112964 0.992563 0.3277 
D(DBT) -0.146656 0.090365 -1.622940 0.1136 
D(PSC) -0.417403 0.306996 -1.359638 0.1826 
D(TR) -0.121863 0.157540 -0.773534 0.4444 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.024646 0.020630 1.194645 0.2403 
GCF -0.140012 0.436017 -0.321117 0.7500 
M3 0.091115 0.106163 0.858252 0.3966 
PSC 0.096011 0.225458 0.425850 0.6728 
TR 0.088526 0.096721 0.915271 0.3663 
C -2.934464 9.419890 -0.311518 0.7573 
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     EC = GR - (0.0246*DBT  -0.1400*GCF + 0.0911*M3 + 0.0960*PSC + 0.0885 
        *TR  -2.9345 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  11.84080 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
Bounds Results for Niger 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:53   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -40.66815 11.54610 -3.522242 0.0042 
GR(-1)* -1.250362 0.265069 -4.717126 0.0005 
DBT(-1) -0.312436 0.072246 -4.324596 0.0010 
GCF(-1) -3.102119 0.705455 -4.397333 0.0009 
M3(-1) 3.070558 0.685536 4.479061 0.0008 
PSC(-1) -3.680145 0.754094 -4.880221 0.0004 
TR(-1) 2.261640 0.518270 4.363823 0.0009 
D(GR(-1)) -0.310223 0.208817 -1.485620 0.1632 
D(GR(-2)) -0.413794 0.182731 -2.264497 0.0429 
D(GR(-3)) -0.438181 0.125430 -3.493432 0.0044 
D(DBT) -0.115054 0.065470 -1.757352 0.1043 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.348011 0.063575 5.474057 0.0001 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.136022 0.056756 2.396599 0.0337 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.075868 0.058388 1.299383 0.2182 
D(GCF) -0.179480 0.327546 -0.547954 0.5938 
D(GCF(-1)) 2.567841 0.453566 5.661446 0.0001 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.899351 0.443290 4.284670 0.0011 
D(GCF(-3)) 1.264479 0.277277 4.560346 0.0007 
D(M3) 0.579787 0.411638 1.408487 0.1844 
D(M3(-1)) -0.452078 0.476137 -0.949472 0.3611 
D(M3(-2)) 0.371959 0.463004 0.803360 0.4374 
D(M3(-3)) 0.854202 0.455825 1.873971 0.0855 
D(PSC) -0.329075 0.524105 -0.627880 0.5418 
D(PSC(-1)) 1.259736 0.620649 2.029708 0.0652 
D(PSC(-2)) 1.888627 0.689905 2.737518 0.0180 
D(PSC(-3)) 0.839615 0.577206 1.454619 0.1714 
D(TR) -0.038018 0.148255 -0.256435 0.8020 
D(TR(-1)) -1.928891 0.383232 -5.033217 0.0003 
D(TR(-2)) -1.486888 0.360691 -4.122335 0.0014 
D(TR(-3)) -0.607147 0.237738 -2.553846 0.0253 
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       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.249876 0.059573 -4.194482 0.0012 
GCF -2.480977 0.549375 -4.516001 0.0007 
M3 2.455736 0.480038 5.115712 0.0003 
PSC -2.943264 0.564858 -5.210628 0.0002 
TR 1.808789 0.398639 4.537404 0.0007 
C -32.52510 8.078864 -4.025950 0.0017 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.2499*DBT  -2.4810*GCF + 2.4557*M3  -2.9433*PSC + 1.8088 
        *TR  -32.5251 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  9.603462 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
 
Bounds Results for Nigeria 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 2, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:03   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 13.98499 8.431153 1.658728 0.1155 
GR(-1)* -0.855838 0.302476 -2.829443 0.0116 
DBT(-1) -1.049445 0.432494 -2.426495 0.0267 
GCF(-1) -1.042526 0.318203 -3.276292 0.0045 
M3(-1) -0.311868 0.490405 -0.635939 0.5333 
PSC(-1) 0.781282 0.472193 1.654584 0.1164 
TR(-1) 0.028170 0.089869 0.313458 0.7577 
D(GR(-1)) -0.056989 0.230407 -0.247342 0.8076 
D(GR(-2)) -0.433204 0.154818 -2.798141 0.0124 
D(DBT) 0.728853 0.543497 1.341043 0.1976 
D(DBT(-1)) 2.041380 0.537003 3.801431 0.0014 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.458639 0.445103 -1.030411 0.3173 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.537283 0.519939 1.033357 0.3159 
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D(GCF) 0.300608 0.474044 0.634135 0.5344 
D(GCF(-1)) 1.905078 0.560341 3.399853 0.0034 
D(M3) -0.671168 0.536287 -1.251508 0.2277 
D(M3(-1)) -1.327362 0.448771 -2.957775 0.0088 
D(PSC) 0.584447 0.494836 1.181094 0.2538 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.782878 0.434327 1.802507 0.0892 
D(PSC(-2)) -0.654045 0.237487 -2.754017 0.0136 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.474862 0.236710 -2.006094 0.0610 
D(TR) -0.119889 0.118123 -1.014947 0.3244 
D(TR(-1)) -0.020590 0.128005 -0.160855 0.8741 
D(TR(-2)) -0.188422 0.121963 -1.544910 0.1408 
D(TR(-3)) 0.253360 0.109323 2.317544 0.0332 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -1.226220 0.641657 -1.911020 0.0730 
GCF -1.218136 0.419734 -2.902162 0.0099 
M3 -0.364400 0.500863 -0.727545 0.4768 
PSC 0.912886 0.301144 3.031391 0.0075 
TR 0.032915 0.066183 0.497340 0.6253 
C 16.34070 5.802112 2.816336 0.0119 
     
     EC = GR - (-1.2262*DBT  -1.2181*GCF  -0.3644*M3 + 0.9129*PSC + 0.0329 
        *TR + 16.3407 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  3.091222 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
 
Bounds Results for Senegal 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:11   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 13.43829 4.751844 2.828015 0.0087 
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GR(-1)* -2.181144 0.410389 -5.314818 0.0000 
DBT(-1) -0.001987 0.023707 -0.083808 0.9338 
GCF(-1) 0.548340 0.157393 3.483893 0.0017 
M3(-1) -0.167244 0.126344 -1.323711 0.1967 
PSC(-1) -0.075605 0.091367 -0.827490 0.4152 
TR** -0.160543 0.075450 -2.127794 0.0426 
D(GR(-1)) 0.846245 0.318016 2.661016 0.0130 
D(GR(-2)) 0.519558 0.231978 2.239688 0.0335 
D(GR(-3)) 0.212666 0.130319 1.631886 0.1143 
D(DBT) -0.072717 0.057820 -1.257652 0.2193 
D(GCF) 0.329173 0.180816 1.820485 0.0798 
D(M3) 0.166924 0.232515 0.717904 0.4790 
D(M3(-1)) 0.628418 0.273893 2.294393 0.0298 
D(PSC) -0.565774 0.195282 -2.897215 0.0074 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
** Variable interpreted as Z = Z(-1) + D(Z).  
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.000911 0.016333 -0.055771 0.9559 
GCF 0.251400 0.057805 4.349090 0.0002 
M3 -0.076677 0.052355 -1.464552 0.1546 
PSC -0.034663 0.027095 -1.279326 0.2117 
TR -0.073605 0.020551 -3.581499 0.0013 
C 6.161118 2.274674 2.708572 0.0116 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.0009*DBT + 0.2514*GCF  -0.0767*M3  -0.0347*PSC  -0.0736 
        *TR + 6.1611 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.832788 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
Bounds Results for Togo 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:19   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
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     C -7.767653 6.124791 -1.268232 0.2169 
GR(-1)* -1.476968 0.311277 -4.744867 0.0001 
DBT(-1) 0.014237 0.030620 0.464955 0.6462 
GCF(-1) -0.368906 0.244458 -1.509081 0.1443 
M3(-1) -0.436400 0.245887 -1.774802 0.0886 
PSC(-1) 0.784949 0.328205 2.391641 0.0250 
TR(-1) 0.170214 0.098462 1.728726 0.0967 
D(GR(-1)) 0.198060 0.267569 0.740221 0.4663 
D(GR(-2)) 0.282540 0.207957 1.358644 0.1869 
D(GR(-3)) 0.325018 0.129549 2.508833 0.0193 
D(DBT) -0.157188 0.061568 -2.553065 0.0175 
D(GCF) 0.126046 0.172133 0.732260 0.4711 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.156203 0.155301 1.005808 0.3245 
D(GCF(-2)) 0.488813 0.175845 2.779804 0.0104 
D(M3) 0.128073 0.283176 0.452273 0.6551 
D(PSC) -0.271364 0.284927 -0.952400 0.3504 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.362390 0.253578 -1.429108 0.1659 
D(TR) 0.336895 0.088787 3.794425 0.0009 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.009639 0.017227 0.559553 0.5810 
GCF -0.249773 0.144982 -1.722783 0.0978 
M3 -0.295470 0.155463 -1.900588 0.0694 
PSC 0.531460 0.235439 2.257316 0.0334 
TR 0.115245 0.064340 1.791201 0.0859 
C -5.259190 4.295430 -1.224369 0.2327 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0096*DBT  -0.2498*GCF  -0.2955*M3 + 0.5315*PSC + 0.1152 
        *TR  -5.2592 )   
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.396161 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
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APPENDIX B: ECM Results 
ECM Results for Benin 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 3, 2, 2, 0, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:42   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 43   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(DBT) -0.077584 0.035669 -2.175126 0.0379 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.062545 0.036173 -1.729050 0.0944 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.048422 0.036978 -1.309495 0.2006 
D(GCF) -0.213671 0.089530 -2.386570 0.0238 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.396579 0.092269 -4.298064 0.0002 
D(M3) -0.075282 0.117709 -0.639566 0.5275 
D(M3(-1)) 0.371530 0.116427 3.191099 0.0034 
CointEq(-1)* -1.042474 0.117831 -8.847179 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.810302    Mean dependent var -0.100742 
Adjusted R-squared 0.772363    S.D. dependent var 4.380650 
S.E. of regression 2.090067    Akaike info criterion 4.478510 
Sum squared resid 152.8933    Schwarz criterion 4.806175 
Log likelihood -88.28797    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.599343 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.752728    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  9.264918 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
ECM Results for Burkina Faso 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 4, 2, 4, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:48   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 0.661854 0.224934 2.942443 0.0096 
D(GR(-2)) 0.475378 0.161469 2.944083 0.0095 
D(DBT) -0.328070 0.077783 -4.217771 0.0007 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.008043 0.083475 0.096353 0.9244 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.221640 0.096101 -2.306332 0.0348 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.398970 0.108783 -3.667567 0.0021 
D(GCF) 0.365841 0.149758 2.442874 0.0265 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.654626 0.230439 -2.840783 0.0118 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.699498 0.207917 -3.364308 0.0039 
D(GCF(-3)) 0.248674 0.122459 2.030679 0.0592 
D(M3) 0.079805 0.184265 0.433100 0.6707 
D(M3(-1)) 0.711539 0.217941 3.264829 0.0049 
D(PSC) -0.926238 0.252137 -3.673551 0.0021 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.592071 0.247272 2.394415 0.0292 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.199247 0.274933 0.724710 0.4791 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.532527 0.268437 -1.983808 0.0647 
D(TR) -0.098747 0.115130 -0.857698 0.4037 
D(TR(-1)) 0.459253 0.107209 4.283713 0.0006 
D(TR(-2)) 0.305000 0.139214 2.190869 0.0436 
CointEq(-1)* -1.741749 0.282897 -6.156820 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.922869    Mean dependent var 0.084493 
Adjusted R-squared 0.856256    S.D. dependent var 4.956375 
S.E. of regression 1.879138    Akaike info criterion 4.405258 
Sum squared resid 77.68554    Schwarz criterion 5.232719 
Log likelihood -72.51041    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.708555 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.029647    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  3.938331 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
 
ECM Results for Ghana 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 0, 0, 0, 4, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:05   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(PSC) -0.218573 0.353258 -0.618735 0.5406 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.544490 0.330279 1.648579 0.1093 
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D(PSC(-2)) 1.064086 0.325404 3.270041 0.0026 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.444116 0.324369 4.452076 0.0001 
CointEq(-1)* -0.939801 0.137634 -6.828251 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.598474    Mean dependent var 0.024555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.555066    S.D. dependent var 5.026908 
S.E. of regression 3.353117    Akaike info criterion 5.369001 
Sum squared resid 416.0055    Schwarz criterion 5.575866 
Log likelihood -107.7490    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.444825 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.160088    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.580599 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
 
ECM Results for Mali 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:11   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 45   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(DBT) -0.146656 0.070093 -2.092299 0.0437 
D(PSC) -0.417403 0.247344 -1.687543 0.1004 
D(TR) -0.121863 0.117888 -1.033712 0.3084 
CointEq(-1)* -1.266562 0.128537 -9.853655 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.714161    Mean dependent var -0.003875 
Adjusted R-squared 0.693246    S.D. dependent var 8.134562 
S.E. of regression 4.505357    Akaike info criterion 5.933099 
Sum squared resid 832.2280    Schwarz criterion 6.093691 
Log likelihood -129.4947    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.992966 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.186752    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  11.84080 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
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  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
ECM Results for Niger 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:54   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.310223 0.087987 -3.525773 0.0042 
D(GR(-2)) -0.413794 0.075895 -5.452157 0.0001 
D(GR(-3)) -0.438181 0.064286 -6.816101 0.0000 
D(DBT) -0.115054 0.036361 -3.164236 0.0082 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.348011 0.041245 8.437762 0.0000 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.136022 0.040442 3.363390 0.0056 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.075868 0.041154 1.843497 0.0901 
D(GCF) -0.179480 0.187675 -0.956336 0.3578 
D(GCF(-1)) 2.567841 0.267979 9.582253 0.0000 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.899351 0.275284 6.899599 0.0000 
D(GCF(-3)) 1.264479 0.187424 6.746606 0.0000 
D(M3) 0.579787 0.273438 2.120358 0.0555 
D(M3(-1)) -0.452078 0.318528 -1.419273 0.1813 
D(M3(-2)) 0.371959 0.283994 1.309745 0.2148 
D(M3(-3)) 0.854202 0.242906 3.516591 0.0043 
D(PSC) -0.329075 0.312965 -1.051477 0.3138 
D(PSC(-1)) 1.259736 0.377029 3.341221 0.0059 
D(PSC(-2)) 1.888627 0.416294 4.536767 0.0007 
D(PSC(-3)) 0.839615 0.367793 2.282849 0.0415 
D(TR) -0.038018 0.086515 -0.439437 0.6682 
D(TR(-1)) -1.928891 0.217941 -8.850519 0.0000 
D(TR(-2)) -1.486888 0.211596 -7.027016 0.0000 
D(TR(-3)) -0.607147 0.149800 -4.053041 0.0016 
CointEq(-1)* -1.250362 0.124517 -10.04173 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.974674    Mean dependent var 0.491735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.942312    S.D. dependent var 8.342766 
S.E. of regression 2.003784    Akaike info criterion 4.523512 
Sum squared resid 72.27273    Schwarz criterion 5.516466 
Log likelihood -70.99374    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.887468 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.761372    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  9.603462 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
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  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
ECM Results for Nigeria 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 2, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:04   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.056989 0.139142 -0.409577 0.6872 
D(GR(-2)) -0.433204 0.102693 -4.218440 0.0006 
D(DBT) 0.728853 0.392992 1.854623 0.0811 
D(DBT(-1)) 2.041380 0.369157 5.529849 0.0000 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.458639 0.302383 -1.516750 0.1477 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.537283 0.344281 1.560593 0.1370 
D(GCF) 0.300608 0.363350 0.827323 0.4195 
D(GCF(-1)) 1.905078 0.433829 4.391313 0.0004 
D(M3) -0.671168 0.333162 -2.014536 0.0601 
D(M3(-1)) -1.327362 0.323723 -4.100297 0.0007 
D(PSC) 0.584447 0.344018 1.698885 0.1076 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.782878 0.333970 2.344154 0.0315 
D(PSC(-2)) -0.654045 0.181097 -3.611577 0.0022 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.474862 0.185044 -2.566204 0.0200 
D(TR) -0.119889 0.077314 -1.550682 0.1394 
D(TR(-1)) -0.020590 0.089943 -0.228927 0.8217 
D(TR(-2)) -0.188422 0.087931 -2.142830 0.0469 
D(TR(-3)) 0.253360 0.079628 3.181811 0.0055 
CointEq(-1)* -0.855838 0.158175 -5.410702 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.891407    Mean dependent var -0.065240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.806421    S.D. dependent var 9.719064 
S.E. of regression 4.276151    Akaike info criterion 6.046570 
Sum squared resid 420.5658    Schwarz criterion 6.832659 
Log likelihood -107.9780    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.334703 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.857189    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  3.091222 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
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ECM Results for Senegal 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1, 1, 2, 1, 0)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:12   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 0.846245 0.247156 3.423932 0.0020 
D(GR(-2)) 0.519558 0.191413 2.714332 0.0114 
D(GR(-3)) 0.212666 0.110174 1.930269 0.0641 
D(DBT) -0.072717 0.038874 -1.870588 0.0723 
D(GCF) 0.329173 0.118813 2.770507 0.0100 
D(M3) 0.166924 0.185996 0.897458 0.3774 
D(M3(-1)) 0.628418 0.197031 3.189429 0.0036 
D(PSC) -0.565774 0.151010 -3.746606 0.0009 
CointEq(-1)* -2.181144 0.308761 -7.064187 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.850977    Mean dependent var 0.287344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.814850    S.D. dependent var 5.101911 
S.E. of regression 2.195305    Akaike info criterion 4.597928 
Sum squared resid 159.0390    Schwarz criterion 4.970286 
Log likelihood -87.55649    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.734412 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.141615    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.832788 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
     
      
ECM Results for Togo 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 1, 3, 1, 2, 1)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:20   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
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     D(GR(-1)) 0.198060 0.181080 1.093770 0.2849 
D(GR(-2)) 0.282540 0.156612 1.804073 0.0838 
D(GR(-3)) 0.325018 0.109704 2.962685 0.0068 
D(DBT) -0.157188 0.044908 -3.500220 0.0018 
D(GCF) 0.126046 0.125261 1.006265 0.3243 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.156203 0.116332 1.342738 0.1919 
D(GCF(-2)) 0.488813 0.129202 3.783318 0.0009 
D(M3) 0.128073 0.217043 0.590079 0.5607 
D(PSC) -0.271364 0.208676 -1.300412 0.2058 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.362390 0.195652 -1.852217 0.0763 
D(TR) 0.336895 0.064735 5.204195 0.0000 
CointEq(-1)* -1.476968 0.214944 -6.871420 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.846407    Mean dependent var 0.036391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.790090    S.D. dependent var 8.260744 
S.E. of regression 3.784740    Akaike info criterion 5.734788 
Sum squared resid 429.7277    Schwarz criterion 6.231265 
Log likelihood -108.4305    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.916766 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.242359    
     
     * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.396161 10%   2.08 3 
k 5 5%   2.39 3.38 
  2.5%   2.7 3.73 
  1%   3.06 4.15 
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APPENDIX C – ROBUST BOUNDS TEST RESULT 
Robust ARDL test for Benin 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:40   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -765.5940 245.2278 -3.121971 0.0355 
GR(-1)* -5.821259 1.589119 -3.663200 0.0215 
DBT(-1) 0.309588 0.099865 3.100065 0.0362 
GCF(-1) -7.477347 2.593819 -2.882756 0.0449 
M3(-1) 2.894800 0.876500 3.302681 0.0299 
PSC(-1) -5.906889 1.935677 -3.051589 0.0380 
TR(-1) 2.341426 0.865635 2.704865 0.0538 
IN(-1) -2.593598 1.111374 -2.333685 0.0799 
PX(-1) 7.313692 2.378456 3.074975 0.0371 
D(GR(-1)) 2.975314 0.927241 3.208784 0.0326 
D(GR(-2)) 1.818490 0.639779 2.842373 0.0468 
D(GR(-3)) 1.165084 0.470421 2.476682 0.0685 
D(DBT) 0.259672 0.156464 1.659624 0.1723 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.430934 0.160737 -2.680979 0.0552 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.182159 0.123836 1.470965 0.2153 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.277124 0.079054 3.505481 0.0248 
D(GCF) -0.926266 0.186066 -4.978159 0.0076 
D(GCF(-1)) 4.265497 1.814506 2.350776 0.0784 
D(GCF(-2)) 2.205636 1.001991 2.201254 0.0925 
D(GCF(-3)) 0.613436 0.521845 1.175515 0.3050 
D(M3) 1.752272 0.654716 2.676385 0.0554 
D(M3(-1)) -0.743088 0.518210 -1.433951 0.2249 
D(M3(-2)) 0.335783 0.404847 0.829406 0.4535 
D(M3(-3)) -0.847894 0.588020 -1.441947 0.2228 
D(PSC) -1.202990 0.707008 -1.701524 0.1641 
D(PSC(-1)) 5.704870 2.159869 2.641304 0.0575 
D(PSC(-2)) 4.254223 1.565771 2.717014 0.0532 
D(PSC(-3)) 2.773492 1.209756 2.292604 0.0836 
D(TR) 0.830883 0.281671 2.949838 0.0420 
D(TR(-1)) -0.105132 0.186171 -0.564707 0.6024 
D(IN) -1.291195 0.514024 -2.511934 0.0659 
D(IN(-1)) 1.038001 0.574827 1.805764 0.1453 
D(IN(-2)) -0.031370 0.147786 -0.212266 0.8423 
D(IN(-3)) -0.183264 0.097704 -1.875705 0.1339 
D(PX) -0.350455 0.408938 -0.856987 0.4398 
D(PX(-1)) -5.585031 2.028293 -2.753562 0.0512 
D(PX(-2)) -3.404717 1.379248 -2.468531 0.0691 
D(PX(-3)) -1.280778 0.688486 -1.860282 0.1364 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
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Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.053182 0.011757 4.523586 0.0106 
GCF -1.284490 0.189815 -6.767051 0.0025 
M3 0.497281 0.050041 9.937414 0.0006 
PSC -1.014710 0.110745 -9.162577 0.0008 
TR 0.402220 0.083068 4.842072 0.0084 
IN -0.445539 0.119136 -3.739750 0.0201 
PX 1.256376 0.114249 10.99684 0.0004 
C -131.5169 10.88425 -12.08323 0.0003 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0532*DBT  -1.2845*GCF + 0.4973*M3  -1.0147*PSC + 0.4022 
        *TR  -0.4455*IN + 1.2564*PX  -131.5169 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  8.573311 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Burkina Faso 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:49   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -157.7471 69.22331 -2.278814 0.0849 
GR(-1)* -3.571623 0.786640 -4.540354 0.0105 
DBT(-1) 0.032709 0.149114 0.219356 0.8371 
GCF(-1) 0.325376 0.509503 0.638615 0.5578 
M3(-1) 1.358055 0.813041 1.670341 0.1702 
PSC(-1) -0.405758 0.493803 -0.821700 0.4574 
TR(-1) -0.696671 0.281453 -2.475264 0.0686 
IN(-1) -0.113103 0.300026 -0.376976 0.7253 
PX(-1) 1.488519 0.618327 2.407334 0.0738 
D(GR(-1)) 2.033457 0.694166 2.929351 0.0428 
D(GR(-2)) 1.163573 0.531561 2.188974 0.0938 
D(GR(-3)) 0.444420 0.260389 1.706756 0.1631 
D(DBT) -0.182594 0.119428 -1.528911 0.2010 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.185341 0.149676 1.238282 0.2833 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.123933 0.266164 -0.465628 0.6657 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.159452 0.153222 -1.040661 0.3568 
D(GCF) 0.306320 0.373391 0.820372 0.4581 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.413113 0.307089 -1.345252 0.2497 
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D(GCF(-2)) -0.388799 0.270810 -1.435689 0.2244 
D(M3) 0.155630 0.267844 0.581048 0.5924 
D(M3(-1)) -1.024308 0.804610 -1.273049 0.2720 
D(M3(-2)) -0.972076 0.665090 -1.461570 0.2177 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828961 0.410354 -2.020112 0.1135 
D(PSC) 0.130841 0.692762 0.188868 0.8594 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.872506 0.565064 1.544085 0.1974 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.669327 0.513193 1.304241 0.2621 
D(TR) -0.141912 0.266083 -0.533335 0.6221 
D(TR(-1)) 1.000320 0.284291 3.518648 0.0245 
D(TR(-2)) 0.643966 0.320781 2.007492 0.1151 
D(TR(-3)) 0.468894 0.302645 1.549321 0.1962 
D(IN) -0.106587 0.122187 -0.872334 0.4323 
D(IN(-1)) -0.035928 0.258167 -0.139167 0.8960 
D(IN(-2)) 0.021431 0.186783 0.114737 0.9142 
D(IN(-3)) -0.171278 0.215943 -0.793167 0.4721 
D(PX) 0.042358 0.358989 0.117992 0.9118 
D(PX(-1)) -1.064867 0.419182 -2.540343 0.0640 
D(PX(-2)) -0.652090 0.338489 -1.926472 0.1263 
D(PX(-3)) -0.138246 0.271630 -0.508951 0.6376 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.009158 0.061121 0.149833 0.8881 
GCF 0.091100 0.122532 0.743481 0.4985 
M3 0.380235 0.250978 1.515009 0.2043 
PSC -0.113606 0.114902 -0.988723 0.3788 
TR -0.195057 0.061146 -3.190004 0.0332 
IN -0.031667 0.072476 -0.436932 0.6847 
PX 0.416762 0.106150 3.926180 0.0172 
C -44.16677 11.90018 -3.711437 0.0206 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0092*DBT + 0.0911*GCF + 0.3802*M3  -0.1136*PSC  -0.1951 
        *TR  -0.0317*IN + 0.4168*PX  -44.1668 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  6.112519 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Cote D’Ivoire 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 2, 4, 2, 1, 4, 4, 3) 
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Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:59   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 53.06766 28.35707 1.871409 0.0908 
GR(-1)* -0.925043 0.310139 -2.982675 0.0137 
DBT(-1) 0.081703 0.044008 1.856541 0.0930 
GCF(-1) 1.707160 0.643150 2.654375 0.0241 
M3(-1) 1.009890 0.319814 3.157742 0.0102 
PSC(-1) -0.414039 0.227355 -1.821112 0.0986 
TR(-1) 0.022197 0.163687 0.135607 0.8948 
IN(-1) -0.512002 0.333481 -1.535329 0.1557 
PX(-1) -1.077904 0.402000 -2.681353 0.0230 
D(GR(-1)) 0.072573 0.300513 0.241498 0.8140 
D(GR(-2)) 0.608953 0.236271 2.577346 0.0275 
D(GR(-3)) 0.644945 0.211908 3.043520 0.0124 
D(DBT) 0.027217 0.061376 0.443452 0.6669 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.090324 0.051135 -1.766381 0.1078 
D(GCF) 0.988207 0.240207 4.113986 0.0021 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.274731 0.621522 -2.050985 0.0674 
D(GCF(-2)) -1.817353 0.609555 -2.981443 0.0138 
D(GCF(-3)) -1.684555 0.512462 -3.287177 0.0082 
D(M3) 0.525487 0.325796 1.612932 0.1378 
D(M3(-1)) -0.641922 0.372598 -1.722829 0.1156 
D(PSC) -0.761735 0.420352 -1.812138 0.1001 
D(TR) 0.195441 0.148673 1.314571 0.2180 
D(TR(-1)) 0.157259 0.159338 0.986952 0.3469 
D(TR(-2)) 0.208566 0.138697 1.503747 0.1636 
D(TR(-3)) 0.574397 0.173336 3.313778 0.0078 
D(IN) -0.228582 0.089307 -2.559505 0.0284 
D(IN(-1)) 0.377884 0.245037 1.542154 0.1541 
D(IN(-2)) 0.625659 0.225650 2.772696 0.0197 
D(IN(-3)) 0.355382 0.156257 2.274341 0.0462 
D(PX) -0.035176 0.312896 -0.112421 0.9127 
D(PX(-1)) 1.348493 0.381287 3.536691 0.0054 
D(PX(-2)) 1.286729 0.351128 3.664557 0.0044 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.088323 0.075375 1.171788 0.2684 
GCF 1.845492 1.114771 1.655489 0.0288 
M3 1.091722 0.542016 2.014189 0.0717 
PSC -0.447589 0.275649 -1.623764 0.0355 
TR 0.023996 0.192286 0.124792 0.9032 
IN -0.553490 0.502540 -1.101384 0.2965 
PX -1.165247 0.682289 -1.707849 0.0185 
C 57.36776 29.78421 1.926113 0.0830 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0883*DBT + 1.8455*GCF + 1.0917*M3  -0.4476*PSC + 0.0240 
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        *TR  -0.5535*IN  -1.1652*PX + 57.3678 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  5.970873 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Ghana 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:06   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -38.45015 30.73486 -1.251027 0.2996 
GR(-1)* -0.777671 0.284820 -2.730392 0.0719 
DBT(-1) 0.023215 0.112057 0.207173 0.8491 
GCF(-1) 1.154202 0.357281 3.230518 0.0482 
M3(-1) -1.001599 0.252390 -3.968454 0.0286 
PSC(-1) 2.518409 1.039975 2.421607 0.0940 
TR(-1) -0.280214 0.320065 -0.875489 0.4458 
IN(-1) 0.949896 0.173282 5.481801 0.0119 
PX(-1) 0.057006 0.360902 0.157954 0.8845 
D(GR(-1)) -0.516657 0.268271 -1.925878 0.1498 
D(GR(-2)) -0.615024 0.214716 -2.864363 0.0643 
D(GR(-3)) -0.401042 0.137248 -2.922013 0.0614 
D(DBT) 0.222809 0.059286 3.758183 0.0329 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.041292 0.126797 -0.325653 0.7661 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.299725 0.092150 -3.252587 0.0474 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.218804 0.091722 -2.385520 0.0971 
D(GCF) 0.281045 0.259709 1.082153 0.3584 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.061613 0.234545 0.262693 0.8098 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.214085 0.238931 -0.896009 0.4363 
D(M3) 0.417678 0.234493 1.781191 0.1729 
D(M3(-1)) 2.575086 0.333482 7.721808 0.0045 
D(M3(-2)) 1.580196 0.278860 5.666627 0.0109 
D(M3(-3)) 2.210977 0.258070 8.567338 0.0033 
D(PSC) -1.559638 0.998523 -1.561945 0.2162 
D(PSC(-1)) -2.473708 0.728802 -3.394213 0.0426 
D(PSC(-2)) -2.096954 0.610311 -3.435876 0.0414 
D(PSC(-3)) 0.887104 0.392801 2.258407 0.1091 
D(TR) 0.051760 0.135405 0.382260 0.7277 
D(TR(-1)) 0.038862 0.278551 0.139516 0.8979 
D(TR(-2)) 0.388390 0.187266 2.074006 0.1297 
D(TR(-3)) 0.070916 0.117389 0.604109 0.5884 
D(IN) 0.079692 0.024940 3.195332 0.0495 
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D(IN(-1)) -0.672127 0.126808 -5.300367 0.0131 
D(IN(-2)) -0.390927 0.077757 -5.027527 0.0152 
D(IN(-3)) -0.153509 0.038575 -3.979512 0.0284 
D(PX) 0.674843 0.245731 2.746273 0.0710 
D(PX(-1)) 0.180586 0.371259 0.486417 0.6600 
D(PX(-2)) 0.440692 0.359302 1.226522 0.3075 
D(PX(-3)) 0.088443 0.210664 0.419830 0.7029 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.029852 0.103810 0.287567 0.7924 
GCF 1.484177 0.858589 1.728624 0.1823 
M3 -1.287947 0.503972 -2.555591 0.0835 
PSC 3.238398 1.520544 2.129763 0.1230 
TR -0.360324 0.327742 -1.099414 0.3519 
IN 1.221462 0.639060 1.911341 0.1519 
PX 0.073303 0.492021 0.148984 0.8910 
C -49.44268 36.52554 -1.353647 0.2688 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0299*DBT + 1.4842*GCF  -1.2879*M3 + 3.2384*PSC  -0.3603 
        *TR + 1.2215*IN + 0.0733*PX  -49.4427 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  18.94189 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
 
Robust ARDL test for Mali 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:12   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -427.9921 168.5286 -2.539582 0.0847 
GR(-1)* -2.702073 0.302186 -8.941748 0.0030 
DBT(-1) 0.216305 0.101960 2.121471 0.1240 
GCF(-1) 7.442617 1.674206 4.445461 0.0212 
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M3(-1) -1.946136 0.841171 -2.313602 0.1037 
PSC(-1) 5.554091 1.022943 5.429521 0.0123 
TR(-1) 1.455493 0.218729 6.654326 0.0069 
IN(-1) 0.254673 0.516327 0.493240 0.6557 
PX(-1) 1.483418 0.981555 1.511294 0.2279 
D(GR(-1)) 0.814951 0.233639 3.488075 0.0398 
D(GR(-2)) 0.173908 0.108598 1.601396 0.2076 
D(DBT) -0.493427 0.085946 -5.741118 0.0105 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.686487 0.084868 -8.088871 0.0039 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.583354 0.115486 -5.051299 0.0150 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.195310 0.084521 -2.310792 0.1040 
D(GCF) 1.579200 0.511336 3.088379 0.0538 
D(GCF(-1)) -4.856279 0.792114 -6.130782 0.0087 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.935763 0.467585 -6.278562 0.0082 
D(GCF(-3)) -3.082228 0.377409 -8.166804 0.0038 
D(M3) -0.967259 0.410346 -2.357179 0.0997 
D(M3(-1)) 2.736958 0.401205 6.821841 0.0064 
D(M3(-2)) 2.851871 0.509904 5.592952 0.0113 
D(M3(-3)) 1.556047 0.378530 4.110763 0.0261 
D(PSC) 1.658936 0.334390 4.961077 0.0157 
D(PSC(-1)) -5.980549 0.524317 -11.40637 0.0014 
D(PSC(-2)) -3.071559 0.362867 -8.464685 0.0035 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.089978 0.209624 -0.429235 0.6967 
D(TR) 0.635089 0.259350 2.448766 0.0918 
D(TR(-1)) -0.995474 0.376442 -2.644428 0.0774 
D(TR(-2)) 0.022620 0.268732 0.084174 0.9382 
D(TR(-3)) 0.618308 0.190398 3.247453 0.0476 
D(IN) 0.101215 0.136153 0.743396 0.5112 
D(IN(-1)) -0.429311 0.323372 -1.327609 0.2763 
D(IN(-2)) -0.691483 0.195814 -3.531332 0.0386 
D(IN(-3)) -0.399711 0.104416 -3.828066 0.0314 
D(PX) 0.785754 0.214389 3.665083 0.0351 
D(PX(-1)) 0.626658 0.624311 1.003759 0.3895 
D(PX(-2)) 0.932441 0.453147 2.057700 0.1318 
D(PX(-3)) 0.910129 0.264228 3.444478 0.0411 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.080051 0.050717 1.578402 0.2126 
GCF 2.754410 0.945895 2.911961 0.0619 
M3 -0.720238 0.451958 -1.593597 0.2093 
PSC 2.055492 0.728587 2.821205 0.0667 
TR 0.538658 0.164528 3.273967 0.0466 
IN 0.094251 0.225729 0.417541 0.7044 
PX 0.548992 0.434853 1.262478 0.2960 
C -158.3940 75.67446 -2.093097 0.1274 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0801*DBT + 2.7544*GCF  -0.7202*M3 + 2.0555*PSC + 0.5387 
        *TR + 0.0943*IN + 0.5490*PX  -158.3940 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
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Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  38.75450 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Niger 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:57   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 583.8098 247.2530 2.361183 0.1421 
GR(-1)* -1.548337 0.792393 -1.954000 0.1899 
DBT(-1) -1.108422 0.288831 -3.837614 0.0617 
GCF(-1) -6.182166 1.845615 -3.349651 0.0787 
M3(-1) 11.19993 2.711212 4.130970 0.0539 
PSC(-1) -14.89916 3.669367 -4.060416 0.0556 
TR(-1) 7.144716 1.722869 4.146987 0.0535 
IN(-1) 3.239748 1.079909 3.000019 0.0955 
PX(-1) -7.100169 2.671633 -2.657614 0.1172 
D(GR(-1)) -0.491873 0.591832 -0.831102 0.4933 
D(GR(-2)) -2.444586 0.799392 -3.058057 0.0924 
D(GR(-3)) -1.914045 0.652275 -2.934416 0.0992 
D(DBT) 0.273892 0.138387 1.979170 0.1864 
D(DBT(-1)) 1.475180 0.377410 3.908691 0.0597 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.756084 0.223935 3.376356 0.0776 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.427017 0.216413 1.973163 0.1872 
D(GCF) 1.959899 0.862705 2.271806 0.1511 
D(GCF(-1)) 7.097799 1.723314 4.118692 0.0542 
D(GCF(-2)) 5.621199 1.141924 4.922568 0.0389 
D(GCF(-3)) 3.788589 0.886883 4.271802 0.0507 
D(M3) 9.995450 3.324488 3.006614 0.0951 
D(M3(-1)) -2.295962 0.647954 -3.543403 0.0712 
D(M3(-2)) 1.400354 0.537582 2.604914 0.1212 
D(M3(-3)) 3.406980 1.062784 3.205713 0.0851 
D(PSC) -7.900701 2.480659 -3.184920 0.0860 
D(PSC(-1)) 4.753223 1.126125 4.220868 0.0518 
D(PSC(-2)) 5.658776 1.288195 4.392796 0.0481 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.535545 0.605068 2.537807 0.1265 
D(TR) -0.103693 0.209017 -0.496097 0.6690 
D(TR(-1)) -8.120221 2.017875 -4.024144 0.0566 
D(TR(-2)) -6.913882 1.838032 -3.761568 0.0640 
D(TR(-3)) -4.425606 1.167319 -3.791257 0.0631 
D(IN) 0.658466 0.285159 2.309119 0.1472 
D(IN(-1)) -2.256591 0.725496 -3.110413 0.0897 
D(IN(-2)) -1.867925 0.680471 -2.745047 0.1110 
D(IN(-3)) -0.735741 0.337545 -2.179678 0.1611 
D(PX) -1.190599 0.671025 -1.774298 0.2180 
D(PX(-1)) 5.295184 2.032029 2.605861 0.1211 
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D(PX(-2)) 7.058847 2.449773 2.881429 0.1023 
D(PX(-3)) 4.524367 1.586997 2.850898 0.1042 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT -0.715879 0.376734 -1.900222 0.1978 
GCF -3.992779 2.988837 -1.335897 0.3133 
M3 7.233526 3.792501 1.907323 0.1967 
PSC -9.622685 4.593036 -2.095060 0.1712 
TR 4.614446 2.394270 1.927287 0.1938 
IN 2.092405 0.965922 2.166226 0.1626 
PX -4.585675 1.546973 -2.964289 0.0975 
C 377.0561 125.6746 3.000257 0.0955 
     
     EC = GR - (-0.7159*DBT  -3.9928*GCF + 7.2335*M3  -9.6227*PSC + 4.6144 
        *TR + 2.0924*IN  -4.5857*PX + 377.0561 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  11.65587 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Nigeria 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 3, 4, 4, 3, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:07   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 229.8119 94.80336 2.424091 0.0516 
GR(-1)* 0.162387 1.146810 0.141599 0.8920 
DBT(-1) -2.423022 1.053598 -2.299760 0.0611 
GCF(-1) -0.936381 0.722485 -1.296055 0.2426 
M3(-1) -0.492634 0.643901 -0.765077 0.4732 
PSC(-1) 0.269591 0.735555 0.366514 0.7266 
TR(-1) -0.626090 0.312839 -2.001316 0.0923 
IN(-1) 0.297430 0.193865 1.534213 0.1759 
PX(-1) -1.905138 0.836085 -2.278643 0.0629 
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D(GR(-1)) -0.764448 0.794443 -0.962244 0.3731 
D(GR(-2)) -0.612278 0.437525 -1.399413 0.2112 
D(GR(-3)) 0.221847 0.212270 1.045119 0.3362 
D(DBT) -0.680744 1.081498 -0.629445 0.5523 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.313348 1.617973 0.193667 0.8528 
D(DBT(-2)) -1.094988 0.840468 -1.302830 0.2404 
D(DBT(-3)) 1.828604 0.934116 1.957577 0.0980 
D(GCF) -0.887424 1.724177 -0.514694 0.6252 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.733833 1.830923 -0.400800 0.7025 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.236400 1.542408 -1.449941 0.1973 
D(M3) -0.993338 0.994068 -0.999266 0.3562 
D(M3(-1)) -0.778197 1.547197 -0.502972 0.6329 
D(M3(-2)) 2.749932 1.493605 1.841137 0.1152 
D(PSC) 0.850105 0.726682 1.169845 0.2864 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.552027 0.773758 0.713437 0.5024 
D(PSC(-2)) -1.022178 0.697819 -1.464818 0.1933 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.830352 1.032838 1.772158 0.1267 
D(TR) -0.668565 0.274572 -2.434934 0.0508 
D(TR(-1)) 0.191401 0.325831 0.587424 0.5783 
D(TR(-2)) 0.098397 0.258281 0.380970 0.7163 
D(TR(-3)) 0.308140 0.214837 1.434300 0.2015 
D(IN) -0.199172 0.284078 -0.701118 0.5095 
D(IN(-1)) -0.589315 0.255570 -2.305883 0.0606 
D(IN(-2)) -0.275859 0.145667 -1.893764 0.1071 
D(PX) -0.927154 0.515408 -1.798873 0.1221 
D(PX(-1)) 0.232238 0.383078 0.606243 0.5666 
D(PX(-2)) 0.243725 0.267739 0.910307 0.3978 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 14.92129 143.5214 0.103966 0.0206 
GCF 5.766356 59.38229 0.097106 0.0658 
M3 3.033702 31.03363 0.097755 0.9253 
PSC -1.660177 21.00751 -0.079028 0.0796 
TR 3.855544 34.80959 0.110761 0.0154 
IN -1.831616 17.26435 -0.106092 0.0090 
PX 11.73209 106.5138 0.110146 0.0259 
C -1415.212 12963.18 -0.109172 0.9166 
     
     EC = GR - (14.9213*DBT + 5.7664*GCF + 3.0337*M3  -1.6602*PSC + 3.8555 
        *TR  -1.8316*IN + 11.7321*PX  -1415.2122 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  13.139398 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
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Robust ARDL test for Senegal 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C 192.4864 113.2488 1.699677 0.1644 
GR(-1)* -2.051428 0.604852 -3.391620 0.0275 
DBT(-1) 0.018752 0.092731 0.202225 0.8496 
GCF(-1) 2.605448 1.154628 2.256526 0.0870 
M3(-1) 0.296631 0.264089 1.123223 0.3242 
PSC(-1) 0.204709 0.216303 0.946398 0.3975 
TR(-1) -1.035757 0.456263 -2.270088 0.0857 
IN(-1) 0.533918 0.223580 2.388037 0.0753 
PX(-1) -1.635409 1.030533 -1.586954 0.1877 
D(GR(-1)) 0.819690 0.389509 2.104420 0.1031 
D(GR(-2)) 0.031041 0.313957 0.098869 0.9260 
D(GR(-3)) -0.211651 0.214673 -0.985924 0.3800 
D(DBT) 0.078938 0.069457 1.136506 0.3192 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.107688 0.074770 1.440261 0.2232 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.021876 0.132776 0.164758 0.8771 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.178709 0.178303 1.002272 0.3729 
D(GCF) 0.610791 0.429109 1.423395 0.2277 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.364462 0.595653 -2.290699 0.0838 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.071237 0.645735 -0.110320 0.9175 
D(GCF(-3)) -0.602394 0.693612 -0.868488 0.4341 
D(M3) 0.435814 0.340755 1.278964 0.2701 
D(M3(-1)) 1.781260 0.646271 2.756210 0.0510 
D(M3(-2)) -0.102781 0.519796 -0.197732 0.8529 
D(M3(-3)) 1.318800 0.948748 1.390042 0.2369 
D(PSC) -1.018228 0.451560 -2.254913 0.0872 
D(PSC(-1)) -1.701919 0.946949 -1.797265 0.1467 
D(PSC(-2)) -0.315824 0.725721 -0.435186 0.6859 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.492852 0.758135 -0.650085 0.5511 
D(TR) -0.613797 0.155687 -3.942499 0.0169 
D(TR(-1)) 0.580347 0.352855 1.644716 0.1754 
D(IN) 0.112230 0.153097 0.733064 0.5042 
D(IN(-1)) -0.769264 0.318213 -2.417447 0.0730 
D(IN(-2)) -0.341536 0.241266 -1.415602 0.2298 
D(IN(-3)) -0.309726 0.206421 -1.500458 0.2079 
D(PX) -0.162712 0.450836 -0.360912 0.7364 
D(PX(-1)) 1.924037 0.802832 2.396562 0.0746 
D(PX(-2)) 0.066908 0.909560 0.073561 0.9449 
D(PX(-3)) 1.148133 1.244348 0.922679 0.4084 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.009141 0.067732 0.134962 0.8992 
GCF 1.270065 0.928558 1.367782 0.2432 
M3 0.144597 0.119872 1.206260 0.2942 
PSC 0.099789 0.152969 0.652344 0.5498 
TR -0.504895 0.320276 -1.576440 0.1901 
IN 0.260266 0.115036 2.262486 0.0864 
PX -0.797205 0.800942 -0.995334 0.3759 
C 93.83043 90.88820 1.032372 0.3602 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0091*DBT + 1.2701*GCF + 0.1446*M3 + 0.0998*PSC  -0.5049 
        *TR + 0.2603*IN  -0.7972*PX + 93.8304 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  2.919159 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
     
      
Robust ARDL test for Togo 
ARDL Long Run Form and Bounds Test  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:21   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     Conditional Error Correction Regression 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     C -105.5547 29.84547 -3.536707 0.0385 
GR(-1)* -1.804989 0.454408 -3.972179 0.0285 
DBT(-1) 0.036251 0.048352 0.749736 0.5079 
GCF(-1) -1.993857 0.756530 -2.635529 0.0780 
M3(-1) -1.202044 0.901958 -1.332704 0.2748 
PSC(-1) 1.596345 1.079022 1.479437 0.2356 
TR(-1) 0.740399 0.311066 2.380200 0.0976 
IN(-1) 2.189145 0.379731 5.764981 0.0104 
PX(-1) 0.658598 0.229282 2.872441 0.0639 
D(GR(-1)) -0.221826 0.343218 -0.646313 0.5641 
D(GR(-2)) -0.737718 0.325066 -2.269436 0.1080 
D(GR(-3)) -0.271848 0.156070 -1.741833 0.1799 
D(DBT) -0.239356 0.163902 -1.460367 0.2403 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.242746 0.124977 -1.942327 0.1474 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.101513 0.091106 1.114238 0.3464 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.432739 0.164280 2.634162 0.0780 
D(GCF) -0.597157 0.448907 -1.330249 0.2755 
D(GCF(-1)) 1.293543 0.482048 2.683433 0.0748 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.170379 0.289206 4.046866 0.0272 
D(M3) 0.218680 0.263677 0.829349 0.4677 
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D(M3(-1)) -0.293231 0.505508 -0.580071 0.6026 
D(M3(-2)) -0.926730 0.393336 -2.356079 0.0998 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828515 0.284553 -2.911640 0.0619 
D(PSC) 1.210305 0.537490 2.251772 0.1098 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.047788 0.450010 -0.106194 0.9221 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.311728 0.288373 1.080989 0.3589 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.013041 0.339672 2.982410 0.0585 
D(TR) 0.209990 0.133204 1.576454 0.2130 
D(TR(-1)) -0.043369 0.173430 -0.250066 0.8187 
D(TR(-2)) -0.429047 0.332791 -1.289239 0.2877 
D(TR(-3)) -0.355681 0.299602 -1.187180 0.3206 
D(IN) 0.736815 0.130486 5.646684 0.0110 
D(IN(-1)) -1.068036 0.310387 -3.440979 0.0412 
D(IN(-2)) -0.882268 0.296472 -2.975887 0.0588 
D(IN(-3)) -0.411517 0.268670 -1.531683 0.2231 
D(PX) 0.338554 0.271415 1.247366 0.3008 
D(PX(-1)) -0.065875 0.308679 -0.213410 0.8447 
D(PX(-2)) 0.041435 0.254389 0.162881 0.8810 
D(PX(-3)) 0.290123 0.140534 2.064428 0.1309 
     
       * p-value incompatible with t-Bounds distribution. 
     
     
     
     
     Levels Equation 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     DBT 0.020084 0.026639 0.753938 0.5057 
GCF -1.104637 0.574952 -1.921267 0.1505 
M3 -0.665956 0.591912 -1.125094 0.3424 
PSC 0.884407 0.659362 1.341306 0.2723 
TR 0.410196 0.231305 1.773398 0.1743 
IN 1.212830 0.555696 2.182543 0.1171 
PX 0.364877 0.243536 1.498244 0.2310 
C -58.47939 35.81755 -1.632702 0.2010 
     
     EC = GR - (0.0201*DBT  -1.1046*GCF  -0.6660*M3 + 0.8844*PSC + 0.4102 
        *TR + 1.2128*IN + 0.3649*PX  -58.4794 ) 
     
          
     
F-Bounds Test Null Hypothesis: No levels relationship 
     
     Test Statistic Value Signif. I(0) I(1) 
     
     F-statistic  18.26875 10%   1.92 2.89 
k 7 5%   2.17 3.21 
  2.5%   2.43 3.51 
  1%   2.73 3.9 
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APPENDIX D – ROBUST ECM RESULTS 
Robust ECM Results for Benin 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:41   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 2.975314 0.359287 8.281152 0.0012 
D(GR(-2)) 1.818490 0.232008 7.838047 0.0014 
D(GR(-3)) 1.165084 0.165316 7.047598 0.0021 
D(DBT) 0.259672 0.050354 5.156971 0.0067 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.430934 0.050592 -8.517827 0.0010 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.182159 0.022528 8.086026 0.0013 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.277124 0.025901 10.69943 0.0004 
D(GCF) -0.926266 0.086585 -10.69777 0.0004 
D(GCF(-1)) 4.265497 0.504569 8.453744 0.0011 
D(GCF(-2)) 2.205636 0.253757 8.691936 0.0010 
D(GCF(-3)) 0.613436 0.141530 4.334304 0.0123 
D(M3) 1.752272 0.201886 8.679523 0.0010 
D(M3(-1)) -0.743088 0.141294 -5.259168 0.0063 
D(M3(-2)) 0.335783 0.091828 3.656666 0.0216 
D(M3(-3)) -0.847894 0.149660 -5.665473 0.0048 
D(PSC) -1.202990 0.185926 -6.470261 0.0029 
D(PSC(-1)) 5.704870 0.619991 9.201532 0.0008 
D(PSC(-2)) 4.254223 0.462950 9.189371 0.0008 
D(PSC(-3)) 2.773492 0.363511 7.629734 0.0016 
D(TR) 0.830883 0.055777 14.89641 0.0001 
D(TR(-1)) -0.105132 0.070247 -1.496611 0.2088 
D(IN) -1.291195 0.121705 -10.60925 0.0004 
D(IN(-1)) 1.038001 0.132804 7.816038 0.0014 
D(IN(-2)) -0.031370 0.037511 -0.836278 0.4500 
D(IN(-3)) -0.183264 0.035702 -5.133140 0.0068 
D(PX) -0.350455 0.087322 -4.013374 0.0160 
D(PX(-1)) -5.585031 0.610526 -9.147905 0.0008 
D(PX(-2)) -3.404717 0.422333 -8.061682 0.0013 
D(PX(-3)) -1.280778 0.205157 -6.242913 0.0034 
CointEq(-1)* -0.821259 0.592652 -9.822392 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.989611    Mean dependent var -0.038374 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964504    S.D. dependent var 4.414386 
S.E. of regression 0.831683    Akaike info criterion 2.645078 
Sum squared resid 8.300366    Schwarz criterion 3.886271 
Log likelihood -25.54665    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.100025 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.216926    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Burkina Faso 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
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Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 09:50   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 2.033457 0.224849 9.043640 0.0008 
D(GR(-2)) 1.163573 0.159155 7.310938 0.0019 
D(GR(-3)) 0.444420 0.078720 5.645559 0.0048 
D(DBT) -0.182594 0.046055 -3.964728 0.0166 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.185341 0.050010 3.706059 0.0207 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.123933 0.074834 -1.656112 0.1730 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.159452 0.052602 -3.031288 0.0387 
D(GCF) 0.306320 0.134946 2.269938 0.0857 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.413113 0.112345 -3.677188 0.0213 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.388799 0.108627 -3.579220 0.0232 
D(M3) 0.155630 0.095601 1.627914 0.1789 
D(M3(-1)) -1.024308 0.157862 -6.488626 0.0029 
D(M3(-2)) -0.972076 0.147900 -6.572534 0.0028 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828961 0.153052 -5.416201 0.0056 
D(PSC) 0.130841 0.171333 0.763663 0.4876 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.872506 0.224153 3.892462 0.0177 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.669327 0.190261 3.517946 0.0245 
D(TR) -0.141912 0.082052 -1.729534 0.1588 
D(TR(-1)) 1.000320 0.083341 12.00276 0.0003 
D(TR(-2)) 0.643966 0.117562 5.477678 0.0054 
D(TR(-3)) 0.468894 0.105937 4.426166 0.0115 
D(IN) -0.106587 0.045365 -2.349565 0.0786 
D(IN(-1)) -0.035928 0.052185 -0.688482 0.5290 
D(IN(-2)) 0.021431 0.043431 0.493453 0.6476 
D(IN(-3)) -0.171278 0.076108 -2.250480 0.0876 
D(PX) 0.042358 0.103528 0.409142 0.7034 
D(PX(-1)) -1.064867 0.140954 -7.554694 0.0016 
D(PX(-2)) -0.652090 0.126879 -5.139449 0.0068 
D(PX(-3)) -0.138246 0.097554 -1.417133 0.2294 
CointEq(-1)* -3.571623 0.278018 -12.84671 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.989686    Mean dependent var 0.084493 
Adjusted R-squared 0.964760    S.D. dependent var 4.956375 
S.E. of regression 0.930423    Akaike info criterion 2.869453 
Sum squared resid 10.38823    Schwarz criterion 4.110645 
Log likelihood -30.25851    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.324399 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.092455    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Cote D’Ivoire 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 2, 4, 2, 1, 4, 4, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:00   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
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     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 0.072573 0.161647 0.448963 0.6630 
D(GR(-2)) 0.608953 0.146284 4.162819 0.0019 
D(GR(-3)) 0.644945 0.128218 5.030066 0.0005 
D(DBT) 0.027217 0.027734 0.981348 0.3496 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.090324 0.022988 -3.929182 0.0028 
D(GCF) 0.988207 0.111323 8.876932 0.0000 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.274731 0.267380 -4.767486 0.0008 
D(GCF(-2)) -1.817353 0.271561 -6.692245 0.0001 
D(GCF(-3)) -1.684555 0.276788 -6.086073 0.0001 
D(M3) 0.525487 0.197570 2.659752 0.0239 
D(M3(-1)) -0.641922 0.212600 -3.019394 0.0129 
D(PSC) -0.761735 0.223830 -3.403187 0.0067 
D(TR) 0.195441 0.083982 2.327167 0.0423 
D(TR(-1)) 0.157259 0.090631 1.735155 0.1134 
D(TR(-2)) 0.208566 0.085709 2.433414 0.0352 
D(TR(-3)) 0.574397 0.106335 5.401773 0.0003 
D(IN) -0.228582 0.048529 -4.710224 0.0008 
D(IN(-1)) 0.377884 0.077571 4.871453 0.0007 
D(IN(-2)) 0.625659 0.082586 7.575832 0.0000 
D(IN(-3)) 0.355382 0.073763 4.817899 0.0007 
D(PX) -0.035176 0.165390 -0.212685 0.8358 
D(PX(-1)) 1.348493 0.202210 6.668773 0.0001 
D(PX(-2)) 1.286729 0.193583 6.646923 0.0001 
CointEq(-1)* -0.925043 0.133341 -6.937444 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.942827    Mean dependent var 0.076766 
Adjusted R-squared 0.869773    S.D. dependent var 5.025817 
S.E. of regression 1.813666    Akaike info criterion 4.324137 
Sum squared resid 59.20893    Schwarz criterion 5.317091 
Log likelihood -66.80688    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.688094 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.414891    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Ghana 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:07   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.516657 0.040700 -12.69418 0.0011 
D(GR(-2)) -0.615024 0.045096 -13.63809 0.0009 
D(GR(-3)) -0.401042 0.044481 -9.015986 0.0029 
D(DBT) 0.222809 0.022863 9.745588 0.0023 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.041292 0.019252 -2.144801 0.1213 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.299725 0.021617 -13.86538 0.0008 
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D(DBT(-3)) -0.218804 0.031337 -6.982396 0.0060 
D(GCF) 0.281045 0.070922 3.962734 0.0287 
D(GCF(-1)) 0.061613 0.087219 0.706417 0.5309 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.214085 0.083042 -2.578026 0.0819 
D(M3) 0.417678 0.083534 5.000078 0.0154 
D(M3(-1)) 2.575086 0.133504 19.28848 0.0003 
D(M3(-2)) 1.580196 0.124839 12.65788 0.0011 
D(M3(-3)) 2.210977 0.123470 17.90701 0.0004 
D(PSC) -1.559638 0.302072 -5.163126 0.0141 
D(PSC(-1)) -2.473708 0.222182 -11.13368 0.0016 
D(PSC(-2)) -2.096954 0.189093 -11.08951 0.0016 
D(PSC(-3)) 0.887104 0.128788 6.888103 0.0063 
D(TR) 0.051760 0.035276 1.467297 0.2386 
D(TR(-1)) 0.038862 0.041417 0.938323 0.4173 
D(TR(-2)) 0.388390 0.048925 7.938406 0.0042 
D(TR(-3)) 0.070916 0.039455 1.797398 0.1701 
D(IN) 0.079692 0.009841 8.098013 0.0039 
D(IN(-1)) -0.672127 0.032332 -20.78806 0.0002 
D(IN(-2)) -0.390927 0.023912 -16.34831 0.0005 
D(IN(-3)) -0.153509 0.014874 -10.32083 0.0019 
D(PX) 0.674843 0.075369 8.953902 0.0029 
D(PX(-1)) 0.180586 0.065048 2.776206 0.0692 
D(PX(-2)) 0.440692 0.061559 7.158890 0.0056 
D(PX(-3)) 0.088443 0.062030 1.425812 0.2492 
CointEq(-1)* -0.777671 0.031105 -25.00164 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.993742    Mean dependent var 0.024555 
Adjusted R-squared 0.976674    S.D. dependent var 5.026908 
S.E. of regression 0.767747    Akaike info criterion 2.445704 
Sum squared resid 6.483797    Schwarz criterion 3.728270 
Log likelihood -20.35979    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.915815 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.094034    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Mali 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:13   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 0.814951 0.056958 14.30793 0.0007 
D(GR(-2)) 0.173908 0.034950 4.975930 0.0156 
D(DBT) -0.493427 0.022416 -22.01196 0.0002 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.686487 0.027605 -24.86796 0.0001 
D(DBT(-2)) -0.583354 0.029776 -19.59150 0.0003 
D(DBT(-3)) -0.195310 0.024898 -7.844301 0.0043 
D(GCF) 1.579200 0.094379 16.73251 0.0005 
D(GCF(-1)) -4.856279 0.154245 -31.48425 0.0001 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.935763 0.118809 -24.70995 0.0001 
D(GCF(-3)) -3.082228 0.117327 -26.27033 0.0001 
D(M3) -0.967259 0.085472 -11.31664 0.0015 
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D(M3(-1)) 2.736958 0.108649 25.19092 0.0001 
D(M3(-2)) 2.851871 0.095628 29.82271 0.0001 
D(M3(-3)) 1.556047 0.082042 18.96648 0.0003 
D(PSC) 1.658936 0.098528 16.83719 0.0005 
D(PSC(-1)) -5.980549 0.168655 -35.46018 0.0000 
D(PSC(-2)) -3.071559 0.122628 -25.04787 0.0001 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.089978 0.064578 -1.393323 0.2578 
D(TR) 0.635089 0.048493 13.09659 0.0010 
D(TR(-1)) -0.995474 0.051545 -19.31270 0.0003 
D(TR(-2)) 0.022620 0.037895 0.596926 0.5926 
D(TR(-3)) 0.618308 0.047211 13.09681 0.0010 
D(IN) 0.101215 0.020502 4.936939 0.0159 
D(IN(-1)) -0.429311 0.019984 -21.48320 0.0002 
D(IN(-2)) -0.691483 0.025534 -27.08079 0.0001 
D(IN(-3)) -0.399711 0.022359 -17.87656 0.0004 
D(PX) 0.785754 0.063510 12.37216 0.0011 
D(PX(-1)) 0.626658 0.053967 11.61183 0.0014 
D(PX(-2)) 0.932441 0.052130 17.88680 0.0004 
D(PX(-3)) 0.910129 0.056767 16.03263 0.0005 
CointEq(-1)* -0.702073 0.075558 -35.76169 0.0000 
     
     R-squared 0.998025    Mean dependent var 0.176612 
Adjusted R-squared 0.992637    S.D. dependent var 8.313206 
S.E. of regression 0.713337    Akaike info criterion 2.298690 
Sum squared resid 5.597342    Schwarz criterion 3.581255 
Log likelihood -17.27248    Hannan-Quinn criter. 2.768801 
Durbin-Watson stat 3.067836    
     
 
Robust ECM Results for Niger 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 10:59   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.491873 0.046365 -10.60875 0.0088 
D(GR(-2)) -2.444586 0.111294 -21.96508 0.0021 
D(GR(-3)) -1.914045 0.081569 -23.46534 0.0018 
D(DBT) 0.273892 0.022792 12.01709 0.0069 
D(DBT(-1)) 1.475180 0.058343 25.28443 0.0016 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.756084 0.040653 18.59836 0.0029 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.427017 0.032018 13.33697 0.0056 
D(GCF) 1.959899 0.109829 17.84495 0.0031 
D(GCF(-1)) 7.097799 0.312477 22.71462 0.0019 
D(GCF(-2)) 5.621199 0.291380 19.29166 0.0027 
D(GCF(-3)) 3.788589 0.184352 20.55084 0.0024 
D(M3) 9.995450 0.448152 22.30369 0.0020 
D(M3(-1)) -2.295962 0.234746 -9.780624 0.0103 
D(M3(-2)) 1.400354 0.175648 7.972500 0.0154 
D(M3(-3)) 3.406980 0.171169 19.90420 0.0025 
D(PSC) -7.900701 0.416423 -18.97279 0.0028 
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D(PSC(-1)) 4.753223 0.319441 14.87982 0.0045 
D(PSC(-2)) 5.658776 0.318758 17.75256 0.0032 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.535545 0.191478 8.019443 0.0152 
D(TR) -0.103693 0.059580 -1.740387 0.2239 
D(TR(-1)) -8.120221 0.377416 -21.51533 0.0022 
D(TR(-2)) -6.913882 0.325626 -21.23261 0.0022 
D(TR(-3)) -4.425606 0.223812 -19.77375 0.0025 
D(IN) 0.658466 0.043991 14.96836 0.0044 
D(IN(-1)) -2.256591 0.104951 -21.50139 0.0022 
D(IN(-2)) -1.867925 0.086255 -21.65575 0.0021 
D(IN(-3)) -0.735741 0.038069 -19.32673 0.0027 
D(PX) -1.190599 0.128317 -9.278584 0.0114 
D(PX(-1)) 5.295184 0.257448 20.56798 0.0024 
D(PX(-2)) 7.058847 0.321872 21.93058 0.0021 
D(PX(-3)) 4.524367 0.204892 22.08169 0.0020 
CointEq(-1)* -0.548337 0.067606 -22.90227 0.0009 
     
     R-squared 0.997534    Mean dependent var 0.491735 
Adjusted R-squared 0.989890    S.D. dependent var 8.342766 
S.E. of regression 0.838871    Akaike info criterion 2.575205 
Sum squared resid 7.037042    Schwarz criterion 3.899144 
Log likelihood -22.07930    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.060481 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.959128    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Nigeria 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 3, 4, 4, 3, 3)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:08   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.764448 0.133018 -5.746950 0.0012 
D(GR(-2)) -0.612278 0.131739 -4.647656 0.0035 
D(GR(-3)) 0.221847 0.096842 2.290816 0.0619 
D(DBT) -0.680744 0.470858 -1.445753 0.1984 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.313348 0.392787 0.797755 0.4554 
D(DBT(-2)) -1.094988 0.510180 -2.146279 0.0755 
D(DBT(-3)) 1.828604 0.480006 3.809546 0.0089 
D(GCF) -0.887424 0.562632 -1.577274 0.1658 
D(GCF(-1)) -0.733833 0.398309 -1.842373 0.1150 
D(GCF(-2)) -2.236400 0.402512 -5.556112 0.0014 
D(M3) -0.993338 0.440037 -2.257396 0.0648 
D(M3(-1)) -0.778197 0.733291 -1.061239 0.3294 
D(M3(-2)) 2.749932 0.586647 4.687543 0.0034 
D(PSC) 0.850105 0.350048 2.428538 0.0513 
D(PSC(-1)) 0.552027 0.374504 1.474023 0.1909 
D(PSC(-2)) -1.022178 0.388943 -2.628095 0.0392 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.830352 0.421361 4.343909 0.0049 
D(TR) -0.668565 0.131865 -5.070054 0.0023 
D(TR(-1)) 0.191401 0.103907 1.842043 0.1151 
D(TR(-2)) 0.098397 0.106878 0.920653 0.3927 
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D(TR(-3)) 0.308140 0.104296 2.954471 0.0255 
D(IN) -0.199172 0.084252 -2.364002 0.0560 
D(IN(-1)) -0.589315 0.103575 -5.689724 0.0013 
D(IN(-2)) -0.275859 0.067268 -4.100929 0.0064 
D(PX) -0.927154 0.195459 -4.743471 0.0032 
D(PX(-1)) 0.232238 0.202776 1.145297 0.2957 
D(PX(-2)) 0.243725 0.145546 1.674554 0.1450 
CointEq(-1)* -0.162387 0.033197 4.891560 0.0027 
     
     R-squared 0.955575    Mean dependent var -0.065240 
Adjusted R-squared 0.869897    S.D. dependent var 9.719064 
S.E. of regression 3.505648    Akaike info criterion 5.581349 
Sum squared resid 172.0539    Schwarz criterion 6.739795 
Log likelihood -89.20832    Hannan-Quinn criter. 6.005965 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.878690    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Senegal 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 4, 4, 4, 2, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:15   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) 0.819690 0.156355 5.242490 0.0063 
D(GR(-2)) 0.031041 0.089594 0.346459 0.7465 
D(GR(-3)) -0.211651 0.057189 -3.700919 0.0208 
D(DBT) 0.078938 0.023384 3.375674 0.0279 
D(DBT(-1)) 0.107688 0.026450 4.071340 0.0152 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.021876 0.030664 0.713419 0.5150 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.178709 0.031780 5.623257 0.0049 
D(GCF) 0.610791 0.097749 6.248538 0.0033 
D(GCF(-1)) -1.364462 0.211932 -6.438199 0.0030 
D(GCF(-2)) -0.071237 0.148908 -0.478397 0.6573 
D(GCF(-3)) -0.602394 0.128470 -4.689001 0.0094 
D(M3) 0.435814 0.094024 4.635154 0.0098 
D(M3(-1)) 1.781260 0.167983 10.60384 0.0004 
D(M3(-2)) -0.102781 0.209177 -0.491358 0.6489 
D(M3(-3)) 1.318800 0.214673 6.143299 0.0036 
D(PSC) -1.018228 0.107154 -9.502455 0.0007 
D(PSC(-1)) -1.701919 0.244415 -6.963221 0.0022 
D(PSC(-2)) -0.315824 0.181354 -1.741473 0.1566 
D(PSC(-3)) -0.492852 0.142021 -3.470277 0.0256 
D(TR) -0.613797 0.048244 -12.72267 0.0002 
D(TR(-1)) 0.580347 0.074065 7.835640 0.0014 
D(IN) 0.112230 0.049393 2.272206 0.0855 
D(IN(-1)) -0.769264 0.089530 -8.592229 0.0010 
D(IN(-2)) -0.341536 0.070739 -4.828115 0.0085 
D(IN(-3)) -0.309726 0.044591 -6.945977 0.0023 
D(PX) -0.162712 0.106556 -1.527010 0.2015 
D(PX(-1)) 1.924037 0.229011 8.401497 0.0011 
D(PX(-2)) 0.066908 0.220972 0.302787 0.7771 
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D(PX(-3)) 1.148133 0.187472 6.124304 0.0036 
CointEq(-1)* -0.551428 0.231071 -8.877910 0.0009 
     
     R-squared 0.992823    Mean dependent var 0.287344 
Adjusted R-squared 0.975480    S.D. dependent var 5.101911 
S.E. of regression 0.798904    Akaike info criterion 2.564656 
Sum squared resid 7.658967    Schwarz criterion 3.805849 
Log likelihood -23.85778    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.019602 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.423595    
     
      
Robust ECM Results for Togo 
ARDL Error Correction Regression  
Dependent Variable: D(GR)   
Selected Model: ARDL(4, 4, 3, 4, 4, 4, 4, 4)  
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend  
Date: 10/12/18   Time: 11:22   
Sample: 1970 2015   
Included observations: 42   
     
     ECM Regression 
Case 2: Restricted Constant and No Trend 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.    
     
     D(GR(-1)) -0.221826 0.064296 -3.450092 0.0409 
D(GR(-2)) -0.737718 0.079440 -9.286461 0.0026 
D(GR(-3)) -0.271848 0.053509 -5.080460 0.0147 
D(DBT) -0.239356 0.027510 -8.700590 0.0032 
D(DBT(-1)) -0.242746 0.030069 -8.072965 0.0040 
D(DBT(-2)) 0.101513 0.021172 4.794814 0.0173 
D(DBT(-3)) 0.432739 0.032252 13.41723 0.0009 
D(GCF) -0.597157 0.086267 -6.922219 0.0062 
D(GCF(-1)) 1.293543 0.080256 16.11769 0.0005 
D(GCF(-2)) 1.170379 0.082401 14.20347 0.0008 
D(M3) 0.218680 0.099434 2.199248 0.1153 
D(M3(-1)) -0.293231 0.070433 -4.163244 0.0252 
D(M3(-2)) -0.926730 0.105334 -8.797989 0.0031 
D(M3(-3)) -0.828515 0.109632 -7.557212 0.0048 
D(PSC) 1.210305 0.132239 9.152422 0.0028 
D(PSC(-1)) -0.047788 0.101841 -0.469244 0.6709 
D(PSC(-2)) 0.311728 0.109786 2.839417 0.0657 
D(PSC(-3)) 1.013041 0.114028 8.884182 0.0030 
D(TR) 0.209990 0.032390 6.483215 0.0074 
D(TR(-1)) -0.043369 0.034872 -1.243665 0.3019 
D(TR(-2)) -0.429047 0.041925 -10.23369 0.0020 
D(TR(-3)) -0.355681 0.048698 -7.303830 0.0053 
D(IN) 0.736815 0.045759 16.10223 0.0005 
D(IN(-1)) -1.068036 0.072513 -14.72890 0.0007 
D(IN(-2)) -0.882268 0.062909 -14.02457 0.0008 
D(IN(-3)) -0.411517 0.045129 -9.118627 0.0028 
D(PX) 0.338554 0.062235 5.439952 0.0122 
D(PX(-1)) -0.065875 0.081319 -0.810085 0.4772 
D(PX(-2)) 0.041435 0.080417 0.515253 0.6419 
D(PX(-3)) 0.290123 0.051648 5.617317 0.0112 
CointEq(-1)* -0.804989 0.073513 -24.55339 0.0001 
     
     R-squared 0.995458    Mean dependent var 0.036391 
Adjusted R-squared 0.983071    S.D. dependent var 8.260744 
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S.E. of regression 1.074822    Akaike info criterion 3.118604 
Sum squared resid 12.70768    Schwarz criterion 4.401170 
Log likelihood -34.49069    Hannan-Quinn criter. 3.588715 
Durbin-Watson stat 2.567696    
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APPENDIX E – JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION RESULTS 
Johansen Cointegration Results Benin 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 01:20    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.702299  123.5922  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.559428  73.91399  47.85613  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.396175  40.30706  29.79707  0.0022  
At most 3 *  0.339557  19.62376  15.49471  0.0112  
At most 4  0.061792  2.615110  3.841466  0.1058  
      
       Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.702299  49.67824  33.87687  0.0003  
At most 1 *  0.559428  33.60692  27.58434  0.0074  
At most 2  0.396175  20.68330  21.13162  0.0577  
At most 3 *  0.339557  17.00865  14.26460  0.0180  
At most 4  0.061792  2.615110  3.841466  0.1058  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.081452 -0.067842  0.258343 -0.110895 -0.260801  
-0.240251 -0.073156 -0.336348 -0.244436 -0.143579  
 0.265174 -0.085584 -0.068377 -0.130571 -0.266680  
-0.163191 -0.027609  0.048641  0.087741  0.585112  
 0.073820  0.003024 -0.046808 -0.224990 -0.119557  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC)  0.491106  0.560000 -0.475815  0.687603 -0.182562 
D(DBT)  1.284647 -3.448682  1.152496  1.875651  0.353428 
D(IN) -1.662063  0.076433  2.345209  0.546460  0.469728 
D(M3) -0.172764 -0.043547  0.875589  0.265998 -0.177135 
D(PX)  1.801722  0.322138  0.224052 -0.644806  0.080189 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -465.6926   
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      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000 -0.832913  3.171721 -1.361484 -3.201906  
  (0.24494)  (0.72831)  (0.70047)  (1.09944)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.040002     
  (0.03325)     
D(DBT)  0.104637     
  (0.11473)     
D(IN) -0.135378     
  (0.08255)     
D(M3) -0.014072     
  (0.03052)     
D(PX)  0.146754     
  (0.03246)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -448.8891   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  1.874299  0.380560 -0.419555  
   (0.30309)  (0.23093)  (0.44273)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -1.557692  2.091508  3.340508  
   (0.68033)  (0.51836)  (0.99377)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.094539 -0.074285    
  (0.09829)  (0.03866)    
D(DBT)  0.933187  0.165138    
  (0.29562)  (0.11626)    
D(IN) -0.153741  0.107167    
  (0.25706)  (0.10110)    
D(M3) -0.003610  0.014906    
  (0.09502)  (0.03737)    
D(PX)  0.069360 -0.145799    
  (0.09933)  (0.03907)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -438.5475   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.239761 -0.069572  
    (0.21593)  (0.44944)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  2.208523  3.049644  
    (0.38318)  (0.79755)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.075121 -0.186727  
    (0.14356)  (0.29882)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.220713 -0.033563 -0.028947   
  (0.13643)  (0.04887)  (0.15971)   
D(DBT)  1.238799  0.066503  1.413033   
  (0.41649)  (0.14918)  (0.48755)   
D(IN)  0.468147 -0.093545 -0.615448   
  (0.31511)  (0.11287)  (0.36887)   
D(M3)  0.228574 -0.060030 -0.089855   
  (0.11601)  (0.04155)  (0.13580)   
D(PX)  0.128773 -0.164974  0.341791   
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  (0.14245)  (0.05102)  (0.16675)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -430.0431   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.937865  
     (0.32454)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -4.948499  
     (1.83458)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.458776  
     (0.26829)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  3.621489  
     (0.82097)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.332924 -0.052547  0.004499 -0.068887  
  (0.13520)  (0.04522)  (0.14554)  (0.10474)  
D(DBT)  0.932708  0.014718  1.504266  0.714608  
  (0.42178)  (0.14106)  (0.45403)  (0.32673)  
D(IN)  0.378970 -0.108632 -0.588868 -0.092638  
  (0.34116)  (0.11410)  (0.36725)  (0.26428)  
D(M3)  0.185165 -0.067374 -0.076917 -0.061185  
  (0.12458)  (0.04166)  (0.13410)  (0.09650)  
D(PX)  0.234000 -0.147172  0.310427 -0.364375  
  (0.14413)  (0.04820)  (0.15515)  (0.11165)  
      
       
Johansen Cointegration Results Burkina Faso 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 03:19    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.801031  129.1975  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.538848  62.99859  47.85613  0.0010  
At most 2 *  0.317580  31.26347  29.79707  0.0337  
At most 3 *  0.300140  15.59697  15.49471  0.0483  
At most 4  0.023264  0.965082  3.841466  0.3259  
      
       Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.801031  66.19887  33.87687  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.538848  31.73512  27.58434  0.0138  
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At most 2  0.317580  15.66650  21.13162  0.2449  
At most 3 *  0.300140  14.63189  14.26460  0.0437  
At most 4  0.023264  0.965082  3.841466  0.3259  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.178058  0.096088 -0.086129 -0.008463  0.479974  
 0.740861  0.037108 -0.215218 -0.399087 -0.372015  
-0.344875 -0.050053 -0.536472  0.295295  0.503651  
-0.467756 -0.148504 -0.294480  0.527710  0.733541  
-0.143743 -0.016244  0.000153 -0.220642 -0.126754  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC) -0.682715 -0.587799  0.015418  0.303920  0.005591 
D(DBT) -0.398762  1.202354 -0.076788  0.733651  0.464024 
D(IN) -1.108714  0.624300  1.777024 -0.201682  0.133823 
D(M3) -0.901015  0.676056 -0.047450  0.501590 -0.068575 
D(PX) -1.245269 -0.271069 -0.492030 -0.300758  0.032197 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -407.7416   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.539643 -0.483711 -0.047531  2.695604  
  (0.08225)  (0.40863)  (0.26633)  (0.52616)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.121563     
  (0.04219)     
D(DBT) -0.071003     
  (0.15169)     
D(IN) -0.197415     
  (0.14078)     
D(M3) -0.160433     
  (0.05916)     
D(PX) -0.221730     
  (0.05215)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -391.8741   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.270730 -0.588931 -0.829305  
   (0.18739)  (0.12607)  (0.26425)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.394670  1.003255  6.531923  
   (0.83444)  (0.56142)  (1.17671)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.557040 -0.087412    
  (0.14846)  (0.02007)    
D(DBT)  0.819774  0.006300    
  (0.61416)  (0.08302)    
D(IN)  0.265104 -0.083368    
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  (0.59247)  (0.08009)    
D(M3)  0.340431 -0.061490    
  (0.22388)  (0.03026)    
D(PX) -0.422554 -0.129714    
  (0.21807)  (0.02948)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -384.0408   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.648280 -1.056271  
    (0.11600)  (0.18966)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.916735  6.201052  
    (0.51460)  (0.84136)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.219220 -0.838350  
    (0.19057)  (0.31158)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.562357 -0.088184  0.177035   
  (0.16293)  (0.02231)  (0.11385)   
D(DBT)  0.846256  0.010144 -0.183229   
  (0.67398)  (0.09229)  (0.47094)   
D(IN) -0.347746 -0.172313 -0.992193   
  (0.55378)  (0.07583)  (0.38695)   
D(M3)  0.356795 -0.059115 -0.042441   
  (0.24557)  (0.03363)  (0.17160)   
D(PX) -0.252866 -0.105086  0.429553   
  (0.21997)  (0.03012)  (0.15370)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -376.7249   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.943971  
     (0.39207)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  3.372503  
     (0.58970)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.161957  
     (0.27360)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  3.085459  
     (0.54755)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.704517 -0.133318  0.087537  0.405295  
  (0.17432)  (0.03411)  (0.11904)  (0.13181)  
D(DBT)  0.503086 -0.098807 -0.399275 -0.111990  
  (0.75519)  (0.14779)  (0.51572)  (0.57102)  
D(IN) -0.253408 -0.142362 -0.932802  0.178550  
  (0.63295)  (0.12387)  (0.43224)  (0.47859)  
D(M3)  0.122173 -0.133603 -0.190149 -0.011498  
  (0.25886)  (0.05066)  (0.17678)  (0.19573)  
D(PX) -0.112184 -0.060423  0.518120 -0.185288  
  (0.24320)  (0.04759)  (0.16608)  (0.18389)  
      
       
Johansen Cointegration Results Cote D’Ivoire 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 02:49    
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Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.734526  113.6194  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.649096  59.24371  47.85613  0.0030  
At most 2  0.210000  16.30672  29.79707  0.6905  
At most 3  0.140988  6.642110  15.49471  0.6196  
At most 4  0.009980  0.411230  3.841466  0.5213  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.734526  54.37573  33.87687  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.649096  42.93699  27.58434  0.0003  
At most 2  0.210000  9.664605  21.13162  0.7755  
At most 3  0.140988  6.230880  14.26460  0.5838  
At most 4  0.009980  0.411230  3.841466  0.5213  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.740322 -0.134349 -0.491497 -0.619048 -0.151327  
-0.166686  0.016181  0.372596  0.217616 -0.778111  
-0.139793 -0.016263 -0.080478  0.031766  0.089072  
-0.074465 -0.003642  0.071936 -0.006863  0.457345  
 0.071962 -0.021082 -0.254547  0.391371  0.354977  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC)  0.548980  1.089541  0.290774  0.145388  0.096265 
D(DBT)  3.692560 -3.843282 -1.849109 -0.317368  0.098023 
D(IN) -0.708278 -4.073189  0.670846 -1.316562 -0.504963 
D(M3)  0.430239 -0.836900  0.703461  0.056662  0.093067 
D(PX) -0.332096  0.188602  0.060198 -0.804179 -0.002885 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -481.4637   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000 -0.181473 -0.663897 -0.836188 -0.204407  
  (0.00866)  (0.06965)  (0.08735)  (0.18362)  
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Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.406422     
  (0.31404)     
D(DBT)  2.733682     
  (1.14744)     
D(IN) -0.524353     
  (1.37696)     
D(M3)  0.318515     
  (0.35598)     
D(PX) -0.245858     
  (0.36820)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -459.9952   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -4.042746 -1.845395  10.27247  
   (0.77800)  (1.02486)  (2.14902)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -18.61899 -5.561186  57.73234  
   (4.33821)  (5.71469)  (11.9831)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.224810 -0.056125    
  (0.26008)  (0.04638)    
D(DBT)  3.374305 -0.558279    
  (0.96731)  (0.17249)    
D(IN)  0.154592  0.029248    
  (1.22036)  (0.21762)    
D(M3)  0.458015 -0.071344    
  (0.33454)  (0.05966)    
D(PX) -0.277296  0.047668    
  (0.37598)  (0.06705)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -455.1629   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.495651 -0.230497  
    (0.83783)  (1.15868)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.655102  9.360608  
    (3.99486)  (5.52473)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.333868 -2.597978  
    (0.31266)  (0.43240)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.184162 -0.060854  0.112735   
  (0.25940)  (0.04582)  (0.20910)   
D(DBT)  3.632798 -0.528207 -3.098062   
  (0.92752)  (0.16383)  (0.74766)   
D(IN)  0.060812  0.018338 -1.223525   
  (1.23520)  (0.21818)  (0.99568)   
D(M3)  0.359676 -0.082784 -0.579900   
  (0.31656)  (0.05591)  (0.25517)   
D(PX) -0.285711  0.046689  0.228652   
  (0.38216)  (0.06750)  (0.30805)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -452.0475   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
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PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -5.241063  
     (2.60484)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  15.98307  
     (7.09948)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.777116  
     (1.86167)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -10.10906  
     (5.31423)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.173336 -0.061383  0.123194 -0.094504  
  (0.25932)  (0.04561)  (0.20945)  (0.21977)  
D(DBT)  3.656431 -0.527051 -3.120892 -3.178794  
  (0.93012)  (0.16359)  (0.75126)  (0.78828)  
D(IN)  0.158850  0.023133 -1.318233 -0.417589  
  (1.21865)  (0.21433)  (0.98431)  (1.03281)  
D(M3)  0.355456 -0.082991 -0.575824 -0.426504  
  (0.31787)  (0.05591)  (0.25674)  (0.26939)  
D(PX) -0.225828  0.049618  0.170803  0.254058  
  (0.35630)  (0.06267)  (0.28779)  (0.30197)  
      
       
Johansen Cointegration Results Ghana 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 01:50    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.681004  125.2270  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.598858  78.38145  47.85613  0.0000  
At most 2 *  0.450234  40.93041  29.79707  0.0018  
At most 3 *  0.262944  16.40163  15.49471  0.0364  
At most 4 *  0.090580  3.892859  3.841466  0.0485  
      
       Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.681004  46.84558  33.87687  0.0009  
At most 1 *  0.598858  37.45104  27.58434  0.0020  
At most 2 *  0.450234  24.52878  21.13162  0.0160  
At most 3  0.262944  12.50877  14.26460  0.0930  
At most 4 *  0.090580  3.892859  3.841466  0.0485  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
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 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
-0.558026 -0.052343 -0.152158  0.362218  0.141067  
 0.322162  0.022606 -0.053340 -0.150852  0.093405  
 0.299252 -0.050181  0.179011 -0.170333  0.366317  
 0.308940 -0.017041 -0.038070 -0.324217 -0.111054  
 0.831212  0.040257  0.090403 -0.154041 -0.363898  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC) -0.140358  0.269986  0.111837  0.213849 -0.256090 
D(DBT)  2.361123  0.307601  0.148000  3.337514 -1.248736 
D(IN)  8.213955 -1.735807 -6.847227 -5.055495  1.101712 
D(M3) -0.098260  0.838829 -0.609239  0.287847  0.150601 
D(PX) -1.198369 -0.571242 -0.874913  0.542548 -0.259277 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -502.6107   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.093800  0.272671 -0.649106 -0.252796  
  (0.02137)  (0.05715)  (0.08642)  (0.14031)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.078323     
  (0.13160)     
D(DBT) -1.317567     
  (1.01124)     
D(IN) -4.583597     
  (2.02970)     
D(M3)  0.054832     
  (0.20521)     
D(PX)  0.668721     
  (0.27987)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -483.8852   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -1.466908  0.068794  1.901542  
   (0.47214)  (0.73100)  (0.89793)  
 0.000000  1.000000  18.54560 -7.653506 -22.96733  
   (5.25698)  (8.13925)  (9.99802)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.165302  0.013450    
  (0.14662)  (0.01297)    
D(DBT) -1.218470 -0.116634    
  (1.16678)  (0.10324)    
D(IN) -5.142808 -0.469181    
  (2.32958)  (0.20614)    
D(M3)  0.325070  0.024106    
  (0.20191)  (0.01787)    
D(PX)  0.484688  0.049813    
  (0.31194)  (0.02760)    
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3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -471.6208   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.475847  0.617804  
    (0.16114)  (0.18231)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.767800 -6.737477  
    (1.13931)  (1.28904)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.371285 -0.875132  
    (0.40722)  (0.46074)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.198770  0.007838  0.026975   
  (0.16063)  (0.01717)  (0.05447)   
D(DBT) -1.174181 -0.124061 -0.349177   
  (1.28625)  (0.13751)  (0.43618)   
D(IN) -7.191855 -0.125577 -2.382956   
  (2.31345)  (0.24733)  (0.78451)   
D(M3)  0.142754  0.054678 -0.138853   
  (0.19926)  (0.02130)  (0.06757)   
D(PX)  0.222869  0.093717  0.056192   
  (0.31299)  (0.03346)  (0.10614)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -465.3664   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.665384  
     (0.47687)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -5.047161  
     (1.11830)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.057746  
     (0.40562)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  2.201505  
     (0.74549)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.264836  0.004194  0.018834 -0.179951  
  (0.17099)  (0.01718)  (0.05383)  (0.11846)  
D(DBT) -0.143089 -0.180936 -0.476238 -0.298449  
  (1.27100)  (0.12771)  (0.40016)  (0.88058)  
D(IN) -8.753699 -0.039427 -2.190491  6.042474  
  (2.35728)  (0.23686)  (0.74216)  (1.63318)  
D(M3)  0.231682  0.049773 -0.149811 -0.151682  
  (0.21117)  (0.02122)  (0.06649)  (0.14631)  
D(PX)  0.390483  0.084471  0.035537 -0.374774  
  (0.32739)  (0.03290)  (0.10308)  (0.22683)  
      
       	
Johansen Cointegration Results Mali 
 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 01:51    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
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Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.522617  83.64127  69.81889  0.0027  
At most 1 *  0.423528  53.32435  47.85613  0.0140  
At most 2 *  0.318365  30.74035  29.79707  0.0388  
At most 3  0.234287  15.02664  15.49471  0.0587  
At most 4 *  0.094761  4.081791  3.841466  0.0433  
      
       Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None  0.522617  30.31692  33.87687  0.1255  
At most 1  0.423528  22.58400  27.58434  0.1919  
At most 2  0.318365  15.71371  21.13162  0.2420  
At most 3  0.234287  10.94485  14.26460  0.1570  
At most 4 *  0.094761  4.081791  3.841466  0.0433  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegration eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.009653 -0.055917  0.307186 -0.551218 -0.613992  
-0.348196 -0.037579  0.099556  0.346336  0.744615  
-0.339555 -0.061680  0.168609 -0.500027 -0.247030  
-0.194467  0.026440 -0.027587  0.445879  0.252553  
 0.026922  0.007186 -0.380910  0.449444  0.351420  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC)  0.698785  0.165414  0.679926  0.601666 -0.019094 
D(DBT)  1.609975 -0.733790 -0.434834 -2.943464  0.910609 
D(IN) -2.532305 -0.218787  0.398928 -1.239766  1.469666 
D(M3) -0.395287 -0.607157  0.813215  0.052141 -0.233745 
D(PX)  0.703943 -0.869233 -0.563066 -0.028197  0.341739 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -499.1959   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000 -5.792533  31.82189 -57.10147 -63.60437  
  (1.77892)  (11.2783)  (23.5083)  (22.7398)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.006746     
  (0.00415)     
D(DBT)  0.015542     
  (0.01565)     
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D(IN) -0.024445     
  (0.01326)     
D(M3) -0.003816     
  (0.00425)     
D(PX)  0.006795     
  (0.00468)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -487.9039   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.301366 -2.020910 -3.262769  
   (0.32716)  (0.50413)  (0.62832)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -5.441579  9.508889  10.41713  
   (1.46283)  (2.25413)  (2.80938)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.050851 -0.045290    
  (0.14917)  (0.02885)    
D(DBT)  0.271044 -0.062450    
  (0.56181)  (0.10866)    
D(IN)  0.051736  0.149821    
  (0.47798)  (0.09245)    
D(M3)  0.207594  0.044920    
  (0.14539)  (0.02812)    
D(PX)  0.309458 -0.006697    
  (0.15398)  (0.02978)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -480.0470   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -4.814406 -6.581042  
    (1.14842)  (1.53705)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  59.94941  70.33323  
    (16.4041)  (21.9554)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  9.269463  11.01079  
    (3.07567)  (4.11649)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.281723 -0.087228  0.345767   
  (0.19400)  (0.03643)  (0.14528)   
D(DBT)  0.418694 -0.035629  0.348193   
  (0.78307)  (0.14704)  (0.58642)   
D(IN) -0.083722  0.125215 -0.732408   
  (0.66602)  (0.12506)  (0.49876)   
D(M3) -0.068538 -0.005240 -0.044757   
  (0.18162)  (0.03410)  (0.13601)   
D(PX)  0.500650  0.028033  0.034767   
  (0.20565)  (0.03862)  (0.15400)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -474.5746   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.253052  
     (0.46998)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -14.76551  
     (5.02361)  
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 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -2.147297  
     (0.81489)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  1.419509  
     (0.23980)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.398728 -0.071320  0.329169 -0.399605  
  (0.19602)  (0.03558)  (0.13669)  (0.34953)  
D(DBT)  0.991101 -0.113455  0.429394 -2.236585  
  (0.76554)  (0.13896)  (0.53385)  (1.36506)  
D(IN)  0.157371  0.092435 -0.698207  0.567818  
  (0.70162)  (0.12736)  (0.48928)  (1.25109)  
D(M3) -0.078677 -0.003861 -0.046195 -0.375772  
  (0.19550)  (0.03549)  (0.13633)  (0.34859)  
D(PX)  0.506133  0.027287  0.035544 -0.420097  
  (0.22145)  (0.04020)  (0.15443)  (0.39487)  
      
       	
Johansen Cointegration Results Niger 
 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 02:51    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.736212  124.5516  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.574535  69.91467  47.85613  0.0001  
At most 2 *  0.401281  34.87717  29.79707  0.0119  
At most 3  0.267315  13.84573  15.49471  0.0873  
At most 4  0.026309  1.093115  3.841466  0.2958  
      
       Trace test indicates 3 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.736212  54.63696  33.87687  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.574535  35.03749  27.58434  0.0046  
At most 2  0.401281  21.03145  21.13162  0.0516  
At most 3  0.267315  12.75261  14.26460  0.0855  
At most 4  0.026309  1.093115  3.841466  0.2958  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
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PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.422735 -0.028537 -0.375366 -0.726311  0.416058  
 0.114212 -0.043043 -0.450759 -0.010679 -0.130952  
-0.092972  0.068518  0.017550 -0.030169  0.062247  
 0.409832  0.058507  0.140072 -0.090875  0.131525  
-0.056455 -0.006492 -0.123090  0.191248  0.150095  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC)  0.533415 -0.193033 -0.396985 -0.354748  0.027667 
D(DBT) -2.185445  2.164598 -4.235705  0.657721  0.623007 
D(IN) -2.295374  2.597330  1.698282 -1.857018 -0.119636 
D(M3)  1.243948  0.048579 -0.006920  0.043696  0.077081 
D(PX) -1.466713 -0.275655  0.764809  0.127513  0.185428 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -461.6750   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000 -0.067505 -0.887947 -1.718124  0.984206  
  (0.03380)  (0.18395)  (0.15817)  (0.11516)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.225493     
  (0.09982)     
D(DBT) -0.923864     
  (0.81688)     
D(IN) -0.970335     
  (0.56767)     
D(M3)  0.525860     
  (0.08629)     
D(PX) -0.620031     
  (0.18726)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -444.1563   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.220518 -2.072623  1.449150  
   (0.22379)  (0.25654)  (0.19254)  
 0.000000  1.000000  9.887138 -5.251464  6.887572  
   (2.32734)  (2.66791)  (2.00234)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.203446 -0.006913    
  (0.10157)  (0.01198)    
D(DBT) -0.676641 -0.030806    
  (0.81775)  (0.09644)    
D(IN) -0.673688 -0.046295    
  (0.52696)  (0.06215)    
D(M3)  0.531408 -0.037589    
  (0.08925)  (0.01053)    
D(PX) -0.651514  0.053720    
  (0.19199)  (0.02264)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -433.6406   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
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PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -2.117010  1.538259  
    (0.29171)  (0.22083)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -3.261352  2.892262  
    (1.87796)  (1.42167)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.201283  0.404092  
    (0.29852)  (0.22599)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.240355 -0.034114 -0.120181   
  (0.09549)  (0.01830)  (0.12518)   
D(DBT) -0.282838 -0.321026 -0.229708   
  (0.71389)  (0.13683)  (0.93588)   
D(IN) -0.831581  0.070067 -0.279360   
  (0.50969)  (0.09769)  (0.66818)   
D(M3)  0.532052 -0.038063 -0.488955   
  (0.09124)  (0.01749)  (0.11961)   
D(PX) -0.722620  0.106123  0.688231   
  (0.17987)  (0.03448)  (0.23580)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -427.2643   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.002535  
     (0.25452)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.518596  
     (1.07085)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.257595  
     (0.17688)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -0.727816  
     (0.15315)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.094968 -0.054869 -0.169872 -0.341149  
  (0.11967)  (0.02048)  (0.11896)  (0.14447)  
D(DBT) -0.013283 -0.282544 -0.137579  1.632215  
  (0.96355)  (0.16487)  (0.95785)  (1.16319)  
D(IN) -1.592647 -0.038582 -0.539477  1.756938  
  (0.64084)  (0.10965)  (0.63705)  (0.77362)  
D(M3)  0.549960 -0.035507 -0.482834 -0.907774  
  (0.12355)  (0.02114)  (0.12282)  (0.14915)  
D(PX) -0.670361  0.113583  0.706092  1.033573  
  (0.24322)  (0.04162)  (0.24178)  (0.29361)  
      
       	
Johansen Cointegration Results Nigeria 
 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 02:17    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN PX M3     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
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No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.849684  145.2557  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.647867  67.56009  47.85613  0.0003  
At most 2  0.286006  24.76650  29.79707  0.1699  
At most 3  0.213362  10.95437  15.49471  0.2143  
At most 4  0.026827  1.114915  3.841466  0.2910  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.849684  77.69558  33.87687  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.647867  42.79359  27.58434  0.0003  
At most 2  0.286006  13.81213  21.13162  0.3807  
At most 3  0.213362  9.839459  14.26460  0.2227  
At most 4  0.026827  1.114915  3.841466  0.2910  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN PX M3  
 0.088672  0.407956 -0.093442  0.131920  0.064930  
 0.535678  0.277742  0.088591  0.281794 -0.427807  
 0.154872  0.094070  0.047395 -0.137314 -0.140428  
-0.143523 -0.349728  0.125779 -0.027423  0.379827  
-0.228049  0.071755  0.064036  0.027692  0.153321  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC) -2.221574 -0.907114 -0.280820 -0.648764  0.176779 
D(DBT) -0.133015 -0.963825 -0.780915  0.489168 -0.035955 
D(IN)  15.10948 -0.623056  3.807306 -0.188163 -0.192110 
D(PX) -4.688729 -0.883058  1.716808  0.751762 -0.121521 
D(M3) -2.329047 -0.620862 -0.918320 -0.575631 -0.069982 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -510.1751   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN PX M3  
 1.000000  4.600705 -1.053792  1.487722  0.732246  
  (0.53394)  (0.21284)  (0.28339)  (0.32396)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.196992     
  (0.04795)     
D(DBT) -0.011795     
  (0.04428)     
D(IN)  1.339794     
  (0.19640)     
D(PX) -0.415761     
  (0.08773)     
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D(M3) -0.206522     
  (0.05081)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -488.7783   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN PX M3  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.320230  0.403908 -0.993065  
   (0.06024)  (0.09217)  (0.11156)  
 0.000000  1.000000 -0.298655  0.235576  0.375010  
   (0.04380)  (0.06702)  (0.08112)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.682914 -1.158247    
  (0.27102)  (0.24634)    
D(DBT) -0.528095 -0.321959    
  (0.24314)  (0.22100)    
D(IN)  1.006037  5.990950    
  (1.20012)  (1.09084)    
D(PX) -0.888796 -2.158056    
  (0.52580)  (0.47793)    
D(M3) -0.539105 -1.122588    
  (0.30137)  (0.27393)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -481.8722   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN PX M3  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  3.149674 -0.722145  
    (1.06103)  (1.29110)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -2.325196  0.122344  
    (0.98023)  (1.19278)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -8.574360 -0.846016  
    (3.26934)  (3.97822)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.726405 -1.184664  0.113917   
  (0.27947)  (0.24868)  (0.06791)   
D(DBT) -0.649037 -0.395419 -0.109969   
  (0.23172)  (0.20619)  (0.05631)   
D(IN)  1.595682  6.349103 -1.286616   
  (1.14641)  (1.02009)  (0.27859)   
D(PX) -0.622911 -1.996556  0.441262   
  (0.49951)  (0.44447)  (0.12138)   
D(M3) -0.681327 -1.208974  0.119105   
  (0.28993)  (0.25799)  (0.07046)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -476.9525   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN PX M3  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -2.664131  
     (0.56021)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.555984  
     (0.50023)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  4.440654  
     (1.60769)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.616567  
     (0.40915)  
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Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.633293 -0.957773  0.032316 -0.492338  
  (0.27501)  (0.28897)  (0.08787)  (0.16107)  
D(DBT) -0.719244 -0.566495 -0.048441 -0.195332  
  (0.22998)  (0.24165)  (0.07348)  (0.13469)  
D(IN)  1.622687  6.414908 -1.310283  1.300033  
  (1.18260)  (1.24262)  (0.37784)  (0.69261)  
D(PX) -0.730805 -2.259468  0.535818 -1.123734  
  (0.50550)  (0.53116)  (0.16151)  (0.29606)  
D(M3) -0.598711 -1.007660  0.046703 -0.340320  
  (0.28909)  (0.30377)  (0.09237)  (0.16931)  
      
       	
Johansen Cointegration Results Senegal 
 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 01:53    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.733636  110.5883  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.540855  56.34968  47.85613  0.0065  
At most 2  0.268036  24.43572  29.79707  0.1826  
At most 3  0.226445  11.64272  15.49471  0.1749  
At most 4  0.026844  1.115640  3.841466  0.2909  
      
       Trace test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.733636  54.23861  33.87687  0.0001  
At most 1 *  0.540855  31.91396  27.58434  0.0130  
At most 2  0.268036  12.79300  21.13162  0.4715  
At most 3  0.226445  10.52708  14.26460  0.1796  
At most 4  0.026844  1.115640  3.841466  0.2909  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 2 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.001378  0.172386  0.410000  0.096946  0.055721  
-0.133197 -0.032895  0.387315  0.445171 -0.326917  
 0.112932  0.029381  0.315339 -0.062167  0.216707  
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-0.164004 -0.000779 -0.171273 -0.137384  0.312278  
-0.087399 -0.041350 -0.166968 -0.552990  0.395577  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC)  0.135098  0.803755  0.040874  0.128994  0.253384 
D(DBT) -4.562625  0.444599  0.019669 -1.484797 -0.252477 
D(IN) -1.732702 -2.058023 -1.950880 -0.323230 -0.211146 
D(M3) -0.086992  0.573579 -0.245446  0.484035 -0.064085 
D(PX)  0.520335  0.382666 -0.581349 -0.520183  0.117977 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -451.7469   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  125.1086  297.5565  70.35812  40.43919  
  (17.7422)  (68.2891)  (73.4340)  (63.9347)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC)  0.000186     
  (0.00061)     
D(DBT) -0.006287     
  (0.00141)     
D(IN) -0.002387     
  (0.00159)     
D(M3) -0.000120     
  (0.00045)     
D(PX)  0.000717     
  (0.00058)     
      
            
2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -435.7900   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -3.502119 -3.487963  2.379255  
   (0.89159)  (1.15526)  (1.01405)  
 0.000000  1.000000  2.406379  0.590256  0.304215  
   (0.44712)  (0.57934)  (0.50853)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.106872 -0.003150    
  (0.05316)  (0.07004)    
D(DBT) -0.065506 -0.801156    
  (0.13611)  (0.17932)    
D(IN)  0.271735 -0.230995    
  (0.14006)  (0.18453)    
D(M3) -0.076519 -0.033864    
  (0.03978)  (0.05241)    
D(PX) -0.050253  0.077111    
  (0.05464)  (0.07199)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -429.3935   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.767950  2.045935  
    (1.20253)  (1.18785)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -0.591600  0.533247  
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    (0.97826)  (0.96632)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.491135 -0.095177  
    (0.36276)  (0.35833)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.102256 -0.001949  0.379586   
  (0.06968)  (0.07100)  (0.25783)   
D(DBT) -0.063285 -0.800578 -1.692272   
  (0.17844)  (0.18182)  (0.66027)   
D(IN)  0.051418 -0.288315 -2.122699   
  (0.16616)  (0.16931)  (0.61483)   
D(M3) -0.104238 -0.041075  0.109091   
  (0.05122)  (0.05218)  (0.18951)   
D(PX) -0.115906  0.060030  0.178228   
  (0.06774)  (0.06902)  (0.25066)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -424.1299   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -1.204867  
     (0.49412)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000 -0.554553  
     (0.56294)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.807892  
     (0.30768)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000 -1.838740  
     (0.39872)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.123411 -0.002050  0.357493  0.350642  
  (0.09533)  (0.07080)  (0.26600)  (0.19096)  
D(DBT)  0.180228 -0.799421 -1.437967 -0.041640  
  (0.23079)  (0.17142)  (0.64400)  (0.46232)  
D(IN)  0.104429 -0.288063 -2.067339 -0.918462  
  (0.22726)  (0.16879)  (0.63413)  (0.45524)  
D(M3) -0.183621 -0.041452  0.026189  0.195667  
  (0.06503)  (0.04830)  (0.18146)  (0.13027)  
D(PX) -0.030594  0.060435  0.267321  0.328401  
  (0.08842)  (0.06568)  (0.24674)  (0.17713)  
      
       	
Johansen Cointegration Results Togo 
 
Date: 11/28/18   Time: 01:54    
Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend   
Series: PSC DBT IN M3 PX     
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
      
      Hypothesized  Trace 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.857791  163.2720  69.81889  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.590920  83.30326  47.85613  0.0000  
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At most 2 *  0.432874  46.65562  29.79707  0.0003  
At most 3 *  0.318964  23.40153  15.49471  0.0026  
At most 4 *  0.170248  7.651787  3.841466  0.0057  
      
       Trace test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)  
      
      Hypothesized  Max-Eigen 0.05   
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**  
      
      None *  0.857791  79.96876  33.87687  0.0000  
At most 1 *  0.590920  36.64764  27.58434  0.0026  
At most 2 *  0.432874  23.25409  21.13162  0.0248  
At most 3 *  0.318964  15.74975  14.26460  0.0289  
At most 4 *  0.170248  7.651787  3.841466  0.0057  
      
       Max-eigenvalue test indicates 5 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level  
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level  
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values   
      
 Unrestricted Cointegrating Coefficients (normalized by b'*S11*b=I):   
      
      PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 0.203612  0.044773 -0.028613 -0.173482  0.072232  
 0.695493  0.006785 -0.291876 -0.374508 -0.166301  
-0.089792 -0.009572  0.149001  0.223530  0.080717  
-0.181972  0.024018  0.516139  0.036221  0.124460  
-0.086720  0.059225 -0.086545  0.025755 -0.233747  
      
            
 Unrestricted Adjustment Coefficients (alpha):    
      
      D(PSC) -1.678218 -0.191511  0.145041 -0.453129 -0.618120 
D(DBT) -1.416631  7.616429 -4.797601 -0.839758 -0.005804 
D(IN)  3.767172 -1.561038 -0.946150 -1.665237  0.903342 
D(M3) -0.216248 -0.535850 -1.184957  0.324134 -0.773391 
D(PX) -4.635050 -0.331023 -0.659588  0.791755  0.338063 
      
            
1 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -553.2042   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.219896 -0.140527 -0.852020  0.354755  
  (0.03606)  (0.21328)  (0.09012)  (0.13625)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.341706     
  (0.08696)     
D(DBT) -0.288443     
  (0.57946)     
D(IN)  0.767042     
  (0.21926)     
D(M3) -0.044031     
  (0.12861)     
D(PX) -0.943753     
  (0.12697)     
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2 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -534.8804   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000 -0.432626 -0.523924 -0.266681  
   (0.13243)  (0.05021)  (0.07963)  
 0.000000  1.000000  1.328354 -1.492056  2.826052  
   (1.16984)  (0.44350)  (0.70345)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.474900 -0.076439    
  (0.30785)  (0.01924)    
D(DBT)  5.008730 -0.011752    
  (1.62789)  (0.10172)    
D(IN) -0.318649  0.158078    
  (0.73594)  (0.04599)    
D(M3) -0.416710 -0.013318    
  (0.44898)  (0.02806)    
D(PX) -1.173977 -0.209773    
  (0.44855)  (0.02803)    
      
            
3 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -523.2533   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.047198  0.028455  
    (0.17131)  (0.19026)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000 -3.245651  1.919855  
    (0.65302)  (0.72525)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  1.320127  0.682196  
    (0.37347)  (0.41478)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.487923 -0.077827  0.125528   
  (0.30926)  (0.01960)  (0.13931)   
D(DBT)  5.439517  0.034170 -2.897369   
  (1.42995)  (0.09064)  (0.64417)   
D(IN) -0.233692  0.167134  0.206862   
  (0.72443)  (0.04592)  (0.32634)   
D(M3) -0.310310 -0.001975 -0.013971   
  (0.40653)  (0.02577)  (0.18314)   
D(PX) -1.114751 -0.203459  0.130961   
  (0.43827)  (0.02778)  (0.19743)   
      
            
4 Cointegrating Equation(s):  Log likelihood -515.3784   
      
      Normalized cointegrating coefficients (standard error in parentheses)  
PSC DBT IN M3 PX  
 1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.005761  
     (0.17586)  
 0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  3.480395  
     (0.82649)  
 0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.047466  
     (0.15961)  
 0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.480810  
     (0.32195)  
      
Adjustment coefficients (standard error in parentheses)   
D(PSC) -0.405467 -0.088711 -0.108350  0.378870  
  (0.30896)  (0.02141)  (0.25128)  (0.19328)  
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D(DBT)  5.592329  0.014000 -3.330801 -3.709480  
  (1.46653)  (0.10162)  (1.19273)  (0.91741)  
D(IN)  0.069335  0.127138 -0.652633 -0.340723  
  (0.68901)  (0.04774)  (0.56037)  (0.43102)  
D(M3) -0.369294  0.005810  0.153327 -0.014938  
  (0.41521)  (0.02877)  (0.33769)  (0.25974)  
D(PX) -1.258828 -0.184443  0.539617  0.809308  
  (0.43049)  (0.02983)  (0.35012)  (0.26930)  
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APPENDIX F – VECM RESULTS 
VECM Result for Benin 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 05:57    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1)  1.874299 -1.557692    
  (0.31140)  (0.69897)    
 [ 6.01898] [-2.22855]    
      
M3(-1)  0.380560  2.091508    
  (0.23726)  (0.53256)    
 [ 1.60396] [ 3.92724]    
      
PX(-1) -0.419555  3.340508    
  (0.45487)  (1.02100)    
 [-0.92237] [ 3.27180]    
      
C  8.930764 -470.5288    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.094539  0.933187 -0.153741 -0.003610  0.069360 
  (0.10099)  (0.30372)  (0.26410)  (0.09762)  (0.10205) 
 [-0.93616] [ 3.07252] [-0.58213] [-0.03698] [ 0.67964] 
      
CointEq2 -0.074285  0.165138  0.107167  0.014906 -0.145799 
  (0.03972)  (0.11945)  (0.10387)  (0.03839)  (0.04014) 
 [-1.87035] [ 1.38248] [ 1.03176] [ 0.38825] [-3.63257] 
      
D(PSC(-1)) -0.237145  0.953608  0.829000  0.101002 -0.568821 
  (0.28112)  (0.84549)  (0.73519)  (0.27175)  (0.28409) 
 [-0.84356] [ 1.12788] [ 1.12759] [ 0.37167] [-2.00224] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.035957 -0.200269 -0.032485  0.418929 -0.455650 
  (0.23095)  (0.69458)  (0.60397)  (0.22325)  (0.23339) 
 [-0.15569] [-0.28833] [-0.05379] [ 1.87652] [-1.95235] 
      
D(PSC(-3))  0.315825 -0.077083 -0.284142  0.165096  0.133416 
  (0.20178)  (0.60686)  (0.52770)  (0.19505)  (0.20391) 
 [ 1.56519] [-0.12702] [-0.53846] [ 0.84641] [ 0.65429] 
      
D(PSC(-4)) -0.022643 -0.791589 -0.459930  0.273060 -0.013974 
  (0.21167)  (0.63660)  (0.55356)  (0.20461)  (0.21390) 
 [-0.10698] [-1.24346] [-0.83087] [ 1.33452] [-0.06533] 
      
D(DBT(-1))  0.068068 -0.936760 -0.257836 -0.085447  0.060232 
  (0.09216)  (0.27718)  (0.24102)  (0.08909)  (0.09313) 
 [ 0.73858] [-3.37967] [-1.06978] [-0.95912] [ 0.64672] 
      
D(DBT(-2))  0.176003 -0.061317  0.240218 -0.137942 -0.024351 
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  (0.08348)  (0.25108)  (0.21833)  (0.08070)  (0.08437) 
 [ 2.10821] [-0.24421] [ 1.10026] [-1.70929] [-0.28863] 
      
D(DBT(-3))  0.105853 -0.313238 -0.038237 -0.015038  0.096159 
  (0.10499)  (0.31575)  (0.27456)  (0.10149)  (0.10609) 
 [ 1.00826] [-0.99205] [-0.13927] [-0.14818] [ 0.90635] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.042740 -0.248442 -0.284060 -0.025703  0.113869 
  (0.07744)  (0.23290)  (0.20252)  (0.07486)  (0.07826) 
 [ 0.55191] [-1.06672] [-1.40262] [-0.34335] [ 1.45505] 
      
D(IN(-1))  0.179235 -0.703106  0.190440  0.036048 -0.328998 
  (0.13891)  (0.41779)  (0.36329)  (0.13428)  (0.14038) 
 [ 1.29025] [-1.68292] [ 0.52421] [ 0.26845] [-2.34360] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.061864 -1.635534 -0.415596  0.063323 -0.286338 
  (0.12926)  (0.38875)  (0.33804)  (0.12495)  (0.13062) 
 [-0.47861] [-4.20715] [-1.22943] [ 0.50679] [-2.19207] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.019814 -0.328687  0.070022 -0.083530 -0.433415 
  (0.11823)  (0.35559)  (0.30920)  (0.11429)  (0.11948) 
 [-0.16759] [-0.92436] [ 0.22646] [-0.73085] [-3.62750] 
      
D(IN(-4))  0.043009 -0.146855  0.452130  0.122795 -0.466673 
  (0.11077)  (0.33314)  (0.28969)  (0.10708)  (0.11194) 
 [ 0.38827] [-0.44082] [ 1.56076] [ 1.14679] [-4.16896] 
      
D(M3(-1))  0.268934 -1.881307 -0.339207 -0.280474  0.091649 
  (0.30888)  (0.92896)  (0.80777)  (0.29858)  (0.31214) 
 [ 0.87068] [-2.02519] [-0.41993] [-0.93936] [ 0.29362] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.441377 -0.631048  0.266872  0.021654  0.140457 
  (0.22705)  (0.68285)  (0.59377)  (0.21948)  (0.22944) 
 [ 1.94399] [-0.92414] [ 0.44945] [ 0.09866] [ 0.61216] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.112684 -0.307208 -0.603307 -0.209371  0.406713 
  (0.23666)  (0.71176)  (0.61891)  (0.22877)  (0.23916) 
 [-0.47614] [-0.43162] [-0.97478] [-0.91520] [ 1.70059] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.084049  2.208841  0.538931 -0.438608  0.092980 
  (0.20135)  (0.60557)  (0.52657)  (0.19464)  (0.20348) 
 [ 0.41742] [ 3.64755] [ 1.02347] [-2.25344] [ 0.45696] 
      
D(PX(-1))  0.310645  1.004937  0.670770 -0.317534 -0.122105 
  (0.15249)  (0.45862)  (0.39879)  (0.14741)  (0.15410) 
 [ 2.03714] [ 2.19121] [ 1.68200] [-2.15412] [-0.79237] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.095059 -0.475451  0.073731  0.087363  0.130315 
  (0.20469)  (0.61562)  (0.53531)  (0.19787)  (0.20686) 
 [ 0.46440] [-0.77231] [ 0.13773] [ 0.44152] [ 0.62998] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.108727  0.535868  0.029207 -0.130708 -0.105908 
  (0.17222)  (0.51795)  (0.45039)  (0.16648)  (0.17404) 
 [-0.63133] [ 1.03458] [ 0.06485] [-0.78514] [-0.60854] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.065708  0.966476  0.219443 -0.107462 -0.209829 
  (0.16735)  (0.50331)  (0.43765)  (0.16177)  (0.16912) 
 [ 0.39264] [ 1.92025] [ 0.50141] [-0.66429] [-1.24073] 
      
C -0.301767  0.452948 -0.269416  0.940843 -0.377530 
  (0.54730)  (1.64602)  (1.43130)  (0.52906)  (0.55308) 
 [-0.55137] [ 0.27518] [-0.18823] [ 1.77834] [-0.68260] 
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       R-squared  0.728204  0.740076  0.636690  0.578213  0.768786 
 Adj. R-squared  0.396009  0.422392  0.192644  0.062695  0.486190 
 Sum sq. resids  116.9501  1057.842  799.8516  109.2834  119.4335 
 S.E. equation  2.548966  7.666093  6.666048  2.464001  2.575887 
 F-statistic  2.192100  2.329596  1.433838  1.121617  2.720445 
 Log likelihood -79.66408 -124.8100 -119.0790 -78.27412 -80.09483 
 Akaike AIC  5.008004  7.210242  6.930682  4.940201  5.029016 
 Schwarz SC  5.969276  8.171514  7.891955  5.901473  5.990288 
 Mean dependent  0.212620  0.152578 -0.362090  0.601215 -0.087877 
 S.D. dependent  3.279812  10.08689  7.418839  2.545075  3.593566 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  136440.8    
 Determinant resid covariance  2225.295    
 Log likelihood -448.8891    
 Akaike information criterion  27.99459    
 Schwarz criterion  33.21890    
      
       	
VECM Result for Burkina Faso 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 07:55    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1) -0.270730 -0.394670    
  (0.19252)  (0.85730)    
 [-1.40624] [-0.46036]    
      
M3(-1) -0.588931  1.003255    
  (0.12953)  (0.57680)    
 [-4.54670] [ 1.73934]    
      
PX(-1) -0.829305  6.531923    
  (0.27149)  (1.20895)    
 [-3.05467] [ 5.40297]    
      
C  95.49344 -807.2170    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.557040  0.819774  0.265104  0.340431 -0.422554 
  (0.15253)  (0.63099)  (0.60871)  (0.23001)  (0.22405) 
 [-3.65202] [ 1.29918] [ 0.43552] [ 1.48004] [-1.88599] 
      
CointEq2 -0.087412  0.006300 -0.083368 -0.061490 -0.129714 
  (0.02062)  (0.08530)  (0.08229)  (0.03109)  (0.03029) 
 [-4.23932] [ 0.07386] [-1.01313] [-1.97754] [-4.28273] 
      
D(PSC(-1))  0.550724 -0.809994 -0.431320  0.194008  0.410851 
  (0.17539)  (0.72556)  (0.69994)  (0.26449)  (0.25763) 
	 393	
 [ 3.13999] [-1.11636] [-0.61622] [ 0.73352] [ 1.59474] 
      
D(PSC(-2))  0.150534 -0.314185  0.036589 -0.429457 -0.183688 
  (0.18096)  (0.74862)  (0.72219)  (0.27289)  (0.26582) 
 [ 0.83184] [-0.41968] [ 0.05066] [-1.57371] [-0.69103] 
      
D(PSC(-3))  0.429247 -0.635415 -1.190460  0.041839  0.191741 
  (0.18985)  (0.78539)  (0.75765)  (0.28630)  (0.27887) 
 [ 2.26096] [-0.80904] [-1.57125] [ 0.14614] [ 0.68756] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  0.120943 -0.540610  1.129387 -0.434663  0.417926 
  (0.18179)  (0.75203)  (0.72547)  (0.27414)  (0.26703) 
 [ 0.66530] [-0.71887] [ 1.55676] [-1.58558] [ 1.56512] 
      
D(DBT(-1)) -0.009474  0.240122 -0.063691 -0.020536  0.015414 
  (0.05070)  (0.20975)  (0.20234)  (0.07646)  (0.07448) 
 [-0.18686] [ 1.14480] [-0.31477] [-0.26858] [ 0.20697] 
      
D(DBT(-2)) -0.080997  0.345324  0.048288  0.002888 -0.057565 
  (0.04959)  (0.20515)  (0.19791)  (0.07478)  (0.07284) 
 [-1.63329] [ 1.68325] [ 0.24400] [ 0.03862] [-0.79024] 
      
D(DBT(-3))  0.099560 -0.154231  0.017086  0.191585  0.116237 
  (0.05269)  (0.21796)  (0.21026)  (0.07945)  (0.07739) 
 [ 1.88964] [-0.70761] [ 0.08126] [ 2.41132] [ 1.50193] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.072541 -0.143592  0.238052 -0.042184  0.271714 
  (0.05460)  (0.22588)  (0.21790)  (0.08234)  (0.08020) 
 [ 1.32854] [-0.63570] [ 1.09246] [-0.51232] [ 3.38776] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.213644 -0.222630 -0.474357 -0.058962 -0.107272 
  (0.06709)  (0.27754)  (0.26774)  (0.10117)  (0.09855) 
 [-3.18442] [-0.80214] [-1.77170] [-0.58279] [-1.08853] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.263315 -0.096161 -0.589803 -0.069526 -0.079161 
  (0.06848)  (0.28329)  (0.27329)  (0.10327)  (0.10059) 
 [-3.84513] [-0.33944] [-2.15817] [-0.67325] [-0.78696] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.187756  0.117503 -0.288182 -0.080980 -0.172786 
  (0.06731)  (0.27844)  (0.26861)  (0.10150)  (0.09887) 
 [-2.78951] [ 0.42200] [-1.07287] [-0.79784] [-1.74766] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.232140  0.163818 -0.250148 -0.140521 -0.164322 
  (0.05875)  (0.24303)  (0.23445)  (0.08859)  (0.08629) 
 [-3.95149] [ 0.67406] [-1.06697] [-1.58618] [-1.90423] 
      
D(M3(-1)) -0.028072  0.432970  0.302152 -0.074698 -0.439699 
  (0.12902)  (0.53372)  (0.51487)  (0.19456)  (0.18951) 
 [-0.21758] [ 0.81123] [ 0.58685] [-0.38394] [-2.32018] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.023257  0.173296  0.400206 -0.382832  0.051531 
  (0.14269)  (0.59030)  (0.56945)  (0.21518)  (0.20960) 
 [ 0.16299] [ 0.29357] [ 0.70279] [-1.77913] [ 0.24586] 
      
D(M3(-3))  0.132755 -0.576249  0.319518 -0.025466 -0.337933 
  (0.13011)  (0.53826)  (0.51925)  (0.19621)  (0.19112) 
 [ 1.02031] [-1.07058] [ 0.61535] [-0.12979] [-1.76816] 
      
D(M3(-4)) -0.310868  0.904406 -0.453667 -0.469343 -0.205048 
  (0.14034)  (0.58055)  (0.56005)  (0.21163)  (0.20614) 
 [-2.21517] [ 1.55784] [-0.81005] [-2.21780] [-0.99471] 
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D(PX(-1))  0.120678  0.886425  0.077966  0.525187 -0.118141 
  (0.14190)  (0.58703)  (0.56630)  (0.21399)  (0.20844) 
 [ 0.85042] [ 1.51001] [ 0.13768] [ 2.45427] [-0.56679] 
      
D(PX(-2)) -0.117095  0.299936  1.025058  0.272402  0.235633 
  (0.13632)  (0.56392)  (0.54401)  (0.20557)  (0.20023) 
 [-0.85899] [ 0.53187] [ 1.88427] [ 1.32513] [ 1.17679] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.201718  0.764159  0.884929  0.406356  0.034862 
  (0.14974)  (0.61946)  (0.59758)  (0.22581)  (0.21995) 
 [-1.34711] [ 1.23360] [ 1.48086] [ 1.79956] [ 0.15850] 
      
D(PX(-4)) -0.108832  1.084918  0.411560  0.188849 -0.059295 
  (0.13653)  (0.56479)  (0.54484)  (0.20588)  (0.20054) 
 [-0.79716] [ 1.92094] [ 0.75538] [ 0.91728] [-0.29567] 
      
C -0.052855  0.789642 -0.383306  1.446764  0.037346 
  (0.28461)  (1.17738)  (1.13580)  (0.42919)  (0.41806) 
 [-0.18571] [ 0.67067] [-0.33748] [ 3.37093] [ 0.08933] 
      
       R-squared  0.792355  0.529109  0.576761  0.646096  0.725119 
 Adj. R-squared  0.538567 -0.046424  0.059469  0.213546  0.389153 
 Sum sq. resids  29.57344  506.1085  470.9910  67.25156  63.80858 
 S.E. equation  1.281783  5.302559  5.115287  1.932925  1.882796 
 F-statistic  3.122114  0.919337  1.114962  1.493692  2.158309 
 Log likelihood -51.47922 -109.6966 -108.2225 -68.32128 -67.24395 
 Akaike AIC  3.633133  6.473007  6.401095  4.454696  4.402144 
 Schwarz SC  4.594405  7.434279  7.362367  5.415969  5.363416 
 Mean dependent  0.423179  0.431366 -0.185369  0.687155 -0.040891 
 S.D. dependent  1.886950  5.183602  5.274526  2.179608  2.409000 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  8454.245    
 Determinant resid covariance  137.8853    
 Log likelihood -391.8741    
 Akaike information criterion  25.21337    
 Schwarz criterion  30.43767    
      
       	
VECM Result for Cote D’Ivoire 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 07:58    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1) -4.042746 -18.61899    
  (0.79932)  (4.45709)    
 [-5.05771] [-4.17739]    
      
M3(-1) -1.845395 -5.561186    
  (1.05294)  (5.87128)    
 [-1.75261] [-0.94718]    
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PX(-1)  10.27247  57.73234    
  (2.20791)  (12.3115)    
 [ 4.65258] [ 4.68931]    
      
C -917.4982 -5280.403    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1  0.224810  3.374305  0.154592  0.458015 -0.277296 
  (0.26721)  (0.99382)  (1.25381)  (0.34371)  (0.38628) 
 [ 0.84133] [ 3.39529] [ 0.12330] [ 1.33256] [-0.71785] 
      
CointEq2 -0.056125 -0.558279  0.029248 -0.071344  0.047668 
  (0.04765)  (0.17722)  (0.22358)  (0.06129)  (0.06888) 
 [-1.17789] [-3.15023] [ 0.13082] [-1.16403] [ 0.69203] 
      
D(PSC(-1)) -0.752178 -5.478672  0.589919 -1.097985  1.699591 
  (0.70085)  (2.60664)  (3.28855)  (0.90150)  (1.01317) 
 [-1.07324] [-2.10182] [ 0.17939] [-1.21795] [ 1.67750] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.357636 -7.527697 -1.576094 -0.317776  0.675130 
  (0.56764)  (2.11119)  (2.66349)  (0.73015)  (0.82059) 
 [-0.63004] [-3.56561] [-0.59174] [-0.43522] [ 0.82273] 
      
D(PSC(-3)) -0.407998 -5.725152 -0.089608 -1.143746  0.490819 
  (0.71842)  (2.67202)  (3.37103)  (0.92411)  (1.03858) 
 [-0.56791] [-2.14263] [-0.02658] [-1.23767] [ 0.47259] 
      
D(PSC(-4)) -0.044453 -2.186445  0.495816 -0.355868  0.027407 
  (0.43657)  (1.62371)  (2.04848)  (0.56156)  (0.63111) 
 [-0.10183] [-1.34658] [ 0.24204] [-0.63372] [ 0.04343] 
      
D(DBT(-1))  0.028995 -0.528561 -0.136876 -0.083620  0.102717 
  (0.04191)  (0.15588)  (0.19666)  (0.05391)  (0.06059) 
 [ 0.69182] [-3.39085] [-0.69601] [-1.55109] [ 1.69533] 
      
D(DBT(-2))  0.052326 -0.387519 -0.267181 -0.092878  0.085539 
  (0.05110)  (0.19005)  (0.23977)  (0.06573)  (0.07387) 
 [ 1.02401] [-2.03902] [-1.11432] [-1.41305] [ 1.15796] 
      
D(DBT(-3))  0.007407 -0.312763 -0.300036 -0.083338 -0.068227 
  (0.04064)  (0.15116)  (0.19071)  (0.05228)  (0.05876) 
 [ 0.18225] [-2.06902] [-1.57326] [-1.59407] [-1.16120] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.001026 -0.056662 -0.091669 -0.117015  0.016040 
  (0.04581)  (0.17040)  (0.21497)  (0.05893)  (0.06623) 
 [ 0.02240] [-0.33253] [-0.42642] [-1.98562] [ 0.24218] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.136380  2.320625  0.275696  0.389689 -0.208003 
  (0.16960)  (0.63079)  (0.79581)  (0.21816)  (0.24518) 
 [-0.80413] [ 3.67893] [ 0.34644] [ 1.78628] [-0.84837] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.160151  1.542885  0.314642  0.341026 -0.082058 
  (0.14350)  (0.53373)  (0.67336)  (0.18459)  (0.20745) 
 [-1.11601] [ 2.89076] [ 0.46727] [ 1.84748] [-0.39555] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.074089  0.709480  0.509217  0.214336  0.016814 
  (0.09971)  (0.37084)  (0.46786)  (0.12826)  (0.14414) 
 [-0.74306] [ 1.91316] [ 1.08841] [ 1.67117] [ 0.11665] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.005476  0.167675  0.223961  0.247768 -0.060732 
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  (0.07709)  (0.28672)  (0.36172)  (0.09916)  (0.11144) 
 [-0.07104] [ 0.58481] [ 0.61915] [ 2.49865] [-0.54495] 
      
D(M3(-1))  0.337192  1.554017  0.156924  0.473404 -1.392957 
  (0.35926)  (1.33617)  (1.68572)  (0.46211)  (0.51935) 
 [ 0.93858] [ 1.16303] [ 0.09309] [ 1.02443] [-2.68210] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.125889  3.963435  1.615242  0.283728 -0.202434 
  (0.33033)  (1.22859)  (1.55000)  (0.42491)  (0.47754) 
 [ 0.38110] [ 3.22600] [ 1.04209] [ 0.66774] [-0.42391] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.039614  3.034423  1.786148  0.629387 -0.335034 
  (0.40826)  (1.51844)  (1.91568)  (0.52515)  (0.59020) 
 [-0.09703] [ 1.99838] [ 0.93238] [ 1.19849] [-0.56766] 
      
D(M3(-4)) -0.348733  2.879309  0.941796  0.389483  0.295715 
  (0.31318)  (1.16480)  (1.46952)  (0.40284)  (0.45274) 
 [-1.11352] [ 2.47194] [ 0.64089] [ 0.96683] [ 0.65316] 
      
D(PX(-1))  0.730187  0.465487 -1.301742 -0.495649 -0.347548 
  (0.25864)  (0.96196)  (1.21361)  (0.33269)  (0.37390) 
 [ 2.82317] [ 0.48390] [-1.07262] [-1.48982] [-0.92952] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.588945  2.027506 -0.807533  0.091855 -0.475100 
  (0.31588)  (1.17486)  (1.48221)  (0.40632)  (0.45665) 
 [ 1.86444] [ 1.72574] [-0.54482] [ 0.22606] [-1.04040] 
      
D(PX(-3))  0.377755  1.959653 -0.845897  0.235633 -0.350746 
  (0.33406)  (1.24246)  (1.56749)  (0.42970)  (0.48293) 
 [ 1.13080] [ 1.57724] [-0.53965] [ 0.54836] [-0.72629] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.202326  0.200525 -0.507086 -0.091891 -0.350174 
  (0.19766)  (0.73516)  (0.92748)  (0.25425)  (0.28575) 
 [ 1.02359] [ 0.27276] [-0.54673] [-0.36142] [-1.22547] 
      
C -0.629639 -6.662998 -1.738352 -0.702377  0.930570 
  (0.74700)  (2.77830)  (3.50511)  (0.96087)  (1.07989) 
 [-0.84289] [-2.39823] [-0.49595] [-0.73098] [ 0.86173] 
      
       R-squared  0.654472  0.886174  0.652594  0.374530  0.791205 
 Adj. R-squared  0.232161  0.747053  0.227986 -0.389932  0.536011 
 Sum sq. resids  91.50311  1265.764  2014.648  151.3992  191.2287 
 S.E. equation  2.254663  8.385715  10.57946  2.900184  3.259420 
 F-statistic  1.549739  6.369823  1.536934  0.489926  3.100410 
 Log likelihood -74.63390 -128.4886 -138.0163 -84.95662 -89.74439 
 Akaike AIC  4.762629  7.389687  7.854456  5.266177  5.499726 
 Schwarz SC  5.723901  8.350959  8.815728  6.227449  6.460998 
 Mean dependent -0.262436 -0.043322 -0.606650  0.154024 -0.056793 
 S.D. dependent  2.573040  16.67346  12.04067  2.459964  4.785052 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  234546.0    
 Determinant resid covariance  3825.351    
 Log likelihood -459.9952    
 Akaike information criterion  28.53635    
 Schwarz criterion  33.76066    
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VECM Result for Ghana 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:09    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3   
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000   
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000   
      
IN(-1)  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000   
      
M3(-1) -0.475847 -0.767800 -0.371285   
  (0.17035)  (1.20447)  (0.43051)   
 [-2.79331] [-0.63746] [-0.86244]   
      
PX(-1)  0.617804 -6.737477 -0.875132   
  (0.19274)  (1.36276)  (0.48708)   
 [ 3.20537] [-4.94401] [-1.79668]   
      
C -65.22786  697.3912  71.66123   
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1  0.198770 -1.174181 -7.191855  0.142754  0.222869 
  (0.16982)  (1.35981)  (2.44575)  (0.21065)  (0.33089) 
 [ 1.17050] [-0.86349] [-2.94055] [ 0.67768] [ 0.67355] 
      
CointEq2  0.007838 -0.124061 -0.125577  0.054678  0.093717 
  (0.01815)  (0.14538)  (0.26148)  (0.02252)  (0.03538) 
 [ 0.43172] [-0.85337] [-0.48026] [ 2.42790] [ 2.64924] 
      
CointEq3  0.026975 -0.349177 -2.382956 -0.138853  0.056192 
  (0.05759)  (0.46112)  (0.82938)  (0.07143)  (0.11221) 
 [ 0.46844] [-0.75723] [-2.87318] [-1.94378] [ 0.50079] 
      
D(PSC(-1))  0.322664  3.175906  5.619850 -0.040573  0.218074 
  (0.37462)  (2.99983)  (5.39549)  (0.46471)  (0.72996) 
 [ 0.86130] [ 1.05870] [ 1.04158] [-0.08731] [ 0.29875] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.397450  2.916086  7.149878 -0.327294  0.118698 
  (0.40285)  (3.22583)  (5.80197)  (0.49972)  (0.78495) 
 [-0.98660] [ 0.90398] [ 1.23232] [-0.65495] [ 0.15122] 
      
D(PSC(-3)) -0.169881 -3.680437  5.997557 -0.180260  0.153737 
  (0.34653)  (2.77483)  (4.99081)  (0.42986)  (0.67521) 
 [-0.49024] [-1.32636] [ 1.20172] [-0.41935] [ 0.22769] 
      
D(PSC(-4)) -0.390247  0.063282  2.857771 -0.414211 -0.013401 
  (0.26464)  (2.11915)  (3.81149)  (0.32828)  (0.51566) 
 [-1.47462] [ 0.02986] [ 0.74978] [-1.26175] [-0.02599] 
      
D(DBT(-1)) -0.064819  0.091688 -0.074127  0.008677 -0.056183 
  (0.03187)  (0.25522)  (0.45905)  (0.03954)  (0.06210) 
 [-2.03367] [ 0.35925] [-0.16148] [ 0.21945] [-0.90465] 
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D(DBT(-2))  0.066007  0.798527 -0.321643  0.031626 -0.152646 
  (0.03403)  (0.27253)  (0.49017)  (0.04222)  (0.06632) 
 [ 1.93943] [ 2.93004] [-0.65618] [ 0.74911] [-2.30182] 
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.013952  0.274383  0.268864  0.006065 -0.086262 
  (0.04089)  (0.32742)  (0.58890)  (0.05072)  (0.07967) 
 [-0.34121] [ 0.83802] [ 0.45656] [ 0.11957] [-1.08272] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.025704 -0.235665  0.123137 -0.064745 -0.038567 
  (0.03765)  (0.30145)  (0.54218)  (0.04670)  (0.07335) 
 [ 0.68280] [-0.78178] [ 0.22711] [-1.38648] [-0.52578] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.012091  0.249321  0.920614  0.069653 -0.074722 
  (0.04569)  (0.36584)  (0.65800)  (0.05667)  (0.08902) 
 [-0.26464] [ 0.68150] [ 1.39911] [ 1.22902] [-0.83937] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.018967  0.073217  0.823306  0.063587 -0.108340 
  (0.03916)  (0.31357)  (0.56398)  (0.04858)  (0.07630) 
 [-0.48437] [ 0.23350] [ 1.45980] [ 1.30902] [-1.41989] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.004068  0.051791  0.544363  0.027743 -0.091704 
  (0.03137)  (0.25118)  (0.45177)  (0.03891)  (0.06112) 
 [-0.12970] [ 0.20619] [ 1.20495] [ 0.71299] [-1.50038] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.017971  0.047906  0.117155  0.024582 -0.044563 
  (0.02256)  (0.18068)  (0.32497)  (0.02799)  (0.04397) 
 [-0.79646] [ 0.26514] [ 0.36051] [ 0.87825] [-1.01359] 
      
D(M3(-1)) -0.213800 -3.726977 -1.387938 -0.026863  0.098433 
  (0.18804)  (1.50575)  (2.70824)  (0.23326)  (0.36640) 
 [-1.13699] [-2.47516] [-0.51249] [-0.11516] [ 0.26865] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.198774  0.242883 -5.114109 -0.488864  0.536529 
  (0.21789)  (1.74478)  (3.13817)  (0.27029)  (0.42456) 
 [ 0.91226] [ 0.13921] [-1.62965] [-1.80867] [ 1.26372] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.122433 -2.274624 -4.078026  0.118806  0.250725 
  (0.17665)  (1.41451)  (2.54414)  (0.21913)  (0.34420) 
 [-0.69309] [-1.60806] [-1.60291] [ 0.54218] [ 0.72843] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.053637 -0.053478 -2.051232 -0.363532  0.450770 
  (0.19111)  (1.53036)  (2.75250)  (0.23707)  (0.37239) 
 [ 0.28066] [-0.03494] [-0.74523] [-1.53342] [ 1.21049] 
      
D(PX(-1)) -0.172627  0.357859  1.324274  0.152205 -0.662922 
  (0.10089)  (0.80791)  (1.45310)  (0.12516)  (0.19659) 
 [-1.71099] [ 0.44295] [ 0.91134] [ 1.21613] [-3.37211] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.013896 -0.115617  0.667653  0.014682 -0.685210 
  (0.11313)  (0.90590)  (1.62936)  (0.14034)  (0.22044) 
 [ 0.12283] [-0.12763] [ 0.40977] [ 0.10462] [-3.10844] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.051297  1.743038  0.716739  0.035990 -0.501250 
  (0.11044)  (0.88439)  (1.59066)  (0.13700)  (0.21520) 
 [-0.46446] [ 1.97090] [ 0.45059] [ 0.26269] [-2.32923] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.099206  1.669671  0.201049  0.013909 -0.173992 
  (0.10004)  (0.80111)  (1.44087)  (0.12410)  (0.19494) 
 [ 0.99162] [ 2.08421] [ 0.13953] [ 0.11207] [-0.89256] 
      
C  0.448450 -0.599445 -2.051440  0.519375  0.537477 
  (0.30487)  (2.44125)  (4.39083)  (0.37818)  (0.59404) 
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 [ 1.47097] [-0.24555] [-0.46721] [ 1.37335] [ 0.90479] 
      
       R-squared  0.538650  0.655861  0.753146  0.806133  0.768813 
 Adj. R-squared -0.085530  0.190260  0.419166  0.543843  0.456030 
 Sum sq. resids  39.82224  2553.449  8260.299  61.27762  151.1915 
 S.E. equation  1.530518  12.25573  22.04314  1.898569  2.982217 
 F-statistic  0.862972  1.408634  2.255067  3.073442  2.457975 
 Log likelihood -57.57898 -142.8749 -166.9422 -66.41425 -84.92847 
 Akaike AIC  3.979462  8.140237  9.314253  4.410451  5.313584 
 Schwarz SC  4.982529  9.143304  10.31732  5.413518  6.316650 
 Mean dependent  0.360190  0.753613 -0.165049  0.254512  0.196856 
 S.D. dependent  1.468985  13.61966  28.92328  2.811056  4.043445 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  550345.6    
 Determinant resid covariance  6744.671    
 Log likelihood -471.6208    
 Akaike information criterion  29.59126    
 Schwarz criterion  35.23351    
      
       	
VECM Result for Mali 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:11    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1     
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000     
      
DBT(-1) -5.792533     
  (1.77892)     
 [-3.25621]     
      
IN(-1)  31.82189     
  (11.2783)     
 [ 2.82151]     
      
M3(-1) -57.10147     
  (23.5083)     
 [-2.42899]     
      
PX(-1) -63.60437     
  (22.7398)     
 [-2.79705]     
      
C  8708.875     
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1  0.006746  0.015542 -0.024445 -0.003816  0.006795 
  (0.00415)  (0.01565)  (0.01326)  (0.00425)  (0.00468) 
 [ 1.62540] [ 0.99282] [-1.84418] [-0.89836] [ 1.45159] 
      
D(PSC(-1))  0.059337 -1.060354  0.691495  0.089823 -0.212851 
  (0.24234)  (0.91410)  (0.77403)  (0.24803)  (0.27336) 
 [ 0.24485] [-1.15999] [ 0.89337] [ 0.36214] [-0.77864] 
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D(PSC(-2)) -0.356879  1.801948  1.066933  0.144388 -0.290618 
  (0.25756)  (0.97153)  (0.82265)  (0.26361)  (0.29053) 
 [-1.38559] [ 1.85476] [ 1.29695] [ 0.54773] [-1.00029] 
      
D(PSC(-3)) -0.119381 -0.086610 -0.480785  0.383820 -0.423978 
  (0.21277)  (0.80257)  (0.67958)  (0.21777)  (0.24001) 
 [-0.56108] [-0.10792] [-0.70747] [ 1.76253] [-1.76652] 
      
D(PSC(-4)) -0.034121 -0.865447  0.138067  0.106334  0.074708 
  (0.19230)  (0.72534)  (0.61419)  (0.19681)  (0.21691) 
 [-0.17744] [-1.19317] [ 0.22480] [ 0.54029] [ 0.34442] 
      
D(DBT(-1))  0.021757 -0.092416  0.325663  0.052350  0.094267 
  (0.06178)  (0.23305)  (0.19733)  (0.06323)  (0.06969) 
 [ 0.35214] [-0.39656] [ 1.65031] [ 0.82788] [ 1.35263] 
      
D(DBT(-2))  0.049461  0.274994 -0.174993 -0.037816 -0.021474 
  (0.06083)  (0.22945)  (0.19429)  (0.06226)  (0.06862) 
 [ 0.81311] [ 1.19851] [-0.90069] [-0.60742] [-0.31295] 
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.074133  0.349766 -0.210495  0.000920 -0.080025 
  (0.05766)  (0.21749)  (0.18416)  (0.05901)  (0.06504) 
 [-1.28573] [ 1.60822] [-1.14301] [ 0.01559] [-1.23042] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.065640  0.040889 -0.331305 -0.034525 -0.017731 
  (0.06442)  (0.24299)  (0.20576)  (0.06593)  (0.07267) 
 [ 1.01893] [ 0.16827] [-1.61019] [-0.52364] [-0.24401] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.150497 -0.472190 -0.037374  0.123351 -0.208761 
  (0.11813)  (0.44558)  (0.37730)  (0.12090)  (0.13325) 
 [-1.27401] [-1.05972] [-0.09906] [ 1.02025] [-1.56669] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.172801  0.038472  0.062477  0.011160 -0.018842 
  (0.11599)  (0.43751)  (0.37047)  (0.11871)  (0.13084) 
 [-1.48979] [ 0.08793] [ 0.16864] [ 0.09401] [-0.14401] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.044012  0.163344 -0.137018  0.098148 -0.165915 
  (0.09652)  (0.36406)  (0.30828)  (0.09878)  (0.10887) 
 [-0.45600] [ 0.44867] [-0.44447] [ 0.99356] [-1.52393] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.081706  0.393803 -0.125507  0.068512 -0.086674 
  (0.07415)  (0.27969)  (0.23683)  (0.07589)  (0.08364) 
 [-1.10191] [ 1.40800] [-0.52995] [ 0.90277] [-1.03626] 
      
D(M3(-1))  0.415749  0.340072 -0.379345  0.068527 -0.370383 
  (0.30512)  (1.15089)  (0.97453)  (0.31228)  (0.34417) 
 [ 1.36259] [ 0.29549] [-0.38926] [ 0.21944] [-1.07615] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.309449  0.036067 -0.700043 -0.360315  0.668404 
  (0.26380)  (0.99505)  (0.84257)  (0.27000)  (0.29757) 
 [ 1.17303] [ 0.03625] [-0.83084] [-1.33452] [ 2.24620] 
      
D(M3(-3))  0.290561 -2.274231 -0.834299  0.228183 -0.289274 
  (0.27499)  (1.03726)  (0.87831)  (0.28145)  (0.31019) 
 [ 1.05661] [-2.19253] [-0.94989] [ 0.81075] [-0.93256] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.187766  0.605008  0.515185 -0.482545  0.166097 
  (0.23275)  (0.87793)  (0.74340)  (0.23822)  (0.26254) 
 [ 0.80672] [ 0.68913] [ 0.69301] [-2.02566] [ 0.63264] 
      
D(PX(-1))  0.344911  0.791706 -0.780019 -0.381460 -0.140943 
	 401	
  (0.26507)  (0.99983)  (0.84662)  (0.27129)  (0.29900) 
 [ 1.30121] [ 0.79184] [-0.92133] [-1.40608] [-0.47138] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.299833 -0.075553 -0.487094 -0.029656 -0.088653 
  (0.22880)  (0.86303)  (0.73078)  (0.23417)  (0.25809) 
 [ 1.31045] [-0.08754] [-0.66654] [-0.12664] [-0.34350] 
      
D(PX(-3))  0.142337 -0.620153 -0.560135 -0.111755 -0.088878 
  (0.17103)  (0.64514)  (0.54628)  (0.17505)  (0.19293) 
 [ 0.83221] [-0.96127] [-1.02537] [-0.63842] [-0.46068] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.087982 -0.073626  0.269610 -0.198082  0.098042 
  (0.14846)  (0.55998)  (0.47417)  (0.15194)  (0.16746) 
 [ 0.59263] [-0.13148] [ 0.56859] [-1.30365] [ 0.58546] 
      
C -0.187189 -0.029634 -0.472706  0.257377 -0.583684 
  (0.44601)  (1.68234)  (1.42454)  (0.45648)  (0.50310) 
 [-0.41970] [-0.01761] [-0.33183] [ 0.56383] [-1.16017] 
      
       R-squared  0.437437  0.587194  0.656109  0.522844  0.754178 
 Adj. R-squared -0.184342  0.130934  0.276019 -0.004540  0.482481 
 Sum sq. resids  143.9805  2048.513  1468.795  150.8202  183.1999 
 S.E. equation  2.752802  10.38347  8.792326  2.817429  3.105173 
 F-statistic  0.703525  1.286973  1.726192  0.991392  2.775802 
 Log likelihood -83.92665 -138.3581 -131.5383 -84.87807 -88.86510 
 Akaike AIC  5.167153  7.822345  7.489673  5.213564  5.408054 
 Schwarz SC  6.086631  8.741823  8.409151  6.133042  6.327531 
 Mean dependent -0.051444 -0.866053 -0.050239  0.254512 -0.508807 
 S.D. dependent  2.529510  11.13823  10.33332  2.811056  4.316410 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  1211415.    
 Determinant resid covariance  25890.57    
 Log likelihood -499.1959    
 Akaike information criterion  29.96078    
 Schwarz criterion  34.76714    
      
       	
 
VECM Result for Niger 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:13    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1) -0.220518  9.887138    
  (0.22993)  (2.39111)    
 [-0.95908] [ 4.13495]    
      
M3(-1) -2.072623 -5.251464    
  (0.26357)  (2.74101)    
	 402	
 [-7.86356] [-1.91589]    
      
PX(-1)  1.449150  6.887572    
  (0.19782)  (2.05721)    
 [ 7.32564] [ 3.34802]    
      
C -139.5272 -788.0472    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1  0.203446 -0.676641 -0.673688  0.531408 -0.651514 
  (0.10435)  (0.84016)  (0.54140)  (0.09170)  (0.19725) 
 [ 1.94967] [-0.80537] [-1.24434] [ 5.79537] [-3.30293] 
      
CointEq2 -0.006913 -0.030806 -0.046295 -0.037589  0.053720 
  (0.01231)  (0.09909)  (0.06385)  (0.01081)  (0.02326) 
 [-0.56174] [-0.31090] [-0.72505] [-3.47588] [ 2.30921] 
      
D(PSC(-1))  0.014702  3.218096  1.507746 -0.714144  1.001892 
  (0.27388)  (2.20517)  (1.42101)  (0.24067)  (0.51773) 
 [ 0.05368] [ 1.45934] [ 1.06104] [-2.96729] [ 1.93517] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.399577  2.002541  2.186586 -0.469476  1.743981 
  (0.26658)  (2.14634)  (1.38310)  (0.23425)  (0.50392) 
 [-1.49892] [ 0.93300] [ 1.58093] [-2.00416] [ 3.46086] 
      
D(PSC(-3)) -0.129092  4.513943  2.757706 -0.160398  0.431102 
  (0.29954)  (2.41176)  (1.55414)  (0.26322)  (0.56623) 
 [-0.43097] [ 1.87164] [ 1.77443] [-0.60937] [ 0.76135] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  0.100671  2.533821  1.656520 -0.634750  0.272955 
  (0.29508)  (2.37584)  (1.53099)  (0.25930)  (0.55780) 
 [ 0.34116] [ 1.06649] [ 1.08199] [-2.44794] [ 0.48934] 
      
D(DBT(-1)) -0.016757 -0.147396  0.038057  0.006718 -0.047114 
  (0.02973)  (0.23935)  (0.15424)  (0.02612)  (0.05619) 
 [-0.56370] [-0.61582] [ 0.24674] [ 0.25718] [-0.83840] 
      
D(DBT(-2)) -0.049763  0.148100  0.005121 -0.005273 -0.109148 
  (0.02644)  (0.21288)  (0.13718)  (0.02323)  (0.04998) 
 [-1.88210] [ 0.69569] [ 0.03733] [-0.22695] [-2.18383] 
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.022002  0.182632 -0.090334  0.010168 -0.171668 
  (0.02976)  (0.23958)  (0.15439)  (0.02615)  (0.05625) 
 [-0.73939] [ 0.76229] [-0.58512] [ 0.38885] [-3.05192] 
      
D(DBT(-4)) -0.007585 -0.204913 -0.176278  0.014373 -0.010044 
  (0.03047)  (0.24534)  (0.15809)  (0.02678)  (0.05760) 
 [-0.24894] [-0.83523] [-1.11501] [ 0.53679] [-0.17438] 
      
D(IN(-1))  0.070738 -0.167362 -0.615183  0.436350 -0.496809 
  (0.12604)  (1.01479)  (0.65393)  (0.11075)  (0.23825) 
 [ 0.56124] [-0.16492] [-0.94075] [ 3.93982] [-2.08523] 
      
D(IN(-2))  0.118214 -0.210797 -0.418213  0.336097 -0.304604 
  (0.09548)  (0.76876)  (0.49539)  (0.08390)  (0.18049) 
 [ 1.23810] [-0.27421] [-0.84422] [ 4.00584] [-1.68767] 
      
D(IN(-3))  0.035436 -0.243106 -0.172499  0.233552 -0.178731 
  (0.06605)  (0.53184)  (0.34272)  (0.05804)  (0.12486) 
 [ 0.53647] [-0.45711] [-0.50333] [ 4.02366] [-1.43141] 
      
	 403	
D(IN(-4))  0.043532 -0.023793  0.055790  0.105390 -0.076499 
  (0.04425)  (0.35630)  (0.22960)  (0.03889)  (0.08365) 
 [ 0.98372] [-0.06678] [ 0.24299] [ 2.71022] [-0.91451] 
      
D(M3(-1)) -0.042067 -2.452546 -2.154095  0.133751  0.105650 
  (0.23190)  (1.86714)  (1.20319)  (0.20378)  (0.43837) 
 [-0.18140] [-1.31353] [-1.79033] [ 0.65635] [ 0.24101] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.145339 -2.338513 -0.751374  0.097750 -0.254106 
  (0.22614)  (1.82079)  (1.17332)  (0.19872)  (0.42748) 
 [ 0.64268] [-1.28434] [-0.64038] [ 0.49189] [-0.59442] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.057736 -3.647716 -1.440553  3.81E-05 -0.160648 
  (0.20043)  (1.61378)  (1.03992)  (0.17613)  (0.37888) 
 [-0.28806] [-2.26036] [-1.38525] [ 0.00022] [-0.42400] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.083687  0.842160 -0.410319  0.236781  0.196892 
  (0.23003)  (1.85211)  (1.19350)  (0.20214)  (0.43484) 
 [ 0.36380] [ 0.45470] [-0.34380] [ 1.17138] [ 0.45280] 
      
D(PX(-1)) -0.165137  0.194588  0.185151 -0.385913 -0.097171 
  (0.11557)  (0.93050)  (0.59962)  (0.10155)  (0.21846) 
 [-1.42890] [ 0.20912] [ 0.30878] [-3.80004] [-0.44479] 
      
D(PX(-2)) -0.176920 -0.232360  0.385730 -0.331430 -0.008636 
  (0.09369)  (0.75436)  (0.48611)  (0.08233)  (0.17711) 
 [-1.88832] [-0.30802] [ 0.79351] [-4.02561] [-0.04876] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.204473 -0.111829  0.085696 -0.302119 -0.065836 
  (0.09227)  (0.74291)  (0.47873)  (0.08108)  (0.17442) 
 [-2.21605] [-0.15053] [ 0.17901] [-3.72616] [-0.37746] 
      
D(PX(-4)) -0.144732  0.465181  0.412448 -0.154475 -0.233753 
  (0.08158)  (0.65683)  (0.42326)  (0.07169)  (0.15421) 
 [-1.77415] [ 0.70823] [ 0.97446] [-2.15489] [-1.51581] 
      
C  0.522650  1.403634 -0.401262  1.319281 -0.465843 
  (0.36159)  (2.91133)  (1.87607)  (0.31774)  (0.68352) 
 [ 1.44542] [ 0.48213] [-0.21388] [ 4.15204] [-0.68153] 
      
       R-squared  0.640911  0.460140  0.675775  0.794126  0.794303 
 Adj. R-squared  0.202023 -0.199690  0.279501  0.542503  0.542897 
 Sum sq. resids  41.90819  2716.752  1128.138  32.36069  149.7512 
 S.E. equation  1.525855  12.28538  7.916713  1.340827  2.884356 
 F-statistic  1.460308  0.697362  1.705322  3.156015  3.159434 
 Log likelihood -58.62562 -144.1457 -126.1289 -53.32561 -84.73224 
 Akaike AIC  3.981738  8.153449  7.274580  3.723201  5.255231 
 Schwarz SC  4.943010  9.114721  8.235852  4.684473  6.216503 
 Mean dependent  0.136099  0.771515 -0.185875  0.442196  0.135615 
 S.D. dependent  1.708119  11.21642  9.326704  1.982342  4.266204 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  108312.5    
 Determinant resid covariance  1766.534    
 Log likelihood -444.1563    
 Akaike information criterion  27.76372    
 Schwarz criterion  32.98803    
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VECM Result for Nigeria 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:15    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1)  0.320230 -0.298655    
  (0.06189)  (0.04500)    
 [ 5.17448] [-6.63712]    
      
PX(-1)  0.403908  0.235576    
  (0.09470)  (0.06886)    
 [ 4.26517] [ 3.42128]    
      
M3(-1) -0.993065  0.375010    
  (0.11462)  (0.08334)    
 [-8.66423] [ 4.49987]    
      
C -34.56586 -28.80793    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(PX) D(M3) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.682914 -0.528095  1.006037 -0.888796 -0.539105 
  (0.27844)  (0.24980)  (1.23301)  (0.54021)  (0.30963) 
 [-2.45261] [-2.11405] [ 0.81592] [-1.64527] [-1.74115] 
      
CointEq2 -1.158247 -0.321959  5.990950 -2.158056 -1.122588 
  (0.25309)  (0.22706)  (1.12073)  (0.49102)  (0.28143) 
 [-4.57644] [-1.41797] [ 5.34557] [-4.39503] [-3.98884] 
      
D(PSC(-1))  0.485555  0.079304 -1.635293  0.640568  0.417543 
  (0.32620)  (0.29265)  (1.44448)  (0.63287)  (0.36273) 
 [ 1.48852] [ 0.27099] [-1.13209] [ 1.01217] [ 1.15111] 
      
D(PSC(-2))  0.500205  0.489512 -4.698548  2.472840  0.774262 
  (0.33569)  (0.30116)  (1.48651)  (0.65128)  (0.37329) 
 [ 1.49007] [ 1.62541] [-3.16078] [ 3.79689] [ 2.07418] 
      
D(PSC(-3))  1.128857 -0.093429 -0.803750  0.823736  0.770515 
  (0.38407)  (0.34456)  (1.70072)  (0.74513)  (0.42708) 
 [ 2.93923] [-0.27115] [-0.47259] [ 1.10549] [ 1.80416] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  1.268588  0.450370 -9.067409  1.748997  1.639438 
  (0.39088)  (0.35067)  (1.73088)  (0.75834)  (0.43465) 
 [ 3.24549] [ 1.28431] [-5.23860] [ 2.30634] [ 3.77185] 
      
D(DBT(-1))  0.870120  0.106746 -8.373721  1.705604  1.021449 
  (0.37206)  (0.33379)  (1.64756)  (0.72184)  (0.41373) 
 [ 2.33865] [ 0.31980] [-5.08249] [ 2.36286] [ 2.46889] 
      
D(DBT(-2))  0.757648 -0.163562 -2.258652  2.771394  0.446493 
  (0.33616)  (0.30159)  (1.48860)  (0.65220)  (0.37381) 
	 405	
 [ 2.25380] [-0.54234] [-1.51729] [ 4.24933] [ 1.19444] 
      
D(DBT(-3))  2.149275 -0.152238 -8.667374  1.476281  2.079489 
  (0.41028)  (0.36808)  (1.81679)  (0.79598)  (0.45622) 
 [ 5.23860] [-0.41360] [-4.77071] [ 1.85467] [ 4.55805] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  1.021992  0.219531 -7.932043  2.608109  0.910126 
  (0.45138)  (0.40495)  (1.99879)  (0.87572)  (0.50193) 
 [ 2.26416] [ 0.54212] [-3.96842] [ 2.97824] [ 1.81327] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.221797  0.052529  1.485872 -0.420879 -0.215583 
  (0.07751)  (0.06954)  (0.34323)  (0.15038)  (0.08619) 
 [-2.86150] [ 0.75540] [ 4.32902] [-2.79877] [-2.50122] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.047167 -0.003570  0.532493 -0.171203 -0.105942 
  (0.06623)  (0.05942)  (0.29330)  (0.12850)  (0.07365) 
 [-0.71212] [-0.06007] [ 1.81552] [-1.33229] [-1.43842] 
      
D(IN(-3))  0.001597  0.023812  0.130533 -0.006298 -0.013826 
  (0.04364)  (0.03915)  (0.19326)  (0.08467)  (0.04853) 
 [ 0.03659] [ 0.60816] [ 0.67543] [-0.07438] [-0.28490] 
      
D(IN(-4))  0.028067  0.002576 -0.017741 -0.014524 -0.000503 
  (0.02647)  (0.02375)  (0.11722)  (0.05136)  (0.02944) 
 [ 1.06028] [ 0.10846] [-0.15134] [-0.28280] [-0.01709] 
      
D(PX(-1)) -0.029280  0.229570  0.861197 -0.031692 -0.061109 
  (0.15280)  (0.13708)  (0.67662)  (0.29645)  (0.16991) 
 [-0.19162] [ 1.67470] [ 1.27279] [-0.10691] [-0.35965] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.237100  0.139831  0.614167 -0.489972  0.125739 
  (0.14641)  (0.13135)  (0.64835)  (0.28406)  (0.16281) 
 [ 1.61938] [ 1.06453] [ 0.94727] [-1.72489] [ 0.77230] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.003700  0.239406  0.224334 -0.001563 -0.053210 
  (0.11195)  (0.10044)  (0.49575)  (0.21720)  (0.12449) 
 [-0.03305] [ 2.38364] [ 0.45252] [-0.00720] [-0.42743] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.094175  0.053469  1.360077 -0.509057  0.004512 
  (0.11734)  (0.10527)  (0.51961)  (0.22766)  (0.13048) 
 [ 0.80257] [ 0.50791] [ 2.61748] [-2.23608] [ 0.03458] 
      
D(M3(-1)) -0.368173 -0.124094  5.494276 -0.957693 -0.129089 
  (0.35484)  (0.31834)  (1.57132)  (0.68844)  (0.39458) 
 [-1.03756] [-0.38981] [ 3.49659] [-1.39111] [-0.32715] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.163283 -0.509199 -0.815330 -0.209235 -0.324917 
  (0.41078)  (0.36853)  (1.81903)  (0.79696)  (0.45678) 
 [ 0.39749] [-1.38171] [-0.44822] [-0.26254] [-0.71131] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.713293  0.224457 -0.511313 -0.557455 -0.225844 
  (0.41353)  (0.37100)  (1.83121)  (0.80230)  (0.45984) 
 [-1.72487] [ 0.60501] [-0.27922] [-0.69482] [-0.49113] 
      
D(M3(-4)) -1.415626 -0.403351  8.084781 -1.283770 -1.658819 
  (0.39747)  (0.35659)  (1.76008)  (0.77114)  (0.44198) 
 [-3.56159] [-1.13114] [ 4.59341] [-1.66477] [-3.75313] 
      
C  0.391569  0.237098 -0.599463 -0.075144  0.159958 
  (0.54078)  (0.48516)  (2.39469)  (1.04917)  (0.60134) 
 [ 0.72408] [ 0.48871] [-0.25033] [-0.07162] [ 0.26600] 
      
      
	 406	
 R-squared  0.800508  0.467680  0.927663  0.822722  0.789370 
 Adj. R-squared  0.556683 -0.182934  0.839251  0.606050  0.531933 
 Sum sq. resids  194.0810  156.2081  3805.740  730.5270  239.9847 
 S.E. equation  3.283638  2.945883  14.54063  6.370623  3.651367 
 F-statistic  3.283135  0.718829  10.49250  3.797074  3.066268 
 Log likelihood -90.04790 -85.59763 -151.0557 -117.2205 -94.40004 
 Akaike AIC  5.514532  5.297445  8.490522  6.840022  5.726831 
 Schwarz SC  6.475804  6.258718  9.451794  7.801295  6.688103 
 Mean dependent  0.232158 -0.011918 -1.002017  0.291112  0.154089 
 S.D. dependent  4.931718  2.708540  36.26679  10.14988  5.337055 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  954993.6    
 Determinant resid covariance  15575.56    
 Log likelihood -488.7783    
 Akaike information criterion  29.94040    
 Schwarz criterion  35.16471    
      
       	
VECM Result for Senegal 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:17    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1) -3.502119  2.406379    
  (0.91602)  (0.45937)    
 [-3.82318] [ 5.23845]    
      
M3(-1) -3.487963  0.590256    
  (1.18692)  (0.59522)    
 [-2.93867] [ 0.99166]    
      
PX(-1)  2.379255  0.304215    
  (1.04184)  (0.52246)    
 [ 2.28371] [ 0.58227]    
      
C -184.2778 -116.9510    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.106872 -0.065506  0.271735 -0.076519 -0.050253 
  (0.05462)  (0.13984)  (0.14390)  (0.04087)  (0.05614) 
 [-1.95664] [-0.46844] [ 1.88834] [-1.87230] [-0.89518] 
      
CointEq2 -0.003150 -0.801156 -0.230995 -0.033864  0.077111 
  (0.07196)  (0.18424)  (0.18959)  (0.05384)  (0.07396) 
 [-0.04378] [-4.34848] [-1.21839] [-0.62892] [ 1.04259] 
      
D(PSC(-1)) -0.018726 -2.032667 -0.484318  0.045163  0.052779 
  (0.35182)  (0.90073)  (0.92689)  (0.26324)  (0.36159) 
 [-0.05323] [-2.25669] [-0.52252] [ 0.17156] [ 0.14596] 
	 407	
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.339680 -0.439567 -0.180398 -0.144626  0.167276 
  (0.33706)  (0.86294)  (0.88800)  (0.25220)  (0.34642) 
 [-1.00778] [-0.50938] [-0.20315] [-0.57346] [ 0.48287] 
      
D(PSC(-3))  0.464893 -1.666046 -0.872104  0.237852  0.725394 
  (0.32300)  (0.82695)  (0.85097)  (0.24168)  (0.33197) 
 [ 1.43930] [-2.01468] [-1.02483] [ 0.98416] [ 2.18511] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  0.307010 -0.930170 -1.057568  0.561640  0.294217 
  (0.34980)  (0.89558)  (0.92159)  (0.26174)  (0.35952) 
 [ 0.87766] [-1.03863] [-1.14755] [ 2.14581] [ 0.81836] 
      
D(DBT(-1)) -0.047090  0.326004  0.184935 -0.037924 -0.183195 
  (0.06760)  (0.17306)  (0.17809)  (0.05058)  (0.06947) 
 [-0.69664] [ 1.88375] [ 1.03845] [-0.74980] [-2.63690] 
      
D(DBT(-2)) -0.035510  0.671394  0.193557 -0.052964 -0.131723 
  (0.08453)  (0.21641)  (0.22270)  (0.06325)  (0.08688) 
 [-0.42010] [ 3.10242] [ 0.86916] [-0.83741] [-1.51623] 
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.039397  0.892451  0.332779 -0.088643  0.065860 
  (0.08692)  (0.22253)  (0.22899)  (0.06503)  (0.08933) 
 [-0.45328] [ 4.01055] [ 1.45325] [-1.36301] [ 0.73727] 
      
D(DBT(-4)) -0.042308  0.160629 -0.041136  0.033942 -0.120136 
  (0.09298)  (0.23806)  (0.24497)  (0.06957)  (0.09557) 
 [-0.45500] [ 0.67474] [-0.16792] [ 0.48786] [-1.25710] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.302319  0.740438  0.477527 -0.180496 -0.185102 
  (0.18130)  (0.46416)  (0.47764)  (0.13565)  (0.18633) 
 [-1.66753] [ 1.59521] [ 0.99975] [-1.33056] [-0.99339] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.335963 -0.062847  0.276979 -0.210307 -0.230023 
  (0.13770)  (0.35255)  (0.36279)  (0.10303)  (0.14153) 
 [-2.43977] [-0.17826] [ 0.76347] [-2.04113] [-1.62529] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.121011 -0.559507 -0.031175 -0.127957 -0.093613 
  (0.14272)  (0.36539)  (0.37600)  (0.10679)  (0.14668) 
 [-0.84790] [-1.53126] [-0.08291] [-1.19824] [-0.63821] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.016060 -0.089228  0.003958 -0.035472  0.099901 
  (0.10872)  (0.27835)  (0.28644)  (0.08135)  (0.11174) 
 [-0.14772] [-0.32055] [ 0.01382] [-0.43604] [ 0.89403] 
      
D(M3(-1))  0.000900 -3.347379 -0.345245 -0.601025 -0.218004 
  (0.43928)  (1.12465)  (1.15732)  (0.32869)  (0.45148) 
 [ 0.00205] [-2.97638] [-0.29832] [-1.82857] [-0.48287] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.319459 -3.068962  0.006516 -0.432996  0.426038 
  (0.45079)  (1.15413)  (1.18765)  (0.33730)  (0.46331) 
 [ 0.70866] [-2.65912] [ 0.00549] [-1.28371] [ 0.91955] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.114474 -2.324705  0.050755 -0.322249  0.204195 
  (0.38490)  (0.98542)  (1.01405)  (0.28800)  (0.39559) 
 [-0.29741] [-2.35909] [ 0.05005] [-1.11894] [ 0.51618] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.226681 -2.567216 -0.153493 -0.169548  0.301967 
  (0.36361)  (0.93093)  (0.95797)  (0.27207)  (0.37371) 
 [ 0.62341] [-2.75770] [-0.16023] [-0.62318] [ 0.80802] 
      
D(PX(-1)) -0.013693  2.272709  0.543284 -0.188414 -0.086267 
	 408	
  (0.27306)  (0.69909)  (0.71940)  (0.20431)  (0.28064) 
 [-0.05015] [ 3.25095] [ 0.75519] [-0.92218] [-0.30739] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.121405  1.520420  0.191174  0.102598 -0.190252 
  (0.24001)  (0.61447)  (0.63232)  (0.17958)  (0.24667) 
 [ 0.50584] [ 2.47434] [ 0.30234] [ 0.57131] [-0.77127] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.148492  1.345477  0.326882  0.132767 -0.182258 
  (0.22759)  (0.58268)  (0.59960)  (0.17029)  (0.23391) 
 [-0.65245] [ 2.30912] [ 0.54516] [ 0.77965] [-0.77918] 
      
D(PX(-4)) -0.276504  1.256973  0.617751 -0.159375 -0.244556 
  (0.18882)  (0.48343)  (0.49747)  (0.14129)  (0.19407) 
 [-1.46435] [ 2.60010] [ 1.24178] [-1.12803] [-1.26015] 
      
C -0.063327  5.925570  0.013157  1.329370 -0.192148 
  (0.78280)  (2.00415)  (2.06236)  (0.58572)  (0.80454) 
 [-0.08090] [ 2.95666] [ 0.00638] [ 2.26962] [-0.23883] 
      
       R-squared  0.587787  0.762657  0.611848  0.563079  0.627724 
 Adj. R-squared  0.083972  0.472572  0.137440  0.029065  0.172721 
 Sum sq. resids  124.0867  813.3572  861.2925  69.47174  131.0754 
 S.E. equation  2.625586  6.722091  6.917339  1.964571  2.698511 
 F-statistic  1.166673  2.629078  1.289710  1.054427  1.379603 
 Log likelihood -80.87835 -119.4222 -120.5962 -68.98711 -82.00159 
 Akaike AIC  5.067236  6.947427  7.004690  4.487176  5.122029 
 Schwarz SC  6.028509  7.908699  7.965963  5.448448  6.083301 
 Mean dependent  0.258664  0.658576 -0.408030  0.651659  0.312191 
 S.D. dependent  2.743292  9.255987  7.448084  1.993759  2.966868 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  72017.40    
 Determinant resid covariance  1174.575    
 Log likelihood -435.7900    
 Akaike information criterion  27.35561    
 Schwarz criterion  32.57991    
      
       	
VECM Result for Senegal 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:17    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2    
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000    
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000    
      
IN(-1) -3.502119  2.406379    
  (0.91602)  (0.45937)    
 [-3.82318] [ 5.23845]    
      
M3(-1) -3.487963  0.590256    
  (1.18692)  (0.59522)    
 [-2.93867] [ 0.99166]    
      
	 409	
PX(-1)  2.379255  0.304215    
  (1.04184)  (0.52246)    
 [ 2.28371] [ 0.58227]    
      
C -184.2778 -116.9510    
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.106872 -0.065506  0.271735 -0.076519 -0.050253 
  (0.05462)  (0.13984)  (0.14390)  (0.04087)  (0.05614) 
 [-1.95664] [-0.46844] [ 1.88834] [-1.87230] [-0.89518] 
      
CointEq2 -0.003150 -0.801156 -0.230995 -0.033864  0.077111 
  (0.07196)  (0.18424)  (0.18959)  (0.05384)  (0.07396) 
 [-0.04378] [-4.34848] [-1.21839] [-0.62892] [ 1.04259] 
      
D(PSC(-1)) -0.018726 -2.032667 -0.484318  0.045163  0.052779 
  (0.35182)  (0.90073)  (0.92689)  (0.26324)  (0.36159) 
 [-0.05323] [-2.25669] [-0.52252] [ 0.17156] [ 0.14596] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.339680 -0.439567 -0.180398 -0.144626  0.167276 
  (0.33706)  (0.86294)  (0.88800)  (0.25220)  (0.34642) 
 [-1.00778] [-0.50938] [-0.20315] [-0.57346] [ 0.48287] 
      
D(PSC(-3))  0.464893 -1.666046 -0.872104  0.237852  0.725394 
  (0.32300)  (0.82695)  (0.85097)  (0.24168)  (0.33197) 
 [ 1.43930] [-2.01468] [-1.02483] [ 0.98416] [ 2.18511] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  0.307010 -0.930170 -1.057568  0.561640  0.294217 
  (0.34980)  (0.89558)  (0.92159)  (0.26174)  (0.35952) 
 [ 0.87766] [-1.03863] [-1.14755] [ 2.14581] [ 0.81836] 
      
D(DBT(-1)) -0.047090  0.326004  0.184935 -0.037924 -0.183195 
  (0.06760)  (0.17306)  (0.17809)  (0.05058)  (0.06947) 
 [-0.69664] [ 1.88375] [ 1.03845] [-0.74980] [-2.63690] 
      
D(DBT(-2)) -0.035510  0.671394  0.193557 -0.052964 -0.131723 
  (0.08453)  (0.21641)  (0.22270)  (0.06325)  (0.08688) 
 [-0.42010] [ 3.10242] [ 0.86916] [-0.83741] [-1.51623] 
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.039397  0.892451  0.332779 -0.088643  0.065860 
  (0.08692)  (0.22253)  (0.22899)  (0.06503)  (0.08933) 
 [-0.45328] [ 4.01055] [ 1.45325] [-1.36301] [ 0.73727] 
      
D(DBT(-4)) -0.042308  0.160629 -0.041136  0.033942 -0.120136 
  (0.09298)  (0.23806)  (0.24497)  (0.06957)  (0.09557) 
 [-0.45500] [ 0.67474] [-0.16792] [ 0.48786] [-1.25710] 
      
D(IN(-1)) -0.302319  0.740438  0.477527 -0.180496 -0.185102 
  (0.18130)  (0.46416)  (0.47764)  (0.13565)  (0.18633) 
 [-1.66753] [ 1.59521] [ 0.99975] [-1.33056] [-0.99339] 
      
D(IN(-2)) -0.335963 -0.062847  0.276979 -0.210307 -0.230023 
  (0.13770)  (0.35255)  (0.36279)  (0.10303)  (0.14153) 
 [-2.43977] [-0.17826] [ 0.76347] [-2.04113] [-1.62529] 
      
D(IN(-3)) -0.121011 -0.559507 -0.031175 -0.127957 -0.093613 
  (0.14272)  (0.36539)  (0.37600)  (0.10679)  (0.14668) 
 [-0.84790] [-1.53126] [-0.08291] [-1.19824] [-0.63821] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.016060 -0.089228  0.003958 -0.035472  0.099901 
  (0.10872)  (0.27835)  (0.28644)  (0.08135)  (0.11174) 
	 410	
 [-0.14772] [-0.32055] [ 0.01382] [-0.43604] [ 0.89403] 
      
D(M3(-1))  0.000900 -3.347379 -0.345245 -0.601025 -0.218004 
  (0.43928)  (1.12465)  (1.15732)  (0.32869)  (0.45148) 
 [ 0.00205] [-2.97638] [-0.29832] [-1.82857] [-0.48287] 
      
D(M3(-2))  0.319459 -3.068962  0.006516 -0.432996  0.426038 
  (0.45079)  (1.15413)  (1.18765)  (0.33730)  (0.46331) 
 [ 0.70866] [-2.65912] [ 0.00549] [-1.28371] [ 0.91955] 
      
D(M3(-3)) -0.114474 -2.324705  0.050755 -0.322249  0.204195 
  (0.38490)  (0.98542)  (1.01405)  (0.28800)  (0.39559) 
 [-0.29741] [-2.35909] [ 0.05005] [-1.11894] [ 0.51618] 
      
D(M3(-4))  0.226681 -2.567216 -0.153493 -0.169548  0.301967 
  (0.36361)  (0.93093)  (0.95797)  (0.27207)  (0.37371) 
 [ 0.62341] [-2.75770] [-0.16023] [-0.62318] [ 0.80802] 
      
D(PX(-1)) -0.013693  2.272709  0.543284 -0.188414 -0.086267 
  (0.27306)  (0.69909)  (0.71940)  (0.20431)  (0.28064) 
 [-0.05015] [ 3.25095] [ 0.75519] [-0.92218] [-0.30739] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.121405  1.520420  0.191174  0.102598 -0.190252 
  (0.24001)  (0.61447)  (0.63232)  (0.17958)  (0.24667) 
 [ 0.50584] [ 2.47434] [ 0.30234] [ 0.57131] [-0.77127] 
      
D(PX(-3)) -0.148492  1.345477  0.326882  0.132767 -0.182258 
  (0.22759)  (0.58268)  (0.59960)  (0.17029)  (0.23391) 
 [-0.65245] [ 2.30912] [ 0.54516] [ 0.77965] [-0.77918] 
      
D(PX(-4)) -0.276504  1.256973  0.617751 -0.159375 -0.244556 
  (0.18882)  (0.48343)  (0.49747)  (0.14129)  (0.19407) 
 [-1.46435] [ 2.60010] [ 1.24178] [-1.12803] [-1.26015] 
      
C -0.063327  5.925570  0.013157  1.329370 -0.192148 
  (0.78280)  (2.00415)  (2.06236)  (0.58572)  (0.80454) 
 [-0.08090] [ 2.95666] [ 0.00638] [ 2.26962] [-0.23883] 
      
       R-squared  0.587787  0.762657  0.611848  0.563079  0.627724 
 Adj. R-squared  0.083972  0.472572  0.137440  0.029065  0.172721 
 Sum sq. resids  124.0867  813.3572  861.2925  69.47174  131.0754 
 S.E. equation  2.625586  6.722091  6.917339  1.964571  2.698511 
 F-statistic  1.166673  2.629078  1.289710  1.054427  1.379603 
 Log likelihood -80.87835 -119.4222 -120.5962 -68.98711 -82.00159 
 Akaike AIC  5.067236  6.947427  7.004690  4.487176  5.122029 
 Schwarz SC  6.028509  7.908699  7.965963  5.448448  6.083301 
 Mean dependent  0.258664  0.658576 -0.408030  0.651659  0.312191 
 S.D. dependent  2.743292  9.255987  7.448084  1.993759  2.966868 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  72017.40    
 Determinant resid covariance  1174.575    
 Log likelihood -435.7900    
 Akaike information criterion  27.35561    
 Schwarz criterion  32.57991    
      
       	
VECM Result for Togo 
 
 Vector Error Correction Estimates    
	 411	
 Date: 11/29/18   Time: 08:22    
 Sample (adjusted): 1975 2015    
 Included observations: 41 after adjustments   
 Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ]   
      
      Cointegrating Eq:  CointEq1 CointEq2 CointEq3 CointEq4  
      
      PSC(-1)  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
      
DBT(-1)  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  0.000000  
      
IN(-1)  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  0.000000  
      
M3(-1)  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  1.000000  
      
PX(-1)  0.005761  3.480395  0.047466  0.480810  
  (0.19164)  (0.90065)  (0.17393)  (0.35084)  
 [ 0.03006] [ 3.86431] [ 0.27291] [ 1.37045]  
      
C -22.29935 -471.0785 -11.10900 -86.84511  
      
      Error Correction: D(PSC) D(DBT) D(IN) D(M3) D(PX) 
      
      CointEq1 -0.405467  5.592329  0.069335 -0.369294 -1.258828 
  (0.33668)  (1.59811)  (0.75083)  (0.45247)  (0.46912) 
 [-1.20429] [ 3.49933] [ 0.09234] [-0.81618] [-2.68340] 
      
CointEq2 -0.088711  0.014000  0.127138  0.005810 -0.184443 
  (0.02333)  (0.11074)  (0.05203)  (0.03135)  (0.03251) 
 [-3.80253] [ 0.12643] [ 2.44374] [ 0.18531] [-5.67415] 
      
CointEq3 -0.108350 -3.330801 -0.652633  0.153327  0.539617 
  (0.27383)  (1.29974)  (0.61065)  (0.36799)  (0.38153) 
 [-0.39569] [-2.56266] [-1.06875] [ 0.41666] [ 1.41434] 
      
CointEq4  0.378870 -3.709480 -0.340723 -0.014938  0.809308 
  (0.21062)  (0.99973)  (0.46969)  (0.28305)  (0.29346) 
 [ 1.79884] [-3.71049] [-0.72542] [-0.05277] [ 2.75778] 
      
D(PSC(-1)) -0.338186 -5.264189  1.627042  0.303090  0.099902 
  (0.43337)  (2.05705)  (0.96645)  (0.58240)  (0.60384) 
 [-0.78036] [-2.55909] [ 1.68353] [ 0.52041] [ 0.16545] 
      
D(PSC(-2)) -0.283456 -2.058171  1.665686  0.728969  0.264020 
  (0.39537)  (1.87667)  (0.88170)  (0.53133)  (0.55088) 
 [-0.71694] [-1.09672] [ 1.88918] [ 1.37197] [ 0.47927] 
      
D(PSC(-3)) -0.534243 -2.176637  0.959855  0.372525  0.069955 
  (0.33222)  (1.57694)  (0.74088)  (0.44647)  (0.46290) 
 [-1.60808] [-1.38029] [ 1.29556] [ 0.83438] [ 0.15112] 
      
D(PSC(-4))  0.105452 -1.541348  0.913566  0.857325 -0.389103 
  (0.27687)  (1.31419)  (0.61743)  (0.37208)  (0.38577) 
 [ 0.38087] [-1.17285] [ 1.47962] [ 2.30415] [-1.00864] 
      
D(DBT(-1))  0.061718 -0.338154  0.033529  0.009256  0.190903 
  (0.05272)  (0.25026)  (0.11758)  (0.07086)  (0.07346) 
 [ 1.17057] [-1.35119] [ 0.28516] [ 0.13063] [ 2.59861] 
      
D(DBT(-2))  0.021304 -0.561840 -0.019640 -0.013045  0.170052 
  (0.05336)  (0.25329)  (0.11900)  (0.07171)  (0.07435) 
 [ 0.39924] [-2.21819] [-0.16504] [-0.18190] [ 2.28716] 
	 412	
      
D(DBT(-3)) -0.047883 -0.440317  0.163177 -0.023615  0.141918 
  (0.04952)  (0.23504)  (0.11042)  (0.06654)  (0.06899) 
 [-0.96702] [-1.87341] [ 1.47772] [-0.35488] [ 2.05698] 
      
D(DBT(-4))  0.058650 -0.280624  0.093812  0.094710  0.054070 
  (0.05128)  (0.24342)  (0.11436)  (0.06892)  (0.07145) 
 [ 1.14367] [-1.15286] [ 0.82030] [ 1.37426] [ 0.75672] 
      
D(IN(-1))  0.220682  2.340417 -0.410254 -0.310124 -0.653450 
  (0.27749)  (1.31712)  (0.61881)  (0.37291)  (0.38663) 
 [ 0.79529] [ 1.77692] [-0.66297] [-0.83164] [-1.69011] 
      
D(IN(-2))  0.236246  2.300663 -0.475687 -0.264785 -0.360033 
  (0.24387)  (1.15757)  (0.54385)  (0.32774)  (0.33980) 
 [ 0.96872] [ 1.98749] [-0.87466] [-0.80792] [-1.05955] 
      
D(IN(-3))  0.128705  0.922321 -0.561412 -0.395323 -0.034226 
  (0.17414)  (0.82660)  (0.38835)  (0.23403)  (0.24264) 
 [ 0.73907] [ 1.11581] [-1.44562] [-1.68920] [-0.14105] 
      
D(IN(-4)) -0.013342  0.342198 -0.056467 -0.208655  0.009434 
  (0.09938)  (0.47171)  (0.22162)  (0.13355)  (0.13847) 
 [-0.13426] [ 0.72543] [-0.25479] [-1.56232] [ 0.06813] 
      
D(M3(-1)) -0.128517  4.349676  0.277260 -0.140597 -0.557550 
  (0.28461)  (1.35094)  (0.63470)  (0.38248)  (0.39656) 
 [-0.45156] [ 3.21975] [ 0.43684] [-0.36759] [-1.40597] 
      
D(M3(-2)) -0.053186  2.904432 -0.742019 -0.118134 -0.697912 
  (0.28853)  (1.36952)  (0.64343)  (0.38775)  (0.40201) 
 [-0.18434] [ 2.12076] [-1.15322] [-0.30467] [-1.73604] 
      
D(M3(-3))  0.273697  2.867753 -0.530942  0.107545 -0.656932 
  (0.29459)  (1.39830)  (0.65695)  (0.39589)  (0.41046) 
 [ 0.92908] [ 2.05089] [-0.80819] [ 0.27165] [-1.60047] 
      
D(M3(-4)) -0.044969  2.161200 -0.299905 -0.089834 -0.202635 
  (0.26070)  (1.23746)  (0.58139)  (0.35036)  (0.36325) 
 [-0.17249] [ 1.74647] [-0.51584] [-0.25641] [-0.55784] 
      
D(PX(-1))  0.313123  1.861798 -0.427428 -0.160273 -0.617051 
  (0.18757)  (0.89033)  (0.41830)  (0.25208)  (0.26135) 
 [ 1.66934] [ 2.09112] [-1.02183] [-0.63581] [-2.36100] 
      
D(PX(-2))  0.353005  1.965859 -0.900660 -0.281671 -0.042084 
  (0.19351)  (0.91852)  (0.43154)  (0.26006)  (0.26963) 
 [ 1.82422] [ 2.14025] [-2.08708] [-1.08312] [-0.15608] 
      
D(PX(-3))  0.354689  1.106598 -1.289165 -0.265349  0.216408 
  (0.16713)  (0.79332)  (0.37272)  (0.22461)  (0.23287) 
 [ 2.12218] [ 1.39489] [-3.45880] [-1.18138] [ 0.92929] 
      
D(PX(-4))  0.117931  0.174942 -0.460616 -0.321071  0.199478 
  (0.13273)  (0.63003)  (0.29600)  (0.17838)  (0.18494) 
 [ 0.88849] [ 0.27767] [-1.55613] [-1.79997] [ 1.07861] 
      
C  0.564134 -5.587112 -1.083202  0.384935  2.944972 
  (0.62125)  (2.94885)  (1.38543)  (0.83489)  (0.86562) 
 [ 0.90806] [-1.89468] [-0.78185] [ 0.46106] [ 3.40217] 
      
       R-squared  0.774343  0.754213  0.920876  0.647504  0.925174 
	 413	
 Adj. R-squared  0.435858  0.385533  0.802191  0.118760  0.812936 
 Sum sq. resids  131.3016  2958.276  652.9871  237.1341  254.9088 
 S.E. equation  2.864672  13.59751  6.388403  3.849790  3.991466 
 F-statistic  2.287670  2.045713  7.758951  1.224608  8.242925 
 Log likelihood -82.03693 -145.8917 -114.9202 -94.15508 -95.63682 
 Akaike AIC  5.221314  8.336179  6.825375  5.812443  5.884723 
 Schwarz SC  6.266175  9.381040  7.870236  6.857304  6.929584 
 Mean dependent  0.603223  0.141637 -0.939226  0.749381  1.524622 
 S.D. dependent  3.813999  17.34644  14.36378  4.101002  9.228624 
      
       Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  6299261.    
 Determinant resid covariance  57012.52    
 Log likelihood -515.3784    
 Akaike information criterion  32.21358    
 Schwarz criterion  38.27378    
      
       	
 
 
